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Abstract	  The	  study	  of	  electoral	  defence	  and	  its	  stated	  advantages	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  American	  political	  science.	  Post-­‐war,	  much	  academic	  literature	  has	  emerged	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  identify	  and	  explain	  rising	  re-­‐election	  rates	  of	  congressional	  incumbents	  and	  the	  political	  consequences	  of	  such	  a	  phenomenon	  (Mayhew	  1974;	  Fiorina	  1977;	  Cain,	  Ferejohn	  &	  Fiorina	  1987;	  Gelman	  &	  King	  1990;	  King	  1991).	  Conversely,	  the	  study	  of	  political	  incumbency	  in	  Britain	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  handful	  of	  scholars	  who	  tend	  to	  consider	  the	  repercussions	  at	  parliamentary	  level	  (Williams	  1967,	  King	  1981,	  Cain,	  Ferejohn	  and	  Fiorina	  1984,	  Norton	  1990	  &	  1994,	  Norris,	  Valance	  &	  Lovenduski	  1992).	  Consequently,	  incumbency	  advantage	  at	  the	  local	  level	  remains	  a	  relatively	  under-­‐researched	  topic	  in	  England,	  confined	  to	  the	  sub-­‐chapters	  of	  Rallings	  &	  Thrasher	  (1997).	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  research	  and	  present	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  incumbency	  effects	  in	  English	  local	  elections	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  influence	  their	  outcome,	  in	  that,	  incumbent	  candidates	  fare	  better	  than	  less	  experienced	  candidates,	  to	  different	  degrees	  across	  the	  three	  major	  parties.	  It	  will	  do	  so	  using	  survey	  and	  electoral	  data	  collected	  by	  The	  Elections	  Centre	  at	  Plymouth	  University,	  drawing	  on	  established	  methods	  from	  the	  literature	  and	  demonstrating	  via	  a	  variety	  of	  data	  and	  methods,	  that	  incumbency	  advantage	  is	  indeed	  a	  real	  phenomenon	  effecting	  the	  outcomes	  of	  local	  elections	  in	  England.	  The	  research	  provides	  substantial	  evidence	  for	  Sophomore	  Surge	  and	  Retirement	  Slump	  effects	  throughout	  the	  period	  examined	  (1974-­‐2010).	  These	  methods	  of	  estimation	  feature	  alongside	  a	  number	  of	  others,	  which	  are	  constructed	  to	  uncover	  the	  significance	  of	  defending,	  rather	  than	  challenging	  for	  a	  council	  seat.	  A	  number	  of	  influences	  on	  the	  advantage	  that	  defending	  councillors	  maintain	  are	  also	  presented,	  including	  district	  magnitude,	  ward	  size	  and	  rural/urban	  classification.	  Results	  reveal	  a	  modest	  advantage	  for	  Conservative	  and	  Labour	  incumbent	  candidates,	  whilst	  the	  effects	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  stronger	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  a	  finding	  that	  is	  in	  step	  with	  the	  existing	  literature	  on	  electoral	  trends	  and	  the	  local	  campaign	  strategy	  of	  the	  party	  (Dorling	  et	  al,	  1998;	  McAllister	  et	  al,	  2002;	  Russell	  &	  Fieldhouse,	  2005;	  Cutts	  2006).	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Preface	  
	  	  The	   purpose	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   simply	   stated,	   to	   investigate	   the	   notion	   of	   an	  incumbency	   advantage	   in	  English	   local	   elections.	  Although	   there	   is	   a	   now	  well	  established	   set	   of	   literature	   on	   the	   various	   effects	   of	   incumbency	  on	  American	  democracy,	   there	  remains	  surprisingly	   little	  research	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  electoral	  defence	   in	  Britain,	  particularly	   for	  elections	  to	   local	  government.	  Consequently,	  the	  incentive	  for	  pursuing	  this	  topic	   is,	   in	  part,	  a	  result	  of	  the	  great	  strides	  that	  the	  American	   research	   has	  made	   in	   understanding	   their	   politics	   and	   elections.	  The	  American	  example,	  especially	  early	  works	   from	  David	  Mayhew	  (1974)	  and	  Morris	   Fiorina	   (1977),	   are	   demonstrative	   of	   the	   value	   of	   such	   research.	   Both	  directly	  and	  indirectly,	   the	  study	  of	   ‘the	  electoral	  connection’	  has	  furthered	  our	  understanding	  of	  many	  themes	  in	  political	  science;	  such	  as	  electoral	  behaviour,	  campaigns,	   mobilization,	   parties,	   the	   media	   and	   so	   forth.	   Thus,	   even	   if	   the	  literature	   on	   British	   political	   science	  were	   furthered	   by	   just	   a	   fraction	   of	   that	  seen	   across	   the	   Atlantic,	   the	   exercise	   would	   be	   of	   substantial	   worth	   to	   the	  subject.	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  motivations	   for	   the	   study	  of	   this	   subject	  within	  English	  local	   elections.	   Foremost	   is	   the	   relative	   proximity	   of	   candidates	   for	   local	  government	   to	   their	   voters.	   The	   connection	   between	   residents	   and	   local	  government	  in	  England	  is	  one	  of	  the	  closest	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  geography	  and	  scale,	  and	   in	   many	   respects	   the	   traditional	   candidate-­‐orientated	   perspective	   of	   the	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local	   campaign	   resembles	   that	  of	   candidates	   for	  Congress,	   though	  undoubtedly	  there	   remain	   as	   many	   differences.	   Other	   reasons	   for	   its	   study	   include,	   the	  meagre	   volume	  of	   research	  published	   on	   the	   topic	   at	   this	   order	   of	   election,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   fortunate	   position	   of	   having	   access	   to	   an	   extensive	   and	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  electoral	  data	  that	  spans	  almost	  four	  decades.	  	  Broadly	  speaking,	   the	  project	  aims	  to	  assess	   the	  advantage	  of	  electoral	  defence	  for	   councillors	   in	  England	  since	   the	   reorganisation	  of	   local	  government,	   and	   to	  do	   it	   in	  a	  way	  that	  provides	  readers	  with	  conclusive	  evidence	  of	   its	  magnitude,	  influencing	  factors	  and	  potential	  explanations.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  concept	   in	   any	   great	   depth,	   the	   reader	   must	   first	   be	   introduced	   to	   the	   basic	  structure	  and	  development	  of	  local	  governance	  in	  England.	  The	  English	  example	  is	   clearly	   different	   from	   the	   American	   and	   so,	   in	   order	   to	   contextualise	   the	  literature	  examined	  in	  chapter	  2,	  which	  is	  predominantly	  American,	  it	  is	  right	  to	  familiarise	  readers	  with	  key	  developments	  within	  local	  politics,	  outlining	  the	  role	  of	   different	   councils	   and	   the	   councillors	   who	   comprise	   them.	   Thus,	   chapter	   1	  serves	   as	   an	   introduction	   to	  English	   local	   elections	   and	   aims	   to	   give	   readers	   a	  concise	  overview	  of	  its	  structure	  and	  remit	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  its	   politics.	   Following	   this,	   and	   a	   review	   of	   the	   literature,	   chapter	   3	   (Data	   &	  Methods)	  sets	  out	  in	  some	  detail,	  the	  hypotheses	  to	  be	  tested	  and	  data	  used	  to	  do	  so.	   The	   chapter	   also	   describes	   methodological	   issues	   faced	   throughout	   this	  project	   and	   how	   these	   are	   managed	   to	   provide	   the	   research	   with	   objective	  evidence.	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Chapter	  1	  –	  An	  Introduction	  to	  English	  Local	  Elections	  	  	  Local	  government	  remains	  a	  key	  provider	  of	  public	  services	  in	  England.	  Since	  the	  Municipal	   Corporations	   Act	   1835,	   local	   democracy	   has	   become	   a	   nation-­‐wide	  institution	  that	  is	  built	  around	  values	  of	  accountability	  and	  community.	  Though	  administrative	   and	   organisational	   structures	   have	   assumed	  many	   guises	   since	  then,	   local	  authorities	  continue	   to	  be	  charged	  with	   the	  responsibility	  of	   service	  delivery	  to	  their	  residents.	  This	  introductory	  chapter	  offers	  a	  broad	  overview	  of	  local	  government	  and	  details	  key	  developments	  in	  the	  powers	  and	  organisational	  structures	  of	   local	  democracy	   in	  England,	   including	   the	  role	  of	   councillors.	  The	  chapter	   describes	   fundamental	   changes	   to	   local	   administrations,	   how	   the	  relationship	  between	  residents	  and	  local	  government	  has	  changed	  and	  how	  this	  is	  relevant	  to	  this	  thesis.	  	  Looking	   first	  at	   the	  structure	  of	   local	  democracy,	   sub-­‐chapter	  1.1	  discusses	   the	  impact	  of	  local	  authority	  reorganisation	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Act	  1972.	  The	  section	  briefly	  describes	  the	  administrative	  structures	  created,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  they	  have	  altered	  since.	  Sub-­‐chapter	  1.2	  focuses	  more	  on	  the	  powers	  of	  authorities,	  discussing	  the	  position	  of	  local	  government	  and	  how	  it	  has	  evolved.	  The	  section	  describes	  how	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  local	  authorities	  have	  changed	  and	   importantly,	   how	   the	   role	   of	   councillors	   has	   moved	   from	   one	   of	   service	  facilitators,	   to	  community	   leaders.	  The	  section	  also	  describes	  the	   impact	  of	   this	  refocusing	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  councils	  and	  their	  residents.	  Finally,	  sub-­‐chapter	   1.3	   broadly	   discusses	   elections	   to	   local	   government.	   It	   provides	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information	  about	  the	  parties	  that	  contest	  local	  elections	  in	  England	  and	  briefly	  discusses	   campaign	  methods	   used	   during	   elections.	   The	   section	   also	   discusses	  how	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  local	  government	  may	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  agenda	  of	  local	  electoral	  campaigns.	  Section	  1.3	  details	  an	  emerging	  electoral	  problem	  for	  councillors,	   one	  where	   an	   increasingly	   complex	   system	  of	   partnerships	   for	   the	  delivery	   of	   local	   services	   has	   marginalised	   the	   scope	   of	   candidates	   to	   offer	  significant	   ideological	   change,	   thus	   narrowing	   the	   criteria	   for	   voters	   to	   assess	  them.	  	  1.1	  -­‐	  The	  Impact	  of	  Reorganisation	  England’s	   system	   of	   local	   government	   is	   complex	   and	   multi-­‐layered.	   In	   an	  attempt	   to	   standardise	   it	   across	   the	   country,	   a	   major	   reorganisation	   of	   the	  structure	  of	  local	  governance	  across	  England	  came	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Local	  Government	  Act	  1972.	  The	   impact	  of	   the	  act	   created	  a	   two-­‐tier	   system	  of	   local	  governance	  across	   the	   country,	  with	   structures	  best	   suited	   to	   their	  population.	  Each	   of	   these	   authority	   types	   has	   a	   slightly	   different	   set	   of	   powers	   with	   the	  intention	  of	   reflecting	   the	  varied	  needs	  of	   the	  communities	   they	  encompass,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  relative	  rural/urban	  status.	  	  	  Before	   continuing	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   London	   Boroughs	   (LBs)	  preceded	  the	  Local	  Government	  Act	  1972	  being	  created	  in	  1964	  after	  the	  1963	  Local	  Government	  Act.	  The	  two-­‐tier	  system	  was	  introduced	  to	  span	  the	  Greater	  London	  area	  and	  what	  was	  the	  Greater	  London	  Council	   (GLC)	  encompassed	  32	  LBs	  that	  are	  still	  functioning	  today.	  Also,	  though	  the	  district	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London	  is	  in	  Greater	  London	  and	  does	  hold	  elections,	  by	  tradition	  it	  is	  not	  included	  in	  any	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nation-­‐wide	   electoral	   analysis	   as	   it	   is	   a	   sui	   generis	   authority	   and	   not	  conventionally	   contested	   by	   the	  major	   parties	   in	   England.	   As	   a	   result	   it	   is	   not	  included	  in	  any	  analysis	  within	  this	  thesis.	  The	  implementation	  of	  a	  London-­‐wide	  authority	   a	   decade	   ahead	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   nation	   is	   reflective	   of	   the	   unique	  status	   of	   the	   capital,	   not	   only	   as	   a	  major	   urban	   environment	   that	   has	   its	   own	  distinct	  needs,	  but	  also	  as	  an	  area	  that	  requires	  all-­‐encompassing	  infrastructure.	  	  Outside	  London,	  metropolitan	  and	  non-­‐metropolitan	  authorities	  were	  created	  as	  a	  result	  of	   the	  1972	  Act.	  Metropolitan	  authorities	  were	  created	   in	  the	  six	   large,	  urban	   and	   densely	   populated	   areas	   of	   Greater	   Manchester,	   Merseyside,	   South	  Yorkshire,	   Tyne	   &	  Wear,	   the	  West	  Midlands	   and	  West	   Yorkshire.	   These	   areas	  formed	  six	  Metropolitan	  Counties	  (MCs)	  that	  were	  charged	  with	  delivering	  large-­‐scale	  services	  such	  as	  main	  roads,	  public	  transport,	  emergency	  services	  and	  civil	  protection	   in	   what	   are	   predominantly	   northern	   cities.	   Beneath	   the	   MCs	   there	  were	   36	   subdivisions,	   called	   Metropolitan	   Boroughs	   (MBs).	   This	   system	   was	  similar	   to	   London’s	   structure	   of	   boroughs	   (LBs),	   which	   were	   within	   a	   higher	  council	  authority	  and	  was	  reflective	  of	   the	   large	  communities	   they	  represented	  within	  those	  counties	  listed	  above.	  	  After	  the	  1983	  white	  paper	  “Streamlining	  the	  Cities”,	  the	  governing	  Conservative	  party	  abolished	  the	  GLC	  along	  with	  the	  MCs	  in	  1986.	  Since	  then,	  the	  capital	  was	  without	  a	  dedicated	  London-­‐wide	  authority	  till	  2000,	  when	  the	  Greater	  London	  Authority	  (GLA)	  was	  established	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Greater	  London	  Authority	  Act	  
	   17	  
1999.	  The	  act	  also	  created	  a	  directly	  elected	  mayoral	  position1.	  Unlike	  in	  London,	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  county-­‐tier	  of	  the	  metropolitan	  authorities	  has	  never	  resulted	  in	  a	  replacement.	  Their	  abolition,	  during	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  has	  had	  a	  lasting	  impact	  in	  these	  regions,	  particularly	  as	  the	  Labour	  party	  controlled	  the	  MCs	  at	  the	  time.	  As	  detailed	  later	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  Conservative	  party	  suffered	  quite	  badly	  at	  the	  MB	  elections	  during	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  GLC	  and	  MCs,	  and	  this	  is	  thought	  to	  have	  been	   largely	   a	   consequence	   of	   accusations	   that	   the	   move	   was	   led	   by	   party	  politics.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  their	   ‘administrative	  decapitation’,	  the	  MBs	  and	  LBs	  have	  assumed	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   responsibilities	   that	   cover	   areas	   from	   education	   to	  social	  services	  (these	  are	  detailed	  in	  section	  1.2).	  	  The	  LBs	  have	  a	  quadrennial	  electoral	  cycle,	  meaning	  that	  they	  elect	  their	  entire	  council	  every	   four	  years.	  Unlike	   the	  LBs,	   the	  MBs	  elect	   their	  councils	  by	  thirds.	  This	  means	  that	  for	  three	  years	  out	  of	  every	  four,	  the	  MBs	  elect	  a	  third	  of	  their	  council’s	   members.	   Previously	   the	   fourth	   year	   would	   have	   seen	   county-­‐level	  elections	   take	   place,	   thus	   completing	   the	   electoral	   cycle.	   To	  make	   things	  more	  complicated,	   in	   2004	   the	  MBs	  were	   redistricted	   and	   so,	   unusually,	   held	   all-­‐out	  elections	   in	   that	   year.	   The	   results	   from	   these	   3-­‐member	   district	   (3MD)	   all-­‐out	  elections	  then	  went	  on	  not	  only	  to	  decide	  who	  would	  sit	  on	  the	  council,	  but	  also	  the	  length	  of	  the	  first	  term	  that	  each	  elected	  candidate	  would	  serve.	  Those	  who	  finished	  in	  third	  place	  served	  just	  two	  years,	  to	  2006,	  before	  their	  seat	  was	  again	  up	  for	  election.	  Those	  in	  second	  place	  served	  for	  three	  years	  (2007)	  and	  those	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  GLA	  and	  mayoral	  elections	  are	  not	  considered	  in	  the	  electoral	  analysis	  within	  this	  thesis	  2	  This	  figure	  is	  for	  England	  and	  includes	  local	  elections	  that	  were	  held	  on	  the	  same	  day	  as	  General	  and	  European	  elections.	  It	  does	  not	  include	  by-­‐elections.	  3	  Data	  from	  the	  2012	  Candidate	  Survey	  (2012,	  n=142,	  𝑥	  =	  58.3)	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first	   place	   completed	   a	   full	   four	   years	   (2008)	   in	   order	   to	   complete	   the	   thirds	  cycle.	  All	  subsequent	  contests	  were	  for	  four-­‐year	  terms.	  	  Non-­‐metropolitan	   authorities,	   referred	   to	   as	   shires,	  were	   also	   standardised	   by	  the	  Local	  Government	  Act	  1972.	  For	  the	  Shire	  Counties	  (SCs),	  the	  top-­‐tier	  of	  the	  non-­‐metropolitan	  authorities	  went	  from	  a	  total	  of	  58	  county	  councils	  in	  England	  and	   Wales	   to	   just	   47	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   act.	   Also,	   within	   these	   counties,	   the	  patchwork	   of	   1,250	   municipal	   boroughs,	   urban	   and	   rural	   districts,	   were	   all	  merged	  into	  just	  333	  district	  councils	  (Wilson	  &	  Game,	  2006,	  pp.	  58).	  The	  SCs	  are	  elected	  on	  a	  quadrennial	  electoral	  cycle,	  meaning	  that	  elections	  take	  place	  every	  four	  years	  for	  the	  entire	  council.	  As	  they	  are	  a	  top-­‐tier	  of	   local	  government,	  the	  counties	   share	   some,	   though	   not	   all,	   functions	   of	   the	  MBs,	   particularly	   larger-­‐scale	  services	  like	  education	  and	  highways.	  However,	  because	  of	  the	  two-­‐tiered	  nature	  of	  the	  shires,	  powers	  are	  split	  between	  county	  and	  district	  councils.	  The	  district-­‐level	   of	   the	   non-­‐metropolitan	   authorities,	   or	   Shire	   Districts	   (SDs),	   are	  located	   within	   the	   counties	   and	   today	   they	   are	   responsible	   for	   delivering	  smaller-­‐scale	   services	   such	   as	   housing,	   local	   planning,	   museums,	   waste	   and	  council	  tax	  collection.	  After	  the	  1972	  reorganisation	  the	  SDs	  could	  choose	  either	  to	  elect	  their	  councils	  by	  thirds,	  as	  the	  MBs,	  with	  the	  SC	  elections	  taking	  place	  in	  the	   ‘empty’	   fourth	   year	   of	   the	   cycle,	   or	   they	   could	   elect	   their	   council	   on	   a	  quadrennial	  cycle.	  The	  SCs	  and	  SDs	  are	  mostly	  situated	  in	  less	  densely	  populated,	  rural	  areas	  of	  England.	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  Unitary	  Authorities	  (UAs)	  in	  England	  took	  place	  in	  1995	  and	  served	   to	   complicate	   the	   ‘simplified’	   structure	   of	   local	   government	   that	   was	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established	   post-­‐1972.	   This	   was	   another	   significant	   change	   to	   the	   political	  landscape	   of	   England	   as,	   since	   1995,	   some	   55	   county	   and	   district-­‐level	  authorities	  have	  assumed	  a	  single-­‐tier	  structure.	  The	  Local	  Government	  Act	  1992	  established	  a	  Local	  Government	  commission	  with	  the	  power	  to	  oversee:	  	  “the	  replacement,	  in	  any	  non-­‐metropolitan	  area,	  of	  the	  two	  principal	  tiers	  of	  local	  
government	  with	  a	  single	  tier”	  (Local	  Government	  Act,	  1992,	  Section	  14(1a))	  	  Post	   1995	   there	   has	   been	   both	   the	   abolition	   of	   some	   district	   councils	   and	   the	  creation	  of	  more	  authorities	  at	  the	  top-­‐tier	  level.	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  then,	  that	  these	  numbers	  do	  not	  balance	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  UAs	  in	  England	  has	  resulted	  in	  the	  overall	  number	  of	  authorities	  falling,	  as	  have	  the	  total	  number	  of	  councillors.	  Whilst	  their	  introduction	  has	  meant	  that	  the	  UAs	  have	  adopted	  similar	  functions	  to	   the	   boroughs,	   it	   has	   also	  meant	   that	   another	   two	   sets	   of	   local	   government	  systems	   have	   been	   introduced.	   Like	   the	   districts,	   these	   authorities	   also	   had	   a	  choice	  of	  electoral	  cycles	  to	  select	  their	  councillors,	  choosing	  between	  thirds	  or	  quadrennials.	  	  Consequently,	   local	   government	   in	   England	   today	   broadly	   comprises	   seven	  different	  types	  of	  electoral	  system.	  The	  LBs,	  which	  run	  on	  a	  quadrennial	  electoral	  cycle.	  The	  MBs,	  which	  are	  on	  a	  system	  of	  elections	  by	  thirds.	  The	  SCs,	  which	  are	  on	  a	  quadrennial	  electoral	  cycle.	  The	  SDAs	  are	  on	  quadrennial	  cycles	  and	  SDTs	  on	  elections	  by	   thirds.	  And	   finally,	   the	  UAAs	  and	  UATs	  are	  also	  on	  quadrennial	  and	   thirds	   electoral	   cycles	   respectively.	   Section	   1.1	   has	   briefly	   introduced	   the	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basic	   structure	   of	   local	   government	   and	   elections	   in	   England	   after	  reorganisation.	  Sub-­‐chapter	  1.2	  will	  go	  on	  to	  outline	  the	  role	  of	  local	  government	  and	  discusses	  some	  of	  the	  key	  changes	  to	  the	  remit	  of	  councils	  during	  the	  period.	  	  1.2	  –	  The	  Role	  of	  Local	  Government:	  Toward	  Community	  Leadership	  Local	   authorities	   are	   charged	   with	   delivering	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   services	   to	  residents	  and	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  deliver	  these	  services	  since	  the	  1970s	  has	  changed	  significantly.	  Through	  increased	  collaboration	  with	  other	  actors,	  almost	  all	   the	   services	   local	  authorities	  provide	  have	  experienced	  some	   form	  of	  major	  modification.	   The	   general	   trend	   has	   been	   one	  where	   councils	   are	  moving	   to	   a	  shared,	   rather	   than	   exclusive,	   set	   of	   responsibilities.	   Broadly	   speaking,	   as	  described	  in	  section	  1.1,	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  different	  types	  of	  local	  authority	  vary,	   so	   naturally	   it	   is	   right	   to	   give	   a	   brief	   outline	   of	   the	   differences.	   A	   Local	  Government	   Association	   (LGA)	   list	   of	   services	   by	   type	   of	   English	   authority	   is	  illustrated	  in	  figure	  1.2.1.	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[Figure	  1.2.1	   -­‐	  Responsibilities	   of	   Local	  Authorities	   in	  England	   (Source:	   LGA	  Quick	  Guide	   to	  Local	  
Government,	  2009,	  pp.	  7)]	  	  What	  is	  clear	  from	  figure	  1.2.1	  is	  that	  there	  are	  mixed	  sets	  of	  responsibilities	  for	  the	   different	   types	   of	   authority	   in	   England,	   with	   some	   delivering	   more,	   or	  different	   services	   than	   others.	   The	   information	   detailed	   in	   figure	   1.2.1	   was	  correct	   as	   of	   2009,	   but	  whilst	   the	   range	   of	   services	   authorities	   have	   delivered	  since	  the	  1970s	  has	  changed,	  traditionally	  local	  authorities	  have	  had	  something	  of	   a	   monopoly	   over	   their	   provision,	   particularly	   in	   the	   earlier	   years	   after	  reorganisation.	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Local	   government	   has	   always	   been	   substantially	   funded	   through	   central	  government,	  and	  as	  such,	  the	  role	  of	  local	  authorities	  was	  traditionally	  seen	  not	  only	   as	   being	   the	   principle	   agency	   for	   the	   delivery	   of	   services,	   but	   also	   as	   a	  gatekeeper	   of	   central	   government	   spending.	   There	   was	   a	   general	   consensus	  within	   the	   Conservative	   government	   during	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s,	   that	  representation	   without	   explicit	   local	   taxation	   had	   led	   to	   councils	   being	  rewarded,	  in	  terms	  of	  electoral	  support	  from	  their	  residents,	  for	  what	  they	  could	  provide,	  rather	  than	  prudently	  managing	  their	  budgets.	  This	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  erosion	  of	   local	  accountability,	   a	   type	  of	  pork-­‐barrel	  politics,	   akin	   to	   that	  seen	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   American	   congressmen	   being	   seen	   as	   gatekeepers	   of	  U.S.	   federal	   spending	   (Mayhew,	   1974;	   Fiorina	   1977).	   This	   steady	   erosion	   of	  accountability	   increased	   demand	   on	   spending	   for	   public	   services	   and	   had	  “rendered	  local	  democracy	  impotent	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  many.	  During	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  following	  an	  onslaught	  of	  Thatcherism	  against	  it,	  many	  in	  local	  government	  championed	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  ‘power	  of	  general	  competence’	  as	  a	  means	  to	   promote	   it	   and	   guard	   against	   future	   erosion”	   (Stevens,	   2006,	   pp.	   69).	   The	  system	  of	  local	  government	  being	  funded	  by	  central	  spending	  was	  thought	  not	  to	  be	  conducive	  to	  responsible	  budgetary	  restraints.	  Stewart	  (2000)	  outlines,	  that	  if	  a	   local	   authority	   is	   seen	  as	   the	   sole	  provider	  of	   a	   set	  of	   services	   to	   its	   citizens,	  then	  its	  relationship	  with	  residents	  becomes	  defined	  by	  the	  level	  of	  service	  it	  can	  provide	   (pp.	   271-­‐272).	   So,	   logically,	   it	   gradually	   befits	   the	   interest	   of	   local	  government	   to	   maximize	   what	   it	   can	   provide	   for	   residents,	   rather	   than	  examining	  their	  own	  spending	  habits.	  Naturally	  this	  is	  seen	  to	  have	  led	  to	  friction	  between	  local	  and	  national	  priorities	  and	  as	  a	  result	  a	  change	  in	  the	  agenda	  for	  local	  government	  could	  be	  said	  to	  have	  been	  set	  in	  motion.	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  The	  introduction	  of	  the	  Community	  Charge	  in	  1990	  has	  played	  a	  significant	  part	  in	  altering	  the	  way	  local	  government	  operates.	  The	  main	  goal	  was	  to	  improve	  the	  accountability	  of	  local	  government	  by	  establishing	  a	  fiscal	  incentive	  to	  do	  so.	  By	  charging	   people	   locally	   it	   had	   the	   added	   intention	   of	   affecting	   people’s	  engagement	  with	   local	  democracy,	  as	  well	  as	   introducing	  a	  culture	  of	  residents	  scrutinizing	   their	   local	   authority’s	   spending	   habits.	   There	   were	   only	   minor	  electoral	   consequences	   for	   introducing	   the	   charge.	  However,	   as	   these	  elections	  were	  presented	  as	  almost	  a	  referendum	  on	  national	  government	  at	  the	  time,	  one	  could	   argue	   that	   the	   elections	  were	   demonstrative	   of	   the	   increasingly	   blurred	  nature	   of	   national	   and	   local	   politics.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   argue	   that	   the	  community	  charge	  failed	  in	  its	  purpose	  as	  a	  device	  to	  improve	  the	  accountability	  of	   local	  government	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1991,	  pp.	  183)	  as	   the	  elections	  were	  increasingly	  observed	  in	  a	  national,	  rather	  than	  local	  context.	  	  Long-­‐term	   however,	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   Community	   Charge	   (now	   Council	  Tax)	  marked	  the	  point	  at	  which	   the	  agenda	  of	   local	  government	  was	  reframed.	  Since	   then	   a	  whole	   raft	   of	   other	   non-­‐elected	   or	   indirectly	   elected	   bodies	   have	  been	   introduced.	   Many	   of	   these	   provide	   services	   at	   the	   expense	   of,	   or	   in	  collaboration	   with	   local	   authorities.	   The	   rise	   in	   the	   number	   of	   Quasi-­‐Autonomous	  Non-­‐Governmental	  Organizations	  or	  quangos	  has	  changed	  the	  way	  in	   which	   local	   government	   operates,	   not	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   reduced	   level	   of	  service	   facilitation,	  but	  also	  the	  relationship	  between	  authorities	  and	  residents.	  “In	   the	   past,	   local	   authorities	   confidently	   saw	   themselves	   as	   the	   rightful	   and	  undisputed	  leaders	  of	  their	  communities.	  Now	  their	  position	  is	  under	  challenge	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as	   they	   find	   themselves	   sharing	   the	   local	   ‘turf’	   with	   a	   whole	   range	   of	   bodies”	  (Davis,	  1996,	  pp.	  1).	  	  Local	  government	  has	  evolved	  into	  a	  new	  type	  of	  institution	  in	  British	  society.	  As	  Stewart	  (2000)	  suggests,	   this	  new	  institution	  comprises	   three	  distinct	  roles	   for	  councils;	  one	  of	  community	  leadership,	  community	  partnership	  and	  community	  monitoring.	   This	   perspective	   is	   perhaps	   epitomized	   by	   New	   Labour’s	   green	  paper	   “Modernising	   Local	   Government	   –	   Local	   Democracy	   and	   Community	  
Leadership”	  (1998),	  which	  was	   the	   genesis	   of	   the	   Local	   Government	   Act	   2000.	  Because	  local	  authorities	  are	  increasingly	  competing	  with	  other	  institutions	  and	  have	   less	   of	   a	   role	   in	   the	   actual	   facilitation	   of	   services,	   the	   perspective	   of	   a	  councilor	   has	   changed	   markedly,	   moving	   towards	   one	   of	   partnerships,	  leadership	   and	   championing	   local	   values.	   Rather	   than	   delivering	   all	   services,	  authorities	  now	  tend	  to	  hold	  service	  providers	  to	  account	  on	  behalf	  of	  residents.	  They	   also	   collect,	   interpret	   and	   distribute	   important	   information	   for	  government,	  quangos	  and	  other	  local	  providers.	  	  This	  has	  clear	  repercussions	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  councils	  operate	  and	  the	  way	  that	  local	  elections	  are	  fought.	  Where	  previously	  councillors	  may	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  gatekeepers	  for	  services	  ultimately	  paid	  for	  by	  central	  government,	  today	  the	  paradigm	  is	  very	  different.	  The	  role	  of	  a	  councillor	   is	  broader,	  moving	   towards	  management,	   engagement	   with	   residents,	   implementing	   community	   plans	   and	  overseeing	   initiatives	   between	   local	   government	   and	   specialized	   providers.	   To	  summarize,	   one	   is	   drawn	   to	   Stoker’s	   overview	   of	   local	   government	  transformation	  during	  the	  period:	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“There	  has	  been	  a	  decisive	  attempt	  to	  switch	  in	  Britain	  from	  a	  system	  dominated	  by	  
elected	   local	   government	   to	   a	   system	   of	   governance	   in	   which	   a	   wider	   range	   of	  
institutions	  and	  actors	  are	  involved	  in	  local	  politics	  and	  service	  delivery.	  It	  may	  be	  
that	   elected	   authorities	   are	   the	   weakest	   link	   in	   the	   chain	   of	   the	   new	   string	   of	  
institutions	  of	   local	  governance	  and	  will	  eventually	  be	  asked	   to	  exit,	  or	   it	  may	  be	  
that	  they	  will	  discover	  a	  new	  role	  as	  the	  lead	  organization,	  taking	  on	  the	  challenge	  
of	  steering	  a	  complex	  set	  of	  managerial	  and	  democratic	  processes	  at	  the	  local	  level”	  (Stoker,	  2003,	  pp.	  3)	  	  Sub-­‐chapter	  1.2	  has	  described	  some	  of	   the	  key	  changes	   in	   the	  responsibility	  of	  local	  authorities,	  explaining	  how	  the	  role	  of	  local	  government,	  and	  by	  extension	  councillors,	   has	   changed	   from	   one	   of	   service	   provision	   to	   leadership	   and	  community	  engagement.	  Section	  1.3	  goes	  on	  to	  outline	  key	  details	  of	  the	  parties	  that	  contest	  local	  government	  elections	  in	  England,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  agenda	  of	  local	  electoral	  campaigns.	  	  1.3	  –	  Local	  Elections:	  Parties	  &	  Campaigns	  Party	  politics	  are	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  local	  government	  in	  England.	  Though	  there	  is	   a	   strong	   vein	   of	   minor	   party	   and	   independent	   candidate	   influence	   at	   local	  government	   elections,	   however	   much	   we	   examine	   the	   role	   of	   councillors	   or	  notions	   of	   localism	   it	  must	   always	   be	   viewed	   through	   the	   prism	   of	   an	   English	  party	   system.	   There	   will	   inevitably	   be	   exceptions	   to	   the	   rule,	   but	   since	   the	  reorganisation	   of	   local	   government,	   the	   broad	   trend	   across	   England	   is	  inescapable.	   “Since	   1973,	   minor	   parties	   have	   been	   faced	   with	   a	   process	   of	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increased	   party	   politicisation,	   an	   expansion	   in	   competition	   and	  more	   vigorous	  patterns	  of	  election	  campaigning.	  The	  dice	  are	  loaded	  against	  success	  for	  minor	  parties	  and	  independents	  alike”	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  pp.	  150).	  	  One	  might	  believe	   that	   the	   increased	  politicisation	  of	   local	  politics	  has	   led	   to	  a	  blurring	  of	  local	  elections	  with	  national	  politics,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  this	  is	  true.	  For	   many	   voters,	   local	   elections	   are	   simply	   a	   referendum	   on	   national	  government,	   giving	   little	   thought	   to	   distinguishing	   between	   incumbent	  councillors	   and	   their	   respective	   national	   parties.	   However,	   regardless	   of	   party	  dominance,	   for	  many	   residents,	   local	   elections	   are	   still	   seen	   to	   be	   local	   affairs	  and	  there	  is	  clear	  evidence	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  support	  this	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  2001,	  2003a).	  Indeed,	  local	  voters	  do	  respond	  to	  local	  issues	  but	  “the	  influence	  of	  those	   issues	   varies	   from	   place	   to	   place	   and	   from	   time	   to	   time”	   (Rallings	   &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  pp.	  169).	  	  Section	   1.2	   describes	   how	   the	   evolving	   responsibility	   of	   local	   government	   has	  altered	  the	  role	  of	  councillors	  within	  communities.	  Indeed,	  in	  making	  the	  case	  for	  local	  government,	  Jones	  &	  Stewart	  argue	  that	  “localness	  should	  be	  the	  basis	  for	  responsiveness	  in	  local	  government”	  (1983,	  pp.	  6),	  which	  by	  implication	  pertains	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  local	  issues	  should	  drive	  the	  electoral	  campaigns	  of	  candidates.	  But	  in	  what	  sense	  can	  these	  elections	  be	  fought	  today,	  particularly	  in	  light	  of	  an	  increased	  number	  of	   actors	  at	   the	   local	   level?	  The	   trend	  suggests	   that	   councils	  are	  being	  restricted	  more	  and	  more	  in	  what	  they	  can	  do.	  When	  we	  acknowledge	  that	  previous	  incentives	  for	  engagement	  in	  local	  politics	  relied	  to	  some	  degree	  on	  the	   direct	   and	   extensive	   provision	   of	   benefits,	   which	   in	   turn	   are	   electorally	  
	   27	  
‘rewarded’	   for	   their	   quality	   and/or	   quantity,	   we	   must	   also	   acknowledge	   that	  there	  are	  now	  fewer	  and	  perhaps	  less	  clear	  cues	  for	  voters	  to	  respond	  to.	  To	  add,	  with	   the	  restricted	  remit	  of	   local	  government,	   the	   influence	  of	   local	  authorities	  has	  been	  reduced	  to	  one	  that	  competes	  alongside	  other	  institutions.	  As	  a	  result,	  councillors	  may	  be	  forced	  to	  change	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  campaign	  for	  elected	  office.	   Authorities	   “cannot	   raise	   taxes	   as	   they	  might	   like	   to	   and	   their	   influence	  over	  their	  major	  budget	  expenditures	  may	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  margins”	  (Wilson	  &	  Game,	  2006,	  pp.	  314),	  so	  there	  are	  clear	  limitations	  in	  the	  things	  that	  councillors	  can	  promise	  to	  do	  in	  order	  to	  differentiate	  themselves	  from	  the	  opposition.	  	  In	   this	   sense,	   the	   evolving	   responsibilities	   of	   local	   government	   have	   led	   to	   the	  marginalisation	   of	   key	   differences	   between	   parties	   vying	   for	   council	   control.	  There	  is	  an	  increasing	  professionalization	  of	  campaigns	  and	  it	  could	  be	  said	  that	  elections	   are	  moving,	   if	   only	   slightly,	   from	   ideologically-­‐orientated	   differences,	  towards	   a	   more	   candidate-­‐centred	   ‘battle	   of	   the	   bureaucrats’.	   Campaigning	   is	  perhaps	  becoming	  more	  of	  a	  skill,	  or	  trade,	  for	  local	  parties,	  particularly	  with	  the	  emergence	   of	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   as	   a	   credible	   force	   in	   local	   government.	  Techniques	  such	  as	  canvassing,	   ‘fetching-­‐up’,	   leafleting	  and	  campaigning	  online,	  have	   increasingly	   become	   some	   of	   the	   limited	   yet	   principal	   methods	   of	  engagement	  that	   local	  parties	  have	  with	  voters,	  particularly	  with	  the	  continued	  decline	  of	  party	  membership.	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   as	   councillors	  have	   taken	  on	  a	  reduced	  role,	  the	  ability	  of	  voters	  to	  assess	  candidates	  based	  on	  their	  ideology	  or	  political	  record	  is	  diminished.	  This	  puts	  into	  context	  the	  claim	  that	  evidence	  from	  “local	  elections	  demonstrate	  that	  local	  voting	  can	  become	  a	  matter	  of	   ‘horse	  for	  courses’.	   Such	   factors	   as	   the	   nature	   of	   party	   competition,	   the	   conduct	   of	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canvassing	   and	   campaigning,	   and	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   candidates	  themselves,	  either	   real	  or	  as	  portrayed	  by	   the	   local	  media,	  would	  all	   appear	   to	  have	   a	   bearing	   upon	   voters’	   perceptions	   of	   electoral	   context”	   (Rallings	   &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  pp.	  169).	  	  	  In	   light	   of	   this,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   there	   are	  many	   factors	   that	   affect	   the	   electoral	  conditions	   that	   incumbent	   councillors	   face	   when	   seeking	   re-­‐election.	   Some	   of	  these	   are	   national;	   some	   local,	   some	   structural	   and	   so	   forth.	   However,	   though	  there	  will	  always	  be	  special	  instances	  of	  beloved	  councillors	  serving	  decades	  on	  a	   council,	   the	   reality	   is	   that	   the	   conditions	   ensure	   local	   elections	   remain	  influenced,	  to	  some	  degree,	  by	  voters	  assessments	  of	  national	  government.	  Any	  incumbency	  effect	  must	   therefore,	  be	  offset	  against	   the	  national/regional	   trend	  in	   order	   to	   assess	   its	   true	   value.	   Subsequently,	   investigating	   the	   electoral	  fortunes	   of	   councillors	   in	   English	   local	   elections	  may	   tell	   us	   not	   only	  whether	  incumbents	  are	  indeed	  advantaged,	  but	  also	  how	  such	  a	  phenomenon	  is	  nested	  within	   local	   democracy,	   revealing	   what	   conditions	   are	   more	   conducive	   to	  electoral	  defence	   for	   instance,	   and	  whether	   candidates	   can	  alter	   their	  electoral	  fortunes?	  	  Chapter	   1	   has	   given	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   the	   key	   developments	   in	   local	  government	   in	   England.	   The	   chapter	   has	   detailed	   the	   current	   system	   of	  administrations	  as	  well	  as	  the	  evolving	  role	  of	  councillors,	  local	  government	  and	  campaigns.	   Chapter	   2	   goes	   on	   to	   present	   a	   review	   of	   the	   relevant	   literature	  regarding	  incumbency	  advantage.	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Chapter	  2	  –	  Incumbency	  Advantage:	  A	  Literature	  Review	  	  	  In	  The	  Victorious	  Incumbent,	  Somit	  et	  al	  (1994)	  describe	  how	  the	  high	  re-­‐election	  rate	   of	   congressional	   incumbents	   in	   the	   United	   States	   gradually	   drew	   the	  attention	  of	   political	   scholars.	   Their	   original	   concerns	   centred	  on	   the	  potential	  impact	  of	  incumbency	  on	  the	  health	  of	  US	  democracy,	  but	  also	  examined	  some	  of	  the	  ways	   that	   incumbent	   candidates	   are	   able	   to	   connect	  with	   local	   voters	   and	  how	  this	  may	  have	  changed.	  	  
“For	  several	  decades,	  it	  has	  been	  axiomatic	  among	  both	  political	  practitioners	  and	  
students	   of	   government	   that	   incumbent	   members	   of	   the	   United	   States	   Congress	  
have	  a	  substantial	  advantage	  when	  they	  seek	  re-­‐election...the	  resulting	   literature,	  
debates	   and	   discussions	   are	   understandably	   centred	   on	   the	   American	   situation.	  
Inevitably,	   though,	   they	   give	   rise	   to	   the	   obvious	   question:	   Is	   the	   problem	   of	   the	  
‘victorious	  legislative	  incumbent’	  unique	  to	  the	  United	  States	  or	  is	  it	  one	  also	  being	  
experienced	  by	  other	  representative	  democracies?”	  
	  (Somit	  et	  al,	  1994,	  p.3)	  	  What	   those	   early	   scholars	   were	   concerned	   about	   is	   what	   is	   termed	   today	   as	  Incumbency	   Advantage	   (IA).	   The	   phenomenon	   is	   expansive	   and	   reaches	   into	  many	   areas	   of	   psephological	   research	   including	   political	   efficacy,	   campaigns,	  localism	   and	   electoral	   behaviour,	   to	   name	   a	   few.	   Broadly	   speaking,	   IA	   can	   be	  seen	   as	   the	   electoral	   advantage	   gained	   through	   standing	   as	   an	   incumbent	  candidate	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   challenger.	   It	   is	   a	   value	   that	   signifies	   the	   extent	   to	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which	  the	  democratic	  playing	  field	  may	  favour	  elected	  representatives	  over	  their	  challengers	   and	   explores	   the	   connection	   between	   electors	   and	   the	   elected.	  Gelman	  &	  King	  (2003)	  offer	  a	  simple	  theoretical	  definition	  of	   IA.	  They	  describe	  IA	  (ψ),	  as	  the	  vote	  share	  received	  by	  an	  incumbent	  (W	  (i)),	  after	  taking	  away	  the	  share	  of	  the	  vote	  the	  incumbent	  party	  would	  have	  received	  if	  the	  election	  were	  an	   open	   contest	   (W	  (o)).	   This	   serves	   as	   a	   useful	   starting	   point	   to	   examine	   the	  significance	  of	  incumbency,	  not	  only	  because	  of	  its	  simplicity,	  as	  a	  distinction	  is	  made	   between	   the	   types	   of	   candidate	   standing,	   but	   also	   because	   incumbency	  effects	  are	  examined	  within	  a	  prism	  of	  relativity.	  	  	  𝜓 = 𝑊! −   𝑊! 	  (Gelman	  &	  King,	  1990,	  p.1,143)	  	  What	   Gelman	   &	   King	   are	   suggesting	   is	   that,	   political	   partisanship	   aside;	   a	  candidate’s	  electoral	  status	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  relative	  decision-­‐making	  of	  voters.	  In	  every	  election	  where	  an	  incumbent	  is	  standing,	  there	  will	  always	  be	  votes	  cast	  for	  the	  candidate,	  and	  for	  the	  party.	  In	  order	  to	  ascertain	  the	  value	  of	  incumbency	   then	   (ψ),	   the	   underlying	   level	   of	   political	   partisanship	   must	   be	  ascertained	  (W	  (o)).	  	  In	   isolation	   incumbency	   offers	   little	   causal	   explanation.	   Rather,	   it	   is	   a	   broad	  indicator	  and	  must	  therefore	  be	  examined	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  how	  well	  politicians,	  in	  this	  instance	  local	  councillors	  do,	  when	  compared	  to	  freshmen	  candidates.	  It	  is	  clear	   from	   the	   American	   literature	   that	   there	   are	   many	   explanations	   for	   the	  advantage,	   with	   varying	   implications	   and	   different	   levels	   of	   precision.	   For	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instance,	   some	   research	   offers	   detailed	   commentary	   on	   various	   trends	  associated	   with	   incumbency,	   whilst	   others	   attempt	   to	   explicitly	   identify	   the	  causal	  mechanism.	  Spurred	  by	  the	  vanishing	  marginal	  seats	  in	  US	  congressional	  elections,	   Mayhew’s	   work	   on	   electoral	   incentives,	   “Congress.	   The	   Electoral	  
Connection”	   (1974),	   discusses	   in	   some	   detail,	   the	   ability	   of	   congressional	  incumbents	   to	  maintain	   their	  position	  through	  various	  means	  at	   their	  disposal.	  Fiorina	   (1977)	   and	   Jacobson	   &	   Kernell	   (1983)	   build	   on	   this	   commentary	  discussing	  other	  trends	  of	  note	  for	  candidates	  of	  the	  Washington	  ‘establishment’.	  One	  such	  vein	  of	  discussion	  is	  the	  Personal	  Vote	  (PV).	  	  2.1	  –	  The	  Personal	  Vote	  The	   literature	   remains	   relatively	   unclear	   in	   its	   examination	   of	   personal	   vote	  effects.	  At	  times	  the	  phrase	  is	  used	  interchangeably	  with	  incumbency	  advantage,	  at	   others	   it	   is	   concerned	   specifically	   with	   the	   personal	   abilities	   of	   local	  candidates	   to	   influence	   the	   result	   of	   elections.	   Drawing	   on	   some	   of	   the	   more	  precise	  accounts,	   the	  personal	  vote	  can	  be	  defined	  as	   the	  electoral	  advantage	  a	  candidate	  holds	  over	  their	  opponent	  because	  of	  a	  difference	  in	  their	  abilities.	  As	  Cain	  et	  al	  (1987)	  put	  it,	  the	  “personal	  vote	  refers	  to	  that	  portion	  of	  a	  candidate’s	  electoral	  support	  which	  originates	  in	  his	  or	  her	  personal	  qualities,	  qualification,	  activities	   and	   record”	   (Cain,	   Ferejohn	   &	   Fiorina,	   1987,	   p.9).	   A	   candidate	  recognised	   as	   having	   a	   strong	   personal	   vote	  would	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   acquire	  votes	   regardless	   of	   their	   political	   affiliation.	   They	   are	   charismatic	   candidates,	  able	   to	   gain	   support	   regardless	   of	   the	   national	   or	   regional	   trend	   through	   an	  enduring	  connection	  with	  residents	  and	  a	  central	  position	  within	  the	  community.	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Considering	  this	  definition,	  a	  candidate’s	  incumbency	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  product,	  or	  at	   least	   a	   consequence	   in	  part,	   of	   a	   candidate’s	  personality,	   and	   this	   is	   the	  key	  distinction	  between	  the	  concepts.	  Incumbency	  advantage	  theory	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  the	  broad	  topic	  of	  concern,	  a	  multi-­‐faceted	  electoral	  consequence	  of	  various	  stimuli.	   The	   personal	   vote	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   just	   one	   explanation,	   not	  necessarily	  a	  fundamental	  factor,	  but	  part	  of	  a	  broad	  collection	  of	  accounts	  that	  sometimes	   overlap	   and	   are	   not	   always	   exclusive.	   Later	   in	   this	   chapter	   readers	  may	   note	   that	   this	   is	   something	   of	   a	   feature	  within	  much	   of	   the	   literature	   on	  incumbency	  effects,	  as	  some	  of	  the	  ‘schools	  of	  thought’	  on	  IA	  tend	  to	  intersect,	  at	  times	  borrowing	  facets	  of	  the	  theory	  from	  one	  another.	  However,	  in	  this	  context,	  the	  personal	  vote	  literature	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  component	  of	  IA	  theory,	  whilst	  remaining	   an	   important	   electoral	   phenomenon	   in	   it’s	   own	   right.	   As	   Cain	   et	   al	  puts	  it,	  “congressional	  elections	  are	  local,	  not	  national	  events:	  in	  deciding	  how	  to	  cast	   their	   ballots,	   voters	   are	   primarily	   influenced	   not	   by	   the	   President,	   the	  national	  parties,	  or	  the	  state	  of	  the	  economy,	  but	  by	  the	  local	  candidates”	  (1987,	  pp.	  167).	  Thus	   it	   is	  perhaps	   reasonable	   to	  assume	   that	   there	   is	   an	   inevitability	  within	  local	  elections,	  that	  a	  candidate’s	  credentials	  and	  reputation	  will	  have	  at	  least	   some	   influence	   on	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   contest.	   There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   a	  greater	   understanding	   of	   personal	   effects	   will	   contribute	   to	   a	   better	  understanding	  of	  local	  electoral	  behaviour,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  role	  of	  incumbency.	  	  A	   key	   part	   of	   the	   evidence	   put	   forward	   for	   personal	   vote	   effects	   was	   Morris	  Fiorina’s	   Congress:	   Keystone	   of	   the	   Washington	   Establishment	   (1977),	   which	  suggested	   that	   personal	   vote	   seeking	   behaviour	   was	   responsible	   for	   a	  diminishing	  number	  of	  marginal	  seats	  in	  US	  congressional	  elections.	  The	  premise	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was	   that	   as	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   an	   emerging	   ‘breed’	   of	   congressional	  representatives,	   incumbents	   increased	   their	   electoral	   advantage	   over	   their	  competitors	  and	  tended	  to	  win	  more	  often.	  These	  representatives	  were	  not	  only	  more	   likely	   to	   connect	   with	   residents	   by	   exploiting	   the	   growing	   level	   of	  resources	  available	  to	  them,	  but	  they	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  behaviour	  and	  attitudes	  of	  congressional	  candidates	  were	  changing.	  This	  marked	  increase	  in	  incumbency	  advantage	   is	   well	   documented	   by	   the	   literature	   (Ferejohn,	   1977;	   Alford	   &	  Hibbing,	  1981;	  Cox	  &	  Morgenstern,	  1993;	  Cox	  &	  Katz,	  1996).	  For	  personal	  vote	  scholars,	  the	  rise	  came	  about	  because	  congressmen	  were	  spending	  more	  of	  their	  time	   responding	   to	   constituent’s	   needs.	   They	   used	   the	   franking	   system	   to	  maintain	   contact	   with	   voters	   and	   tended	   to	   present	   themselves	   more	   as	  facilitators	  of	  the	  federal	  system,	  rather	  than	  principled	  candidates	  of	  the	  party	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  their	  elected	  position.	  It	  was	  seen	  as	  an	  increasing	  priority	  for	   candidates	   to	   maximize	   local	   support	   by	   emphasizing	   their	   own	   personal	  qualities	  rather	  than	  their	  party’s.	  However,	  there	  are	  clear	  differences	  between	  the	   American	   and	   English	   case	   and	   “it	   remains	   uncertain	   the	   degree	   to	  which	  personal	  vote	  seeking	  strategies	  actually	  have	  an	  electoral	  payoff	  in	  Westminster	  type	   parliamentary	   systems,	   where	   national	   and	   partisan	   factors	   are	   so	  much	  more	  important	  to	  voters’	  choices”	  (Shugart	  et	  al,	  2005,	  pp.	  438).	  	  Perhaps	  the	  first	  and	  most	  basic	  quality	  common	  to	  elections	  in	  both	  Britain	  and	  America	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  electoral	  accountability.	  Both	  countries	  have	  adopted	  a	  representative	  style	  of	  democracy.	  As	  Newton	  explains,	  this	  notion	  “assumes	  that	  politicians	  are	  held	  accountable	  for	  their	  own	  actions	  on	  election	  day”	  (Newton,	  1976,	  p.14).	  The	  concept	  of	  democratic	  accountability,	  and	  in	  a	  wider	  sense,	  the	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ability	   of	   voters	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   performance	   of	   local	   authorities	   is	   already	  evident	  in	  the	  literature.	  It	  has	  already	  been	  demonstrated	  that	  voters	  are	  able	  to	  make	   performance-­‐related	   judgements	   about	   local	   administrations	   (Rallings	   &	  Thrasher,	  1997;	  Boyne	  et	  al,	  2009).	  However,	  little	  evidence	  exists	  regarding	  the	  assessment	   of	   incumbent	   candidates	   in	   England.	   Democracies	   are	   designed	   to	  enable	   citizens	   the	  opportunity	   to	  evaluate	   the	  performance	  of	   representatives	  through	   use	   of	   the	   ballot	   box,	   replacing	   incumbents	   with	   another	   candidate	  should	   they	   feel	   it	   necessary.	   Seeking	   a	   personal	   vote	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   an	  attractive	   electoral	   strategy	   for	   incumbents.	   Personal	   vote	   seeking	   incumbents	  look	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	   electoral	   accountability	   process	   by	   convincing	   voters	  that	  they	  represent	  the	  best	  future	  for	  their	  constituents.	  Personal	  vote	  seeking	  incumbents	  are	  good	  communicators	  and	  frequently	  engage	  with	  voters	  in	  order	  to	   maintain	   their	   position	   as	   the	   credible	   local	   candidate,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	  challenging	  ‘imposter’.	  	  Because	  re-­‐election	  is	  the	  primary	  objective	  for	  what	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  the	  ‘new	  breed’,	  those	  who	  employ	  a	  personal	  vote	  seeking	  strategy	  aim	  to	  convince	  constituents	  that	  it	   is	  their	  own	  personal	  qualities,	  education,	  managerial	  skills,	  personality	  and/or	  local	  connections	  that	  are	  most	  beneficial	  to	  the	  prospects	  of	  their	   constituents.	   In	   many	   respects,	   they	   put	   themselves	   before	   their	   party.	  They	  ask	  you	  to	  vote	  for	  them	  first	  and	  their	  party	  second,	  in	  order	  to	  present	  an	  image	   of	   themselves	   as	   ‘constituency	   facilitators’.	   As	   Fiorina	   puts	   it,	   these	  representatives	  “would	  rather	  be	  elected	  as	  an	  errand	  boy	  than	  not	  re-­‐elected	  at	  all”	   (Fiorina,	   1977,	   p.37).	   In	   this	   knowledge,	   that	   the	   desire	   of	   incumbents	   to	  preserve	  their	  political	  career	  is	  paramount,	  we	  can	  learn	  which	  strategy	  works	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best	   and	   to	  which	   cues	   voters	   respond.	   These	   ‘cues’,	   as	   Shugart	   et	  al	  describe	  them,	   can	   be	   more	   important	   to	   voters	   than	   some	   of	   the	   more	   behaviour-­‐oriented	   qualities	   that	   have	   traditionally	   dominated	   personal	   vote	   research.	  Behaviour	   is	   easily	   changeable,	   whereas	   qualifications,	   political	   resumes	   and	  where	   you	   live	   are	   not.	   For	   Shugart	   et	   al,	   “a	   politician	   either	   has	   the	   right	  attributes	  to	  signal	  credibility	  as	  a	  local	  servant	  or	  not”	  (Shugart	  et	  al,	  2005,	  pp.	  438).	  Applying	  Shugart’s	  model	  to	  English	  local	  elections,	  personal	  vote	  seeking	  behaviour	   can	   take	   many	   forms;	   from	   local	   meetings,	   to	   producing	   regular	  newsletters,	   from	   responding	   to	   local	   residents’	   queries,	   to	   networking	   with	  community	   groups.	   There	   are	   clear	   criteria	   for	   identifying	   the	   emergence	   of	  personal	  vote-­‐seeking	   incumbents	   in	  England.	  The	   literature	  suggests	   that	   they	  spend	   high	   levels	   of	   contact	   time	   with	   their	   residents.	   Campaign	   materials	  should	  inform	  voters	  that	  they	  live	  in	  and	  have	  served	  the	  area,	  have	  held	  roles	  within	   the	   authority	   or	   local	   party,	   are	   responsible	   upholders	   of	   local	   values,	  have	  skills	  and	  qualifications	  of	  particular	  relevance	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  that	  area	  and	  at	   times	  may	   demonstrate	   that	   they	   have	   chosen	   to	   distance	   themselves	   from	  national	  party	  politics.	   In	   other	  words,	   those	  who	   seriously	   employ	   a	  personal	  vote	  strategy	  in	  local	  elections	  will	  promote	  their	  personal	  and	  local	  credentials	  as	  the	  primary	  focus	  wherever	  possible.	  	  Personal	  vote	   theory	  centres	  on	   the	  premise	   that	   candidates	   for	  political	  office	  feel	   that	   emphasising	   their	   personal	   qualities	   will	   further	   their	   chances	   in	   an	  electoral	  contest.	  The	   theory	  also	   implies	   that	  exploiting	   local	  connections	  may	  be	  more	  advantageous,	  at	  times,	  than	  explicit	  political	  principles	  and	  ideology.	  At	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no	   other	   electoral	   contest	   in	   England	   do	   these	   concepts	   have	   more	   relevance	  than	  elections	  to	  local	  government.	  	  2.2	  -­‐	  Local	  Politics	  Initially,	  the	  American	  literature	  suggests	  that	  candidate	  behaviour	  may	  make	  a	  significant	   contribution	   to	   explaining	   the	   variance	   of	   local	   election	   results	   in	  England.	   For	   some,	   the	   significance	   of	   personalities	   in	  American	   congressional	  elections	  is	  “unquestioned”	  (Cain,	  Ferejohn	  &	  Fiorina,	  1987,	  p.167),	  and	  although	  political	   partisanship	   is	   widely	   agreed	   to	   have	   been	   stronger	   in	   Britain	   at	   the	  time,	  Cain	  et	  al	  (1987)	  argues	  that	  in	  British	  parliamentary	  elections	  there	  was	  a	  small	   but	   significant	   personal	   influence	   on	   the	   electoral	   support	   of	  parliamentarians	  seeking	  re-­‐election.	  As	  Cain	  et	  al	  (1987)	  continue	  “despite	  the	  relatively	  smaller	  personal	  vote	  in	  Britain,	  it	  is	  more	  than	  a	  trivial	  matter”(Cain,	  Ferejohn	  &	  Fiorina,	  1987,	  p.181).	  Though	  this	  statement	  is	  still	  something	  of	  an	  admission	   that	   parties	   dominate	   elections	   in	   England,	   it	   does	   not	   mean	   that	  incumbents,	   as	   individuals,	   cannot	   retain	   a	   significant	   electoral	   advantage.	  England	  elects	   its	   local	   representatives	  via	  plurality	  electoral	   systems	  and	  as	  a	  result,	   councillors	   being	   elected	   with	   a	   minority	   of	   votes,	   is	   a	   frequent	  occurrence.	  In	  such	  contests,	  even	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  electoral	  variance	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  consequence	  on	  the	  result.	  The	  effect	  of	  incumbency	  therefore,	  can	  be	   exacerbated	   by	   the	   electoral	   system.	   Stewart	   (2000)	   demonstrates	   that	  because	  of	   the	   relative	  homogeneity	  of	   some	   local	   authorities,	   elections	  by	   the	  plurality	   system	   can	   have	   a	   greater	   impact	   on	   local	   authorities	   than	   on	  parliamentary	  elections.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  unitary	  authority	  of	  Stoke-­‐on-­‐Trent,	  the	  local	  elections	  in	  1996	  returned	  60	  Labour	  councillors	  out	  of	  a	  council	  of	  60,	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even	   though	   other	   parties	   won	   over	   a	   third	   of	   the	   votes	   cast	   (Stewart,	   2000,	  p.129).	  This	   is	  not	  necessarily	  an	  example	  of	  60	  councillors	  winning	  because	  of	  their	   incumbency	   status,	   rather	   a	   demonstration	   of	   how	   the	  plurality	   electoral	  system	  in	  Britain	  can	  intensify	  such	  effects.	  In	  competitive	  elections,	  the	  plurality	  system	   decreases	   the	   share	   of	   the	   vote	   required	   to	   win	   and	   thus,	   in	   these	  conditions,	  even	  small	  advantages	  can	  be	  of	  enormous	  electoral	  value.	  	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   other	   facets	   of	   local	   elections	   that	   further	   intensify	   the	  value	   of	   marginal	   gains.	   As	   these	   contests	   are	   at	   a	   local-­‐level,	   voters	   are	  electorally	  close	  to	  their	  representatives.	  By	  definition	  then,	  these	  contests	  are	  a	  more	  personal	  affair.	  In	  elections	  where	  ward	  sizes	  are	  small,	  an	  average	  of	  just	  5,981	  voters	  from	  1973	  to	  2010	  (σ	  =	  3,533)	  and	  where	  turnout	  is	  also	  low	  just	  43.6%2	  during	   the	   same	   period	   (σ	   =	   13.2)	   every	   vote	   carries	   greater	   weight.	  Indeed,	  many	   local	  elections	  are	  won	  by	   the	  hundreds	  or	  even	  dozens	  of	  votes	  and	  this	  level	  of	  support	  does	  not	  need	  press	  conferences	  or	  high	  profile	  media	  appearances	   in	   order	   to	   sway	   the	   result.	   At	   this	   scale	   the	   number	   of	   people	  required	  are	  easily	  contactable	  in	  person,	  leafleted,	  emailed	  or	  phoned.	  In	  short,	  at	  this	  level	  of	  governance,	  by	  scale	  alone	  personal	  contact	  not	  only	  matters	  but,	  is	  also	  a	  realistic	  and	  perhaps	  crucial	  goal	  in	  the	  campaign	  process.	  Scale	  matters	  and	  for	  incumbents,	  smaller	  is	  better.	  	  This	   argument	   is	   supported	   by	   Lieske	   (1989)	  who	   suggests	   that	   the	   secret	   to	  success	  in	  American	  local	  politics	  seems	  to	  “depend	  critically	  on	  the	  mobilization	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  figure	  is	  for	  England	  and	  includes	  local	  elections	  that	  were	  held	  on	  the	  same	  day	  as	  General	  and	  European	  elections.	  It	  does	  not	  include	  by-­‐elections.	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and	   nurture	   of	   a	   loyal	   political	   following”	   (Lieske,	   1989,	   p.169).	   Incumbent	  candidates	  can	  become	  more	  reliant	  on	  a	  small	  but	  dependable	  group	  of	  voters	  to	   secure	   their	   position.	   At	   the	   local	   level	   voters	   have	  more	   influence	   than	   at	  national	   elections.	   This	   is	   because,	   as	   discussed	   above,	   district	   sizes	   are	  much	  smaller.	   This	   influence	   is	  magnified	   again	   by	   the	   poor	   turnout	   associated	  with	  local	   elections	   in	  both	  England	  and	   the	  United	  States.	   In	   this	   instance,	   election	  results	  can	  be	  determined	  simply	  by	  a	  motivated	  few,	  those	  who	  see	  themselves	  as	   stakeholders	   in	   their	   local	   community	   perhaps.	   This	   group	   can	   be	   a	   non-­‐representative	  pool	  of	  voters,	  well	  informed,	  engaged	  in	  the	  community	  and	  even	  politically	   loyal.	   So,	   as	   turnout	   falls,	   so	   too	  may	   the	   representativeness	   of	   that	  pool	  of	  voters	  compared	  to	  the	  wider	  population.	  A	  motivated	  group,	  such	  as	  a	  residents	   association,	   school	   committee,	   church	   or	   sports	   club	   can	   easily	  mobilise	  enough	  voters	  to	  tip	  the	  scales	  of	  a	  close	  contest,	  particularly	  as	  these	  groups	  are	   typically	  engaged	  with	   local	   issues.	  By	   implication	   then	   local	   issues	  must	  have	  some	  credible	  influence	  at	  local	  elections,	  particularly	  in	  years	  where	  turnout	   is	   not	   being	   ‘propped	  up’	   by	   simultaneous	  European	   or	   Parliamentary	  elections.	   Indeed,	   “Miller’s	   provocatively	   entitled	   Irrelevant	   Elections?	   (1988),	  found	   even	   in	   the	   1980s,	   when	  more	   of	   the	   populace	   identified	   strongly	   with	  political	   parties	   than	   they	   do	   today,	   that	   a	   great	   many	   voters	   treated	   local	  elections	  very	  much	  as	  local	  events”	  (Wilson	  &	  Game,	  2004,	  pp.	  241).	  
	   -­‐ 56%	  of	  respondents	  claimed	  to	  be	  influenced	  in	  local	  elections	  more	  by	  local	  
than	  national	  issues	  	  -­‐ 39%	  claimed	   to	   vote	  more	   for	   the	   individual	   candidate	   in	  a	   local	   election	  
than	  for	  the	  party	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-­‐ 20%	  had	  local	  party	  preferences	  different	  from	  their	  current	  national	  party	  
identification	  
(Miller,	  1988	  in	  Wilson	  &	  Game,	  2004,	  pp.	  241-­‐2)	  	  Considering	  this,	  it	  is	  clear	  not	  only	  that	  local	  elections	  are	  complex,	  but	  also	  that	  they	  are	  very	  personal	  affairs.	  As	  discussed	  above	  the	  scale	  of	  local	  elections	  will	  always	  ensure	  the	  viability	  of	  building	  a	  personal	  following,	  or	  at	  least	  having	  the	  opportunity	  to	  engage	  with	  those	  likely	  to	  vote.	  Mobilising	  just	  a	  fraction	  of	  those	  likely	   to	   turn	  out,	   in	  a	   small	   council	  ward,	  will	   take	  minimal	   resources	  most	  of	  which	  cost	  nothing	  but	  personal	  time	  and	  effort.	  As	  if	  to	  exacerbate	  the	  situation,	  due	   to	   financial	   and	   regulatory	   constraints,	   personal	   contact,	   such	   as	   ‘door	  knocking’,	  newsletters	  or	  meetings	  with	  community	  groups,	  present	  themselves	  as	  more	  attractive	  and	  viable	  methods	  through	  which	  incumbents	  can	  maintain	  contact	  with	   voters.	   Far	   from	   being	   constraints,	   these	  methods	   are	  more	   than	  enough	   to	   make	   the	   difference,	   as	   local	   political	   campaigns	   remain	   fiercely	  contested	  by	  all	  three	  major	  parties	  via	  traditional	  means.	  Even	  on	  election	  day	  there	   are	   many	   heavily	   fought	   contests	   and	   activities	   that	   go	   to	   the	   edge	   of	  legality	  (Coulson,	  2004,	  pp.	  476).	  What	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  this	  point	  is	  that	  the	  conditions	  of	  local	  elections	  magnify	  the	  value	  of	  building	  and	  nurturing	  a	  loyal	  following,	  however	  small.	  	  Although	   the	   personal	   vote	   described	   in	   sub-­‐chapter	   2.1	   is	   an	   important	  phenomenon	  within	  the	  topic	   local	  politics	  are	  also	  a	  crucial	  consideration	  and	  remain	   a	   major	   component	   of	   the	   discussion	   in	   much	   of	   the	   research.	   Local	  elections	   are	   presented	   not	   only	   as	   advantageous	   for	   incumbents	   in	   terms	   of	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their	  small	  scale	  but	  also	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  councillors	  to	  set,	  or	  at	  least	  embrace,	  the	  local	  agenda.	  Small	  neighbourhoods	  often	  have	  issues	  that	  are	  central	  to	  the	  objectives	  of	  local	  committees	  or	  associations.	  Ultimately	  councillors	  are	  there	  to	  help	   determine	   the	   policies	   of	   local	   councils,	   that	   will	   in	   turn	   deliver	   those	  policies	   in	  the	  form	  of	   local	  services,	  and	  they	  are	  also	  there	  to	  assist	  residents	  when	   those	   services	   are	   thought	  not	   to	  be	   fully	  met.	  As	   such	   a	   councillor	  who	  engages	  in	  local	  politics	  and	  works	  with	  local	  groups	  stands	  to	  make	  important	  electoral	  gains.	  The	  chapter	  now	  goes	  on	  to	  outline	  further	  aspects	  discussed	  in	  the	  literature,	  looking	  at	  selection	  effects.	  	  2.3	  -­‐	  Selection	  Effects	  The	  “selection	  effect”	  is	  a	  term	  used	  by	  Erikson	  et	  al	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  explain	  the	  prevalence	   of	   incumbency	   effects	   in	   western	   democracies	   (Erikson,	   Wright	   &	  McIver,	  1993).	  Selection	  Effect	   (SE)	  scholars	  argue	   that	   the	  pool	  of	   incumbents	  gradually	   ends	   up	   being	   ‘better	   quality’	   candidates	   than	   their	   challengers	  through	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  electoral	  process.	  This	  concept	  can	  be	  thought	  of	  as	   a	   Darwinian	   type	   approach	   to	   the	   election	   of	   representatives	   where	   more	  often	   than	   not,	   weaker	   candidates	   are	   eliminated	   at	   every	   election.	   As	   John	  Zaller’s	   title	   “Politicians	   as	   Prize	   Fighters”	   (Zaller,	   1998)	   suggests,	   the	   most	  capable	  candidate	  should	  continue	  to	  be	  victorious	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  pool	  of	  incumbents	  left	  should,	  over	  time,	  improve.	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  implications	  from	  these	  assertions.	  First,	  it	  is	  immediately	  clear	  that	  SE	  scholars	  feel	  that	  there	  must	  be	  criteria	   for	  determining	  what	   is	  a	  ‘strong’	  candidate.	  While	  it	  is	  conceivable	  that	  democratic	  systems	  will	  continue	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to	  select	  ‘strong’	  candidates,	  it	  remains	  fairly	  unclear	  as	  to	  what	  these	  credentials	  are,	  other	  than	  the	  possession	  of	  a	  set	  of	  qualities	  and	  abilities	  that	  make	  them	  more	  desirable	  to	  the	  electorate	  (Jacobson	  &	  Kernell,	  1981).	  But	  SE	  scholars	  go	  further	   than	   this,	  arguing	   that	   the	  effect	  kicks	   in	  because	  of	  a	  series	  of	   fulfilled	  circumstances	   that	  are	  somewhat	  unrelated	   to	  candidates’	  ability	   to	  push	   their	  own	  personal	  characteristics.	  The	  SE	  scholar’s	  argument	  is	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  electorate	  and	  their	  representatives	   is	   irrelevant.	  As	  Zaller	  (1998)	  states,	   “most	  members	   of	   Congress	   never	   become	   better	   known	   or	   liked	   than	  they	  were	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  first	  re-­‐election”(Zaller,	  1998,	  p.2),	  and	  perhaps	  we	  have	   the	   same	   anecdotal	   impressions	   of	   English	   local	   representatives.	   Instead,	  Zaller	   and	   others	   suggest	   that	   it	   is	   not	   what	   candidates	   do	   that	   explains	  incumbency	  effects,	  “rather	  it	  is	  how	  well	  they	  do	  it”	  (Zaller,	  1998,	  p.28),	  a	  notion	  that	   implies	   elections	   are	  won	   or	   lost	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   candidates’	   bureaucratic	  ability.	  	  Indeed	   Richard	   Fenno	   points	   out	   that	   most	   representatives	   win	   their	   first	  election	   by	   narrow	   margins	   so	   most	   victors	   aim	   to	   firm	   up	   their	   electoral	  position	   immediately	   and	   decrease	   their	   electoral	   marginality	   (Fenno,	   1978).	  The	  term	  ‘sophomore	  surge’	  is	  used	  in	  American	  political	  science	  to	  describe	  the	  increased	   relative	   vote	   share	   that	   a	   congressional	   candidate	   often	   acquires	   at	  their	   first	   election	  as	   an	   incumbent.	   SE	   scholars	   suggest	   that	   this	  phenomenon	  occurs	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  As	  explained	  above,	  there	  is	  an	  individual	  quality	  effect	  related	  to	  the	  incumbent’s	  high	  ability.	  High	  ability	  incumbents	  will	  more	  often	  have	  the	  political	  skill	  to	  get	  things	  done	  within	  their	  term	  forming	  a	  good	  political	  record	  come	  election	  day.	  As	  Zaller	  puts	  it,	  “voters	  do	  not	  need	  to	  follow	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everything	   politicians	   do	   on	   a	   day-­‐to-­‐day	   basis	   in	   order	   to	   choose	   the	   better	  politicians;	  they	  need	  only	  pay	  attention	  at	  election	  time,	  to	  what	  the	  incumbent	  has	  done	  and	  what	  the	  challenger	  promises	  to	  do”	  (Zaller,	  1998,	  p.28).	  	  Second,	   higher	   quality	   candidates	   are	   often	   able	   to	   produce	   something	   of	   a	  “Scare-­‐Off”	  effect	   (Carson,	  Engstrom	  &	  Roberts,	  2007;	  Cox	  &	  Katz,	  2002;	  Cox	  &	  Katz,	   1996;	   Cox	  &	  Morgenstern,	   1993;	   Stone,	  Maisel	  &	  Maestas,	   2004).	   This	   is	  described	  by	  Cox	  &	  Katz	  as	   “the	  ability	  of	   incumbents	   to	   scare	  off	  high	  quality	  challengers”	   from	  standing	   in	  their	  seat	  (Cox	  &	  Katz,	  1996,	  p.478).	  This	  type	  of	  practice	  can	  be,	  and	  often	  is,	   implemented	  in	  English	  local	  elections.	  During	  the	  process	  of	  selecting	  its	  candidates	  for	  an	  up-­‐coming	  election	  the	  local	  party	  may,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  utilize	  the	  candidates	  available	  to	  them	  as	  effectively	  as	  possible,	  be	   reluctant	   to	   ‘waste’	   any	   high	   quality	   candidates	   in	   safe	   opposition	   seats.	  Instead,	  the	  party	  often	  opts	  to	  let	  weaker	  or	  shorter	  serving	  ‘paper	  candidates’	  earn	  their	  service	  to	  the	  local	  party	  by	  accepting	  the	  role	  of	  cannon	  fodder	  this	  time	   around.	   In	   time,	   paper	   candidates	   may	   earn	   the	   chance	   to	   contest	   more	  viable	   seats,	   their	   case	   being	   made	   stronger	   because	   of	   their	   accumulated	  electoral	  experience.	  	  The	   ‘Retirement	  Slump’	   is	  another	  measure	   that	  some	  selection	  effect	  scholars,	  as	  well	  as	  others,	  have	  used	  to	  assess	  the	  quality	  of	  candidates	  (Gelman	  &	  King,	  1990;	   Norris	   &	   Lovenduski,	   1994;	   Stonecash,	   2008).	   Instead	   of	   examining	   the	  surge	   in	   a	   candidate’s	   vote,	   this	   measure	   assesses	   the	   electoral	   value	   that	   an	  experienced	   candidate	   brings	   to	   the	   local	   party.	   It	   is	   a	   sort	   of	   experience	  accumulator	  that	  reflects,	  “how	  much	  electoral	  advantage	  a	  party	  accrues	  when	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it	  has	  an	  experienced	  rather	  than	  inexperienced	  candidate”	  running	  (Cox	  &	  Katz,	  1996,	  p.478).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  having	  high	  quality	  and	  experienced	  candidates	  can	  benefit	   the	   party	   and	   may	   also	   benefit	   other	   less	   experienced	   candidates.	   SE	  scholars	  argue	  that	  having	  more	  experience	  on	  a	  local	  party	  slate	  can	  benefit	  the	  whole	   team	  running	   for	  control	  of	  an	  authority,	  but	  most	   importantly	  will	  give	  the	  party	  the	  best	  chance	  of	  winning	  the	  individual	  candidate’s	  seat.	  	  Zaller	   goes	   on	   to	   add	   that	   a	   politician’s	   career	   could	   essentially	   be	   explained	  through	   identifying	   their	   ‘dealt’	  measures	   of	   skill	   and	   luck.	   “The	   conception	   of	  luck	   implicit	   in	   my	   simulation	   of	   electoral	   selection	   is	   any	   kind	   of	   randomly	  occurring	   event	   that	   helps	   or	   hurts	   a	   candidate…	  National	   partisan	   swings	   are	  probably	   the	   most	   important	   form	   of	   luck,	   tides	   that	   sweep	   otherwise	   weak	  candidates	   into	  office	  and	  defeat	  even	  strong	  ones”	  (Zaller,	  1998,	  p.28).	  Clearly	  there	   are	   poor	   local	   candidates	   swept	   to	   victory	   based	   solely	   on	   the	   national	  tides	  of	  partisan	  support.	  There	  are	  also	  stronger	  candidates	  unfortunate	  enough	  to	  be	   removed	  because	  of	   the	   logo	  beside	   their	  name.	  However,	   the	   important	  point	   raised	   by	   the	   SE	   scholars’	   approach	   to	   explaining	   incumbency	   effects	   is	  that	  candidates	  differ	  in	  their	  abilities	  and	  fortune.	  It	  recognises	  the	  relevance	  of	  electoral	   accountability	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   those	   higher	   quality	   incumbents	   are	  more	   able	   to	  make	   the	  most	   of	   their	   time	   in	   office	   and	   further	   their	   electoral	  chances	   come	   election	   day	   because	   they	   have	   an	   established	   and	   respected	  political	  record.	  While	  it	  may	  appear	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  work	  towards	  building	  an	   incumbency	   advantage	   takes	   place	   during	   the	   first	   period	   of	   incumbency,	  ultimately	  the	  ‘selection	  effect’	  takes	  place	  before	  this	  period.	  It	  is	  a	  combination	  of	   the	   inherent	   ability	   of	   the	   candidate,	   the	   strategic	   nomination	   of	   their	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opponent,	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   local	   party	   and	   perhaps	   a	   little	   luck	   that	   will	  determine	  the	  length	  of	  their	  tenure.	  	  2.4	  -­‐	  Systemic	  Advantages	  This	   area	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   incumbency	   advantage	   tends	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  resources	  that	  incumbents	  are	  able	  to	  exploit	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  their	  chance	  of	  re-­‐election.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  structural	  segments	  to	  incumbency	  advantage	  that	  have	  been	  studied	  in	  detail.	  Gerrymandering	  (Forgette	  &	  Platt,	  2005)	  can	  be	  discounted	   from	   this	   project’s	   analysis	   immediately	   as	   “since	   1972,	   an	  independent	   national	   commission	   has	   been	   charged	   with	   ensuring	   that	   the	  boundaries	  of	  these	  wards	  are	  drawn	  so	  that	  each	  vote	  is	  roughly	  of	  equal	  value”	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  2004,	  p.470).	  However,	  other	  areas	  include	  greater	  access	  to	   resources,	   such	   as	   franking	   (Cover	   &	   Brumberg,	   1982;	   Jacobson,	   1997;	  Mayhew,	   1974),	   extra	   media	   coverage	   (Prior,	   2006)	   and	   campaign	   resources	  (Abramowitz,	   1991;	   Abramowitz,	   Alexander	   &	   Gunning,	   2006).	   These	   allow	  incumbents	  to	  reinforce	  their	  electoral	  position	  through	  subsidised	  promotional	  costs.	   Mayhew	   (1974)	   highlights	   how	   much	   franking	   privileges	   have	   been	   an	  intrinsic	  part	  of	  American	  Congressional	  representatives’	  continued	  promotional	  activities,	   adding;	   “it	   should	   be	   said	   that	   these	   incumbency	   advantages	   cause	  little	  displeasure	  among	  members”	  (Mayhew,	  1974,	  p.84).	  	  	  Literature	   that	   I	   class	   as	   systemic	   are	   often	   framed	   more	   as	   catalysts	   of	   an	  incumbency	   advantage,	   working	   in	   tandem	   with	   selection	   and	   the	   more	  behavioural	   effects.	   The	   ‘effect’	  may	   advantage	   strong	   candidates	   but	   can	   also	  disadvantage	   or	   expose	   weaker	   ones.	   For	   instance,	   Levitt	   &	   Wolfram	   (1997)	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question	   whether	   it	   is	   systemic	   or	   behavioural	   advantages	   that	   hold	   greater	  influence	  over	  the	  electoral	  success	  of	  incumbents.	  Whether	  or	  not	  incumbency	  advantage	   is	   gained	   from	  systemic	   advantages	   is	   ultimately	  determined	  by	   the	  ability	   of	   an	   incumbent	   to	   exploit	   the	   resources,	   or	   perks	   available	   to	   them.	  However,	  as	  with	  the	  literature	  on	  gerrymandering,	  it	  soon	  becomes	  clear	  there	  are	   problems	   when	   applying	   this	   concept	   in	   its	   entirety,	   to	   the	   English	   local	  situation.	  	  First,	   there	   is	   a	  huge	  difference	  between	   the	   level	   of	   resources	   allocated	   to	  US	  congressional	   incumbents	   at	   the	   time	  of	  Mayhew’s	   study,	   and	   that	   available	   to	  local	   councillors	   in	   England	   today.	   Most	   councillors	   receive	   a	   basic	   allowance	  well	  below	  £10,000	  and	  even	  this	  varies	  widely.	  Data	  collected	  by	  the	  TaxPayers	  Alliance	   (TPA)	   in	   2012	   shows	   that	   allowances	   in	   England	   can	   range	   from	   just	  £1,500	  in	  the	  small	  non-­‐metropolitan	  district	  of	  South	  Ribble,	  to	  £16,267	  in	  the	  larger	   and	  more	   urban	  metropolitan	   authority	   of	   Birmingham	   (TPA,	   Research	  Note	   116,	   2012).	   Councillors	   can	   also	   receive	   special	   responsibility	   stipends	  depending	   on	   their	   role	   within	   committees,	   groups,	   minor	   travel	   made,	  subsistence	   and	   any	   care	   costs.	   However,	   incumbents	   do	   not	   benefit	   from	   any	  franking	   privileges	   and	   have	   no	   paid	   staff	   dedicated	   to	   their	   political	   career.	  Though	  the	  TPA	  argues	  in	  its	  foreword	  that	  in	  some	  local	  authorities	  rising	  pay	  and	   pensions	   mean	   that	   councillors	   are	   increasingly	   treated	   as	   professional	  politicians,	   they	  also	   acknowledge	   that	   the	  majority	  of	   councillors	   receive	  only	  modest	   allowances,	   which	   are	   appropriate	   for	   a	   position	   representing	   local	  communities	   (TPA,	   Research	   Note	   116,	   2012,	   pp.1).	   Essentially	   the	   role	   is	   an	  unpaid	   one	  where	   resources	   available	   are	   severely	   limited.	   As	   a	   result,	   this	   is	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another	  area	  of	  the	  (American)	  systemic	  advantage	  literature	  that	  can	  be	  largely	  discounted	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   relevance	   to	   this	   project.	   Systemic	   Advantage	   (SA)	  scholars	  maintain	  that	  the	  emergence	  and	  increase	  in	  the	  electoral	  consequences	  of	  incumbency	  are	  in	  part	  explained	  through	  a	  series	  of	  resources	  and	  platforms	  that	   incumbent	  candidates	  have	  access,	  or	  at	   least	  greater	  access,	   to	   than	   their	  challengers.	  But	  because	  of	   strict	   regulations	   governing	  English	   local	   elections,	  differences	  in	  resources	  for	  campaigns	  are	  unlikely	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  impact.	  Since	  2006	  the	  total	  spending	  limit	   for	  a	  candidate	   in	  a	   local	  election	  campaign	  has	  been	  £600	  +5p	  per	  elector	  (Stevens,	  2006,	  pp.	  86;	  The	  Electoral	  Commission,	  2012).	  It	  is	  hard	  therefore,	  to	  foresee	  campaign	  finance	  or	  institutional	  perks	  as	  having	  any	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  local	  elections.	  	  Of	   all	   the	   ‘perks’	   available	   to	   councillors	   perhaps	   regular	   coverage	   in	   the	   local	  media	   may	   feature	   as	   the	  most	   likely	   component	   of	   the	   SA	   literature	   to	   have	  some	  tangible	  application	  to	  the	  English	  situation.	  Stewart	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  say	  that	   it	   is	   through	   the	   local	  media	   that	   authorities	   reach	   out	   to	   the	   public,	   and	  through	   the	   media	   that	   they	   may	   hear	   the	   voices	   of	   the	   public,	   or	   what	   may	  appear	   to	   be	   so	   (Stewart,	   2000,	   pp.	   270-­‐1).	   However,	   at	   the	   same	   time	   other	  authors	  would	  question	  the	  principal	  discourse	  within	  the	  media	  regarding	  local	  electoral	  contests.	  For	  instance,	  Rallings	  &	  Thrasher	  argue	  that	  local	  elections	  are	  increasingly	   seen	   within	   the	   media	   as	   a	   reflection	   of	   national	   politics.	   Local	  authorities	  had	  once	  exercised	   substantial	  power	  over	  voters’	   lives,	  but	   after	   a	  series	  of	  legislative	  changes,	  which	  have	  restricted	  the	  local	  scope	  and	  autonomy	  of	   authorities,	   the	   administrative	   importance	  of	   local	   government	  has	  declined	  significantly.	  Thus,	   the	  paradox	  presented	   is	   one	  where	  media	   interest	   in	   local	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government	  has	  risen	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  its	  powers	  have	  diminished;	  leading	  to	  the	  assumption	  that	  media	  interest	  in	  local	  politics	  is	  a	  mere	  reflection	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  local	  elections	  have	  been	  elevated	  into	  national	  events	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  pp.	  208-­‐9).	  	  Regardless,	   councillors	   can	   and	   regularly	   do	   feature	   within	   local	   media,	  especially	  those	  with	  special	  responsibilities.	  Councillors	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  have	   greater	   access	   to	   the	   local	   media	   than	   their	   potential	   challengers,	  particularly	   throughout	   the	   midterm	   as	   for	   many	   wards	   no	   challenger	   would	  have	  yet	  been	  selected.	  This	  access	  will	  not	  always	  be	  positive;	  perhaps	  it	  could	  be	  something	  of	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword,	  at	  times	  doing	  greater	  harm	  than	  good.	  However,	   in	   the	   main,	   it	   is	   incumbents	   that	   will	   have	   a	   local	   platform	   to	  grandstand	  throughout	  their	  term,	  challengers	  will	  not.	  	  2.5	  –	  Candidate	  Behaviour	  &	  Campaigns	  Behavioural	   scholars	   examine	   the	   actions	   of	   incumbents	   and	   their	   challengers.	  Whereas	  the	  sub-­‐chapters	  above	  have	  been	  concerned	  with	  aspects	  such	  as	  the	  personal	   qualities	   of	   candidates,	   resources	   and	   conditions	   that	   favour	  incumbents,	   behavioural	   scholars	   are	   primarily	   concerned	   with	   the	   electoral	  campaign	   and	   the	   methods	   used	   by	   different	   types	   of	   candidate.	   Candidates’	  behaviour	   is	   of	   great	   interest	   to	   scholars	   of	   incumbency	   advantage	   because	  unlike	  other	  more	  commonly	  researched	  variables,	  behavioural	  factors	  are	  much	  more	   malleable.	   Indeed,	   this	   area	   of	   research	   is	   of	   great	   interest	   to	   political	  scientists	   because	   it	   “reflects	   a	   principal	   feature	   of	   the	   single-­‐member	   district	  plurality	  electoral	  system.	  The	  distinction	  between	  the	  interests	  and	  fortunes	  of	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an	   individual	   representative	   and	   those	   of	   any	   collectivity;	   especially	   party	   to	  which	   he	   or	   she	   may	   belong”	   (Cain,	   Ferejohn	   &	   Fiorina,	   1984,	   p.111).	  Symbolically	   at	   least,	   the	   growing	   level	   of	   research	   on	   candidates’	   behaviour	  represents	  how	  important	  it	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  cues	  voters	  respond	  to	  in	  local	  political	  contests.	  If	  incumbency	  does	  carry	  some	  degree	  of	  electoral	  value,	  as	  the	  American	  literature	  suggests,	  then	  those	  councillors	  who	  are	  successful	  may	  hold	  commonly	   identifiable	  behaviours	  and	  attitudes.	  That	   is	   to	  say	   those	  particular	  behaviours	  may	  be	  more	  conducive	  to	  electoral	  success	  and	  because	  these	  traits	  can	   be	   learned,	   incumbent	   councillors,	   especially	   those	  with	  more	   experience,	  will	  have	  greater	  opportunity	  than	  their	  challengers	  to	  adopt	  and	  execute	  these	  methods	  effectively.	  	  Within	  the	  American	  literature,	  there	  is	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  research	  suggesting	  that	  a	  general	  change	  in	  the	  behaviour	  of	   incumbent	  members	  of	  Congress	  during	  the	  1960’s,	  aided	  a	  gradual	   increase	  in	  their	  re-­‐election	  rate.	  Incumbent	  candidates	  began	  to	  spend	  more	  of	  their	  time	  tending	  to	  their	  constituent’s	  needs	  or	  queries	  and	  breaking	  from	  their	  own	  party	  on	  single	  or	  locally	  orientated	  issues.	  Gaines	  states	  that	  “what	  most	  observers	  think	  happened	  in	  the	  U.S.	   is	  that	   incumbents	  sensed	   an	   increased	   voter	   receptivity	   to	   non-­‐partisan,	   non-­‐programmatic	   cues	  and	   then	   wisely	   put	   the	   prerequisites	   of	   power	   to	   use	   building	   war-­‐chests	   of	  personal	  popularity	  that	  could	  withstand	  party	  tides.	  This	   is	  why	  personal	  vote	  and	   incumbency	   advantage	   are	   taken	   to	   be	   bedfellows”	   (Gaines,	   1998,	   p.188).	  Since	  the	  1950’s	  there	  has	  been	  a	  growing	  body	  of	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  general	  behaviour	  of	  political	  candidates	  has	  shifted	  somewhat.	  Alford	  &	  Brady	  support	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  period	  in	  U.S.	  politics,	  by	  stating	  that	  it	  holds	  “the	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key	   to	   understanding	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   personal	   vote”	   (Alford	   &	   Brady,	   1993,	  p.152),	   as	   has	   been	   detailed	   in	   section	   2.1	   .	   It	  would	   seem	   that	   a	   new	   kind	   of	  representative	  has	  emerged,	  less	  concerned	  with	  principle,	  ideology,	  or	  forming	  legislation	  and	  more	  concerned	  with	  his	  or	  her	  own	  job	  security.	  	  	  This	   behavioural	   shift	   has	   been	   acknowledged	   in	   British	   political	   science	   also.	  Austin	   Mitchell	   neatly	   illustrates	   a	   divergence	   in	   the	   attitudes	   of	   Members	   of	  Parliament,	   pre	   and	   post-­‐1960’s,	   in	   Westminster	   Man,	   stating	   “a	   Labour	  newcomer	  in	  1945	  told	  of	  his	  first	  visit	  to	  the	  constituency	  after	  the	  election.	  A	  top-­‐hatted	   station	  master	   met	   him	   to	   ask	   whether	   he	   would	   be	   following	   the	  previous	  Member	  in	  paying	  his	  annual	  visit	  at	  that	  time	  of	  year”	  (Mitchell,	  1982,	  p.183).	  Subsequently,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  scholarly	  interest	  focused	  on	  the	   level	   of	   attention	   paid	   by	   representatives	   to	   their	   constituencies.	   For	  instance,	   Norton	   &	   Wood	   (1990)	   argue,	   “the	   contrast	   between	   the	   leisurely,	  largely	   untroubled	   (by	   constituents,	   that	   is)	   days	   of	   the	   1950’s	   and	   the	   hectic	  pace	   of	   the	   1980’s	   is	   marked.	   Of	   the	   extensive	   work	   undertaken	   on	   behalf	   of	  constituents,	   not	   all	   is	   reactive.	   There	   is	   evidence	   that	   a	   significant	   number	   of	  Members	  adopt	  a	  proactive	  approach,	  actively	  soliciting	  constituency	  casework”	  (Norton	  &	  Wood,	  1990,	  p.199).	  The	  evidence	  from	  Norton	  &	  Wood	  is	  supportive	  of	  the	  suggestion	  that	  a	  career	  politician	  may	  have	  emerged	  in	  British	  politics,	  i.e.	  people	   who	   regard	   politics	   as	   their	   line	   of	   business.	   Indeed,	   when	   defining	   a	  career	  politician,	  Anthony	  King	  described	  them	  as	  “hooked.	  Politics	  is	  his	  life,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  doctoring	  is	  the	  life	  of	  most	  medical	  doctors,	  lawyering	  the	  life	  of	  most	   lawyers	  and	  political	   science	   the	   life	  of	  most	  political	   scientists”	   (King,	  1981,	   p.250).	   The	   perception	   of	   IA	   behavioural	   scholars,	   that	   increased	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constituency	  service	  will	  foster	  stronger	  relationships	  between	  incumbents	  and	  constituents,	   is	   now	   a	   familiar	   concept	   in	   the	   study	   of	   national	   politics	  (Abramowitz,	  Alexander	  &	  Gunning,	  2006;	  Fenno,	  1978).	  	  According	  to	  the	  literature,	  incumbents	  can	  undertake	  ‘constituency	  service’	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways;	  some	  explicit,	  some	  facilitating	  and	  some	  simply	  inferred	  (Alford	  &	   Brady,	   1993;	   Cain,	   Ferejohn	   &	   Fiorina,	   1987;	   Fiorina,	   1977;	   Gaines,	   1998;	  Herrera	  &	  Yawn,	  1999).	  As	  Larry	  Bartels	  puts	   it,	   rational	  candidates	  seeking	  to	  maximise	   their	   electoral	   prospects	  must	   “go	   hunting	  where	   the	   ducks	   are”,	   so	  incumbents	  must	  respond	  by	  tailoring	  their	  agenda	  to	  those	  prospective	  voters	  who	   are	   likely	   to	   turn	   out	   (Bartels,	   1998,	   p.43).	   Practically	   then,	   behavioural	  scholars	  maintain	  that	   incumbent	  candidates	  are	  successful	  because	  during	  the	  campaign	  they	  are	  able	  to	  emphasize	  the	  regular	  support	  they	  give	  to	  residents	  throughout	   their	   term.	   Assistance	   for	   residents,	   as	   well	   as	   advice,	   raising	  questions	  to	  their	  local	  Member	  of	  Parliament	  and	  help	  promoting	  campaigns	  on	  local	   issues	   are	   all	   examples	  of	   forms	  of	   constituency	   service.	  Though	  many	  of	  the	  requests	  from	  residents	  may	  appear	  trivial,	  this	  attention	  is	  important	  at	  the	  local	   level,	  as	  it	   is	  councillors	  that	  explain,	  advise	  or	  assist	  residents,	  or	  at	   least	  try	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  doing	  so.	  Challengers	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  are	  not	  afforded	  the	  same	  opportunity.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  entire	  term	  of	  a	  politician	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  campaign.	   For	  behavioural	   scholars,	   successful	   communication	   and	   responding	  to	   resident’s	   needs	   is	   a	   key	   facet	   of	   maintaining	   a	   well-­‐serviced	   constituency.	  High	  politics	  doesn’t	   serve	   to	  protect	   the	   candidate	   from	   inevitable	  backlashes	  against	   his	   or	   her	   party,	  whereas	   being	   seen	   as	   a	   local	   facilitator,	   or	   at	   least	   a	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local	  campaigner,	  empowers	  candidates	  and	  helps	  to	  put	  them	  in	  greater	  control	  of	  their	  own	  political	  career.	  	  Rallings	   &	   Thrasher	   substantiate	   this	   distancing	   between	   local	   election	  candidates	   and	   the	   political	   party	   with	   evidence	   of	   split	   ticketing	   in	   British	  elections.	   They	   comment,	   “political	   parties	   increasingly	   need	   to	   realise	   that	  targeted,	  localised	  campaigning	  is	  important	  at	  all	  levels.	  The	  national	  campaign	  sets	  the	  scene,	  but	  only	  activity	  on	  the	  ground	  can	  maximise	  effective	  votes	  at	  the	  ballot	  box”	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  2003,	  pp.	  569).	  The	  practical	  benefit	  of	  a	  loyal	  local	   following	   is	   that	   it	  can	  allow	  an	   incumbent	   to	   ‘weather	   the	  storm’	  against	  his	  or	  her	  party.	  If	  a	  party	  that	  is	  unpopular	  at	  the	  time	  controls	  the	  authority,	  a	  candidate	  can	  distance	  themselves	  from	  the	  national	  party	  up	  to	  and	  during	  the	  campaign,	  by	  tailoring	  their	  agenda	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  local	  residents.	  However,	  in	   acknowledging	   that	   incumbent	   candidates	   must	   respond	   to	   local	   events	   by	  adapting	  their	  behaviour,	  there	  remain	  further	  questions	  regarding	  the	  effect	  of	  community	  on	  the	  electoral	  fortunes	  of	  candidates.	  	  2.6	  -­‐	  Community	  There	  is	  wide	  array	  of	  research	  suggesting	  that	  geography	  may	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  re-­‐election	  of	  local	  councillors	  (Miller,	  1988;	  Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997a;	   Rallings,	   Thrasher	   &	   Gunter,	   1998;	   Waller,	   1980).	   That	   is	   to	   say	   that	  research	  indicates	  that	  those	  councillors	  in	  rural	  communities	  may	  enjoy	  greater	  chances	  of	  re-­‐election	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  more	  densely	  populated	  towns	  and	  cities	  where	  the	  population	  is	  more	  transient.	  William	  Miller	  (1988)	  argues	  that	   “there	   is	   a	   tendency	   in	   rural	   areas	   towards	   a	   lack	   of	   contest	   because	   the	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incumbent	  councillor	   is	  personally	  known	   to	  his	  electors	  who	  may	  not	  wish	   to	  give	   offence	   by	   opposing	   him”	   (Miller,	   1988,	   p.65).	   Miller’s	   summation	   of	   the	  ‘polite	  British	  voter’	  who	  wishes	  not	  to	  offend	  their	  fellow	  townsman	  is	  perhaps	  a	   simplistic	   explanation	   of	   the	   difference	   between	   urban	   and	   rural	   districts.	  However,	   in	  Local	  Elections	   in	  Britain	   (1997),	   Rallings	  &	   Thrasher	   support	   the	  idea	  of	  community	  effects,	  providing	  some	  evidence	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  suggestion	  that	  incumbency	  may	  have	  stronger	  effects	  in	  more	  rural	  districts.	  Rallings	  et	  al	  (1998)	   reiterate	   their	   support	   for	   this	   notion	   stating,	   “voters	   in	   the	   Shires	  appeared	  either	  more	  able	  or	  more	  willing	  to	  recognise	  a	  former	  councillor	  than	  those	  voting	   in	  London	  authorities.	  This	  suggests	   that	   individuals	   from	  smaller	  districts	   in	  rural	  areas	  have	  a	  better	  chance	  of	  becoming	  known	  as	  councillors”	  (Rallings,	  Thrasher	  &	  Gunter,	  1998,	  p.121).	  This	  study	  compared	  multimember	  wards	  from	  the	  London	  Boroughs	  and	  English	  shire	  councils.	  While	  the	  authors	  may	   have	   positively	   identified	   a	   voting	   pattern,	   or	   simply	   tendencies	  differentiated	   by	   geographies,	   there	   is	   plenty	   of	   scope	   to	   investigate	   the	  phenomenon	  further.	  	  One	  possible	  explanation	  may	  be	  that	  the	  voting	  population	  in	  rural	  areas	  is	  less	  transient	   and	   therefore	   less	   inclined	   to	   change.	   This	   in	   turn	   gives	   a	   greater	  impetus	  towards	  establishing	  a	  political	  bond	  between	  the	  voter	  and	  candidate.	  Another	   explanation	   may	   be	   that	   densely	   populated	   areas	   are	   perhaps	   more	  likely	  to	  have	  greater	  population	  mobility,	  which	  will	  result	   in	  residents	  having	  less	   of	   a	   social	   investment	   in	   their	   own	   community.	   Rallings	   et	   al	   go	   further,	  stating	  that	  “shire	  elections	  can	  take	  place	  in	  relatively	  small	  authorities	  with	  a	  stable	  population,	  where	  scope	  for	  candidates	  to	  nurture	  a	  “personal”	  vote	  might	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be	   considered	   better	   than	   in	   the	   de-­‐personalised	   atmosphere	   of	   a	  major	   city”	  (Rallings,	  Thrasher	  &	  Gunter,	  1998,	  p.115).	  Yet	  another	  explanation,	  as	  detailed	  by	   Malcolm	  Moseley,	   is	   that	   residents	   of	   more	   remote	   communities	   are	   more	  demanding	  when	   it	   comes	   to	  having	   a	   say	   in	  decisions	   that	   are	   likely	   to	   affect	  them.	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  get	  involved	  in	  the	  support	  and	  delivery	   of	   local	   services	   and	   are	   generally	   more	   engaged	   with	   local	   politics	  because	   they	   tend	   to	  depend	  on	   local	   services	  more	   (Moseley,	   2007).	   It	  would	  seem	  then,	  that	  from	  the	  outset	  community	  effects	  may	  frame	  any	  discussion	  on	  the	  electoral	  advantage	  of	  incumbent	  candidates.	  	  2.7	  –	  Parties	  A	  key	  difference	  between	  the	  American	  and	  English	  situation	  is	  that	  traditionally,	  British	  elections	  are	  often	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  parties	  that	  contest	  them	  rather	  than	   the	   individuals.	  Austin	  Mitchell	   has	   suggested	   for	  parliamentary	   elections	  that	  “our	  party	  system	  was	  strong,	  and	  most	  seats	  were	  so	  safe	  that	  MPs	  could	  more	   safely	   ignore	   them,	   a	   marked	   contrast	   with	   the	   USA	   where	   frequent	  elections	  and	  weaker	  parties	  make	  the	  constituency	  all	  important…our	  MPs	  were	  better	   at	   representing	   classes	   than	   constituencies”	   (Mitchell,	   1982,	  p.182).	  The	  fact	   remains	   that	   at	   both	   parliamentary	   and	   local	   levels,	   parties	   have	  traditionally	   been	   seen	   as	   such	   a	   strong	   influence	   on	   the	   result,	   that	   many	  political	   commentators	   rate	   elected	   representatives	   as	   mere	   pawns.	   Gaines	  illustrates	   this	   point	   by	   arguing	   that	   the	   “conventional	   accounts	   of	   modern	  British	   elections	   emphasize	   parties	   and	   issues	   and	   make	   no	   mention	   of	  individual	   candidates	   other	   than	   their	   party	   leaders.	   This	   is	   true	   not	   only	   of	  journalistic	  political	  analysis	   in	  Britain,	  but	  also	  of	  British	  political	  science.	  The	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received	  wisdom	   is	   that	   local	   candidates	  are	  nothing	  more	   than	   ‘lobby	   fodder”	  (Gaines,	   1998,	   p.168).	   Norton	   &	   Wood	   go	   further	   saying	   that	   any	   “talk	   of	   a	  ‘personal	   vote’,	   a	   candidate	   attracting	   votes	   because	   of	   the	   qualities	   that	   are	  particular	   to	  him,	   is	   ascribed	   to	  wishful	   thinking	  on	   the	  part	   of	   the	   candidates	  (justifying	  their	  existence)	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  election	  correspondents,	  to	  the	  need	  to	   fill	   column	   space	   or	   air	   time”	   (Norton	   &	   Wood,	   1990,	   p.196).	   And	   finally,	  Phillip	  Williams’	   famous	   quote	   from	   the	   veteran	   election	   agent	  who	   once	   said	  that	  “no	  candidate	  is	  worth	  500	  votes”	  (Williams,	  1967,	  p.13)	  epitomises	  a	  view	  regularly	  held	  about	  candidates	  for	  English	  local	  government.	  	  Most	   of	   the	   examples	   described	   above	   are	   directed	   at	   British	   parliamentary	  elections,	  but	  parties	  are	  just	  as	  important	  at	  the	  local	  level	  of	  government.	  “Most	  council	   candidates	   contest	   elections	   on	   behalf	   of	   registered	   political	   parties.	  Although	   independents	  do	  get	  elected	   (10	  per	   cent	  of	  all	   councillors,	  mostly	   in	  rural	   areas),	   it	   remains	   the	   case	   that	   a	   party	   label	   often	   assists	   voters	   and	  enables	   candidates	   to	   receive	   campaigning	   support	   in	   their	   bid	   to	   secure	  election”	  (Stevens,	  2006,	  p.89).	  In	  this	  sense	  we	  can	  suppose	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  political	  party	  at	   the	   local	   level	  will	  be	   similar	   to	   that	  at	   a	  parliamentary	   level,	  but	   more	   importantly,	   that	   parties	   are	   the	   principal	   route	   through	   which	  candidates	  enter	  and	  maintain	   their	   career	  as	  a	   local	   councillor.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	  parties	   dominate	   elections	   at	   all	   levels	   in	   England,	   so	   if	   there	   are	   significant	  incumbency	   effects,	   they	   are	   unlikely	   to	   rival	   the	   influence	   of	   party	   affiliation.	  However,	   even	   if	   incumbency	   were	   worth	   just	   100	   votes,	   a	   fraction	   of	   the	  example	   described	   by	   Williams	   in	   1967,	   there	   will	   have	   been	   a	   substantial	  number	  of	  different	  electoral	  outcomes	   in	  England	  since	  1972.	  As	  noted	  above	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effects	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  large	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	   local	   councils.	  According	   to	  data	   collected	  by	  The	  Elections	  Centre,	   some	  5,936	  incumbent	  candidates	  have	  secured	  their	  seat	  by	  a	  margin	  of	  100	  votes	  or	  less	  between	  1974	  and	  2010.	  	  The	  literature	  also	  acknowledges	  that	  party	  organisation	  is	  a	  crucial	  component	  of	  the	  local	  electoral	  campaign	  (Bochel	  &	  Denver,	  1972;	  Cutts,	  2004	  &	  2006)	  and	  by	  extension	   the	   fortunes	  of	  councillors	  defending	   their	  seats.	  Different	  parties	  will	  no	  doubt	   facilitate	   the	  performance	  of	   their	  candidates	  differently	  and	  this	  will	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  how	  well	   they	  are	  organised.	  For	   instance,	   the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  local	  Liberal	  Democrat	  campaign	  (Cutts,	  2006)	  has	  helped	  scholars	  of	  British	  political	   science	  understand	   the	  crucial	   role	  of	  well-­‐established	  councillors	  and	  well-­‐maintained	  councils	   in	  the	  wider	  success	  of	  a	  political	  party	  (Dorling	  et	  al,	  2005).	   Research	   from	   local	   elections	   in	   America	   has	   also	   emphasized	   the	  importance	   of	   local	   party	   organisation	   during	   the	   electoral	   campaign,	  demonstrating	  their	  efficacy	  in	  translating	  contact	  time	  with	  residents	  into	  votes.	  The	  success	  with	  which	  local	  door-­‐to-­‐door	  campaigns	  has	  mobilised	  voters	  was	  “especially	  impressive	  given	  the	  meagre	  budgets	  on	  which	  these	  campaigns	  are	  operated…experimental	   results	   suggest	   that	  12	   successful	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   contacts	  translated	  into	  one	  additional	  vote”	  (Green	  et	  al,	  2003,	  pp.	  1,094).	  So	  as	  well	  as	  considering	   campaigns,	   it	   is	   important	   also	   to	   consider	  parties	   throughout	   any	  investigation	   into	   incumbency	   advantage,	   as	   the	   effect	   may	   have	   subtle	  variations	   across	   the	   parties	   due	   to	   different	   organisational	   structures	   or	  practices.	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2.8	  –	  Analytical	  Structure	  Considering	   the	   literature	   just	   outlined	   the	   chapters	   that	   follow	   have	   been	  divided	   into	   themes	   of	   contextual	   relevance.	   Each	   chapter	   aims	   to	   clarify	  propositions	  raised	  by	  the	  literature	  regarding	  the	  effects	  of	   incumbency	  in	  the	  English	   situation.	   Each	   chapter	  may	   encompass	   a	   number	   of	   hypotheses,	   thus	  chapters	   are	   further	   divided	   into	   sub-­‐chapters	   with	   the	   express	   intention	   of	  assessing	  a	  particular	  premise	  or	  general	  hypothesis	  within	  the	  theme.	  	  Chapter	  3	  details	  the	  methods	  and	  data	  used	  for	  the	  project	  and	  goes	  on	  to	  detail	  various	   sets	   of	   data	   used,	   as	   well	   as	   methods	   employed	   to	   make	   objective	  assessments.	  The	  project	  is	  principally	  a	  quantitative	  examination	  of	  incumbency	  effects	  in	  England	  at	  the	  local	  level	  and	  where	  possible	  its	  methods	  are	  guided	  by	  the	  literature.	  The	  chapter	  also	  details	  how	  the	  three	  major	  sets	  of	  data	  obtained	  are	   used.	   These	   include;	   aggregate	   electoral	   data	   provided	   by	   The	   Elections	  Centre	   database	   at	   Plymouth	   University,	   results	   from	   annual	   Local	   Elections	  Candidate	   Surveys	   as	   well	   as	   2001	   rural/urban	   information	   provided	   by	   the	  Office	  for	  National	  Statistics	  (ONS).	  It	  further	  describes	  variables	  used,	  including	  those	  constructed	  for	  the	  specific	  purpose	  of	  the	  project.	  	  After	  the	  data	  and	  methods	  are	  outlined,	  the	  thesis	  is	  split	  into	  five	  major	  results	  chapters,	   each	   based	   on	   broad	   themes	   concerned	   with	   a	   particular	   facet	   of	  incumbency	  advantage.	  	  Chapter	   4	   is	   titled	   Competition	  &	   Incumbent	   Success	   in	   English	   Local	   Elections.	  The	   objective	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   present	   an	   overview	   of	   local	   elections	   in	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England	  over	  the	  period	  examined.	  This	   is	  done	  from	  a	  perspective	  of	  electoral	  competitiveness	   and	   the	   relative	   success	   of	   incumbent	   candidates	   choosing	   to	  stand	   again.	   The	   chapter	   first	   examines	   seat	   contestation	   with	   a	   view	   to	  assessing	  competition	  in	  local	  elections	  over	  time.	  Data	  discussed	  show	  a	  gradual	  growth	   in	   the	   seats	   contested	   for	   local	   government	   over	   the	   thirty	   six	   years	  examined,	   this	   is	   shown	   to	   be	   principally	   due	   to	   the	   growth	   of	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats,	   independents	   and	   minor	   party	   candidates.	   After	   this	   the	   chapter	  moves	   on	   to	   contestation	   rates	   for	   incumbent	   candidates,	   revealing	   a	   slight	  growth	  in	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  incumbent	  candidates	  choose	  to	  stand	  again.	  Finally,	  the	  chapter	  examines	  trends	  in	  the	  success	  of	  incumbent	  councillors	  standing	  for	  re-­‐election	   over	   the	   period.	   Overall,	   chapter	   4	   is	   designed	   to	   serve	   as	   an	  introduction	   to	   local	   election	   results	   in	   England,	   setting	   the	   electoral	   scene	  within	  which	  to	  contextualise	  data	  in	  those	  chapters	  that	  follow.	  	  Chapter	   5	   is	   titled	   Estimating	   Incumbency	   Advantage:	   Winners,	   Losers	   &	  
Experience	  Effects.	  The	  chapter	  offers	  estimations	  of	  incumbency	  effects	  through	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  estimating	  models,	  some	  derived	  from	  the	  theory	  and	  others	  constructed	  solely	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  project.	  It	  also	  considers	  the	  impact	  of	   candidates’	   experience	  on	   their	  electoral	  performance.	  The	   following	  general	  hypotheses	  are	  considered:	  	   -­‐ Incumbents	  do	  better	  than	  freshmen	  in	  English	  local	  elections	  -­‐ Incumbent	   sophomores	   do	   better	   than	   their	   freshmen	   colleagues	   (i.e.	  there	  is	  evidence	  for	  a	  Sophomore	  Surge	  in	  English	  local	  elections)	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-­‐ Retiring	   councillors	   do	   better	   than	   incoming	   freshmen	   (i.e.	   there	   is	  evidence	  for	  a	  Retirement	  Slump)	  -­‐ Incumbent	  losers	  do	  better	  than	  freshmen	  losers	  -­‐ More	  experienced	  councillors	  do	  better	  than	  less	  experienced	  councillors	  	  Beginning	  with	  an	  analysis	  of	  winning	  candidates	  in	  local	  elections,	  the	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  compare	  the	  performances	  of	  incumbents	  and	  freshmen.	  Results	  show	  a	  consistent	   performance	   gap	   in	   favour	   of	   councillors	   seeking	   re-­‐election.	   After	  this	  two	  unbiased	  models	  are	  presented	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  measuring	  Sophomore	  Surge	  and	  Retirement	  Slump	  effects.	  Models	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  theory,	  which	  is	   well	   established	   in	   the	   literature.	   Results	   from	   both	  models	   indicate	   a	  mild	  advantage	   for	   incumbent	   candidates.	   Using	   both	   these	   measures,	   the	   chapter	  goes	   on	   to	   assess	   the	   effect	   of	   candidate	   experience	   on	   electoral	   performance.	  Results	   indicate	  that	  a	  candidate’s	  experience	  may,	  to	  varying	  degrees	  between	  the	   parties,	   add	   to	   their	   electoral	   performance.	   Finally,	   using	   data	   for	   losing	  candidates	   in	  English	   local	  elections,	   two	   further	  estimators	  are	  constructed	   to	  assess	   any	   effect	   of	   incumbency	   in	   situations	   where	   councillors	   lose.	   Both	  models	  are	  experimental	  and	  developed	  with	  the	  express	  intention	  of	  assessing	  incumbent	  performance	   in	  a	  comparatively	  equitable	  and	  measurable	  scenario.	  Results	   revealed	   are	   similar	   in	   magnitude	   with	   that	   discussed	   for	   Sophomore	  Surge	  and	  Retirement	  Slump	  models	  detailed	  earlier,	  showing	  a	  mild	  advantage	  for	  incumbent	  candidates.	  	  Chapter	  6	  examines	  any	  effects	  of	  election	  structure	  on	   incumbency	  advantage	  and	   is	   titled	  Administrative	  Mitigations	  on	   Incumbent	  Performance.	  The	   chapter	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assesses	  councillor	  performance	  across	  district	  magnitudes	  and	  electoral	  cycles,	  for	  differences	  in	  the	  relative	  vote	  share	  of	  councillors	  and	  whether	  these	  votes	  are	  new	  or	  come	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  others.	  The	  chapter	  addresses	  the	  following	  broad	  hypotheses:	  	   -­‐ Incumbency	  advantage	  weakens	  as	  the	  number	  of	  vacancies	  increases	  -­‐ Incumbents	   are	   safer	   electorally	   in	   quadrennial	   electoral	   cycles	   than	  elections	  by	  thirds	  	  The	   results	   for	   the	   effect	   of	   district	   magnitude	   show	   a	   weakening	   of	   any	  advantage	   associated	   with	   incumbency	   as	   district	   magnitude	   increases.	   The	  incumbent	   performance	  measures	   described	   in	   chapter	   5	   are	   used	   to	   reveal	   a	  performance	  gap	  between	  those	  in	  two	  member	  and	  three	  member	  wards.	  Also,	  incumbents	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  most	  likely	  of	  success,	  relatively,	  in	  single	  member	  wards.	   Finally,	   electoral	   cycles	   are	   considered	   for	   their	   effects.	   The	   data	   are	  largely	   unclear	   and	   fail	   to	   lend	   any	   significant	  weight	   in	   support	   of	  mitigating	  effects	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  incumbent	  candidates.	  	  Titled	  Structural	  Effects,	  chapter	  7	  looks	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  electorates,	  turnout	  and	  rural/urban	   composition	   on	   incumbent	   performance.	   The	   chapter	   seeks	   to	  address	  the	  following	  general	  hypotheses:	  	   -­‐ Smaller	   geographies	   will	   offer	   more	   favourable	   conditions	   for	   the	   re-­‐election	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  -­‐ Turnout	  is	  lower	  when	  incumbent	  candidates	  are	  not	  contesting	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-­‐ Rural	   communities	  will	   offer	  more	   favourable	   conditions	   for	   incumbent	  candidates	  	  After	   examining	   the	   literature,	   the	   consensus	   appears	   to	   be	   that	   smaller	  geographies	   are	   more	   conducive	   to	   cultivating	   an	   electoral	   advantage.	   This	  chapter	  examines	  electorate	  size	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  comparing	  small	  and	  large	  electoral	  communities.	  The	  data	  imply	  that	  smaller	  wards	  offer	  more	  favourable	  conditions	   for	   councillors	   to	   retain	   their	   seats.	   Variations	   in	   turnout	   are	   also	  considered	  in	  chapter	  7.	  As	  before,	  data	  revealed	  show	  that	  turnout	  rises	  slightly	  in	  wards	  where	  sophomore	  candidates	  decide	  to	  defend	  their	  seat.	  An	  unbiased	  model	  is	  offered	  to	  estimate	  the	  average	  rise	  for	  each	  of	  the	  three	  major	  parties.	  Finally,	   the	   chapter	   seeks	   to	   assess	   the	   effect	   of	   a	   ward’s	   urban	   status	   on	  incumbency	   advantage.	   Urban	   effects	   are	   examined	   to	   ascertain	  whether	   rural	  districts	  offer	  more	  favourable	  conditions	  for	  incumbents	  than	  do	  urban	  ones,	  as	  well	  as	  estimating	  any	  difference	  between	  them.	  	  Chapter	  8	   is	   titled	  Candidates’	  Attitudes	  &	  Behaviour	  and	  discusses	  results	   from	  the	   Election	   Centre’s	   Annual	   Candidate	   Survey.	   The	   chapter	   presents	   results	  primarily	   from	  incumbency	  questions	   in	  the	  2011	  and	  2012	  candidate	  surveys,	  as	  well	   as	  data	   from	  existing	  questions	  on	   the	  behaviour	  of	   candidates	   in	   local	  government	  elections	  with	  varying	  electoral	  experience.	  Three	  broad	  themes	  are	  covered	  in	  this	  chapter:	  	   -­‐ Incumbent	  candidates	  have	  greater	  administrative	  experience	  	  -­‐ Incumbent	  candidates	  have	  a	  greater	  public	  profile	  than	  their	  challengers	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-­‐ Incumbent	  candidates	  are	  better	  campaigners	  than	  their	  challengers	  	  The	   chapter	   begins	   by	   examining	   experiential	   effects	   associated	   with	   greater	  incumbent	  success.	  Respondents	  overwhelmingly	  felt	  that	  incumbent	  councillors	  were	   advantaged,	   that	   councillor’s	   greater	   experience	   from	   working	   on	   the	  council	   helped	   them	   to	   secure	   re-­‐election	   and	   that	   local	   support	   is	   more	  consistent	  and	  reliable	  for	  incumbent	  candidates.	  	  The	   chapter	   then	   goes	   on	   to	   discuss	   data	   concerned	  with	   the	   public	   profile	   of	  incumbent	   candidates.	   Data	   for	   all	   types	   of	   respondent	   imply	   that	   councillors	  defending	   their	   seat	   enjoy	   a	  higher	   local	  profile	   than	   their	   challengers	   and	  are	  advantaged	   by	   this	   on	   election	   day.	   Respondents	   tended	   also	   to	   suggest	   that	  incumbents	  benefit	  from	  a	  stronger	  relationship	  with	  the	  local	  media.	  	  	  It	   then	  moves	   on	   to	   assess	   data	   regarding	   campaigns.	   Not	   only	   do	   the	   results	  suggest	   that	   incumbent	   candidates	   put	  more	   personal	   effort	   into	   the	   electoral	  campaign,	   though	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   respondents	   agree	   varies	   by	   their	  candidate	  type,	  but	  respondents	  also	  suggest	  that	  councillors	  seeking	  re-­‐election	  are	   able	   to	   recruit	   more	   volunteers	   to	   help	   them	   do	   so.	   These	   results	   are	  corroborated	  by	  other	  data	  collected	  on	  candidates’	  campaigning	  efforts.	  These	  include	   average	  weekly	   hours	  delivering	   leaflets	   and	  help	   received	   throughout	  the	  campaign	  period.	  	  	  Finally,	   chapter	   9	   is	   the	   project’s	   concluding	   chapter	   and	   summarises	   results	  discussed	  throughout	  the	  thesis.	  It	  details	  the	  potential	  impact	  incumbency	  may	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have	  on	   the	  electoral	   fortunes	  of	  candidates	   in	   local	  government	  elections.	  The	  chapter	   also	   describes	   observed	   differences	   between	   the	   parties,	   paying	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	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Chapter	  3	  –	  Data	  &	  Methods	  	  	  As	  detailed	  above,	  this	  study	  is	  predominantly	  a	  quantitative	  examination	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  incumbency	  on	  local	  electoral	  outcomes.	  As	  such	  large	  and	  varied	  sets	  of	   high-­‐quality	   data	   are	   required	   in	   order	   to	   propose	   any	   generalizable	  observations	  to	  English	  local	  elections.	  There	  are	  three	  principal	  sources	  of	  data	  utilised	   for	   this	   thesis.	   The	   major	   sets	   are;	   first,	   the	   aggregate	   electoral	   data	  provided	   by	   The	   Elections	   Centre	   local	   elections	   database	   at	   Plymouth	  University.	   Second,	   results	   from	   the	   2011	   and	   2012	   local	   elections	   Candidate	  Survey	   are	   also	   provided	   by	   The	   Elections	   Centre.	   Third,	   neighbourhood	  Statistics	  and	  Census	   information	   including	  data	   from	  the	  2001	  UK	  Census	  and	  estimated	   population	   statistics	   were	   all	   provided	   by	   the	   Office	   for	   National	  Statistics	   (ONS).	   The	   project	   uses	   these	   data	   in	   a	   number	   of	   ways,	   principally	  they	   are	   used	   to	   assess	   the	   broad	   research	   hypotheses	   raised	   in	   the	   literature	  and	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2	  	  but	  they	  are	  also	  used	  to	  illustrate	  the	  state	  of	  local	  elections	   in	   England	   over	   the	   period	   examined	   by	   this	   thesis	   although,	   this	   is	  largely	  confined	  to	  discussions	  in	  chapter	  4.	  This	  chapter	  now	  goes	  on	  to	  provide	  more	   detailed	   information	   on	   the	   sets	   of	   data	   utilised,	   describing	   their	   format	  and	   relevance	   to	   the	  project,	   as	  well	   as	   information	  on	   the	  key	  dependent	  and	  independent	  variables	  used.	  	  3.1	  –	  Election	  Data	  The	  Elections	  Centre	  has	   compiled	   a	   comprehensive	   record	  of	   results	   for	   local	  elections	   across	   Great	   Britain.	   The	   stated	   aim	   of	   the	   Centre	   is	   to	   provide	   a	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“comprehensive	  record	  of	  local	  elections	  in	  Britain”	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  2003)	  and	   the	   database	   now	   holds	   the	   details	   of	   almost	   every	   candidate	   who	   has	  contested	   an	   election	   to	   local	   government	   since	   its	   reorganisation	   in	   the	   early	  1970s.	   Details	   such	   as;	   candidates’	   names,	   initials,	   gender,	   party	   affiliation,	  incumbency	  status,	  votes	  cast,	  turnout	  and	  electorate	  size	  are	  collected	  annually	  by	   the	   Centre.	  However,	   for	   reasons	   that	   are	   explained	   below,	   information	   for	  initials,	  gender,	  incumbency	  and	  turnout	  are	  extrapolated	  from	  the	  data	  at	  times,	  using	   methods	   that	   are	   well	   established	   by	   the	   Centre	   and	   the	   appropriate	  academic	  literature.	  The	  working	  file;	  constructed	  from	  the	  dataset	  comprise	  all	  candidates	  who	  stood	  for	  election	  to	  local	  government	  in	  England	  between	  1973	  and	  2010	  and	  totals	  554,995	  cases.	  This	   figure	   includes	  a	  number	  of	  seats	   that	  were	  unopposed	  (i.e.	  where	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  is	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  the	  number	  of	   seats	   available).	   The	  majority	   of	   uncontested	   seats	   occurred	  during	  earlier	  years	  of	  the	  period.	  The	  dataset	  also	  fails	  to	  consider	  by-­‐election	  results	  due	  to	  an	  inconsistency	  in	  the	  information	  collected	  and	  the	  format	  in	  which	  the	  data	  are	  stored	  in	  the	  database.	  	  
Independent	  Variables	  Independent	  variables	  are	  the	  principle	  explanatory	  and	  divisionary	  information	  used	   throughout	   the	   project	   to	   examine	   patterns	   and	   interactions	   of	   interest.	  Independent	   variables	   are	   free	   to	   be	   manipulated	   in	   order	   to	   identify	   any	  relationship	  with	  dependent	  variables	  (detailed	  later),	  or	  general	  information	  of	  interest.	  The	  independent	  variables	  used	  within	  this	  project	  are	  outlined	  in	  detail	  below.	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Party	  -­‐	  Party	  affiliation	  of	  candidates	  is	  collected	  in	  its	  exact	  form,	  but	  has	  been	  collapsed	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   study	   into	   a	   four-­‐category	   nominal	   variable.	  These	   categories	   are	   Conservative	   (Con),	   Labour	   (Lab),	   Liberal	  Democrat	   (LD)	  and	   everyone	   else	   (Other).	   Pre-­‐1989	   data	   for	   the	   Liberals,	   Social	   Democratic	  Party	  (SDP)	  and	  the	  Liberal/SDP	  Alliance	  has	  been	  coded	  together	  as	  LD	  for	  this	  study.	  As	  such,	  any	  references	  to	  LD	  pre-­‐1989	  will	  be	  referring	  to	  these	  parties.	  There	   are	   obvious	   issues	   also	   about	   how	   to	   interpret	   results	   for	   the	   Other	  category,	  namely	  the	  ‘bundling’	  of	  Independent	  candidates	  with	  those	  candidates	  standing	   for	   national	   or	   minor	   parties,	   but	   also	   within	   these	   minor	   parties.	  Though	  Other	   candidates	   are	   considered	   at	   times,	   this	   study	   is	   predominantly	  concerned	   with	   the	   examination	   of	   incumbency	   effects	   for	   the	   three	   major	  parties	  and	  does	  not	  consider	  Others	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  thesis.	  	  
Gender	   –	   The	   Elections	   Centre	   collects	   gender	   information	   of	   candidates.	  However,	   as	   it	   is	   not	   a	   requirement	   to	   declare	   gender	  when	   standing	   for	   local	  government	  this	  information	  is	  sometimes	  extrapolated	  from	  candidates’	  names.	  Also,	  although	  lists	  of	  forenames	  are	  consulted	  names	  are	  not	  an	  infallible	  guide	  to	  gender,	  meaning	  that	  on	  occasion	  it	   is	   impossible	  to	  determine	  a	  candidate’s	  gender	  from	  their	  name	  alone.	  These	  data	  are	  excluded	  from	  any	  gender-­‐based	  analysis	  of	  the	  data.	  	  
Incumbency	   Status	   –	   Incumbency	   Status	   is	   a	   categorical	   variable	   comprising	  freshmen,	   incumbents,	   sophomores	   and	   retirees.	   As	   for	   party	   and	   gender,	  incumbency	  is	  already	  available	  in	  the	  data	  provided	  by	  the	  Elections	  Centre	  but	  in	  simple	  binary	   form.	  From	  this	   information	   freshmen	  and	   incumbents	  can	  be	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easily	  distinguished,	   freshmen	  are	  coded	  simply	  when	   incumbency	   is	  absent	   in	  the	   candidate	   data.	   Coding	   for	   sophomores	   and	   retirees	   is	   a	   little	   more	  complicated.	   Sophomores	  are	  defined	  as	   first	   time	   incumbents	  and	  so	   they	  are	  coded	   as	   such	   only	   when	   they	   appear	   in	   the	   data	   after	   having	   stood	   as	   an	  incumbent	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  there	  is	  a	  small	  underestimate	   in	   the	   number	   of	   incumbents	   within	   the	   dataset,	   due	   to	   what	  Rallings	   &	   Thrasher	   describe	   as	   the	   increasing	   difficulty	   in	   “tracking	   some	  candidates…because	   of	   the	   apparently	   growing	   practice	   of	   candidates	   using	  preferred	   names	   on	   the	   ballot	   paper	   –	   Anthonys	   become	   Tonys,	   Elizabeths	  become	  Liz/Betty	  etc.”	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  2010,	  p.xx).	  	  	  Retirees	  are	  defined	  as	  incumbents	  who	  have	  stood	  down	  at	  or	  before	  the	  next	  election,	   not	   those	   incumbents	   who	   have	   failed	   to	   win.	   Retirees	   are	   coded	   as	  such	  only	  when	  they	  appear	  in	  the	  dataset	  as	  a	  winning	  incumbent	  before	  failing	  to	   contest	   the	   seat	   at	   the	   next	   point	   in	   the	   electoral	   cycle.	   There	   are	   two	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  coding	  for	  retirees	  within	  the	  dataset.	  The	  first	  derives	  from	  the	   failure	   to	  combine	  by-­‐election	  data	  with	  core	  aggregate	  data.	  As	  previously	  stated,	   by-­‐election	   data	   have	   not	   been	   considered	   for	   this	   project	   due	   to	   the	  names	  of	  candidates	  not	  being	  collected	  and	  stored	  by	  the	  Centre.	  Bearing	  this	  in	  mind,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  handful	  of	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  freshman	  candidate	  has	  won	  a	  by-­‐election,	   the	   local	   authority	   failed	   to	   report	   their	   incumbency	   by	   their	  sophomore	  election	  and	  thus	  the	  win	  appears	  as	  though	  it	  was	  a	  freshman	  win	  in	  the	  working	   file.	  However,	   this	   is	   likely	   to	  be	   a	   rare	  occurrence	  particularly	   in	  more	  recent	  elections.	  Finally,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  retirees	  during	  2007-­‐2010	  will	  be	  underestimated.	  Due	  to	  the	  2010	  cut-­‐off	  point	  for	  examination	  there	  is	  a	  severing	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in	  the	  line	  of	  information	  required	  to	  corroborate	  whether	  candidates	  have	  failed	  to	  stand	  again.	  	  
Experience	  –	  Perhaps	  better	  termed	  ‘council	  experience’,	  the	  Experience	  variable	  is	  derived	  from	  incumbency	  information	  provided	  in	  the	  data	  from	  the	  Elections	  Centre.	  The	   coding	  procedure	   is	   simple,	   for	  every	   consecutive	  electoral	   victory	  
Experience	   is	   added	   to	   the	   candidate,	   thus	   the	   Experience	   variable	   is	  fundamentally	  a	  proxy	  for	  time	  spent	  on	  the	  council.	  As	  freshmen	  are	  defined	  as	  a	  candidate	  contesting	  a	  seat,	  and	  not	  currently	  on	  the	  council,	  they	  will	  continue	  to	  retain	  their	  freshman	  status	  until	  their	  first	  freshman	  win.	  After	  this	  win	  and	  having	   served	   a	   term	   on	   the	   council,	   if	   they	   choose	   to	   contest	   again	   they	   are	  referred	  to	  as	  sophomores.	  Thereafter,	  candidates’	  level	  of	  experience	  is	  referred	  to	   simply	   as	   the	   number	   of	   terms	   they	   have	   served	   on	   the	   council,	   i.e.	   ‘Two	  Termers’	  will	  have	  contested	  their	  second	  election	  after	  winning,	  Three	  Termers	  will	  have	  contested	  their	  third,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  preserve	  a	  meaningful	  number	   of	   cases	   for	   analysis,	   at	   times	   more	   experienced	   groups	   have	   been	  collapsed	  into	  either	  a	  “4+	  Terms”	  group,	  or	  “3+	  Terms”	  group.	  	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	  voluntary	   resignation	   is	   considered	   to	  be	   the	  biggest	   factor	   in	   councillor	   turnover	   (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997a,	  p.79)	   and	  as	  the	  average	  age	  of	   incumbent	  candidates	   is	  some	  58	  years3	  there	  are	  relatively	  few	  Incumbent	  winners	  with	  Experience	  that	  span	  beyond	  12	  years,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  figure	  3.1.1	  .	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Data	  from	  the	  2012	  Candidate	  Survey	  (2012,	  n=142,	  𝑥	  =	  58.3)	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[Figure	  3.1.1	  –	  Winners	  by	  Experience	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  143,379)]	  	  The	   Experience	   variable	   was	   constructed	   simply	   by	   arranging	   the	   data	   into	  relevant	   authorities	   and	   wards	   then	   sorting	   by	   name	   and	   year	   to	   isolate	   a	  candidate’s	   change	   in	   incumbency	   status	   from	   freshman	   to	   sophomore.	   After	  sorting	  there	  is	  a	  simple	  process	  of	  following	  the	  chronological	  order	  of	  electoral	  results	   for	   that	   candidate	   and	   adding	   experience	   to	   the	   candidate	   if	   they	  contested	  at	  that	  point	  in	  the	  electoral	  cycle.	  	  Before	  continuing,	  there	  are	  caveats	  and	  potential	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  constructed	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ballot	  paper	  to	  the	  next.	  Secondly,	  as	  candidates	  who	  represent	  wards	  that	  have	  undergone	   boundary	   changes	   are	   not	   considered,	   Experience	   will	   not	   include	  these	   candidates	   after	   any	   alteration.	   The	   methodological	   implication	   of	  including	  these	  data	  would	  mean	  the	  electoral	   ‘conditions’	  would	  have	  changed	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  is	  not	  directly	  comparable.	  Name	  and	  boundary	  changes	  pose	  a	  serious	  challenge	  in	  identifying	  a	  greater	  quantity	  of	  longer	  serving	  candidates	  as	  a	   break	   anywhere	   in	   the	   chain	   of	   elections	   will	   stem	   the	   remaining	   series	   of	  results	  for	  that	  candidate,	  leaving	  a	  chain	  of	  stagnant	  candidate	  data.	  	  A	   similar	   consequence	   arises	   for	   candidates	   whose	   political	   career	   may	   have	  emerged	  from	  a	  by-­‐election	  victory.	  As	  discussed	  earlier	  due	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  data	   for	   by-­‐elections	   are	   collected	   and	   compiled,	   they	   lack	   the	   required	  candidate	   information	   to	   code	   the	   variable	   accurately.	   There	   are	   two	  principal	  consequences.	  The	  first	  being,	  that	  on	  the	  rare	  occasion	  that	  an	  incumbent	  does	  stand	  down	  to	  re-­‐contest	  for	  another	  party,	  this	  information	  will	  be	  missed.	  The	  second	  and	  more	  crucial	  consequence	  concerns	  candidates	  who	  enter	  the	  council	  via	  by-­‐elections.	  There	  have	  been	  2,012	  by-­‐elections	   in	  England	  between	  2004	  and	   2012,	   averaging	   just	   over	   one	   thousand	   per	   electoral	   cycle.	   Of	   these	   the	  Elections	   Centre	   has	  managed	   to	   collect	   reasons	   for	   vacancies	   for	   1,781	   cases.	  Around	  43%	  (766/1,781)	  are	  initiated	  due	  to	  death	  of	  the	  incumbent;	  some	  5%	  (98/1,781)	   are	   due	   to	   disqualification,	   failure	   to	   attend	   and	   other	   similar	  reasons,	  whilst	  the	  majority	  of	  by-­‐elections	  52%	  (924/1,781)	  are	  initiated	  by	  the	  resignation	  of	   incumbent	  councillors.	  These	  data	  are	  a	  clear	   indication	   that	   the	  dropout	   rate	   for	   councillors	   is	   high	   and	   so	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	  many	   incumbent	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councillors	   will	   have	   re-­‐contested	   their	   seat	   during	   a	   by-­‐election,	   or	   for	   that	  matter	  contest	  the	  seat	  ever	  again.	  	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  rather	  lengthy	  timeframes	  are	  considered	  once	  we	  examine	  data	   for	   those	   incumbents	   who	   have	   served	   for	   three	   or	   more	   terms	   on	   the	  council.	  As	  the	  numbers	  of	  by-­‐elections	  over	  an	  electoral	  cycle	  are	  high	  and	  name	  and	  boundary	  changes	  pose	  yet	  further	  issues	  in	  the	  continuity	  of	  the	  Experience	  variable,	   the	   number	   of	   cases	   considered,	   particularly	   for	   more	   experienced	  candidates,	  quickly	  becomes	  harder	   to	   track.	  With	   this	   in	  mind,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	  the	   constructed	   Experience	   variable	   will	   both	   underestimate	   the	   overall	  experience	   of	   candidates	   in	   local	   government	   elections	   and	   return	   a	   sizeable	  portion	   of	   candidates	   with	   no	   Experience	   information	   at	   all.	   In	   light	   of	   this	  underestimation,	  and	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  Retirement	  Slump	  analysis	  (details	  of	  which	   are	   discussed	   below),	   the	   Experience	   variable	   has	   been	   expanded.	  
Experience	  Expanded	   is	   used	   solely	   for	   the	  Retirement	   Slump	  analysis,	   so	   as	   to	  include	   a	   larger	   portion	   of	   these	   ‘missing	   data’.	   To	   do	   this	   an	   assumption	   has	  been	   made	   that	   all	   incumbents	   who	   appear	   in	   the	   dataset	   for	   the	   first	   time	  without	   a	   corresponding	   freshman	   year	   in	   the	   previous	   electoral	   cycle	   are	  sophomores.	  Clearly	   there	  are	  potential	  weaknesses	  with	   this	  expansion	  of	   the	  
Experience	  variable	  adding	  to	  pre-­‐existing	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  variable.	  However,	   due	   to	   the	   unfortunate	   incompatibility	   between	   the	   election	   and	  by-­‐election	  data,	  and	  motivations	  for	  the	  expansion	  the	  data	  used	  for	  SRS	  analysis,	  the	  assumption	  is	  a	  worthwhile	  compromise.	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FYC	  –	  Due	  to	  the	  timeframe	  considered	  and	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  many	  illustrations	  used	  throughout	  the	  thesis,	  the	  ordinal	  variable	  ‘Four-­‐Year	  Cycle’	  (FYC)	  has	  been	  constructed.	   The	   variable	   collapses	   election	   years	   into	   nine	   four-­‐year	   electoral	  cycles	  (apart	  from	  the	  1974-­‐1979	  category	  which	  is	  a	  5	  year	  band).	  The	  number	  of	  elections	  varies	  considerably	  over	  a	  cycle.	  So	  collapsing	  election	  years	   into	  a	  
FYC	  allows	  charts	  to	  reflect	  comparably,	  any	  significant	  changes	  in	  the	  data	  over	  the	  period	  of	  study.	  Comparing	  cycles	  rather	  than	  years,	  though	  extending	  over	  a	  longer	   timeframe,	   is	  a	  better	  way	  of	  making	   like	   for	   like	  comparisons.	  The	  FYC	  variable	  is	  used	  predominantly,	  though	  not	  exclusively,	  for	  illustrative	  purposes.	  	  
Dependent	  Variables	  Where	   independent	   variables	   are	   predominantly	   explanatory,	   dependent	  variables	  are	  measures,	  or	  variables	  of	   interest,	   that	  vary	  or	   indeed	  fail	   to	  vary	  based	  on	  independent	  variable	  input.	  They	  are	  measures	  of	  effect;	  enabling	  us	  to	  identify	  whether	  there	  are	  potential	  causal	  mechanisms	  within	  the	  data.	  Many	  of	  the	  dependent	  variables	  used	   in	   this	  project	  have	  been	  constructed	  specifically	  to	   identify	   particular	   phenomena.	   Full	   details	   of	   all	   dependent	   variables	   are	  outlined	  below.	  	  
CVS	  –	  Candidate	  Vote	  Share	  (CVS)	  for	  Single	  Member	  Districts	  (SMDs)	  is	  simple	  to	  determine.	   It	   is	  calculated	  as	  a	  candidate’s	  vote	  count	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	   the	  total	  number	  of	  votes	  for	  that	  election	  in	  that	  ward.	  However,	  for	  multimember	  districts	  (MMDs)	  CVS	  is	  calculated	  as	  a	  candidates	  vote	  count	  as	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	   ballot	   papers	   used.	   These	   data	   are	   not	   necessarily	   supplied	   and	   for	  MMDs	  where	  ballot	  data	  is	  missing	  CVS	  may	  be	  tricky	  to	  estimate.	  Consequently,	  for	  the	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purposes	   of	   this	   thesis,	   ballot	   papers	   are	   estimated	   using	   the	   Ware	   et	   al	  ‘Weighted	   Sum	   of	   Votes’	   method	   that	   can	   be	   found	   in	   ‘A	   New	   Algorithm	   for	  
Estimating	  Voter	  Turnout	  When	  the	  Number	  of	  Ballot	  Papers	   Issued	   is	  Unknown’	  (Ware	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  	  
Turnout	  –	  Calculating	  the	  Turnout	  variable	  in	  SMDs	  is	  a	  simple	  case	  of	  summing	  all	  votes	  against	  the	  electorate	  size	  reported	  from	  the	  local	  authority.	  However,	  for	  MMDs,	  as	  for	  CVS	  ,	  the	  calculation	  of	  Turnout	  where	  ballot	  paper	  information	  is	  missing	  is	  reliant	  on	  the	  Ware	  et	  al	  (2006)	  method	  described	  above.	  	  
SIP	   –	   The	   Standardised	   Incumbent	   Performance	   (SIP)	   measure	   is	   a	   scalar	  variable	   derived	   from	   CVS.	   The	   objective	   of	   the	   variable	   is	   to	   be	   able	   to	  accurately	  measure	  the	  relative	  electoral	  disparity	  between	  winning	  incumbent	  and	  freshmen	  candidates	  of	  the	  same	  Party,	  who	  run	  in	  the	  same	  election	  and	  in	  the	   same	  ward.	   The	   variable	   does	   this	   by	   comparing	   the	   CVS	   of	   an	   incumbent	  candidate	  against	  the	  average	  freshmen	  CVS	  within	  the	  same	  MMD	  at	  the	  same	  election.	   SIP	   is	   not	   only	   a	   relative	   indicator	   of	   the	   electoral	   performance	   of	  incumbents	   against	   freshmen,	   but	   also	   a	   measure	   that	   eliminates	   many	  opportunities	   for	   bias	   in	   the	   result	   as	   all	   electoral	   conditions	   aside	   from	  candidate	   ballot	   order	   are	   controlled	   for.	   SIP	   for	   party	   category	   p	   can	   be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	  
SIP! = 𝑥!" − 𝑦!𝑛!!!! 	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Where	  p	  denotes	  the	  party	  category,	  x	  represents	  the	  CVS	  of	  incumbent	  i	  in	  ward	  
j	  and	  𝑦	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  mean	  CVS	  of	  all	  freshmen	  in	  ward	  j.	  SIP	  is	  calculated	  only	  for	  multimember	  wards	  where	  the	  full	  slate	  of	  candidates	  for	  the	  party	  p	  wins.	  As	  the	  measure	  only	  considers	  winners	  and	  wards	  where	  all	  the	  party’s	  candidates	  win,	   this	   is	   likely	   to	   have	   a	   dampening	   effect	   on	   the	   measure,	   eliminating	  extreme	  cases	  of	  lone	  incumbents	  surviving	  large	  partisan	  swings.	  	  
SRS	  –	  As	  for	  SIP,	  the	  Standardised	  Retirement	  Slump	  (SRS)	  variable	  is	  scalar	  and	  derived	  from	  CVS.	  The	  variable	  is	  designed	  to	  measure	  any	  change	  in	  CVS	  that	  a	  party	  experiences	  when	  retaining	  a	  seat	  after	  their	  incumbent	  councillor	  decides	  not	  to	  contest	  at	  the	  next	  point	  in	  the	  electoral	  cycle.	  The	  variable	  considers	  only	  quadrennial	   SMDs,	   examining	   party	   election	   data	   in	   the	   incumbent’s	   final	  election	  year	  against	  the	  freshman	  win	  in	  the	  following	  election.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	   the	   effects	   of	   local	   party	   swing	   on	   the	   results,	   the	   ‘slump’	   is	   in-­‐effect	  standardised	  by	  considering	  the	  change	  in	  CVS	  of	  other	  seats	  for	  the	  party	  within	  the	  same	  authority.	  SRS	  compares	  the	  seats	  of	  interest	  (those	  seats	  retained	  after	  the	  loss	  of	  an	  incumbent	  candidate)	  against	  the	  average	  CVS	  of	  all	  non-­‐selected	  winners	  from	  the	  same	  party	  in	  the	  same	  local	  authority.	  SRS	  for	  party	  category	  
p	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	  
SRS! = 𝑥!"# − µμ!" − 𝑦!"# − µμ!"𝑛!!!! 	  	  Where	  p	  denotes	  the	  party	  category,	  i	  refers	  to	  election	  1	  (the	  retiring	  incumbent	  year)	   and	   j	   to	   election	   2	   (the	   winning	   freshman	   year).	   x	   equals	   the	   CVS	   of	   a	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retiree	   in	   seat	  k	   in	   authority	   l.	   	  y	  refers	   to	   the	  CVS	  of	   a	  winning	   freshman	   that	  follows	   in	   election	   j	  and	   also	   in	   seat	  k.	  µ	   refers	   to	   the	   average	   CVS	   of	   all	   non-­‐selected	  winners	  from	  the	  same	  party	  in	  the	  same	  local	  authority.	  Any	  wards	  that	  are	   redistricted	   or	   change	   authority	   type	   from	   election	   i	   to	   election	   j	   are	   not	  considered.	  	  	  Also,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  an	  assumption	  of	  this	  model	  is	  that	  an	  average	  change	  in	  local	  authority	  partisanship	  is	  a	  proxy	  indicator	  for	  ward-­‐level	  changes	  across	   the	   whole	   authority.	   This	   has	   been	   based	   on	   electoral	   geography	  arguments	   about	   the	   local	   dimensions	   to	   determinants	   in	   the	   variation	   of	  partisanship	   (Johnston	  &	   Pattie,	   2006).	   But	   it	   has	   also	   been	   influenced	   by	   the	  Schumpeterian	   argument	   that	   decisions	   are	   made	   at	   the	   authority	   level	   and	  therefore,	   it	   is	   rational	   to	   assume	   that	   residents	   will	   respond	   to	   the	   council’s	  record.	  However,	  there	  appears	  to-­‐date	  to	  be	  little	  published	  academic	  literature	  in	  support	  of	  the	  later	  hypothesis	  and	  the	  model’s	  ‘authority	  swing’	  assumption	  is	  a	  potential	  weakness	  in	  the	  SRS	  model	  that	  must	  be	  acknowledged.	  	  
RRILP	   –	   Termed	   the	   Role	   Reversal	   Method	   of	   estimating	   Incumbent	   Loser	  Performance	   (RRILP),	   the	   aim	   of	   this	  model	   is	   to	   examine	   the	   disparity	   in	   the	  performance	   of	   candidates	   in	   seats	   where	   more	   than	   one	   party	   is	   electorally	  competitive.	  Where	  the	  SIP	  and	  SRS	  models	  discussed	  above	  consider	  only	  wards	  where	   one	   party	   wins,	   the	   RRILP	   model	   considers	   data	   where	   incumbent	  candidates	  both	  win	  and	  lose	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  directly	  comparable.	  To	  do	  this	  the	  model	   compares	  data	   from	   two	  different	   scenarios,	   in	   both	   of	  which	   the	  party	  manages	   to	   secure	   just	   one	   seat	   in	   a	   two-­‐member	   district	   (2MD).	   The	   first	  
	   75	  
scenario	   examined	   is	   one	   where	   both	   an	   incumbent	   and	   freshman	   candidate	  from	  the	  same	  party	  contest	  a	  ward	  and	  only	  the	  incumbent	  is	  elected.	  The	  CVS	  gap	   between	   the	   winning	   incumbent	   candidate	   and	   their	   losing	   freshman	  counterpart	  is	  measured	  and	  averaged.	  This	  average	  is	  offset	  against	  the	  average	  CVS	  difference	   in	   the	  second	  scenario,	  where	  both	  an	   incumbent	  and	   freshman	  candidate	  of	   the	   same	  party	   stand	   in	   a	  2MD	  and	   the	   freshman	  wins	  whilst	   the	  incumbent	  loses.	  The	  former	  scenario	  tends	  to	  occur	  much	  more	  frequently	  than	  the	   latter,	   so	   there	   is	  an	   imbalance	   in	   the	  model	  where	   the	  number	  of	  cases	   in	  one	  half	   far	  outweighs	  the	  number	  in	  the	  other.	  RRILP	  for	  party	  category	  p	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	  
RRILP(!) = 𝜑! − 𝜔!𝑛!!!!!! − 𝜔! − 𝜑!𝑛!!!!!! 	  	  Where	   p	   denotes	   the	   party	   category,	   φ	   refers	   to	   the	   CVS	   of	   an	   incumbent	  candidate	  and	  ω	   is	   the	  CVS	   for	  a	   freshman	   in	   the	   same	  2MD	  ward.	   i	  denotes	  a	  ward	  where	  the	  lone	  winner	  for	  the	  party	  is	  an	  incumbent	  and	  j	  denotes	  that	  the	  lone	  winner	  for	  the	  party	  is	  a	  freshman.	  	  
EPILP	   –	   The	   Experienced	   Partner	   Method	   of	   estimating	   Incumbent	   Loser	  Performance	   (EPILP)	   operates	   in	   a	   similar	  way	   to	   the	   RRILP	  model	   described	  above,	  except	  for	  one	  key	  detail.	  The	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  model,	   this	  time	  denoted	  the	  k	  segment,	   compares	  wards	  where	  both	   the	  winner	  and	   loser	   for	   the	  same	  party	   are	   incumbent	   candidates.	   For	   both	   the	   RRILP	   and	   EPILP	   models	   it	   is	  important	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  results	  are	  equivalent	  and	  comparable.	   In	  a	  purist	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sense	   the	   RRILP	   model	   outlined	   above	   is	   an	   ideal	   measure	   of	   the	   disparity	  between	   incumbent	   and	   freshman	   losers	   in	  wards	   that	   are	   competitive	   for	   the	  party.	   There	   is	   symmetry	   to	   the	   model	   as	   opposing	   scenarios	   are	   directly	  compared.	  Unfortunately,	  due	  to	  the	  successes	  of	  incumbent	  candidates,	  data	  for	  the	   j	  segment	  of	  the	  RRILP	  model	  are	  far	  fewer	  than	  for	  i,	  and	  this	  imbalance	  is	  an	  inherent	  weakness.	  The	  EPILP	  model	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  aims	  to	  examine	  how	  incumbent	   losers	   fare	   compared	   to	   freshmen	   losers	   where	   an	   incumbent	  colleague	  wins	  for	  the	  party	  in	  both	  scenarios.	  Thus	  the	  model	  for	  party	  p	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	  EPILP(!) = 𝜑! − 𝜔!𝑛!!!!!! − 𝜑!! − 𝜑!!𝑛!!!!!! 	  	  Where	  p	  refers	  to	  the	  party,	  φ	  refers	  to	  the	  CVS	  of	  an	  incumbent	  candidate	  and	  ω	  is	   the	  CVS	   for	   a	   freshman.	   i	  denotes	   a	   2MD	  ward	  where	   the	   lone	  winner	   is	   an	  incumbent	   and	   loser	   a	   freshman,	   and	   k	   denotes	   a	   2MD	   ward	   where	   both	  candidates	  for	  the	  party	  are	  incumbents	  but	  only	  a	  lone	  winner.	  1	  and	  2	  refer	  to	  the	   rank	   of	   incumbent	   contestants	   in	   ward	   k,	  where	   1	   indicates	   the	   winning	  incumbent	  and	  2	  the	  loser.	  	  
STS	   -­‐	   The	   Sophomore	   Turnout	   Surge	   (STS)	   model	   is	   simple	   in	   design	   and	  compares	  two	  measures	  over	  two	  consecutive	  elections.	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  model	  is	  to	  assess	  whether	  incumbency	  leads	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  Turnout	  in	  safely	  partisan	  SMDs.	  The	  data	  considered	  tracks	  Turnout	  in	  a	  ward	  where	  a	  freshman	  candidate	  wins	  by	  a	  margin	  in	  excess	  of	  20%	  and	  then	  choses	  to	  defend	  that	  seat	  at	  the	  next	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election.	   Data	   are	   considered	   regardless	   of	   the	   result	   in	   the	   second	   election.	  Therefore,	  Turnout	  at	  both	  points	  in	  the	  electoral	  cycle	  is	  compared.	  However,	  in	  an	   attempt	   to	   control	   for	   national	   or	   local	   fluctuations	   in	   Turnout,	   a	  ‘participatory	  yard-­‐stick’	  is	  used	  to	  isolate	  fluctuations	  associated	  solely	  with	  the	  selected	  ward.	  The	   ‘yard-­‐stick’	  used	   is	  calculated	  as	  the	  average	  Turnout	   for	  all	  other	   wards	   won	   by	   the	   same	   party,	   in	   the	   same	   local	   authority,	   in	   the	   same	  election	  year.	  So,	  STS	  is	  essentially	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  relative	  variation	  in	  Turnout	  within	   safely	   partisan	   seats	   during	   a	   candidate’s	   change	   in	   incumbency	   status.	  
STS	  for	  party	  category	  p	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	  
STS ! = 𝜏!"# − 𝜑!"𝑛!!!!!! − 𝜏!!" − 𝜑!"𝑛!!!!!! 	  	  Where	  φ	  refers	  to	  the	  average	  turnout	  of	  all	  unselected	  safe	  seat	  wards	  for	  the	  party	   in	   local	   authority	   k	   at	   point	   i	  or	   j	  of	   the	   freshman-­‐sophomore	   electoral	  cycle.	  τ	  signifies	  ward	  Turnout	  for	  candidate	  l	  at	  either	  the	  i	  election	  in	  the	  cycle,	  where	  the	  freshman	  candidate	  won	  by	  a	  margin	  in	  excess	  of	  20%	  of	  the	  vote,	  or	  the	  j	  point	  where	  the	  very	  same	  candidate	  returns	  to	  defend	  their	  seat.	  There	  is	  no	  pre-­‐requisite	  for	  the	  candidate	  to	  win	  their	  sophomore	  election.	  	  The	  model	  attempts	  to	  ensure	  comparison	  of	  like-­‐with-­‐like	  wards	  by	  considering	  only	   wards	   won	   in	   the	   freshman	   year	   by	   an	   ‘electorally	   safe’	   margin	   for	   the	  party.	   In	   this	   case	   an	   arbitrary	   figure	   of	   20%	   has	   been	   assigned	   after	   careful	  consultation	  with	   Elections	   Centre	   academics.	   Cases	   are	   not	   considered	  where	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average	   turnout	   data	   for	   the	   party	   within	   the	   local	   authority	   are	   missing	   or	  partially	   missing.	   This	   prerequisite	   has	   severely	   limited	   the	   number	   of	   cases	  considered	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats.	   Uncontested	   elections	   are	   also	   not	  considered.	   Finally,	   the	   model’s	   attempt	   to	   control	   for	   variation	   in	   Turnout	  within	  the	  local	  authority	  is	  based	  on	  a	  similar	  principle	  to	  that	  discussed	  for	  the	  constructed	  SRS	  variable,	   and	   as	   such,	   it	  must	  be	  bound	  by	   the	   same	  potential	  weaknesses.	  	  Chapter	   3.1	   has	   described	   the	   information	   available	   in	   the	   aggregate	   dataset	  used	  for	  empirical	  analysis	  in	  this	  thesis,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  variables	  constructed	  for	  testing	  hypotheses	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  Chapter	  3.2	  will	  go	  on	  to	  describe	  and	  discuss	   data	   used	   from	   the	   Local	   Candidate	   Survey	   (2011	   &	   2012),	   including	  questionnaire	  structure,	  sampling	  and	  response	  rates.	  The	  section	  will	  also	  detail	  7	  questions	   that	  were	  assigned	   to	   the	  candidate	   survey	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	  project,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  rationale	  behind	  their	  construction.	  	  3.2	  –	  Candidate	  Survey	  Data	  The	   Local	   Candidate	   Survey,	   conducted	   by	   the	   Elections	   Centre	   at	   Plymouth	  University,	   is	   an	  annual	   survey	  of	   candidates	   for	   local	   government.	  The	   survey	  encompasses	   a	   number	   of	   themes	   including	   the	   electoral	   experience	   of	  candidates,	  their	  motivations	  for	  contesting	  a	  council	  seat,	  the	  election	  campaign	  and	  candidates’	  support	  network.	  The	  survey	  is	  usually	  conducted	  soon	  after	  the	  election	  to	  ensure	  that	  candidates	  have	  some	  time	  to	  reflect	  on	  events	  up	  to	  and	  after	  polling.	  Data	  used	  for	  this	  research	  were	  collected	  over	  7	  surveys,	  between	  2006	  and	  2012.	  Details	  for	  candidates	  are	  publicly	  available.	  These	  include	  their	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name,	   address	   and	  where	   applicable,	   their	   party	   affiliation	   and	  were	   obtained	  from	  nomination	  forms	  published	  by	  each	  local	  authority.	  The	  first	  five	  candidate	  surveys	   were	   completed	   in	   paper	   format	   and	   the	   final	   two	   were	   conducted	  predominantly	   on	   the	   internet.	   Immediately	   after	   their	   respective	   May	   local	  elections,	   letters	  were	  posted	  to	  a	  stratified	  sample	  of	  candidates	   inviting	  them	  to	   participate.	   The	   number	   of	   sampled	   candidates	   and	   response	   rates	   are	  detailed	  below:	  	  
• 2006	  –	  Sample	  (2,800),	  Responses	  (1,183),	  Response	  Rate	  (42.3%)	  
• 2007	  –	  Sample	  (2,848),	  Responses	  (1,255),	  Response	  Rate	  (44.1%)	  
• 2008	  –	  Sample	  (3,142),	  Responses	  (1,095),	  Response	  Rate	  (34.9%)	  
• 2009	  –	  Sample	  (3,534),	  Responses	  (1,105),	  Response	  Rate	  (31.2%)	  
• 2010	  –	  Sample	  (5,676),	  Responses	  (1,966),	  Response	  Rate	  (34.7%)	  
• 2011	  –	  Sample	  (4,503),	  Responses	  (899),	  Response	  Rate	  (20.0%)	  
• 2012	  –	  Sample	  (6,500),	  Responses	  (1,043),	  Response	  Rate	  (16.0%)	  	  As	   results	   from	   the	   2011	   and	   2012	   candidate	   surveys	   are	   used	   expansively	   in	  chapter	  8	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  detail	  relevant	  information	  regarding	  the	  surveys	  and	  respondents	  to	  them.	  	  There	  were	  899	  usable	  replies	  received	  by	  the	  end	  of	  data	  collection	  in	  2011	  and	  1,043	  by	  the	  same	  point	   in	  2012,	  meaning	  that	  the	  survey	  response	  rates	  were	  20%	  and	  16%	  respectively.	  Survey	  responses	  are	  compared	  with	  the	  full	  range	  of	   candidates	   that	   contested	   local	   elections	   and	   the	   results	   were	   found	   to	   be	  largely	  representative	  in	  terms	  of	  gender,	  party	  and	  authority	  type.	  However,	  the	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data	   was	   weighted	   to	   more	   accurately	   reflect	   the	   make	   up	   of	   the	   candidate	  population	   in	   their	   respective	   year.	   The	   survey	   also	   catalogues	   candidates	   by	  their	  self-­‐reported	  electoral	  experience.	  There	  are	  four	  broad	  groups	  that	  can	  be	  distinguished	  similar	   to	   those	  described	   in	   the	  aggregate	  data	  variables	   in	  sub-­‐chapter	   3.1.	   These	   are;	   Incumbent	   councillors	   seeking	   re-­‐election,	   first	   time	  candidates	  termed	  Freshmen,	  Serial	  Freshmen	  whom	  are	  those	  candidates	  having	  contested	   more	   than	   one	   election	   but	   have	   never	   been	   elected,	   and	   finally	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	  who	  are	   candidates	   that	  have	   some	  previous	   experience	  as	  a	  local	  councillor	  but	  currently	  contest	  as	  a	  non-­‐incumbent.	  	  Table	   3.2.1	   shows	   the	   share	   of	   candidate	   responses	   by	   self-­‐reported	   electoral	  experience.	  The	   results	   show	  similar	  proportions	  of	   experience	   across	   the	   two	  years.	   Some	   19.4%	   (174/897)	   of	   respondents	   to	   the	   2011	   candidate	   survey	  identified	   themselves	   as	   a	   incumbent	   candidate	   whilst	   just	   less	   than	   15%	  (151/1,014)	  reported	  so	  in	  2012.	  The	  largest	  experience	  group	  for	  both	  surveys	  were	  first	  time	  freshmen.	  The	  results	  indicated	  that	  38.5%	  (345/897)	  and	  40.7%	  (413/1,014)	  of	  respondents	   identified	   themselves	  as	   first	   time	   freshmen	   in	   the	  2011	   and	   2012	   surveys	   respectively.	   Experienced	   freshmen	  were	   the	   smallest	  experience	  group	  in	  both	  surveys,	  with	  just	  8.8%	  (79/897)	  and	  8.5%	  (86/1,014)	  indicating	   so	   in	   2011	   and	   2012	   respectively.	   Finally,	   a	   sizeable	   portion	   of	  respondents	   identified	   themselves	   as	   serial	   freshmen	   candidates.	   Serial	  freshmen	  made	  up	  one	   third	  of	   total	   responses	   (33.3%,	  299/897)	   in	  2011	  and	  35.9%	  (364/1,014)	  in	  2012.	  The	  data	  in	  table	  3.2.1	  show	  continuity	  of	  responses	  over	  the	  two	  years,	  suggesting	  that	  there	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  any	  temporal	  selection	  effects	   in	   the	   experience	   groups.	   Considering	   this,	   there	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   few	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methodological	  implications	  when	  combining	  the	  two	  datasets	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  analysis	  across	  the	  experience	  groups.	  	  
Survey	   respondents	   by	   Self-­‐
Reported	  Electoral	  Experience	   2011	   2012	  Incumbents	   19.4%	   14.9%	  Freshmen	   38.5%	   40.7%	  Experienced	  Freshmen	   8.8%	   8.5%	  Serial	  Freshmen	   33.3%	   35.9%	  Identifiable	  Respondents	   897	   1,014	  
[Table	  –	  3.2.1	  (Survey	  Response	  by	  Candidate	  Experience	  %)	  (Total	  n)	  2011-­‐2012]	  	  Overall,	   the	   survey	   is	   shown	   to	  be	   fairly	   representative	  of	   candidates’	   partisan	  identities	  and	  demographic	  characteristics	  as	  there	  is	  little	  temporal	  variation	  in	  the	  response	  portions	  of	  all	  experience	  groups.	  However,	   it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  the	   surveys	   do	   tend	   to	   somewhat	   underrepresent	   Black,	   Asian	   and	   Minority	  Ethnic	   (BAME)	   candidates	   and	   those	   candidates	   who	   represent	   wards	   in	  deprived	   areas.	   There	   is	   no	   evidence	   from	   the	   literature	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  systemic	  nonresponse	  of	  these	  two	  groups	  will	  prove	  a	  significant	  hindrance	  in	  the	  study	  of	  incumbency	  effects	  and	  the	  candidate	  survey	  datasets	  have	  not	  been	  weighted	  to	  account	  for	  these	  shortfalls.	  	  	  As	  discussed	  above	   the	  candidate	  survey	  provides	  a	  comprehensive	  set	  of	  data	  for	   the	   analysis	   of	   candidate	   characteristics,	   behaviour	   and	   opinion.	   However,	  the	  survey	  also	  provides	  an	  excellent	  opportunity	  to	  ask	  candidates	  a	  tailored	  set	  of	  questions	  on	  incumbency	  effects	  and	  whether	  candidates	  perceive	  there	  to	  be	  any	  electoral	  advantages.	  Fortunately	  the	  2011	  and	  2012	  survey	  allowed	  space	  for	   seven	   questions	   to	   be	   put	   to	   candidates	   directly	   for	   their	   opinion	   on	   the	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subject.	  All	  questions	  were	  asked	  under	  the	  premise	  of	  incumbents	  tending	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  their	  attempts	  at	  re-­‐election.	  	  	  Figure	  3.2.2	  is	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  seven	  statements	  presented	  to	  respondents.	  The	  incumbency	  questions	  block	  began	  with	  the	  statement	  that	  “In	  local	  elections	  
many	   incumbents	   seeking	   re-­‐election	   are	   successful.	   Below	   is	   a	   list	   of	   possible	  
explanations	  for	  why	  this	  might	  be	  the	  case”.	  Candidates	  were	  asked	  to	  respond	  to	  the	   seven	   possible	   explanations	   on	   a	   5-­‐point	   Agree/Disagree	   Likert	   scale.	   The	  scales	  were	  selected	  using	  ‘Radio	  Buttons’	  that	  allowed	  the	  user	  to	  easily	  select	  a	  single	  response	   for	  each	  statement.	   In	  order	   to	  eliminate	  any	  structural	  bias	   in	  the	  question	  block,	  the	  statements	  were	  randomly	  ordered	  for	  each	  respondent.	  The	  statements	  for	  respondents	  to	  agree/disagree	  with	  are	  listed	  as	  below,	  in	  no	  particular	  order.	  	  
• “Incumbents	  no	  longer	  have	  an	  advantage”	  
• “Incumbents	   have	   greater	   experience	   gained	   from	   working	   on	   the	  council”	  
• “Support	  among	  local	  voters	  is	  consistent	  and	  reliable”	  
• “Incumbents	  enjoy	  a	  higher	  local	  profile	  than	  their	  challengers”	  
• “Incumbents	  have	  a	  stronger	  relationship	  with	  local	  media”	  
• “Incumbents	  put	  more	  personal	  effort	  into	  their	  re-­‐election	  campaigns”	  
• “Incumbents	  are	  able	  to	  recruit	  more	  volunteers	  for	  their	  campaigns”	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[Figure	  3.2.2	  –	  Questions	  on	  Incumbency	  in	  the	  2011	  and	  2012	  Candidate	  Surveys]	  	  There	   are	   numerous	   benefits	   in	   questioning	   candidates	   directly	   on	   proposed	  sources	  of	  incumbency	  effects.	  First,	  candidates	  for	  local	  government	  experience	  these	  events	  first	  hand	  and	  remain	  a	  largely	  untapped	  source	  of	  information	  on	  the	  subject.	  Second,	  and	  perhaps	  more	  importantly,	  asking	  candidates	  of	  varied	  electoral	   experience	   allows	   for	   a	   ‘triangulation’	   of	   candidates’	   perspectives	   on	  the	   sources	   of	   incumbency	   effects.	   Because	   candidates’	   experiences	   will	   vary,	  there	  may	  at	  times	  be	  a	  disparity	  in	  their	  attitudes	  and	  knowledge.	  This	  disparity	  can	  be	  utilised	  to	  place	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  explanations	   for	   the	  differences	  across	  experiential	  groups.	  This	   is	  not	   to	  say	  that	  the	  perspective	  of	   incumbent	  candidates	   trumps	   that	   for	   serial	   freshmen	   or	   others,	   but	   rather,	   that	   it	   is	  important	   to	   identify	   the	   differences	   in	   perspectives	   and	   consider	   candidates’	  previous	  electoral	  history	  when	  placing	  any	  emphasis	  on	  results.	  Thus	  if	  there	  is	  a	   clear	   and	   open	   admission	   from	   incumbents	   on	   a	   particular	   explanation	   of	  incumbency	   advantage,	   this	  may	   be	   of	   greater	   objective	   value	   to	   the	   research	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than	   the	   same	   opinion	   from	   relatively	   inexperienced	   candidates	   at	   local	  elections.	  	  	  Third,	  structuring	  the	  questions	  as	  statements	  to	  an	  agree/disagree	  scale	  allows	  for	   clear	   testing	   of	   various	   theoretical	   explanations	   from	   the	   literature,	   as	  discussed	   in	   chapter	   2.	   Some	   examples	   of	   these	   explanations	   are	   candidate	  quality,	  experience,	  perks	  and	  incumbent	  monopolies	  on	  community	  access.	  Due	  to	   the	   limited	   space	  available	  within	   these	   surveys	   the	   seven	   statements	   listed	  above	  were	  originally	  selected	  from	  a	  longer	  list	  for	  their	  particular	  relevance	  to	  the	  local	  electoral	  situation	  in	  England.	  	  Finally,	  though	  broad	  and	  open	  to	  interpretation,	  structuring	  the	  questions	  in	  an	  agree/disagree	  Likert	  scale	  allows	  for	  an	  ordinal	  codification	  of	  the	  results.	  This	  scale	   is	   preferred	   to	   a	   numerical	   scale	   as	   it	   is	   more	   intuitive	   and	   comparison	  between	   the	   suggested	   explanations	   remains	   testable	   and	   collapsible.	   This	  method	   is	   the	   most	   practical	   way	   of	   being	   able	   to	   distinguish	   between	  explanations	   from	   the	   literature,	   is	  more	   nuanced	   than	   a	   binary	   response	   and	  more	   practical	   than	   requesting	   detailed	   observational	   evidence	   of	   other	  candidates’	   behaviour.	   Structuring	   responses	   to	   the	   questions	   on	   an	  agree/disagree	  Likert	  scale	  also	  allows	  for	  a	  heuristic	  exploration	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  incumbency	  and	  a	  broad	  comparison	  of	  results.	  	  Section	  3.2	  has	  detailed	  the	  sampling,	  structure	  and	  methods	  of	  candidate	  survey	  data	   obtained	   from	   the	   Elections	   Centre,	   as	   well	   as	   incumbency	   questions	  designed	   for	   this	   project.	   The	   section	   has	   described	   the	   dataset,	   explained	   the	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rationale	   behind	   methods	   used	   and	   how	   the	   data	   may	   contribute	   to	   the	  examination	  of	  the	  thesis	  topic.	  Chapter	  3.3	  will	  go	  on	  to	  detail	  the	  Rural/Urban	  dataset	  obtained	  from	  the	  Office	  for	  National	  Statistics	  (ONS)	  and	  how	  it	  will	  be	  used.	  	  	  3.3	  –	  Office	  for	  National	  Statistics	  Data	  For	   the	   purpose	   of	   exploring	   any	   urban-­‐related	   effects	   on	   the	   performance	   of	  incumbent	   candidates,	   the	   project	   utilises	   data	   from	   the	   Office	   for	   National	  Statistics	  (ONS)	  on	  the	  rural/urban	  status	  of	  wards	  in	  England.	  There	  are	  various	  definitions	   of	   what	   constitutes	   an	   urban	   or	   rural	   area.	   For	   instance,	   Moseley	  (1999)	  indicates	  that	  the	  “criteria	  most	  commonly	  used	  are	  population	  density,	  the	  proportion	  of	  built-­‐up	   land,	   remoteness	   from	  urban	   centres,	   and	  degree	  of	  reliance	  upon	   ‘land	  extensive’	  economic	  activities.	  But	  every	  researcher	  applies	  such	   criteria	   in	   a	   slightly	   different	  way”	   (Moseley,	   1999,	   p.213).	   However,	   the	  established	  definition	  that	  is	  used	  for	  ONS	  data	  products	  was	  introduced	  in	  2004	  by	  DEFRA	  and	  the	  Commission	  for	  Rural	  Communities	  (CRC)	  in	  partnership	  with	  the	  ONS.	  To	  give	  readers	  a	  brief	  outline	  of	  the	  methods	  employed,	  there	  are	  three	  broad	  classifications	  of	  ward,	  one	  urban	  and	  two	  rural.	  	  	  Areas	   with	   settlements	   of	   over	   ten	   thousand	   residents	   are	   considered	   to	   be	  
Urban,	   and	   the	   rest	   are	   classified	   as	   one	   of	   two	  Rural	   settlement	   types,	   either	  
Town	  &	  Fringe	   or	  Village,	  Hamlet	  &	  Isolated	  Dwellings	   (VHID).	  Their	  population	  density	  distinguishes	  the	  rural	  types	  from	  one	  another,	  using	  detailed	  postcode	  data	  at	  varying	  scales.	  However,	   the	  key	  distinction	  between	  the	  types	  are	  that	  
Town	  &	  Fringe	  areas	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  densely	  populated	  over	  a	  wider	  area	  than	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VHID	  areas,	  which	  tend	  to	  be	  smaller,	  have	  a	  smaller	  overall	  population	  and	  are	  generally	   less	  densely	  populated.	  A	   further	  discussion	  of	   the	  classifications	  can	  be	   found	   in	  Bibby	  &	   Shepherd	   (2004),	  who	   offer	   a	   detailed	   explanation	   of	   the	  methodology	  behind	   the	   classifications.	  Below	  are	   the	   three	   classifications,	   the	  frequency	  of	  their	  occurrence	  and	  total	  share	  of	  English	  wards:	  	  Rural/Urban	  Classifications	  (3	  Categories)	  
• Urban	  (65.8%,	  5,253	  Wards)	  
• Rural	  -­‐	  Town	  &	  Fringe	  (14.3%,	  1,139	  Wards)	  
• Rural	  -­‐	  Village,	  Hamlet	  &	  Isolated	  Dwellings	  (VHID)	  (20%,	  1,595	  Wards)	  	  From	  the	  list	  above	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  vast	  number	  of	  districted	  wards	  in	  England	  are	  classed	  as	  Urban,	  almost	  two	  thirds	  (65.8%	  5,253/7,987).	  Around	  one	  in	  five	  (20%,	   1,595/7,987)	   are	   classed	   at	   VHID	   wards	   and	   14.3%	   (1,139/7,987)	   are	  considered	   to	   be	  Town	  &	  Fringe.	   But	   these	   classifications	   can	   also	   be	   assigned	  into	  either	  a	  ‘Sparse'	  or	  'Less	  Sparse'	  category	  that	  distinguishes	  wards	  based	  on	  the	  relative	  density	  of	  residential	  housing.	  	  
Sparse	  wards	  tend	  to	  be	  comprised	  predominantly	  of	  housing	  that	  is	  less	  densely	  spaced.	  Less	  Sparse	  type	  wards	  will	  be	  composed	  largely	  of	  housing	  that	  is	  more	  clustered.	  This	  division	  now	  leaves	  six	  broad	  groupings	  and	  their	  frequency	  and	  share	  of	  total	  English	  wards	  are	  listed	  below:	  	  Rural/Urban	  Classifications	  (6Cat)	  
• Urban	  –	  Sparse	  (65.3%,	  5,215	  Wards)	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• Urban	  -­‐	  Less	  Sparse	  (0.5%,	  38	  Wards)	  
• Rural	  -­‐	  Town	  &	  Fringe	  –	  Sparse	  (13.4%,	  1,068	  Wards)	  
• Rural	  -­‐	  Town	  &	  Fringe	  -­‐	  Less	  Sparse	  (0.9%,	  71	  Wards)	  
• Rural	  -­‐	  Village,	  Hamlet	  &	  Isolated	  Dwellings	  –	  Sparse	  (17.5%,	  1,399	  Wards)	  
• Rural	  -­‐	  Village,	  Hamlet	  &	  Isolated	  Dwellings	  -­‐	  Less	  Sparse	  (2.5%,	  196	  Wards)	  	  There	   are	   relatively	   few	   Less	   Sparse	   wards	   in	   England	   in	   both	   the	  Urban	   and	  
Rural	   settlements,	   less	   than	  1	   in	  every	  25	  (3.8%,	  305/7,987)	  with	   the	  majority	  categorised	   in	   the	  VHID	  class.	  But	  ward	   count	   is	  not	  necessarily	   a	   reflection	  of	  population	   and	   therefore	   representation.	   In	   many	   Urban	   areas	   wards	   are	  multimember	  and	  rather	  large	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  population	  they	  represent.	  Table	  3.3.1	  breaks	  down	  the	  English	  population	  by	  the	  ward	  type	  in	  which	  they	  reside.	  Less	  than	  one	  fifth	  (18.5%)	  of	  the	  English	  population	  in	  2001	  were	  estimated	  to	  be	   living	   in	   rurally	   classified	   areas,	   compared	   to	   the	   more	   than	   four	   fifths	  (81.4%)	   living	   in	  Urban	   areas.	   Just	   1.4%	   (less	   than	   690,000)	   lived	   in	   sparsely	  populated	  areas	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  2001	  census.	  Considering	  the	  relatively	  small	  number	   of	   sparsely	   populated	   wards	   and	   the	   small	   share	   of	   residents	   they	  represent,	   the	   three-­‐category	   variable	   is	   preferred.	   The	   six-­‐category	  classification	  has	  not	  been	  considered	  for	  analytical	  purposes	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  
English	  Population	  by	  Rural/Urban	  type	  (2001)	   n	   %	   Less	  Sparse	  %	   Sparse	  %	  Total	  Persons	  in	  England	   49,139,000	   100.0	   98.6	   1.4	  Urban	   40,490,536	   81.4	   81.2	   0.2	  Rural	  -­‐	  Town	  &	  Fringe	   4,815,622	   9.8	   9.3	   0.5	  Rural	  –	  VHID	  	   4,275,093	   8.7	   8.0	   0.7	  
[Table	   –	   3.3.1	   (English	   Population	   shares	   by	   Rural/Urban	   type	   –	   CAS	   Ward	   Level	   (Source:	   UK	  
Census	  2001)]	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Figure	  3.3.2	  maps	  the	  estimated	  geography	  of	  these	  settlements	  across	  England	  and	   forms	   as	   an	   illustration	   of	   where	   the	   urban	   centres	   of	   England	   are.	   The	  London	   Boroughs	   (LBs)	   and	   the	   Metropolitan	   Boroughs	   (MBs);	   of	   the	   West	  Midlands,	  South	  Yorkshire,	  West	  Yorkshire,	  Merseyside,	  Greater	  Manchester	  and	  Tyne	   &	   Wear	   are	   undoubtedly	   the	   major	   contributors	   to	   the	   total	   portion	   of	  urban	  wards	  in	  England.	  Conversely,	  the	  top	  tier	  Shire	  Counties	  (SCs)	  and	  lower	  tier	  Shire	  Districts	  (SDs)	  are	  the	  principal	  local	  authority	  type	  for	  the	  more	  rural	  communities	   across	   England.	   Alongside	   the	   LBs	   and	   MBs,	   many	   of	   England’s	  cities	  are	  now	  organised	  as	  Unitary	  Authorities	  (UAs)	  and	  so	  many	  of	  these	  will	  tend,	   to	   some	  degree,	   to	   represent	   a	   share	   of	  more	  urban	  English	   settlements,	  particularly	  those	  district	  authorities	  that	  gained	  county	  functions.	  For	  instance;	  Leicester,	   Swindon,	   Bristol,	   Plymouth,	   Reading,	   Stoke-­‐on-­‐Trent,	  Milton	   Keynes,	  Southampton	   and	   Slough	   to	   name	   a	   few.	  Where	   the	   reverse	   is	   true,	   i.e.	  whole	  counties	  gaining	  district	   functions;	   such	  as	  Cornwall,	  Wiltshire,	   Shropshire	  and	  the	  Isle	  of	  Wight,	  these	  authorities	  will	  undoubtedly	  include	  a	  large	  share	  of	  rural	  settlements.	  However,	   it	   is	   clear	   from	   figure	  3.3.2	   that	   the	  English	   rural/urban	  dichotomy	   will	   divide	   principally,	   though	   not	   exclusively,	   along	   types	   of	   local	  authority	   and	   any	   analysis	   by	   authority	   type	   should	   also	   take	   the	   rural/urban	  classification	  into	  consideration.	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[Figure	  3.3.2	  –	  English	  Rural/Urban	  Map	  (Source:	  Pateman	  (2010)	  Regional	  Trends,	  ONS)]	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Finally,	  the	  ONS	  dataset	  was	  merged	  with	  the	  aggregate	  electoral	  data	  supplied	  by	  the	  Elections	  Centre	  via	  a	  ward	  reference	  key.	  Due	  to	  the	  frequent	  occurrence	  of	  boundary	  changes	  and	  the	  renaming	  of	  wards,	  particularly	  in	  earlier	  years	  of	  the	   period,	   urban	   effects	   are	   only	   examined	   for	   the	   final	   two	   decades	   under	  examination,	   1991-­‐2010.	   There	   are	   two	   major	   methodological	   benefits	   to	   the	  project	  in	  doing	  so.	  	  	  The	  first	  concerns	  the	  maximisation	  of	  the	  relative	  share	  of	  matched	  wards.	  Due	  to	  the	  way	  the	  aggregate	  election	  data	  is	  collected	  and	  compiled,	  the	  ONS	  ward	  key	  has	  to	  be	  matched	  by	  comparing,	  county,	  district	  and	  ward	  names.	  This	  is	  not	  a	   faultless	  exercise	  however;	   the	  benefit	   is	   that	  data	   for	  more	   recent	  years	  are	  more	  consistent	  than	  those	  for	  earlier	  years,	  with	  the	  caveat	  that	  there	  are	  some	  wards	  that	  remain	  unmatched.	  	  Second,	  whilst	  there	  are	  clear	  epistemological	  issues	  concerning	  the	  longevity	  of	  potentially	   ‘superior’	   1991	   census	   measures	   compared	   to	   the	   information	  derived	  from	  2001	  (i.e.	  at	  what	  point	  do	  the	  2001	  census	  measures	  become	  more	  appropriate	  to	  use	  than	  those	  for	  1991?);	  it	  makes	  little	  sense	  to	  generalise	  these	  data	   to	   all	   years	   in	   this	   study.	   So	   the	   benefit	   of	   examining	   a	   smaller	   20-­‐year	  window,	   is	   that	   the	  data	  are	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  meaningful	   as	   it	   is	   closer	   to	   the	  time	  originally	   collected.	  To	   add,	   the	  new	  ONS	  definition	  was	   established	  after	  the	  2001	  census	  and	  based	  on	  these	  data,	  so	   this	  may	  mean	  that	   the	  1991	  and	  2001	   classifications	   are	  not	  directly	   comparable.	   It	   is	   unlikely	   that	   it	  would	  be	  methodologically	  appropriate	  to	  use	  both	  measures	  for	  the	  same	  analysis	  as	  they	  are	  defined	  slightly	  differently.	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  Chapter	  3	  has	  described	  in	  detail	  the	  data	  and	  methods	  that	  are	  used	  throughout	  this	  thesis	  as	  well	  as	  their	  relevance	  to	  the	  overall	  project.	  The	  first	  of	  five	  results	  chapters,	   chapter	  4	   goes	  on	   to	  describe	  broad	   trends	   in	  English	   local	   elections	  with	  a	  view	  to	  informing	  the	  reader	  of	  relevant	  electoral	  developments	  over	  the	  years.	   Throughout	   chapter	   4,	   there	   is	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   contestation	   of	   seats,	  incumbent	  competition	  and	   the	   trend	   in	  how	  successful	   incumbents	  have	  been	  since	  the	  1970s.	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Chapter	   4	   –	   Competition	  &	   Incumbent	   Success	   in	   English	   Local	  
Elections	  	  	  The	  aim	  of	  chapter	  4	  is	  to	  introduce	  the	  reader	  to	  the	  relevant	  electoral	  trends	  in	  English	  local	  elections	  since	  the	  reorganisation	  of	  local	  government	  following	  the	  1972	   Act.	   As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   2,	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   seats	   is	   a	   crucial	  component	   for	   their	   turnover	   in	   elections	   at	   all	   levels	   and	   as	   “access	   to	  public	  office	   is	   open	   to	   all	   citizens”	   (Economist,	   2010,	   p.34)	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   an	  indicator	   of	   the	   strength	   of	   a	   democracy.	   Seat	   contestation	   is	   not	   only	   an	  indication	   of	   electoral	   choice	   (i.e.	   the	   number	   of	   candidates	   standing	   or	   the	  ideological	  range)	  and	  is	  reflective	  of	  any	  structural	  barriers	  to	  standing	  for	  local	  government	   (i.e.	   rules	   for	  eligibility,	   election	   fees,	   campaign	   finance	   regulation,	  work	  hours	  and	  remuneration),	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  symptom	  of	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  local	  elections.	  It	  is	  an	  indication	  of	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  reasonable	  opportunity	  to	   hold	   elected	   officials	   to	   account	   on	   election	   day,	   as	   the	   Schumpeterian	  assertion	  maintains.	  Understanding	  how	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  in	  English	  local	  elections	  has	  altered	  over	  the	  period	  and	  how	  many	  incumbents	  choose	  to	  stand	  again	   is	   an	   important	   part	   of	   examining	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   incumbent	  councillors	  are	  advantaged,	  or	  not	  so.	  If	  too	  many	  incumbents	  are	  successful,	  the	  system	  becomes	  stagnant	  and	  resistant	  to	  change	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  pp.	  67).	  Too	  few	  and	  there	  may	  be	  little	  continuity.	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The	   chapter	   begins	   by	   examining	   the	   contestation	   of	   council	   seats	   over	   the	  period	  of	  study,	  aiming	   to	   illustrate	   the	  growth	   in	  contestation	  over	   the	  period	  and	  where	  this	  growth	  comes	  from.	  The	  work	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  present	  data	   for	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  incumbents	  choose	  to	  defend	  their	  seats,	  the	  stand	  again	  rates	  (SARs).	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  data	  on	  the	  successes	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  over	  the	  period	  examined,	  hit	  rates	  (HRs),	  and	  whether	  there	  has	  been	  any	  significant	  variation	   over	   time?	   Finally,	   the	   chapter	   offers	   some	   concluding	   remarks	   on	  findings	  discussed.	  	  4.1	  –	  Seat	  Contestation	  As	   discussed	   above,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   be	   aware	   of	   any	   trends	   in	   electoral	  competition	   when	   examining	   the	   success	   of	   incumbent	   candidates.	   Seat	  contestation	   is	   an	   important	   indicator	   of	   competitiveness	   for	   elections	   at	   all	  levels	   and	   variations	   can	   help	   explain	  much	   about	   the	   successes	   of	   particular	  groups	   at	   that	   time.	   For	   instance,	   soon	   after	   local	   government	   reorganisation,	  competition	  was	   not	   particularly	   strong	   in	   local	   elections.	   Rallings	  &	  Thrasher	  comment	   that	   “at	   the	   initial	   elections	   to	   the	   post-­‐reorganisation	   of	   county	  councils,	   held	   in	   1973,	   no	   fewer	   than	  500	  of	   the	   new	   councillors	  were	   elected	  unopposed”	  (1997,	  pp.	  65).	  “It	  may	  be,	  of	  course,	  that	  some	  local	  candidates	  are	  so	  popular	  that	  no	  one	  dares	  to	  challenge	  them	  in	  an	  election.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  uncontested	  seats	  may	  be	  interpreted	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  a	  general	  lack	  of	  interest	  in,	   and	   apathy	   about,	   local	   politics.	  But,	   voters	   can	  only	  have	   their	   say	   in	   local	  affairs	  if	  there	  is	  an	  electoral	  contest”(Rallings	  et	  al,	  2005,	  pp.395).	  Nevertheless,	  contestation	   in	   English	   local	   elections	   has	   varied	   considerably	   over	   the	   period	  and,	  as	  the	  following	  data	  indicate,	  can	  also	  vary	  across	  the	  type	  of	  authority.	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  Table	   4.1.1	   shows	   the	   total	   number	   of	   vacancies,	   candidates	   and	   average	   seat	  competition	  over	   the	  period	   for	  each	   type	  of	   authority	  and	   the	  most	   contested	  seats	  over	  the	  period	  are	  shown	  to	  be	  in	  the	  capital.	  Since	  1974	  there	  have	  been	  almost	   sixty	   thousand	   candidates	   standing	   for	   election	   in	   more	   than	   eighteen	  and	   a	   half	   thousand	   London	   Borough	   (LB)	   seats,	   a	   ratio	   of	   3.2	   candidates	   for	  every	  vacancy.	  Closely	  behind	  the	  LBs	  are	  the	  predominantly	  urban	  Metropolitan	  Boroughs	   (MBs)	   and	   Unitary	   Authorities	   (UAs).	   The	   UAs	   are	   the	   most	   recent	  addition	   to	   local	   authority	   classifications.	   Over	   the	   period	   there	   have	   been	  almost	  eighty-­‐seven	   thousand	  candidates	   competing	   for	   twenty-­‐eight	   thousand	  MB	   seats.	   In	   the	   UAs,	   since	   the	   first	   elections	   in	   1995	   there	   have	   been	   some	  thirty-­‐five	  thousand	  candidates	  competing	   for	  eleven	  and	  a	  half	   thousand	  seats	  available.	  The	  respective	  ratios	   for	  the	  MBs	  and	  UAs	  are	  around	  3.1	  candidates	  for	  every	  vacancy,	  slightly	  less	  than	  for	  London.	  	  	  At	  a	  yet	  smaller	  ratio	  of	  contestation,	  the	  Shire	  Counties	  (SCs)	  average	  a	  ratio	  of	  just	   2.9	   candidates	   for	   every	   division	   vacancy,	   with	   the	   almost	   twenty-­‐seven	  thousand	  seats	  at	  SC	  level	  being	  contested	  by	  more	  than	  seventy-­‐eight	  thousand	  candidates.	   Finally,	   the	   Shire	   Districts	   (SDs)	   are	   the	   least	   contested	   type	   of	  authority.	   Though	   almost	   three	   hundred	   thousand	   candidates	   have	   stood	   for	  election	   to	   the	   lower	   tier	   shire	   council	   structure,	   there	   have	   been	   some	   one	  hundred	   and	   twenty	   four	   thousand	   vacancies	   over	   the	   period,	   which	   leaves	   a	  ratio	  of	  less	  than	  2.4	  candidates	  for	  every	  seat	  on	  district	  councils.	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Seat	  Competition	  in	  England	   Total	  Vacancies	   Total	  Candidates	   Avg.	  Seat	  Competition	  London	  Boroughs	   18,561	   58,777	   3.17	  Metropolitan	  Boroughs	   28,030	   86,829	   3.10	  Shire	  Counties	   26,900	   78,349	   2.91	  Shire	  Districts	   124,172	   295,613	   2.38	  Unitary	  Authorities	   11,540	   35,427	   3.07	  
All	  Authority	  Types	   209,203	   554,995	   2.65	  
[Table	  4.1.1	  –	  Seats,	  Candidates,	  Average	  Seat	  Competition	  (n	  =	  554,995]]	  	  The	   data	   presented	   in	   table	   4.1.1	   show	   a	   clear	   difference	   in	   the	   level	   of	  competition	  for	  seats	  on	  different	  types	  of	  council,	  which	  in	  turn	  have	  different	  grades	   of	   functional	   power	   and	   rural/urban	   classification.	   There	   is	   greater	  competition	  for	  seats	  at	  the	  county-­‐level	  of	  shire	  authorities	  than	  at	  the	  district-­‐level,	   and	   greater	   competition	   in	   the	  more	   urban	  Boroughs	   than	   in	   the	   Shires.	  These	  data	  support	  established	  notions	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  higher	  tiers	  of	  local	  government	   and	  more	   urban	   districts	   report	   higher	   ratios	   of	   seat	   competition	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997).	  However,	   these	  data	  are	  also	  presented	  as	  a	  static	  snapshot	  of	  contestation	  in	  local	  government	  elections	  in	  England,	  but	  over	  the	  period	   contestation	   has	   changed	   to	   varying	   degrees	   for	   the	   different	   types	   of	  authority.	  	  Figure	   4.1.2	   is	   the	   first	   of	   a	   series	   of	   charts	   (figures	   4.1.2-­‐4.1.8)	   designed	   to	  illustrate	   the	   trend	   in	  seat	  contestation	   for	  various	  authorities	  over	   the	  period.	  Before	   going	   on	   to	   describe	   these	   trends,	   some	   explanation	   is	   required	   as	   to	  what	  the	  various	  scales	  and	  plots	  on	  the	  charts	  are	  indicating.	  The	  scales	  on	  the	  left-­‐hand	  side	  of	  all	  these	  charts	  refer	  to	  frequency	  counts	  of	  incumbents	  and	  all	  candidates	   standing	   for	   that	   year’s	   election	   are	   marked	   in	   dashed	   black	   and	  dashed	  grey	  respectively	  on	  the	  chart.	  The	  scale	  on	  the	  right-­‐hand	  side	  (red)	  is	  a	  ratio	   figure,	   which	   refers	   to	   the	   average	   number	   of	   candidates	   standing	   per	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available	  seat	  in	  the	  election	  that	  year	  (data	  marked	  in	  solid	  red	  on	  chart).	  These	  charts	   illustrate	   three	   features	   of	   seat	   competition.	   Changes	   in	   the	  numbers	   of	  candidates	  standing,	  the	  number	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  defending	  their	  seats	  and	  the	  broad	  level	  of	  contestation	  for	  council	  seats	  over	  the	  period.	  	  Considering	  first	  the	  LBs,	  London	  councils	  are	  elected	  on	  a	  quadrennial	  cycle	  and	  so	  every	   four	  years	  all	  of	  London’s	  councils	  are	  elected	   in	   their	  entirety.	  There	  have	   been	   ten	   elections	   during	   the	   period	   of	   examination	   and	   just	   36	   of	   the	  18,561	  seats	  during	  this	   time	  were	  uncontested4.	  Aside	   from	  1974,	  when	  there	  were	   just	  1,494	  seats,	   the	  number	  of	  vacancies	  has	  remained	   fairly	  constant	  at	  around	  the	  1,900	  mark.	  	  At	  its	  lowest	  point	  for	  the	  ten	  elections,	  the	  LB	  seat	  competition	  ratio	  (marked	  in	  red)	   begins	   at	   some	   2.86	   persons	   per	   seat	   in	   1974.	   Throughout,	   there	   is	   a	  gradual	  increase	  in	  this	  ratio,	  rising	  to	  3.13	  in	  1986,	  the	  year	  the	  Greater	  London	  Council	  (GLC)	  was	  abolished,	  before	  dipping	  slightly	  during	  the	  1990’s.	  The	  ratio	  rises	   more	   sharply	   over	   the	   following	   three	   elections	   to	   finish	   on	   almost	   3.7	  candidates	  per	  vacancy	  in	  2010.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  trend	  largely	  mimics	   the	  number	  of	  candidates	  contesting	  LB	  seats	   (marked	   in	  dashed	  grey)	  over	  the	  period.	  This	   is	  because	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  contesting	  has	  risen,	  whilst	  the	  number	  of	  vacancies	  has	  remained	  broadly	  the	  same.	  The	  number	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  defending	  their	  seats	  (marked	  in	  dashed	  black)	  appears	  to	  have	   little	  effect	  on	  the	  overall	  ratio	  of	  seat	  competition	   for	   the	  Boroughs,	   thus	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  These	  were;	  22	  seats	  in	  1974;	  2	  in	  1982	  and	  3	  in	  1986,	  1990,	  1998	  &	  2002.	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we	  can	  determine	   that	   the	   rise	   in	   seat	   competition	   in	   the	  LBs	  may	  be	  due	   to	  a	  general	  rise	  in	  interest	  from	  candidates.	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almost	  entirely	  of	  three-­‐member	  wards.	  Unfortunately,	  due	  to	  the	  reorganisation	  and	   redistricting	  of	   the	  MBs	   the	   complexity	   is	   increased.	  There	  have	  been	   two	  major	  all-­‐out	  elections	  in	  the	  MBs	  over	  the	  period,	  where	  all	  seats	  on	  the	  council	  were	   elected	   and	   the	   length	   of	   candidates’	   first	   term	   in	   office	  was	   decided	   by	  their	  finishing	  position	  in	  the	  all-­‐out	  year.	  The	  all-­‐out	  elections	  were	  first	  in	  1973	  after	  local	  government	  reorganisation,	  followed	  by	  a	  year	  of	  shadowing	  for	  many	  councillors,	  whilst	   the	   second	  was	   in	   2004,	   after	   re-­‐districting	   as	   explained	   in	  chapter	  1.	  Observing	  figure	  4.1.3,	  contestation	  rates	  for	  the	  MBs	  since	  1973	  have	  clearly	   shown	   strong	   signs	   of	   growth.	  Where	   there	   were	   just	   2.31	   candidates	  standing	   for	   every	   seat	   in	   1973,	   by	   2010	   this	   ratio	   had	   almost	   doubled,	   to	   an	  average	  of	  4.45	  candidates	  for	  every	  MB	  vacancy.	  	  Unlike	  for	  the	  LBs	  there	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  some	  event-­‐driven	  fluctuation	  in	  the	   competition	   for	   seats	   in	   the	  MBs.	   As	   discussed	   above,	   the	   1973	   and	   2004	  elections	   were	   unusual	   cases	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   all	   seats	   were	   up	   for	   election.	  Demand	  on	  the	  pool	  of	  candidates	  was	  inevitably	  much	  higher	  in	  these	  years.	  As	  figure	  4.1.3	   illustrates,	  more	  than	  five	  and	  a	  half	   thousand	  candidates	  stood	  for	  the	  2,415	  vacancies	  in	  1973	  and	  almost	  seven	  and	  a	  half	  thousand	  stood	  for	  the	  2,445	  vacancies	  in	  2004.	  If	  we	  compare	  just	  these	  two	  instances,	  over	  the	  thirty-­‐one	  years	  that	  separate	  them,	  seat	  competition	  has	  grown	  by	  an	  average	  of	  0.7	  persons	  per	  seat.	  Except	  for	  two	  slight	  ‘spikes’	  in	  seat	  competition	  at	  the	  1982-­‐3	  and	  1992	  elections,	  there	  has	  been	  steady	  growth	  throughout.	  In	  1982	  there	  is	  a	  marked	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  standing	  for	  seats	  in	  the	  MBs	  that	  coincides	   with	   a	   dip	   in	   incumbent	   contestation.	   The	   rise	   in	   candidate	  contestation	   is	   probably	  down	   to	   two	  national	   political	   events,	   as	  Rallings	   and	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Thrasher	  detail.	  The	  sudden	   increase	  came	  about	  because	  of	   the	  newly	  created	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	  (SDP)	  that	  recognised	  the	  electoral	  value	  of	  establishing	  a	  purchase	   in	  areas	  traditionally	  associated	  with	  the	  Labour	  party.	  At	  the	  same	  time	   the	   Liberals	   were	   also	   driven	   to	   flood	   the	   MBs	   with	   candidates	   in	   an	  attempt	  to	  break	  the	  domination	  of	  the	  two	  major	  parties	  in	  the	  MBs	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  pp.88-­‐89).	  	  	  Interestingly,	  the	  abolition	  of	  the	  Metropolitan	  Counties	  (MCs),	  the	  old	  upper	  tier	  of	   the	  metropolitan	   authority,	   in	   1985	   appears	   to	   have	   had	   little	   effect	   on	   the	  overall	  contestation	  of	  seats.	  As	  for	  the	  LBs,	  the	  major	  factor	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  seat	  competition	  in	  the	  MBs	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  a	  steady	  rise	  in	  the	  overall	  interest	  of	  candidates	  standing	  rather	  than	  the	  number	  of	  incumbents	  choosing	  to	  defend	  their	   seats.	   In	   addition,	   though	   there	   has	   been	   a	   marked	   increase	   in	   seat	  competition	  since	  2004,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  this	  trend	  was	  set	  well	   before	   this	   election	   year.	   It	   can	   be	   quite	   apparent	   from	   figure	   4.1.3,	   and	  potentially	  misleading,	  to	  observe	  that	  nearly	  all	  the	  growth	  in	  seat	  competition	  has	  come	  about	  since	  reorganisation.	  However,	   there	  are	   two	  key	  observations	  to	  consider.	  	  	  First,	  the	  trend	  for	  what	  can	  be	  termed	  as	  a	  ‘second	  wave’	  of	  contestation	  growth	  in	  the	  MBs,	  was	   in	  place	  from	  elections	   in	  1996.	  This	  growth	  has	  continued	  for	  every	  MB	  election,	   except	   for	   those	   in	  2004	  where	   the	  number	  of	   vacancies	   in	  effect	  tripled,	  placing	  a	  major	  demand	  on	  candidates.	  Gains	  then	  continued	  to	  be	  made	  from	  2006	  on	  almost	  the	  same	  trajectory.	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Second,	   the	   number	   of	   incumbent	   candidates	   standing	   remained	   relatively	   flat	  during	  the	  same	  period,	  again,	  except	  for	  the	  special	  case	  in	  2004.	  These	  data	  are	  broadly	   in	   line	   with	   those	   discussed	   for	   the	   LBs	   and	   suggest	   that	   seat	  competition	  is	  on	  a	  steadily	  rising	  course	  in	  England.	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years.	   However,	   upon	   a	   closer	   examination,	   it	   is	   apparent	   that	   the	   number	   of	  candidates	  and	  incumbents	  has	  altered	  significantly.	  Where	  some	  six	  and	  a	  half	  thousand	   candidates	   stood	   for	   a	   shire	   seat	   in	   1973,	   twenty	   years	   later	   this	  number	   had	   swollen	   to	   more	   than	   nine	   thousand.	   Conversely,	   aside	   from	   the	  1981	   elections,	   there	   has	   been	   relatively	   little	   change	   in	   the	   number	   of	  incumbent	   candidates	   standing	   over	   the	   same	   period	   (1973-­‐1993),	   which	  remains	  at	  around	  the	  2,000	  mark.	  	  The	  sharp	  fall	  in	  the	  overall	  number	  of	  candidates	  at	  the	  1997	  SC	  elections,	  from	  more	   than	   nine	   thousand	   to	   less	   than	   seven	   thousand,	   coincides	   with	   the	  introduction,	   or	   the	   ‘first	   wave’,	   of	   46	   UAs	   in	   England	   &	   Wales.	   This	   was	  effectively	  a	   conversion	  of	  many	  Shire	  authorities,	  particularly	   the	  more	  urban	  SDs,	   into	   a	   new	   single	   tier	   local	   authority	   structure.	   Inevitably,	   as	   UAs	   were	  introduced	   since	   1995	   this	   means	   that	   the	   number	   of	   SC	   seats,	   and	   thus	   the	  number	  of	   candidates	   contesting,	   fell	   in	   line	  with	   the	  growth	  of	  UAs.	  The	  drop	  was	  equal	   to	  almost	  eight	  hundred	  seats,	   a	   fall	   from	  2,998	   in	  1993	   to	  2,203	   in	  1997.	   Yet	   seat	   competition	   has	   remained	   on	   its	   relatively	   steady	   course	   of	   a	  gradual	   increase	   throughout	   the	   entire	   period.	   After	   the	   ‘first	  wave’	   of	   decline	  the	  gradual	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  standing	  for	  SC	  seats	  continues,	  whilst	   the	   number	   of	   incumbent	   candidates	   remains	   relatively	   constant	   at	  around	  1,500.	  In	  2009	  a	  ‘second	  wave’	  of	  authority	  conversions	  were	  made	  as	  a	  further	   9	   UAs	   were	   created.	   Five	   of	   these	   were	   from	   county-­‐level	   authorities	  such	  as	  Cornwall,	  County	  Durham	  and	  Shropshire.	  The	  change	  meant	  a	   further	  drop	   in	   the	   overall	   number	   of	   seats,	   from	   2,269	   in	   2005	   elections	   to	   1,858	   in	  2009,	  a	  drop	  of	  more	   than	   four	  hundred	  SC	  seats.	  What	   is	  most	  apparent	   from	  
	  102	  
this	   change	   is	   that	   relative	   seat	   competition	   continues	   to	   rise,	   this	   time	   at	   a	  greater	  rate	  than	  in	  previous	  years.	  A	  trend	  that	  is	  similar	  in	  the	  Boroughs.	  The	  level	  of	  seat	  competition	  rises	  from	  3.38	  candidates	  per	  seat	   in	  2005	  to	  3.94	  in	  2009.	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been	  elected	  by	  a	  quadrennial	   electoral	   cycle.	  A	   few	  have	  also	  been	  elected	  by	  halves.	  	  	  The	  level	  of	  seat	  competition	  for	  the	  SDs	  has	  grown	  over	  the	  period,	  though	  to	  a	  lesser	   extent	   than	   for	   authorities	   discussed	   above.	   Figure	   4.1.5	   illustrates	   the	  trend	  in	  seat	  contestation	  over	  the	  period.	  There	  is	  a	  trend	  of	  volatility,	  evident	  in-­‐part	  because	  of	  the	  different	  electoral	  cycles	  used	  across	  the	  SDs.	  The	  number	  of	  candidates	  and	  incumbents	  contesting	  varies	  significantly	  over	  the	  years,	  but	  in	  a	  regular	  way	  that	  reflects	  the	  underlying	  mix	  of	  cycles.	  Every	  four	  years	  the	  demand	  for	  candidates	  increases	  sharply	  as	  the	  District	  councils	  on	  quadrennial	  cycles	  reach	  the	  end	  of	  their	  term.	  Seat	  competition	  also	  fluctuates	  significantly	  depending	  on	  the	  stage	  in	  the	  electoral	  cycle.	  For	  instance,	  in	  1973	  districts	  were	  contested	  on	  average	  by	  around	  2	  contestants	  per	  seat	  and	  by	  2010	  this	   figure	  had	  risen	  to	  almost	  3.5	  contestants.	  At	  regular	  intervals	  throughout	  the	  period	  of	  examination	  there	  have	  been	  sharp	  drops	  in	  competition	  as	  the	  electoral	  cycles	  and	   SC	   elections	   coincide.	   These	   falls	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   due	   to	   increases	   in	  vacancies	  and	  thus	  demand	  for	  candidates	  to	  stand	  in	  Shire	  elections	  at	  both	  the	  district	   and	   the	   county	   level,	   figure	   4.1.5,	   illustrates	   this	   trend.	   For	   both	  candidates	  and	   incumbents	   there	  are	  clear	   ‘peaks’	   in	  contestation	  that	  coincide	  with	  dips	  in	  seat	  competition.	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electoral	   cycle	   has	   remained	   relatively	   stable	   at	   just	   above	   two	   and	   a	   half	  candidates	  per	  vacancy.	  	  When	  observing	   the	  number	  of	   candidates	   standing	  over	   the	  period,	   it	   is	   clear	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  gradual	  decline	  in	  the	  total	  number	  of	  candidates	  standing	  for	   election	   to	   the	   district-­‐level	   councils.	   This	   decline	  marries	   neatly	   with	   the	  introduction	  of	  UAs	  in	  England.	  The	  introduction	  of	  UAs	  has	  led	  to	  the	  effective	  removal	  of	  almost	  one	  third	  of	  the	  total	  number	  of	  SDs	  in	  England,	  from	  around	  290	  to	  200.	  There	  were	  34,133	  candidates	  contesting	  SD	  seats	  during	  the	  1991-­‐94	   electoral	   cycle.	   By	   1995-­‐98	   this	   figure	   had	   dropped	   by	  more	   than	   10%	   to	  30,724	  candidates	  and	  there	  was	  a	  further	  drop	  to	  27,863	  candidates	  by	  2007-­‐10.	  	  Interestingly,	   unlike	   for	   other	   types	   of	   authority,	   incumbents	   appear	   to	   be	  bucking	  the	  trend	  set	  by	  the	  total	  number	  of	  candidates	  contesting	  vacancies	  in	  the	  SDs.	  While	   the	  number	  of	   candidates	  has	   fallen,	   the	  number	  of	   incumbents	  choosing	  to	  defend	  their	  seats	  has	  increased	  considerably.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  falling	  number	  of	  SDS,	  the	  rise	  takes	  the	  number	  of	  incumbents	  contesting	  from	  around	  two	  and	  a	  half	   thousand	   in	   the	   first	   three	  cycles	  (around	  17%	  of	  vacancies),	   to	  more	  than	  seven	  and	  a	  half	  thousand	  in	  the	  final	  cycle	  (73%	  of	  vacancies).	  This	  is	  three	   times	   the	   opening	   figure.	   At	   its	   highest	   (1999-­‐02),	   almost	   ten	   thousand	  incumbent	   candidates	   chose	   to	   defend	   their	   seats,	   a	   rate	   of	   75%	   contestation.	  The	  bulk	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  incumbent	  contestation	  took	  place	  after	  the	  1987-­‐90	  cycle	  and	  has	  remained	  broadly	  around	  three	  quarters	  level	  since.	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UAs,	   showing	   large	   variations	   in	   the	   number	   of	   candidates	   and	   incumbents	  standing	   from	  year-­‐to-­‐year	  over	   the	  period	  of	   examination.	  At	   first	   glance	   seat	  competition	   in	   the	  UAs	   appears	   to	   have	   grown	  markedly	   over	   the	   16	   years	   of	  their	   existence.	   Marked	   in	   red,	   the	   chart	   shows	   that	   average	   competition	   has	  grown	  from	  2.75	  candidates	  per	  seat	  in	  1995	  to	  4.1	  in	  2010,	  a	  rise	  of	  almost	  one	  and	  a	  half	   candidates	  per	   seat.	  The	   figure	  4.1.7	   also	   shows	   that	   the	  number	  of	  candidates	   contesting	   UA	   elections	   has	   increased,	   as	   has	   the	   number	   of	  incumbent	  candidates	  (marked	  in	  dashed	  black).	  However,	  for	  both	  these	  groups	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  gauge	  the	  rise,	  as	  one	  year	  is	  not	  necessarily	  comparable	  with	  its	  neighbour.	  Also,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  rise	  will	  reflect,	  in	  part,	  the	  addition	  of	  newer	  UAs,	  particularly	  those	  in	  2009.	  However,	  as	  average	  seat	  competition	  is	  shown	  to	   gradually	   rise,	   it	   is	   inevitable	   that	   there	  must	   have	   been	   an	   increase	   in	   the	  relative	  number	  of	  candidates	  contesting	  UA	  seats,	  particularly	  in	  later	  years.	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contrary	   to	   that	  described	   for	   the	  UAs	  above,	   that	   the	   long	   term	  trend	   for	   seat	  competition	  in	  the	  UAs	  is	  growing	  at	  a	  much	  slower	  rate.	  There	  has	  been	  a	  more	  gradual	   increase	   than	   illustrated	   in	   figure	   4.1.7.	   Seat	   competition	   in	   the	   UAs	  averaged	   just	   2.81	   candidates	   per	   seat	   during	   the	   1995-­‐98	   electoral	   cycle	   and	  rose	   steadily	   over	   the	   period	   to	   3.43	   candidates	   by	   2007-­‐10.	   The	   rise,	   of	   just	  0.62,	  is	  less	  than	  half	  the	  difference	  between	  1995	  and	  2010	  as	  individual	  years.	  As	   for	  the	  Boroughs	  and	  the	  SCs,	  growth	  in	  UA	  seat	  competition	   is	  strongest	   in	  later	   years	   and	   this	   appears	   to	   be	   driven	   by	   the	   overall	   number	   of	   candidates	  contesting	  vacancies,	  not	  necessarily	  a	  significant	  change	  in	  the	  overall	  number	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  contesting.	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per	   seat	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   period,	  whilst	   the	   LBs	   and	   UAs	   begin	   from	   a	  more	  competitive	   position	   and	   have	   risen	   at	   a	   slightly	   slower	   pace.	   For	   all	   types	   of	  authority	   the	   rise	   in	   seat	   competition	   has	   been	   driven	   predominantly	   by	   an	  increase	  in	  the	  total	  number	  of	  candidates	  contesting,	  rather	  than	  incumbents	  or	  a	  fall	  in	  the	  number	  of	  seats.	  	  This	   finding	   has	   a	   number	   of	   implications.	   Firstly,	   the	   data	   suggest	   that	   the	  growth	  in	  contestation	  is	  a	  national	  trend.	  However,	  there	  may	  be	  a	  case	  for	  the	  rise	   being	   associated	   in	   part	   with	   the	   level	   of	   power	   that	   a	   type	   of	   authority	  holds.	   The	   SDs	   exhibited	   consistently	   lower	   levels	   of	   competition	   than	   other	  types	  of	  authority	  with	  greater	  functional	  powers.	  It	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  there	  is	  less	  interest	  because	  there	  is	  less	  at	  stake	  at	  these	  elections.	  	  	  Secondly,	   increased	   seat	   competition	   raises	   further	   questions	   regarding	   who	  these	  extra	   candidates	  are	  and	  what	  political	  background	   they	   come	   from.	  Are	  the	  major	   parties	   increasing	   the	   portion	   of	   seats	   they	   contest?	   If	   so,	   this	  may	  imply	  that	  the	  major	  parties	  have	  failed	  in	  the	  past	  to	  contest	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  seats	   at	   local	   elections	   and	   thus	   the	   capacity	   for	   further	   increases	  may	   not	   be	  sustainable.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   has	   there	   been	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	  independent	   contestants	   or	   those	   from	   minor	   parties?	   This	   would	   have	   a	  different	   set	   of	   implications.	   For	   instance,	   if	   the	   number	   of	   minor	   party	   and	  independent	  (Other)	  candidates	  is	  on	  the	  rise,	  is	  this	  due	  to	  a	  perception	  that	  the	  barriers	  to	  standing	  for	  local	  office	  are	  falling?	  Or	  is	  it	  a	  broader	  development	  for	  instance,	  i.e.	  a	  rejection	  of	  nationally	  established	  parties	  perhaps?	  Also	  are	  these	  candidates	  successful?	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  Finally,	   the	  early	  charges	  of	   the	  SDP	  and	  Liberals,	   the	  Liberal/SDP	  Alliance	  and	  the	   emergence	   of	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	   has	   undoubtedly	   had	   an	   effect	   on	   the	  structure	   of	   party	   competition	   in	   England	   and	   according	   Rallings	   &	   Thrasher	  (2003)	  will	  have	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  contesting	  local	  elections	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  authorities.	  Considering	  this,	  the	  chapter	  now	  goes	  on	   to	   examine	   the	   temporal	   trend	   in	   seat	   contestation	   for	   the	   four	   party	  categories	  across	  all	  authorities.	  	  Table	  4.1.9	  displays	   the	  overall	   rates	  of	   seat	   contestation	  by	  authority	   type	   for	  each	   of	   the	   three	  major	   party	   categories	   and	   Other	   candidates.	   As	   outlined	   in	  chapter	   3	   Others	   refers	   to	   independent	   and	  minor	   party	   candidates.	   The	   data	  show	   that	   far	   from	   contesting	   all	   the	   seats	   available	   over	   the	   period,	   the	   two	  major	  parties	  have	  managed	  to	  stand	  in	  around	  four	  out	  of	  every	  five	  vacancies.	  The	  Conservatives	  have	  fielded	  a	  candidate	  in	  83.6%	  of	  all	  seats	  in	  England	  and	  Labour	  in	  79.2%.	  The	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  a	  combination	  of	  SDP,	  the	  Liberals	  and	  Liberal/SDP	  Alliance	   in	  earlier	  years,	  have	  contested	   just	   less	   than	  three	  out	  of	  every	   five	   vacancies	   (59.2%).	   Finally,	   Other	   candidates	   have	   contested	   more	  than	  two	  of	  every	  five	  seats	  (42.9%)	  available.	  	   Seat	  Contestation	  in	  England	   LBs	   MBs	   SCs	   SDs	   UAs	   All	  
Conservatives	   95.9%	   89.2%	   92.8%	   77.9%	   89.1%	   83.6%	  
Labour	   99.1%	   99.3%	   87.4%	   69.1%	   88.9%	   79.2%	  
Liberal	  Democrats	   75.7%	   71.9%	   69.7%	   49.7%	   78.6%	   59.2%	  
Other	   45.2%	   48.7%	   40.4%	   41.1%	   50.2%	   42.9%	  
[Table	  4.1.9	  Seat	  Contestation	  by	  Party	  by	  Authority	  Type	  (%)	  (n	  =	  554,995]]	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A	   closer	   inspection	   of	   the	   data	   in	   table	   4.1.9	   reveals	   differences	   between	   the	  parties	   across	   the	   authority	   types.	   Seats	   in	   the	   LBs	   are	   the	   most	   contested,	  particularly	   by	   the	   Conservatives	   and	   Labour	  who	   have	   fielded	   a	   candidate	   in	  95.9%	  and	  99.1%	  of	  all	  seats	  respectively.	  The	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  managed	  to	  contest	  more	  than	  three	  quarters	  of	  LB	  seats	  (75.7%).	  Candidates	  categorised	  as	  Other	  have	  contested	  just	  45.2%	  of	  vacancies.	  	  	  Contestation	  for	  Labour	  in	  the	  MBs	  is	  strong,	  with	  nearly	  every	  seat	  having	  been	  contested	   since	   1973	   (99.3%).	   However,	   the	   rate	   of	   contestation	   for	  Conservative	   candidates	   is	   almost	   10%	   lower	   at	   89.2%	   of	   all	   vacancies.	   The	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  managed	   to	   contest	   just	   71.9%	  of	   all	   seats	   in	   the	  MBs	  and	   just	   48.7%	   for	  Others.	   Looking	   to	   the	   Shire	   Counties,	  whereas	   Labour	   has	  dominated	  the	  rather	  urban	  Boroughs,	  the	  Tories	  are	  now	  the	  dominant	  party.	  At	  the	  county	  level	  of	  the	  Shires,	  the	  Conservative	  party	  has	  fielded	  a	  candidate	  in	  92.8%	   of	   all	   seats.	   For	   the	   SDs	   Tory	   seat	   contestation	   is	   shown	   to	   be	   77.9%.	  There	   is	   an	   almost	   15%	   gap	   between	   Conservative	   contestation	   at	   the	   county	  and	  district	  level,	  a	  pattern	  that	  is	  repeated	  for	  the	  two	  other	  major	  parties	  to	  an	  even	   greater	   extent.	   For	   Labour,	   seat	   contestation	   in	   the	   SCs	   is	   shown	   to	   be	  87.4%	   of	   all	   vacancies,	   but	   just	   69.1%	   at	   the	   district	   level,	   a	   fall	   of	  more	   than	  18%.	   The	   drop	   between	   the	   shires	   and	   districts	   is	   greatest	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats.	  A	  Lib	  Dem	  candidate	  has	  contested	  just	  69.7%	  of	  seats	  at	  the	  county-­‐level,	  but	  the	  same	  is	  true	  for	  less	  than	  half	  at	  the	  district-­‐level	  seats	  (49.7%),	  a	  drop	  of	  20%.	  By	  comparison,	  there	  is	  little	  difference	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  seats	  contested	   by	   Other	   candidates	   in	   the	   counties	   and	   districts,	   though	   the	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proportions	   of	   seats	   contested	   are	   rather	   low	   in	   both	   instances,	   at	   just	   40.4%	  and	  41.1%	  respectively.	  	  Finally,	   in	   the	   UAs	   the	   level	   of	   seat	   contestation	   between	   the	   parties	   is	   much	  closer,	  with	  Conservative	  and	  Labour	  contestation	  almost	  identical	  at	  89.1%	  and	  88.9%	   respectively.	   The	   Liberal	   Democrats	   show	   their	   highest	   rate	   of	   seat	  contestation	   across	   all	   types	   of	   authority,	   due	   perhaps	   in	   part	   to	   the	   party’s	  formation	  shortly	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  UAs	  in	  England.	  Some	  78.6%	  of	  UA	  seats	  were	  contested	  by	  the	  Lib	  Dems,	  around	  10%	  less	  than	  for	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives,	  the	  smallest	  gap	  for	  the	  party	  across	  all	  authority	  types.	  The	  UAs	  are	  also	  the	  most	  contested	  type	  of	  authority	  for	  Others	  with	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  amounting	  to	  roughly	  half	  the	  seats.	  	  Overall,	   the	   data	   in	   table	   4.1.9	   show	   that	   the	   Conservative	   and	   Labour	   parties	  have	   fielded	  by	   far	   the	  most	   candidates	   in	  English	   local	   elections.	  But	   the	  data	  discussed	   is	   a	   cross-­‐sectional	   snapshot	   of	   seat	   contestation	   for	   the	   parties	  between	   1973	   and	   2010.	   The	   chapter	   will	   now	   go	   on	   to	   discuss	   temporal	  variations	   in	   party	   contestation.	   Focusing	   once	   again	   on	   different	   types	   of	  authority,	   the	   aim	   is	   to	   illustrate	   the	   changes	   in	   seat	   competition,	   within	   and	  between	  the	  parties,	  as	  well	  as	   their	  contribution	  to	   the	  overall	  change	   in	   local	  election	  competitiveness	  in	  England.	  	  Beginning	  with	   London,	   figure	   4.1.10	   shows	   that	   the	   Conservative	   and	   Labour	  parties	  have	  contested	  the	  capital	  strongly,	  though	  this	  does	  slip	  for	  the	  Tories	  in	  the	  nineteen	  seventies	  and	  mid-­‐to-­‐late	  nineties.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  striking	  facet	  
	   113	  
of	   the	   figure	  4.1.10	   is	   the	  variation	   in	   the	  percentage	  of	   seats	   contested	  by	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  This	  variation	  is	  probably	  due	  to	  the	  concerted	  efforts	  of	  the	  Liberals	  and	  SDP	   in	   the	  early	  1980s	   to	   field	  as	  many	  candidates	  as	  possible,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  eventual	   formation	  of	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	   in	  1988.	  What	   is	   clear	  from	  the	  London	  data	   is	   that,	  aside	   from	  the	  early	  variations	   for	   the	  Lib	  Dems,	  seat	  contestation	  has	  remained	  relatively	  stable	  for	  the	  three	  major	  parties	  since	  1994.	   Also,	   there	   has	   been	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   overall	   level	   of	   contestation	   for	  Other	  candidates	  since	  the	  late	  1990s	  and	  this	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  the	  principal	  driver	   of	   seat	   competition	   in	   London.	   By	   2010,	   seat	   contestation	   from	   Other	  candidates	  in	  the	  LBs	  surpasses	  that	  for	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  with	  85	  candidates	  fielded	  for	  every	  100	  seats.	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Thrasher	   exemplify	   this	   strength	   by	   noting	   that	   Barnsley	   and	   Rotherham	  Boroughs	  are	  based	  in	  what	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Peoples	  Republic	  of	  South	  Yorkshire’,	   as	   the	   authorities	   struggled	   to	   sustain	   two-­‐party,	   let	   alone	   three-­‐party	  competition	  at	  times	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  pp.90).	  	  For	  the	  Conservatives	  however,	  there	  has	  been	  some	  variation	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	   candidates	   to	   seats.	   The	   figure	   4.1.11	   shows	   that	   the	   Tories	   have	   fielded	  candidates	   in	   between	   80%	   and	   99.8%	   of	   MB	   vacancies	   over	   the	   period.	   The	  pattern	   illustrates	   the	   parties’	   struggle	   to	   remain	   as	   competitive	   as	   Labour,	  particularly	   in	   the	   early	   1980s	   and	  mid-­‐1990s.	   For	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	   too,	  there	   has	   been	   considerable	   variation	   in	   the	   number	   of	   seats	   challenged	   and	  since	   the	   1990s	   the	   party	   has	   followed	   similar	   levels	   of	   contestation	   to	   the	  Tories.	  The	  emergence	  and	  growth	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  appears	  to	  have	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  level	  of	  competition	  in	  English	  local	  elections	  and	  as	  Rallings	  &	  Thrasher	  note,	  “the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Liberal/SDP	  Alliance	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  in	  local	  elections,	  particularly	  in	  the	  MBs”	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  pp.88-­‐89).	  A	  closer	  examination	  of	  the	  data	  shows	  that	  the	  share	  of	  MB	  seats	  that	  featured	  a	  Lib	  Dem	  candidate	  on	  the	  ballot	  increased	   sharply	   in	   the	   1982	   elections,	   to	   almost	   nine	   of	   every	   ten	   vacancies	  (88.08%).	  This	   is	   some	  7%	  higher	   than	   for	   the	  Conservatives	   at	   the	   time.	  This	  rise	  coincides	  with	  the	  concerted	  efforts	  of	  the	  SDP	  and	  Liberals	  to	  break	  two	  or	  even	  single-­‐party	  competition	  in	  the	  majority	  of	  MB	  authorities.	  By	  2010,	  the	  Lib	  Dems	   have	   continued	   to	   contest	   almost	   nine	   out	   of	   every	   ten	   seats	   (88.21%),	  10%	  behind	  the	  Conservatives	  (98.18%)	  and	  Labour	  (99.88%).	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Where	  there	  has	  been	  little	  growth	  in	  the	  portion	  of	  seats	  contested	  by	  the	  three	  major	   parties	   since	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   there	   has	   been	   a	   marked	   increase	   in	   the	  number	  of	  candidates	  categorised	  as	  Other	  standing	   for	  election	  to	  the	  MBs.	  At	  its	  lowest,	  in	  1984,	  fewer	  than	  one	  in	  six	  (15.8%)	  MB	  seats	  were	  contested	  by	  a	  candidate	   not	   from	   the	   three	   major	   parties.	   By	   2010,	   voters	   could	   frequently	  expect	  to	  see	  more	  than	  one	  candidate	  on	  the	  ballot	  paper,	  with	  seats	  averaging	  almost	  1.6	  Other	  candidates.	  Earlier	  in	  this	  chapter	  seat	  competition	  in	  the	  MBs	  was	   shown	   to	   have	   increased	   by	  more	   than	   two	   candidates	   per	   seat	   since	   the	  early	  1970s	  (see	  figure	  4.1.3).	  The	  data	  plotted	  in	  figure	  4.1.11	  suggests	  that	  this	  rise	  can	  be	  ascribed	   first,	   to	   the	  growth	   in	   the	  number	  of	  LD	  candidates	   in	   the	  early	  1980s	  and	  then,	  to	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  categorised	  as	  Other	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	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contestation	  grew	  steadily	  over	   the	  period,	   from	  80%	   in	  1973	   to	   almost	   every	  seat	  in	  2009	  (99.78%).	  Another	  interesting	  facet	  of	  the	  data	  is	  the	  widening	  gap	  between	   the	   Conservatives	   and	   other	   two	   parties.	   At	   both	   the	   county	   and	  district-­‐level	   (see	   tables	   4.1.12	   and	   4.1.13	   respectively)	   Tory	   contestation	  appears	  to	  slightly	  outpace	  that	  for	  Labour	  and	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  in	  later	  years.	  In	  the	  districts,	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   period	   the	   gap	   between	   Labour	   and	   the	  Conservatives	   is	  between	  5%	  &	  10%,	  but	  during	   the	  2000s	   this	   gap	  widens	   to	  between	  15%	  and	  20%.	  In	  the	  counties	  a	  gap	  of	  less	  than	  5%	  in	  seat	  contestation	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  period	  widens	  in	  the	  2000s	  to	  around	  10%.	  	  The	   figures	  4.1.12	   and	  4.1.13	   show	   significant	   growth	   in	   competition	   from	   the	  Liberal	   Democrats	   and	   Other	   candidates.	   In	   earlier	   elections	   examined	   the	  number	   of	   Liberals	   and	   SDP	   candidates	   contesting	   the	   counties	   increased	  markedly,	   quadrupling	   from	   21.38%	   in	   1973	   to	   82.79%	   of	   vacancies	   in	   1985.	  This	  trend	  is	  repeated	  in	  the	  districts	  where	  there	  is	  a	  more	  gradual	  progression	  in	   the	   number	   of	   Lib	  Dem	   candidates	   throughout	   the	   first	   20	   years	   examined,	  particularly	  in	  1982.	  These	  data	  are	  broadly	  in	  line	  with	  those	  discussed	  for	  the	  MBs	  and	  LBs	  ,	  indicating	  a	  ‘first	  wave’	  of	  rising	  seat	  competition	  in	  English	  local	  elections	   that	  was	  driven	  by	   the	   increased	  association	  of	   the	  Liberals	  and	  SDP,	  followed	  by	  the	  emergence	  and	  growth	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  as	  a	  competitive	  political	  party	  in	  British	  local	  politics.	  	  It	   is	   independents	   and	   minor	   party	   candidates,	   categorised	   as	   Other,	   that	   are	  responsible	   for	   the	   observable	   ‘second	   wave’	   of	   seat	   competition.	   As	   figure	  4.1.12	   illustrates,	   the	   sharp	   rise	   in	   the	   proportion	   of	   seats	   contested	   by	   these	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candidates	  is	  a	  relatively	  recent	  phenomenon	  in	  local	  elections.	  For	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  period,	  around	  one	  third	  of	  vacancies	  could	  have	  expected	  to	  see	  an	  Other	  candidate.	  However,	  between	  2001	  and	  2009	  this	  figure	  increased	  dramatically,	  with	  the	  relative	  share	  of	  Other	  candidates	   tripling,	  as	   it	  did	   in	   the	  MBs	  during	  that	  time.	  For	  the	  districts	  too	  (see	  figure	  4.1.13),	  seat	  contestation	  by	  Others	  has	  increased	   at	   a	   similar	   rate.	   The	   proportion	   of	   Other	   candidates	   contesting	  vacancies	   has	   risen	   from	   some	   28.9%	   of	   seats	   in	   2002	   to	   more	   than	   three	  quarters	  (75.8%)	  in	  2010.	  	  
	  
[Figure	  4.1.12	  –	  SC	  Seat	  Contestation	  by	  Party	  by	  Years	  (n	  =	  78,349)]	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  For	  the	  Shires,	  the	  overall	  picture	  presented	  by	  figures	  4.1.12	  and	  4.1.13	  implies	  a	   number	   of	   key	   findings.	   First,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   Conservatives	   have	   been	  steadily	  strengthening	   their	  position	  at	  both	   tiers	  of	   local	  government	  over	   the	  period,	  with	   contestation	   rates	   of	   99.78%	   and	   99.5%	   by	   the	   2009	   county	   and	  2010	   district-­‐level	   elections	   respectively.	   Second,	   it	   is	   also	   clear	   that	   since	  Labour’s	   peak	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s,	   the	   party’s	   relative	   rate	   of	   contestation	   has	  fallen	  by	  6	  points	   in	   the	  counties	  and	  10	  points	   in	   the	  districts.	  This	  may	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  conversion	  of	  many	  Shire	  authorities	  to	  a	  UA	  type.	  Third,	  as	   for	   the	   London	   and	   Metropolitan	   Boroughs,	   contestation	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	   has	   increased	   significantly	   throughout	   the	   1980s	   and	   1990s.	   This	  increase	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  ‘first	  wave’	  of	  growth,	  driven	  primarily	  by	  the	  efforts	  of	   the	   party	   and	   its	   former	   component	   parties,	   to	   break	   into	   national	   politics.	  
Fourth,	   in	  what	  can	  be	  described	  as	  a	   ‘second	  wave’	  of	   seat	   contestation,	   there	  has	  been	  a	   significant	   increase	   in	   the	  number	  of	   candidates	  standing	  at	   county	  and	  district-­‐level	  that	  are	  categorised	  as	  Other,	  particularly	  in	  later	  years.	  These	  findings	   are	   also	   in	   line	   with	   data	   described	   for	   the	   Boroughs.	   Finally,	   for	   all	  three	   major	   parties,	   a	   consistent	   difference	   has	   remained	   between	   the	  contestation	   of	   seats	   at	   the	   county-­‐level	   when	   compared	   to	   the	   districts.	   The	  major	  parties	  have	  tended	  to	  contest	  the	  upper	  tier	  at	  much	  higher	  rates	  than	  the	  lower,	  whereas	  contestation	  in	  the	  districts	  for	  Other	  candidates	  has,	  on	  several	  occasions,	  been	  higher	  than	  at	  the	  county-­‐level	  during	  the	  same	  years.	  However,	  since	  the	  2000s	  this	  trend	  has	  changed	  and	  Others	  contest	  county	  seats	  at	  much	  higher	  rates	  than	  the	  districts.	  	  
	   119	  
Figure	   4.1.14	   shows	   party	   seat	   contestation	   over	   the	   period	   for	   the	   Unitaries.	  Contestation	   in	  UAs	   has	   been	   relatively	   strong	   for	   the	   two	  major	   parties,	  with	  more	   than	   four	   out	   of	   every	   five	   seats	   available	   featuring	   a	   Labour	   and/or	  Conservative	   candidate	   during	   the	   16	   years	   of	   their	   existence.	   For	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats,	  seat	  contestation	  has	  also	  been	  robust,	  at	  times	  exceeding	  that	  of	  the	  two	   major	   parties.	   In	   1998	   the	   party	   contested	   96.12%	   of	   all	   vacancies.	   The	  major	   reason	   why	   Liberal	   Democrat	   contestation	   in	   the	   UAs	   has	   been	   higher	  than	  for	  other	  types	  of	  authority	  is	  due	  to	  the	  party’s	  relatively	  late	  introduction.	  As	  described	   in	  chapter	  1,	  UAs	  were	   introduced	   in	  1995,	  which	  was	  after	  both	  the	   formation	   of	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   and	   the	   drive	   by	   the	   party,	   and	   their	  prior	  component	  parties,	  to	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  standing	  at	  local	  elections.	   However,	   unlike	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats,	   the	   share	   of	   candidates	  categorised	  as	  Other,	  has	   increased	  markedly	   in	   the	  UAs,	  particularly	   since	   the	  elections	   in	   2000.	   Other	   candidates	   are	   the	   only	   group	   to	   show	   significant	  growth	  in	  the	  UAs,	  from	  just	  21.09%	  of	  seats	  contested	  in	  2000	  to	  an	  average	  of	  129.81%	   in	   2010.	   Growth	   in	   the	   level	   of	   contestation	   from	   Others	   alone,	   has	  added	  more	  than	  one	  candidate	  to	  the	  ballot	  paper	  on	  average	  in	  the	  UAs.	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Democrat	   candidates	   during	   the	   late	   1980s	   and	   the	   early	   1990s	   that	   was	  responsible	  for	  early	  growth	  in	  the	  overall	  number	  of	  candidates.	  Subsequently,	  the	  second	  and	  perhaps	  most	  striking	  wave	  is	  shown	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  the	  sharp	  growth	   in	   candidates	   categorised	   as	   Other.	   These	   data	   are	   also	   supported	   by	  existing	  literature.	  Rallings	  et	  al	  comment	  that	  “one	  of	  the	  least	  noted	  aspects	  of	  local	   elections	   in	   Britain	   today	   is	   the	   growth	   in	   candidates	   for	   the	   catch-­‐all	  category	  of	  ‘Others’.	  The	  label	  includes	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  candidates,	  from	  national	  parties,	   such	   as	   the	  Greens,	  United	  Kingdom	   Independence	  Party	   (UKIP),	   Plaid	  Cymru	  and	  the	  Scottish	  National	  Party	  (SNP),	  to	  a	  host	  of	  local	  parties	  that	  have	  arisen	  in	  more	  recent	  years.	  There	  have	  always	  been	  areas	  where	  groups	  such	  as	  resident	   and	   ratepayer	   associations	   fight	   elections,	   but	   in	   London	   and	   other	  urban	   areas,	   the	   number	   of	   ‘Others’	   has	   increased	   significantly	   since	   2002”	  (Rallings,	  Thrasher	  &	  Denver,	  2005,	  p.396-­‐397).	  	  Though	  these	  phenomena	  have	  had	  similar	  effects	  on	  the	  competition	  for	  seats	  in	  English	   local	  elections,	   it	   is	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  who	  have	  converted	  the	  rise	  into	   continued	   success.	   As	   Rallings	   &	   Thrasher	   put	   it,	   the	   Lib	   Dems	   have	  managed	   to	   bridge	   the	   credibility	   gap	   since	   the	   1990s,	   they	   have	   proved	   that	  they	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	  win	  elections	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1996,	  pp.222).	  The	  same	   cannot	   be	   said	   for	  minor	   party	   and	   independent	   candidates.	   The	   Liberal	  Democrats	  pose	  a	  serious	  challenge	  and	  “remain	  competitive	  at	   the	   local	   level”	  (Russell	  &	  Fieldhouse,	   2005,	   pp.39).	  The	   rise	   in	  Lib	  Dem	  seat	   contestation	  has	  culminated	  in	  serious	  gains	  for	  the	  party,	  not	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  seats,	  but	  also	  the	  control	  of	  many	  local	  authorities.	  This	  has	  given	  them	  a	  standing	  at	  the	  local	  level	  that	   remains	   a	   vital	   springboard	   for	   national	   breakthroughs	   (Russell	   &	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Fieldhouse,	  2005,	  pp.39).	  Examining	  data	  in	  table	  4.1.15	  shows	  that	  the	  first	  half	  of	   the	   1990s	   was	   prolific	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   local	  electoral	   success,	   reaching	   a	   peak	   in	   1996	  with	   the	   control	   of	   55	   British	   local	  authorities	  (12%).	  	   Year	   LD	  Councillors	  gain/losses	   GB	  Councils	  Controlled	  
1990	   -­‐63	   11	  
1991	   +531	   28	  
1992	   +57	   27	  
1993	   +371	   29	  
1994	   +383	   37	  
1995	   +483	   50	  
1996	   +150	   55	  
[Table	  4.1.15	  -­‐	  Liberal	  Democrat	  election	  performance	  GB,	  1990-­‐1996,	  Source:	  Russell	  &	  Fieldhouse,	  
2005,	  pp.39]	  	  After	  the	  1996	  elections,	  Lib	  Dem	  authority	  control	  dips	  and	  steadies	  at	  around	  30	  councils.	  The	   figure	  4.1.16	  displays	  the	  proportion	  of	  councils	  controlled,	  or	  under	  No	  Overall	  Control	  (NOC),	  in	  Britain,	  by	  party	  over	  the	  period.	  Aside	  from	  the	   major	   exchanges	   between	   Labour	   and	   the	   Conservatives,	   there	   are	   three	  noteworthy	  features	  of	  the	  data	  presented.	  	  	  
First,	   though	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  have	   lost	  ground	  since	  the	  heights	  of	   the	  1990s,	   the	  party	  now	  controls	  three	  to	  four	  times	  the	  share	  of	  councils	  that	  were	  under	  the	  control	   of	   the	   Liberals	   and	   SDP	   pre-­‐alliance.	   Second,	   the	   figure	   4.1.16	   clearly	  illustrates	  a	   long-­‐term	  declining	   trend	   in	   the	   share	  of	   authorities	   controlled	  by	  independents	  and	  minor	  parties	  (Others).	  The	  decline	  appears	  to	  have	  been	  in-­‐place	   well	   before	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   and	   could	   have	   been	  accelerated	  by	  their	  success.	  Unlike	  data	  for	  the	  Lib	  Dems,	  this	  development	  runs	  counter	  to	  the	  rising	  number	  of	  Others	  standing	  at	  elections	  to	  local	  government.	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Finally,	   the	   trend-­‐line	   for	   NOC	   councils	   (marked	   in	   dashed	   grey,	   see	   figure	  4.1.16)	   implies	   that	   the	   general	   rise	   in	   seat	   contestation	   may	   have	   had	   an	  alternative	  effect.	  With	  the	  surge	  in	  the	  number	  of	  LD	  candidates	  since	  the	  early	  1980s,	  the	  share	  of	  councils	  under	  NOC	  has	  steadily	  risen,	  from	  a	  low	  of	  13%	  in	  1980	  to	  around	  35%	  in	  1995.	  Since	  1995	  the	  share	  of	  NOC	  councils	  remained	  at	  roughly	  a	  third,	  before	  dipping	  slightly	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  period.	  These	  data	  suggest	   that	   the	   increase	   in	   competition,	   particularly	   from	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats,	  will	  not	  only	  have	  translated	  into	  gains	  of	  local	  administrations,	  but	  may	  also	  have	  helped	  to	  increase	  the	  share	  of	  councils	  with	  no	  dominant	  party.	  The	  political	  consequences	  of	  such	  an	  event	  will	  likely	  have	  altered	  the	  dynamic	  of	   local	   decision-­‐making	   with	   a	   broader	   spectrum	   of	   parties	   and	   councillors	  involved.	  	  
	  
[Figure	  4.1.16	  –	  Local	  Authorities	  under	  party	  control	  after	  election	  GB	  (%)	  by	  Party	  by	  Year	  (n	  =	  





1973	   1975	   1977	   1979	   1981	   1983	   1985	   1987	   1989	   1991	   1993	   1995	   1997	   1999	   2001	   2003	   2005	   2007	   2009	  
Con	   Lab	   LD	   Other	   NOC	  
	  124	  
incumbent	  contestation.	  The	  sub-­‐chapter	  presents	  data	  on	  how	  many	  incumbent	  candidates	  choose	  to	  defend	  their	  seat	  and	  how	  this	  may	  have	  changed	  over	  time	  and	  for	  the	  parties.	  	  4.2	  –	  Incumbent	  Contestation	  Where	  section	  4.1	  sought	  to	  assess	  trends	  in	  seat	  competition	  and	  contestation,	  sub-­‐chapter	   4.2	   intends	   to	   examine	   the	   trend	   in	   incumbent	   contestation,	   or	  Stand	  Again	  Rates	  (SARs)	  for	  incumbent	  candidates	  over	  the	  period.	  Incumbent	  contestation	  is	  an	  important	  indicator	  of	  democratic	  transience.	  If	  there	  are	  too	  few	  incumbents	  returning	  to	  the	  council	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  from	  one	  election	  to	  the	   next	   may	   become	   destabilising	   and	   can	   contribute	   to	   discontinuity	   and	  uncertainty	   in	   decision-­‐making,	   too	   many	   and	   authorities	   may	   stagnate	   and	  become	  resistant	  to	  change	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997a,	  p.83).	  	  Assessing	  the	  SAR	  of	  councillors	  over	  the	  period	  will	  help	  to	  illustrate	  continuity	  across	  local	  government,	  but	  can	  also	  help	  us	  understand	  voter’s	  choices.	  There	  is	   evidence	   also	   to	   suggest	   that	   because	   the	   electorate	   will	   tend	   to	   be	   more	  familiar	  with	  incumbents,	  whether	  councillors	  choose	  to	  stand	  or	  retire	  will	  have	  significant	  effects	  on	  voter	  behaviour.	   If	  an	   incumbent	  stands	  voters	  may	   judge	  them	   by	   their	   record,	   but	   if	   they	   retire	   on	   what	   basis	   do	   voters	   make	   their	  choice?	   Research	   has	   shown	   that	   “the	   absence	   of	   an	   incumbent	   on	   the	   ballot	  tends	   to	   place	   a	   premium	   on	   citizens’	   assessments	   of	   candidates’	   ideologies”	  (Gershtenson,	   2009,	   p.130),	   but	   as	   detailed	   in	   chapter	   2	   there	   is	   also	   an	  abundance	   of	   literature	   acknowledging	   that	   when	   incumbents	   do	   stand	   they	  tend	  to	  be	  quite	  successful.	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  The	   figure	   4.2.1	   charts	   the	   number	   of	   incumbents	   choosing	   to	   stand	   again	   in	  England	   by	   party	   and	   expresses	   the	   total	   SAR	   as	   a	   percentage.	   The	   data	  illustrates	  a	  rising	  trend	   in	  the	  number	  of	   incumbents	  choosing	  to	  defend	  their	  council	   seat.	   The	   total	   share	   of	   incumbent	   candidates	   choosing	   to	   stand	   again	  (marked	  in	  dashed	  black)	  has	  risen	  over	  the	  period,	  particularly	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	   1990s.	   The	   rise	   is	   substantial,	   taking	   the	   total	   SAR	   from	   one	   in	   five	  incumbents	   to	  almost	   four	  out	  of	   five	  by	   the	   final	   four	  year	  cycle	  (FYC).	  For	  all	  party	   categories	   there	   has	   been	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   incumbents	  deciding	  to	  defend	  their	  council	  seats.	  	  Before	   continuing,	   it	   is	   appropriate	   to	   acknowledge	   some	  weaknesses	   in	   these	  data	   and	   add	   some	   qualifications.	   As	   detailed	   in	   chapter	   3,	   incumbency	  information	   is	  provided	  by	  The	  Elections	  Centre	  and	  after	  consultation	  with	   its	  staff,	   it	   has	   become	   clear	   that	   there	   may	   be	   a	   slight	   underestimation	   in	   the	  number	   of	   councillors	   who	   stood	   again	   in	   earlier	   years	   examined.	   This	  underestimation	  is	  not	  due	  to	  name	  changes,	  the	  effects	  of	  which	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  distributed	  evenly	  over	  years	  rather,	  the	  underestimation	  is	  likely	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	   the	  Centre	  has	  collected	  data	  retrospectively	  prior	   to	  1983.	  At	   times	   there	  has	   been	   some	   difficulty	   in	   obtaining	   information	   on	   incumbency,	   particularly	  for	  years	  immediately	  after	  reorganisation.	  However,	  though	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  data	  provided	  prior	  to	  the	  mid-­‐1980s	  will	  underestimate	  the	  number	  of	   incumbents	  standing,	  there	  will	  still	  have	  been	  significant	  growth	  in	  the	  frequency	  and	  share	  of	  incumbent	  councillors	  choosing	  to	  defend	  their	  seats.	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If	  we	  examine	  data	  since	  the	  1991-­‐94	  cycle,	   the	  share	  of	   incumbent	  candidates	  standing	  again	  has	  risen	  by	  almost	  10%,	  from	  67%	  to	  76%	  by	  2007-­‐10.	  Over	  this	  period,	   the	  number	  of	   Lib	  Dem	  councillors	   standing	  has	   increased	   in	   line	  with	  their	   success	   in	   local	   elections,	   whilst	   the	   frequency	   of	   Others	   standing	   has	  remained	   relatively	   stable	   at	   around	  1,500	  per	   cycle.	  At	   its	   highest,	  more	   than	  7,100	  Labour	  incumbents	  chose	  to	  defend	  their	  seats	  in	  England,	  this	  was	  during	  the	  1999-­‐02	  electoral	  cycle.	  Though	  this	  number	  almost	  halves	  over	  the	  next	  two	  cycles,	  the	  fall	   is	  accounted	  for	  largely	  by	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Conservatives	  over	  the	   same	   period.	   The	   number	   of	   Tory	   incumbents	   defending	   their	   seats	   rises	  from	   around	   4,500	   in	   1999-­‐02,	   to	   roughly	   6,400	   in	   2007-­‐10.	   The	   number	   of	  incumbents	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   and	  Others	   during	   the	   same	   period	   has	  remained	  relatively	  stable.	  Thus,	  over	  the	  final	  three	  cycles	  the	  SAR	  has	  settled	  at	  around	  three	  quarters	  of	  councillors.	  	  
	  
[Figure	   4.2.1	   –	   Incumbents	   Contesting	   by	   Party	   (n)	   Total	   Incumbent	   Contestation	   (%)	   by	   FYC	   (n	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are	  split	  over	  the	  various	  types	  of	  authority	  and	  electoral	  cycles,	  as	   for	  data	  on	  overall	  seat	  contestation	  in	  sub-­‐chapter	  4.1,	  there	  are	  slight	  discrepancies.	  Table	  4.2.2	   shows	   average	   incumbent	   contestation	   for	   all	   parties	   and	   for	   the	   three	  major	  parties	  individually.	  Some	  68.8%	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  have	  chosen	  to	  stand	  again	  in	  English	  local	  elections.	  The	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  been	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  stand	  again,	  with	  an	  average	  of	  72.2%	  doing	  so	  over	  the	  period,	  followed	  by	  the	  Conservatives	  who	  average	  just	  less	  than	  70%.	  Finally,	  just	  less	  than	  two	  thirds	   of	   Labour	   councillors	   stood	   again	   over	   the	   period.	   For	   all	   three	   major	  parties,	  incumbent	  SARs	  are	  highest	  in	  the	  Unitary	  Authorities	  (UAs),	  with	  75.9%	  standing	   again	   in	   the	   quadrennial	   UAs	   (UAAs)	   and	   an	   even	   higher	   proportion	  doing	  so	  in	  the	  Unitary	  Authorities	  elected	  by	  thirds	  (UATs).	  These	  high	  figures	  are	   likely	  to	  be	  a	  result	  of	   the	   late	   introduction	  of	  the	  UAs,	  which	  were	  created	  after	   the	   sharp	   rise	   in	   incumbent	   contestation	   described	   by	   figure	   4.2.1.	   The	  Metropolitan	   Boroughs	   (MBs)	   are	   the	   next	   highly	   contested	   type	   of	   authority	  with	  three	  quarters	  of	  councillors	  standing	  again	  over	  the	  entire	  period,	  Labour	  average	  72.5%,	  the	  Conservatives	  75.2%	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  78.5%.	  	  
Incumbent	   Contestation	  in	  England	   LBs	   MBs	   SCs	   SDAs	   SDTs	   UAAs	   UATs	   All	  
Conservatives	   64.2%	   75.2%	   68.0%	   68.4%	   70.5%	   81.2%	   81.0%	   69.9%	  
Labour	   55.4%	   72.4%	   64.5%	   69.4%	   67.9%	   71.1%	   79.8%	   66.1%	  
Liberal	  Democrats	   68.6%	   78.5%	   68.4%	   71.7%	   70.0%	   74.0%	   83.9%	   72.2%	  
All	  Parties	   60.9%	   75.0%	   67.2%	   69.5%	   69.8%	   75.9%	   79.1%	   68.8%	  
n	   25,183	   20,190	   8,373	   27,189	   8,697	   6,448	   1,312	   97,392	  
[Table	  4.2.2	  –Incumbent	  Contestation	  in	  England	  (SARs)	  (%)	  by	  Party	  (n	  =	  97,392)]	  	  Figures	  4.2.3-­‐4.2.9	  plot	   incumbent	   contestation	  data	   for	   each	   type	  of	   authority	  over	   the	   period.	   A	   first	   glance	   at	   the	   data	   plotted	   across	   all	   charts	   suggests	   a	  trend	   of	   increased	   SARs	   across	   most	   types	   of	   authority	   in	   England.	   The	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proportion	   of	   councillors	   choosing	   to	   stand	   again	   for	   each	   of	   the	   three	  major	  parties	   over	   the	   period	  has,	   in	   the	  Boroughs	   and	   the	   Shires	   at	   least,	   increased	  considerably.	  	  	  Examination	  of	  the	  LBs	  (see	  figure	  4.2.3)	  shows	  that,	  excluding	  the	  1982	  and	  the	  1994	  elections	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	   there	  has	  been	  a	  gradual	   increase	   in	  the	  percentage	  of	  incumbents	  choosing	  to	  stand	  again.	  Between	  the	  parties,	  more	  Conservatives	   have	   tended	   to	   defend	   their	   seats	   than	   incumbents	   of	   the	   other	  two	  parties.	  However,	   the	   trend	  of	  growth	   for	  all	  parties	   is	   consistent.	  At	   their	  lowest,	  in	  1986,	  incumbent	  SARs	  were	  less	  than	  40%	  for	  Labour,	  around	  45%	  for	  the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   and	   some	   54%	   for	   the	   Conservatives.	   Since	   then,	   the	  portion	   of	   councillors	   defending	   their	   seats	   swelled	   markedly,	   by	   around	   20-­‐30%,	  depending	  on	  the	  party.	  By	  2002	  SARs	  were	  some	  68%,	  71%	  and	  75%	  for	  Labour,	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   and	   Conservatives	   respectively.	   This	   level	   of	  incumbent	  contestation	  was	  sustained	  for	  the	  remaining	  two	  LB	  elections.	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For	  the	  MBs,	  figure	  4.2.4	  illustrates	  a	  trend	  that	  is	  in	  line	  with	  that	  discussed	  for	  the	   LBs,	   showing	   a	   gradual	   rise	   in	   the	   portion	   of	   incumbent	   councillors	  defending	   their	   seats.	   In	   the	   1990	  MB	   elections	   just	   57%	   of	   Liberal	   Democrat	  incumbents	   defended	   their	   seats	   on	   the	   council,	   as	   did	   62%	   of	   Labour	   and	  Conservative	  councillors.	  Beyond	  this	  point	  there	  is	  a	  gradual	  rise	  in	  the	  level	  of	  SARs	   for	   all	   the	   parties,	   settling	   at	   around	   four	   out	   of	   every	   five	   incumbents	  during	  the	  late	  2000s	  before	  dipping	  slightly	  in	  2010.	  Interestingly	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  significant	  gap	  in	  the	  level	  of	  seat	  contestation	  between	  Labour	  and	  the	  two	  other	  parties	   from	  1999	  to	  2003,	  with	  proportionally	  many	  more	  Lib	  Dem	  and	  Conservative	  councillors	  choosing	   to	  defend	  their	  seats	   than	  Labour.	  At	   its	  widest,	   in	   2002,	   there	   is	   a	   more	   than	   25	   point	   gap	   between	   Labour	   and	   the	  Conservatives,	  with	   just	   70%	   of	   Labour	   incumbents	   standing	   again,	  whilst	   the	  Tories	  had	  a	  SAR	  of	  almost	  96%.	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level	  (see	  figure	  4.2.5).	  At	  the	  county-­‐level	  of	  the	  Shires,	  SARs	  rise	  some	  5-­‐10%	  over	  the	  period,	  to	  roughly	  70%	  in	  2009.	  As	  for	  the	  Boroughs,	  SARs	  for	  all	  three	  of	  the	  major	  parties	  over	  the	  period	  have	  been	  broadly	  similar,	  excluding	  1985	  where	  the	  Liberal	  Democrat	  SAR	  rose	  20-­‐points	  to	  almost	  88%.	  	  	  There	  has	  been	  a	  slow	  rise	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  defending	  their	   seats	   in	   the	   districts	   also,	   with	   SARs	   in	   the	   quadrennial	   districts	   (SDAs,	  figure	  4.2.6)	  rising	  from	  around	  40%,	  for	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1970s,	  to	  some	  70%	  of	   incumbents	  standing	  again	  by	  2007.	  The	  relatively	  smooth	  and	  gradual	  increase	  in	  incumbent	  contestation	  in	  the	  SDAs	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  district	  level	  authorities	   elected	   by	   thirds	   (SDTs,	   figure	   4.2.7).	   There	   has	   been	   significant	  variation	   in	   the	   level	   of	   incumbent	   contestation	   for	   all	   parties.	  At	   their	   lowest,	  SARs	  for	  the	  Conservatives	  were	  56%	  in	  1996,	  50%	  for	  Labour	  in	  1999	  and	  44%	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  in	  2000.	  At	  their	  highest,	  incumbent	  contestation	  was	  95%	  and	  94%	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  and	  Conservatives	  respectively	  in	  2003,	  and	  92%	  for	  Labour	  in	  2004.	  Though	  there	  has	  been	  significant	  variation	  in	  the	  SDTs,	  by	  the	  latter	  years	  of	  the	  period	  examined,	  SARs	  for	  all	  parties	  are	  broadly	  in	  line	  with	  data	  shown	  for	  the	  SDAs,	  at	  around	  70%.	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[Figure	  4.2.5	  –	  SC	  Incumbents	  (SARs)	  (%)	  by	  Party	  by	  Years	  (n	  =	  8,373)]	  
	  
	  
[Figure	  4.2.6	  –	  SDA	  Incumbents	  (SARs)	  (%)	  by	  Party	  by	  Years	  (n	  =	  27,189)]6	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  SAR	   data	   for	   the	   Unitaries	   are	   plotted	   in	   figures	   4.2.8-­‐4.2.9.	   As	   the	   UAs	   were	  introduced	   in	   the	   later	   stages	   of	   the	   period	   examined,	   there	   are	   relatively	   few	  data	  points	  for	  comparison.	  The	  unitary	  councils	  elected	  on	  a	  quadrennial	  cycle	  (UAAs,	  figure	  4.2.8)	  show	  a	  relatively	  consistent	  SAR	  for	  all	  three	  major	  parties,	  with	   little	   variation	   from	   the	   average.	   Around	   81.2%	   of	   Conservatives	   stood	  again	   in	   the	   UAAs,	   a	   higher	   level	   than	   the	   two	   other	   parties	   considered.	   The	  Liberal	  Democrats	  average	  an	  SAR	  of	  74%,	  whilst	  Labour	  average	  just	  71.1%.	  	  	  For	   the	   Unitaries	   elected	   by	   thirds	   (UATs,	   figure	   4.2.9)	   there	   has	   been	   more	  variation	  in	  the	  SARs	  for	  the	  parties,	  though	  this	  may	  be	  due	  to	  there	  being	  fewer	  authorities	   included	   for	  analysis.	  There	  are	   just	  1,312	  cases	   considered	   for	   the	  UATs	   in	  total.	  The	  SAR	  for	  the	  Conservatives	  drops	   from	  more	  than	  four	  out	  of	  every	  five	  councillors	  during	  2006	  to	  2008,	  to	  around	  two	  out	  of	  every	  three	  in	  2010	  (67%),	  an	  average	  of	  81%	  over	  the	  period.	  However,	  almost	  nineteen	  out	  of	  every	   twenty	  Labour	   incumbents	  decided	   to	  defend	   their	  UAT	  seats	   in	  2007	  (94%),	  dipping	  to	  just	  less	  than	  four	  out	  of	  every	  five	  by	  2010	  (77%).	  Finally,	  for	  the	   Liberal	   Democrats,	   the	   SAR	   averaged	   almost	   84%	   in	   the	   UATs.	   There	  was	  considerable	   growth	   between	   2006	   and	   2008,	   before	   settling	   to	   a	   figure	  more	  similar	   to	   those	   of	   the	   Conservatives	   and	   Labour	   in	   2010,	   at	   just	   over	   two	   of	  every	  three	  (71%)	  councillors.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Limited	  data	  on	  incumbency	  and	  various	  redistricting	  in	  the	  dataset	  mean	  that	  the	  SAR	  analysis	  for	  the	  SDTs	  starts	  from	  1988.	  Included	  in	  the	  analysis	  are	  SDAs	  from	  Kent,	  Lancashire,	  Nottinghamshire,	  Shropshire,	  Suffolk	  and	  Warwickshire.	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[Figure	  4.2.8	  –	  UAA	  Incumbents	  (SARs)	  (%)	  by	  Party	  by	  Years	  (n	  =	  6,448)]8	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over	   the	  period,	   and	   this	   is	   a	  national	   trend,	  which	  varies	   in	  magnitude	  across	  district	  types.	  The	  decrease	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  any	  changes	  in	  the	  level	  of	  competition	  for	  seats.	  Data	  previously	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4	  have	  shown	  that	  council	  seats	  have	  become	  considerably	  more	  competitive	  over	  the	  period,	  so	   if	   rising	   SARs	   were	   a	   response	   to	   that	   trend	   this	   would	   run	   counter	   to	  increased	   levels	   of	   competition.	   Financial	   incentives	   can	   be	   ruled	   out	   also,	   as	  there	   have	   not	   been	   any	   substantial	   changes	   in	   the	   financial	   incentives	   that	  councillors	   are	   awarded.	   As	   outlined	   in	   chapters	   1	   and	   2,	   these	   are	   largely	  confined	   to	   a	   stipend	   comprising	  only	  meagre	   annual	   expenses	   (Prudam	  et	   al.,	  2008,	   p.14-­‐15),	   though	   admittedly	   the	   value	   of	   these	   expenses	   does	   vary	   by	  authority	  (TPA,	  2012).	  In	  light	  of	  this	  it	  remains	  relatively	  unclear	  as	  to	  what	  has	  driven	  the	  rise.	  	  Finally,	   the	   growing	   trend	   in	   incumbent	   contestation	  has	   appeared	   to	   settle	   at	  between	   70%	   and	   80%	   of	   sitting	   councillors.	   Though	   there	   has	   been	   some	  natural	   variation	   the	  new	   level	   of	   seat	   contestation	   is	   significantly	  higher	   than	  that	  during	  earlier	  years	  of	  the	  period	  examined.	  Acknowledging	  this	  facet	  of	  the	  data,	   an	   assessment	   of	   how	   successful	   incumbent	   candidates	   are	   in	   their	   re-­‐election	   attempts	   will	   clearly	   be	   important.	   It	   will	   help	   to	   illustrate	   the	  transience	   of	   local	   government	   and	   the	   time	   it	   takes	   to	   turn	   over	   more	  established	   members	   of	   the	   council.	   Sub-­‐chapter	   4.3	   builds	   on	   the	   data	  presented	  in	  4.2,	  going	  on	  to	  assess	  trends	  in	  incumbent	  success	  in	  England.	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4.3	  –	  Incumbent	  Success	  As	  summarised	  in	  chapter	  2	  of	  this	  thesis,	  American	  research	  into	  the	  electoral	  advantages	  associated	  with	  incumbency	  has	  produced	  extensive	  evidence	  on	  the	  success	   of	   political	   incumbents	   in	   US	   congressional	   elections.	   Though	   the	  advantages	  associated	  with	   incumbency	  are	  now	  a	  well-­‐established	  part	  of	   the	  literature	  for	  federal	  elections,	  there	  is	  little	  published	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  at	  the	  local	   level	   (Trounstine,	   2011),	   and	   very	   little	   concerning	   local	   elections	   in	  England	   (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	   1997).	  As	   a	   guide	   for	   readers,	   congressional	   re-­‐election	  rates,	  or	  hit	  rates	  (HRs),	  have	  been	  shown	  in	  recent	  decades	  to	  be	  high,	  commonly	  above	  90%.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  when	  examining	  HRs	  for	  any	  one	   year	   they	   will,	   to	   some	   degree,	   be	   influenced	   by	   temporal	   fluctuations	   in	  political	  partisanship	  as	  well	  as	  the	  number	  of	  incumbents	  who	  choose	  to	  stand	  again.	  Also,	  as	  the	  selection	  procedure	  and	  party	  system	  is	  different	  in	  the	  US	  (i.e.	  holding	   primary	   elections	   to	   select	   candidates	   and	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   two-­‐party	  system),	  English	  local	  elections	  pose	  a	  very	  different	  set	  of	  circumstances,	  which	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  However,	  what	  can	  be	  learned	  from	  the	  US	  example	   is	   that	   the	   overall	   trend	   for	   a	   number	   of	   decades	   is	   one	   where	  incumbent	  candidates	  are	  highly	  successful	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  be	  re-­‐elected.	  	  Considering	  this,	  sub-­‐chapter	  4.3	  will	  illustrate	  and	  assess	  the	  pattern	  of	  success	  for	   councillors	   in	   the	   broadest	   terms.	   Exploring	   the	   data	   across	   all	   types	   of	  authority	   for	   the	   three	   major	   parties,	   the	   section	   identifies	   similarities	   and	  differences	   between	   the	   parties	   at	   defending	   their	   seats	   for	   local	   government,	  whilst	  commenting	  on	  councillors’	  general	  level	  of	  success	  across	  England.	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Examining	  data	   for	   the	  LBs	  (figure	  4.3.1),	   it	   is	  clear	   that	   incumbent	  candidates,	  for	  all	  parties,	  have	  been	  very	  successful	  in	  the	  capital.	  More	  than	  86%	  of	  major	  party	  councillors	  who	  chose	  to	  stand	  again	  were	  re-­‐elected.	  When	  comparing	  the	  parties,	  the	  Tories	  and	  Labour	  do	  best.	  Almost	  nine	  out	  of	  every	  ten	  incumbent	  Conservatives	   who	   stood	   in	   the	   LBs	   were	   successfully	   elected	   (88.3%,	  3,704/4,195)	  and	  a	  similar	  proportion	  of	  Labour	   incumbents	  were	  also	  able	   to	  defend	  their	  seats	  (88.9%,	  4,119/4,634).	  For	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  average	  HRs	  over	   the	   period	   are	   lower	   than	   for	   the	   two	   other	   parties,	   at	   just	   over	   three	  quarters	   of	   councillors	   standing	   (76.7%,	   877/1,143).	   On	   closer	   inspection,	   it	  appears	   that	   there	   is	   significant	   variation	   in	   the	   HRs	   of	   Liberal	   Democrat	  incumbents	  and	  this	  is	  due	  namely	  to	  the	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  LD	  winners	  in	  London	  during	  that	  time.	  This	  in	  turn	  means	  that	  proportional	  indicators	  such	  as	  percentages	  are	  much	  more	  susceptible	  to	  substantial	  variation10.	  	  	  Since	  the	  high	  point	  of	  the	  1990	  elections	  (96.8%),	  HRs	  for	  Lib	  Dem	  incumbents	  have	  been	  on	  a	  gradual	  decline	  in	  the	  LBs,	  ending	  some	  twenty-­‐five	  points	  lower	  by	  2010	  at	  71.7%.	  By	  comparison,	  HRs	  for	  the	  two	  other	  parties	  was	  reasonably	  strong	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  The	  data	  show	  that	  HRs	  rarely	  dip	  below	  90%	  for	  Labour	  who	  finish	  strongly	  in	  2010,	  with	  more	  than	  98%	  of	  councillors	  standing	  winning	   back	   their	   seat.	   The	   Labour	   party’s	   strength	   in	   London	   is	   closely	  followed	  by	  that	  of	  the	  Conservatives,	  whose	  strong	  performance	  throughout	  the	  1970s	   and	   early	   1980s	  was	   not	   repeated	   during	   the	   next	   three	   elections.	   The	  party	  did	  not	  quite	  recover	  their	  former	  strength	  in	  the	  later	  stages	  of	  the	  period	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  large	  variation	  in	  LD	  HRs	  for	  the	  first	  3	  elections,	  1974,	  1978	  and	  1982	  was	  due	  in	  part	  to	  a	  small	  number	  of	  incumbent	  LD	  cases	  in	  the	  LB	  dataset	  n	  =	  2,	  n	  =	  10	  and	  
n	  =	  51	  respectively.	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examined.	  Nevertheless,	   incumbent	   success	   is	   almost	   87%	   in	   2010	   and	   is	   also	  regularly	  above	  90%.	  Although	  incumbent	  HRs	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  vary	  in	  the	  LBs	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   for	   all	   parties,	   in	   every	   election	   year,	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	  London-­‐based	  councillors	  who	  choose	  to	  stand	  again,	  win.	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compared	   to	   other	   parties.	   At	   the	   party’s	   nadir,	   less	   than	   30%	   of	   Tory	  incumbents	  returned	  to	  the	  council	  in	  1995.	  The	  1994,	  1995	  and	  1996	  elections	  are	   clearly	   special	   instances,	   the	   repercussion	   of	   wide-­‐scale	   anti-­‐Conservative	  voting	   that	   has	   not	   necessarily	   been	   replicated	   to	   the	   same	   magnitude	  elsewhere.	  	  Illustrated	   by	   figure	   4.3.2,	   the	   chart	   shows	   a	   dramatic	   drop	   in	   Conservative	  incumbent	  HRs,	  between	  1994	  and	  1996.	  This	  coincides	  with	  a	  dramatic	   fall	   in	  aggregate	   vote	   and	   seat	   share	   for	   the	   Tories	   across	   the	   MBs.	   In	   1992,	   some	  97.6%	   (121/124)	   of	   Tory	   incumbents	   standing	  were	   re-­‐elected	   and	  by	  way	   of	  comparison,	  23.1%	  (152/658)	  of	  non-­‐incumbents	  were	  elected	  in	  the	  same	  year.	  Comparatively,	   in	   1994	   the	   HR	   of	   Conservative	   incumbents	   fell	   by	   almost	   40-­‐points	   to	  57%	  (45/79),	   just	   three	   fifths	  of	   the	  Conservative	  HR	   in	   the	  previous	  election	  year.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  much	  steeper	  fall	  for	  non-­‐incumbents	  of	  18.5-­‐points	  to	   just	  4.6%	  (31/676),	  which	  is	   less	  than	  one	  fifth	  of	  the	  non-­‐incumbent	  HR	   for	   1992.	   So	   although	   the	   proportion	   of	   incumbents	   winning	   MB	   seats	  dropped	  dramatically,	  incumbent	  Tories	  performed	  much	  better	  than	  their	  non-­‐incumbent	  colleagues.	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  1994	  MB	  elections	  it	  was	  better	  to	  be	  a	  Tory	  incumbent	  than	  a	  Tory	  freshman.	  	  While	  Labour	  and	  Liberal	  Democrat	   incumbents	  average	  around	  88%	  and	  85%	  respectively	  over	   the	  period,	   after	   the	   crash	   in	  Tory	  HRs	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1990s	   the	  three	   major	   parties	   have	   tended	   to	   follow	   a	   similar	   trend,	   with	   high	   rates	   of	  success	   for	   all	   incumbents.	  Overall,	   the	  data	   for	   incumbent	   success	   in	   the	  MBs	  support	  the	  narrative	  outlined	  for	  the	  LBs.	  For	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  period	  and	  for	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all	  the	  parties,	  high	  proportions	  of	  incumbent	  councillors	  standing	  for	  re-­‐election	  are	  returned	  to	  their	  councils.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  incumbents	   are	   able	   to	   escape	   particularly	   large	   swings	   in	   partisanship,	   as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  Conservatives	  in	  the	  MBs	  during	  the	  1990s.	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Though	  there	  are	  far	  more	  Conservative	  incumbents	  in	  the	  SCs	  and	  they	  tend	  to	  average	  a	  higher	   relative	   rate	  of	   success	   than	  other	  parties,	  only	   the	  1977	  and	  2009	   elections	   stand	   out	   with	   substantial	   differences	   in	   HRs.	   Illustrating	   the	  comparative	  stregnth	  of	  the	  Tories	  in	  these	  years,	  the	  chart	  below	  (figure	  4.3.3)	  shows	   that	   just	   27%	   (33/121)	   of	   LD	   incumbents	  were	   re-­‐elected	   in	   1977	   and	  just	  44.5%	  (307/690)	  of	  Labour	  incumbents.	  However,	   in	  the	  same	  year	  99.2%	  (1,038/1,046)	  of	  Conservative	  incumbents	  were	  successful.	  Just	  eight	  councillors	  from	  more	  than	  one	  thousand	  failed	  to	  defend	  their	  seat.	  	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  period,	  in	  the	  2009	  elections,	  more	  than	  94%	  (714/758)	  of	   defending	   Tory	   councillors	   were	   re-­‐elected.	   In	   the	   same	   year	   just	   79.4%	  (220/277)	   of	   defending	   Liberal	   Democrats	   were	   successful	   and	   35.8%	  (112/313)	   for	   Labour.	   Apart	   from	   these	   two	   elections,	   HRs	   for	   councillors	  standing	  again	  has	  been	  broadly	  similar	  for	  all	  the	  parties,	  mostly	  above	  80%.	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For	   the	   district-­‐level	   Shire	   elections,	   figure	   4.3.4	   shows	   similar	   results.	  Incumbent	  HRs	   for	   all	   the	   parties	   have	   been	   fairly	   strong,	   and	   over	   the	   entire	  period	  the	  party	  averages	  are	  within	   just	   two	  and	  a	  half	  points	  of	  one	  another.	  The	  Conservatives	  have	  averaged	  more	  than	  84%	  (18,136/21,530),	  Labour	  83%	  (12,724/15,383)	   and	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   almost	   82%	   (8,361/10,212).	  However,	   on	   closer	   inspection,	   there	   appears	   to	   be	   two	   distinct	   halves	   to	   the	  district-­‐level	   elections.	   Prior	   to	   1992,	   the	   trend	   for	   all	   three	   parties	   was	  relatively	   similar.	  Though	   there	   is	   some	  variation,	   Labour	   incumbents	  perform	  slightly	  better.	  Nine	  out	  of	  every	  ten	  (4,820/5,364)	  councillors	  standing	  returned	  to	   the	   council,	   compared	   to	   86%	   (7,507/8,725)	   of	   Conservatives	   and	   84.5%	  (1,816/2,150)	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  	  The	   Tory	   slump	   in	   the	   early	   1990s	   is	   evident	   once	   more	   (see	   figure	   4.3.4),	  though	  the	  drop	  is	  not	  quite	  as	  deep	  as	  that	  reported	  for	  the	  MBs,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  Tories	  have	  suffered	  at	  the	  polls	  with	  incumbent	  HRs	  falling	  from	  94%	  (442/470)	  in	  1992,	  to	  just	  59%	  in	  1994	  (112/164).	  In	  1995	  it	  falls	  once	  more	  to	  57%	  (1,289/2,251)	  and	   finally	   to	  51%	   in	  1996	  (218/426).	  As	   for	   the	  MB	  data,	  the	  drop	  in	  success	  for	  the	  Tories	  is	  less	  for	  councillors	  than	  for	  non-­‐incumbents.	  In	   1992,	   some	   38.1%	   (463/1,215)	   of	   Tory	   non-­‐inucmbents	   were	   elected	   to	  councils	  in	  England,	  this	  dropped	  by	  four	  fifths	  to	  just	  7.6%	  (98/1,295)	  in	  1994,	  a	  significantly	  larger	  margin	  than	  the	  drop	  of	  one	  third	  for	  incumbent	  candidates.	  	  	  In	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   period,	   after	   the	   Tory	   slump,	   the	   trend	   is	   slightly	  different.	   Now	   Tory	   councillors	   do	   best	  with	  more	   than	   nine	   out	   of	   every	   ten	  (90.9%,	   8,958/9,852)	   returning	   to	   the	   council	   between	   1998	   and	   2010.	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Conversely,	   Labour	   incumbents	  do	   significantly	  worse	  during	   the	   same	  period,	  with	  less	  than	  three	  quarters	  (72.8%,	  5,406/7,424)	  successfully	  elected.	  The	  Lib	  Dems	  fare	  only	  slightly	  worse,	  with	  almost	  four	  out	  of	  five	  (79.1%,	  4,913/6,213)	  incumbents	   returned.	   This	   sudden	   break	   between	   the	   parties	   may	   be	   due,	   in	  part,	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Unitaries	  in	  1995.	  However,	  as	  is	  discussed	  below,	  Labour	  do	  not	  perform	  particularly	  well	  there	  either.	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34.9%	   (8,038/23,038).	   The	   data	   described	   show	   that	   Conservative	   councillors	  have	  performed	  relatively	  well	  in	  the	  districts,	  particularly	  since	  1998.	  Since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s	   slump,	   and	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   UAs	   from	   1995,	   Conservative	  incumbents	  have	  been	  returned	  at	  even	  higher	  rates	  than	  those	  representing	  the	  other	  two	  parties,	  solidifying	  their	  dominance	  in	  the	  Shires	  further.	  	  Finally,	  results	  for	  the	  Unitaries	  are	  presented	  in	  figure	  4.3.5.	  The	  data	  show	  the	  lowest	  HRs	  for	  all	  types	  of	  authority	  over	  the	  same	  period.	  Tory	  incumbents	  are	  most	   successful	   in	   the	   UAs,	   averaging	   a	   HR	   just	   under	   85%	   throughout	  (1,999/2,356).	  This	  is	  more	  than	  5%	  above	  Labour,	  with	  their	  worst	  average	  for	  all	   types	   of	   authority	   at	   just	   over	   79%	   (2,823/3,557).	   The	   Liberal	   Democrats	  have	   averaged	   a	   HR	   of	   77%	   (1,540/2,009),	   which	   is	   only	   slightly	   lower	   than	  Labour’s.	  For	  Labour	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  the	  trend	  in	  the	  UAs	  has	  been	  a	  declining	   one,	   especially	   since	   2003,	   though	   with	   a	   strong	   recovery	   in	   2010.	  Conversely,	  the	  success	  of	  Conservative	  councillors	  has	  been	  largely	  maintained	  over	  the	  entire	  period.	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  Overall,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  incumbents	  for	  all	  parties	  do	  well.	  Though	  varied,	  the	  rate	  of	  success	  for	  all	  parties	  has	  been	  consistently	  high.	  However,	  the	  data	  do	  reveal	  some	   major	   ‘events’	   where	   councillors	   from	   a	   party	   may	   be	   at	   a	   slight	  disadvantage	   when	   compared	   to	   others,	   namely	   the	   Tory	   slump	   in	   the	   mid-­‐1990s	   and	   perhaps	   Labour’s	   fall	   in	   the	   2000s.	   Considering	   this,	   changes	   in	  political	   partisanship	   will,	   to	   some	   extent,	   affect	   the	   fortunes	   of	   incumbent	  councillors	  at	  times.	  However	  as	  detailed	  above,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  non-­‐inumbents.	  Over	  the	  entire	  period,	  the	  odds	  are	  stacked	  well	  in	  the	  favour	  of	  defending	  councillors,	  with	  more	  than	  four	  out	  of	  every	  five	  councillors	  standing	  returned	   to	   the	   council.	   Even	   if	   we	   examine	   the	   results	   of	   individual	   years,	  incumbents	   are	  more	   likely	   than	  not	   to	   return,	  with	  HRs	   rarely	  dipping	  below	  the	  two	  thirds	  level.	  	  4.4	  –	  Concluding	  Remarks	  Chapter	  4	  has	  attempted	  to	  outline	  the	  wider	  trend	  of	  competitiveness	  in	  English	  local	  elections,	  illustrating	  the	  success	  of	  incumbent	  councillors	  over	  the	  period.	  Early	  findings	  suggest	  that,	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  local	  elections	  have	  become	  increasingly	   competitive	   since	   reorganisation.	   Seat	   competition	   has	   been	  consistently	   on	   the	   rise,	   for	   all	   types	   of	   authority.	   The	   rise	   in	   competition	   has	  been	   greatest	   in	   the	  MBs	   and	   SCs,	   with	   increases	   of	   2	   and	   1.5	   candidates	   per	  vacancy	   the	   in	   respective	   authority	   types.	   Conversely,	   the	   district-­‐level	   of	   the	  Shires	  has	  exhibited	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  growth,	  particularly	  since	  the	  late	  1980s.	  Four	  year	  cycle	  (FYC)	  seat	  competition	  has	  increased	  by	  just	  0.5	  candidates	  per	  seat	  in	  the	  SDs,	  though	  there	  is	  considerable	  variation	  within	  these	  cycles	  also.	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  Chapter	   4	   has	   also	   discussed	   trends	   in	   the	   success	   of	   incumbent	   councillors	  choosing	   to	   defend	   their	   seat.	   From	   the	   data	   presented	   above,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	  incumbents	   have	   been	   highly	   successful	   in	   their	   attempts	   to	   return	   to	   the	  council,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  seat	  competition	  across	  England.	  At	  first	   glance,	   this	   finding	   is	   perplexing,	   as	   one	   could	   expect	   the	   success	   of	  incumbent	   councillors	   to	   erode	   in	   line	  with	   any	   rise	   in	   serious	  opposition.	   For	  some	   authorities,	   average	   seat	   competition	   has	   almost	   doubled.	  However,	   it	   is	  only	  when	  competition	  is	  examined	  more	  closely	  that	  judgements	  on	  the	  quality	  of	   the	   opposition	   can	   be	   speculated	   about.	   Data	   described	   above,	   support	  findings	   detailed	   by	   Rallings	   et	   al	   (2005)	  when	   they	   debunk	   the	   conventional	  wisdom	   that	   ‘the	  decline	  of	   Independents’	  has	   run	  alongside	   the	  growth	  of	   the	  parties.	  This	  is	  only	  really	  true	  for	  elected	  councillors	  and	  not	  the	  total	  number	  of	  candidates	  contesting	  local	  elections	  (Rallings	  et	  al,	  2005,	  pp.396).	  Data	  revealed	  in	   chapter	  4	   suggest	   that	   the	  marked	   rise	   in	   contestation	   from	  Others	  has	  had	  little	  effect	  on	  the	  HRs	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  for	  the	  three	  major	  parties.	  	  Conversely,	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   has	   undoubtedly	   had	   an	  impact	   on	   electoral	   outcomes.	   As	   illustrated	   by	   figure	   4.1.16	   (see	   sub-­‐chapter	  4.1),	  whilst	   the	  share	  of	  councils	   led	  by	  Others	  has	  been	  in	  gradual	  decline,	   the	  emergence	   of	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   has	   culminated	   in	   the	   party	   being	   well-­‐established	   in	   local	   government.	   It	   is	   also	   worth	   noting	   that	   the	   number	   of	  councils	  under	  no	  overall	   control	   (NOC)	  has	  also	   increased	  with	   the	  rise	  of	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  The	  ambition	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  at	  local	  elections	  are	  driven	  partly	  because	  of	   the	  party’s	  wider	  electoral	  philosophy,	  which	   is	  based	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on	  a	  ‘where	  we	  work,	  we	  win’	  strategy,	  and	  argues	  that	  by	  “winning	  more	  seats	  locally	  and	  gaining	  control	  of	  more	  local	  councils,	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  are	  able	  to	   build	   electoral	   credibility	   and	   defuse	   any	   electors’	   accusations	   of	   political	  inexperience”	   (Cutts,	   2006,	   pp.221).	   A	   national	   profile	   has	   been	   built	   around	  their	  local	  presence	  and	  successes,	  and	  so	  the	  strong	  vein	  of	  localism	  embedded	  within	   Liberal	   Democrat	   policy	   has	   driven	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   party’s	   local	  success	  and	  popularity	  is	  vital	  to	  securing	  their	  political	  future.	  	  Strong	   local	   election	   performances	   during	   the	   early	   1990s	   are	   considered	   a	  crucial	   component	   in	   the	   party’s	   establishment	   and	   early	   gains.	   Russell	   &	  Fieldhouse	   (2005)	   highlight	   the	   significance	   of	   this	   time	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats,	   and	  how	  quickly	   their	   local	   successes	  have	   translated	   into	  national	  gains.	  Commenting	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Cheltenham	  gain	  in	  1991,	  Russell	  &	  Fieldhouse	   argue	   that	   the	   party	   used	   their	   “local	   success	   as	   a	   springboard	   for	  national	   advances.	   For	   example,	   the	   capture	   of	   Cheltenham…may	   have	  precipitated	   the	  Liberal	  Democrat	   success	   in	   the	  general	  election	   the	   following	  year.	   By	   1995	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   had	   more	   elected	   councillors	   than	   the	  Conservatives”	  (2005,	  pp.38).	  	  Another	   important	   trend	   revealed	   in	   chapter	   4	   is	   the	   rising	   proportion	   of	  councillors	  choosing	  to	  defend	  their	  seat	  on	  the	  council.	  Figure	  4.2.1	  showed	  that	  SARs	  for	  all	  parties	  have	  increased	  markedly.	  From	  the	  1991-­‐94	  electoral	  cycle,	  SARs	  have	   risen	  by	  almost	  10	  points,	   from	  67%	   to	  76%	   in	  2007-­‐10.	  We	  know	  also	   that	   HRs	   for	   incumbent	   candidates	   have	   remained	   strong.	   The	   combined	  effect	   of	   a	   rise	   in	   the	   proportion	   of	   incumbents	   standing	   again,	   with	   a	   rate	   of	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success	  that	  is	  steady,	  suggests	  increased	  stagnation	  on	  England’s	  councils.	  This	  is	   due	   in	   no	   small	   part	   to	   the	   continued	   electoral	   achievements	   of	   returning	  councillors.	  Even	  in	  instances	  where	  one	  party	  is	  suffering	  severely	  at	  the	  polls,	  data	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter	  suggest	  that	  incumbency	  will	  significantly	  increase	  the	   chances	   of	   winning.	   However,	   the	   direct	   comparison	   in	   the	   successes	   of	  incumbents	   and	   freshmen	   is	   a	   problematic	   indicator	   of	   relative	   performance,	  particularly	   in	   any	   one	   year.	   Geographical	   differences	   in	   political	   partisanship	  mean	   that	   examining	   trends	   in	   the	   success	   of	   incumbents	   with	   freshmen	   will	  inevitably	  be	  comparing	  some	  apples	  with	  oranges.	  The	  endogenous	  element	  of	  this	   comparison	   is	   that	  defending	  councillors	  by	  definition	  have	  an	  established	  and	   proven	   base	   of	   support,	   whereas	   many	   freshmen	   contesting	   will	   not.	  Consequently,	  the	  geographical	  disparities	  in	  political	  partisanship	  mean	  that	  the	  aggregate	  data	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  4	  fail	  to	  compare	  electoral	  scenarios	  that	  are	  similar,	  or	  at	  least	  close	  to	  being	  so.	  	  Chapter	   4	   has	   attempted	   to	   describe	   the	   significant	   developments	   in	   the	  competitiveness	   of	   English	   local	   elections.	   The	   chapter	   has	   taken	   a	   heuristic	  approach	  in	  assessing	  the	  performance	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  under	  electoral	  conditions	   that	   have	   changed	   significantly	   over	   the	   period.	   Chapter	   5	   aims	   to	  build	   on	   these	   data,	   utilising	   and	   adapting	   established	   methods	   from	   the	  literature	  to	  identify	  and	  measure	  incumbency	  effects.	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Chapter	  5	  –	  Estimating	  Incumbency	  Advantage:	  Winners,	  Losers	  
&	  Experience	  Effects	  	  	  Whereas	   chapter	   4	   informed	   readers	   of	   the	   state	   of	   competitiveness	   and	  incumbent	   success	   in	  English	   local	   elections,	   chapter	  5	  breaks	   from	   the	  broad-­‐brush	   approach	   to	   examine	   the	   relative	   performance	   of	   councillors	   in	   some	  detail.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  assess	  the	  electoral	  value	  of	  incumbency.	  Are	   councillors	   better	   able	   to	   secure	   their	   seat	   on	   the	   council	   than	   their	  freshmen	   opponents	   and	   party	   colleagues?	   Does	   experience	   matter	   and	   do	  candidates	   and	   their	   parties	   benefit	   from	   fielding	   a	   candidate	   with	   previous	  experience	  on	  the	  council,	  and	  if	  so,	  to	  what	  extent?	  Using	  indicators	  constructed	  solely	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  research,	  as	  well	  as	  models	  adapted	  from	  methods	  well	  established	  in	  the	  American	  literature,	  chapter	  5	  assesses	  the	  magnitude	  of	  any	  electoral	  advantage	  enjoyed	  by	  incumbent	  councillors	  in	  England.	  	  Students	  of	  congressional	  elections	  in	  the	  United	  States	  will	  be	  familiar	  with	  the	  concept	   of	   the	   Sophomore	   Surge	   and	   Retirement	   Slump	   as	   psephological	  phenomena	  (Erikson,	  1972;	  Mayhew,	  1974;	  Cover	  &	  Mayhew,	  1977;	  Born,	  1979;	  Jacobson,	   1987;	   Alford	   &	   Brady,	   1989;	   Gelman	   &	   King,	   1990;	   Holbrook	   &	  Tidmarch,	  1991;	  Lockerbie,	  1994).	  The	  electoral	  significance	  of	   incumbency,	   its	  associated	   advantages	   or	   otherwise,	   are	   well	   documented	   across	   the	   Atlantic.	  Conversely,	   the	   electoral	   effects	   of	   incumbency	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   are	  largely	  confined	  to	  the	  subchapters	  of	  Rallings	  &	  Thrasher	  (1997)	  or	  a	  handful	  of	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works	  that	  tend	  to	  sum	  the	  advantages,	  at	  parliamentary	  level	  at	  least,	  as	  small	  and	   sporadic	   (Williams,	   1967;	   Norton	   &	   Wood,	   1990;	   Norton	   1994a,	   1994b;	  Gaines,	  1998).	  There	  are	  obvious	  differences	  between	  the	  English	  and	  American	  examples,	  which	  have	  been	  described	  in	  some	  detail	   in	  chapter	  2.	  They	  include	  themes	   such	   as	   the	   selection	   process	   (Zaller,	   1998),	   electoral	   campaigns	  (Abramowitz,	   1991;	   Abramowitz,	   Alexander	   &	   Gunning,	   2006)	   and	   incumbent	  resources	  (Mayhew,	  1974;	  Cover	  &	  Brumberg,	  1982;	  Jacobson,	  1997).	  However,	  perhaps	  nowhere	  is	  the	  gap	  wider	  than	  that	  of	  the	  roles	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  the	  party.	  	  In	   English	   local	   elections	   political	   parties	   dominate	   the	   electoral	   process	   from	  beginning	  to	  end.	  Chapter	  4	  illustrates	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  success	  of	  minor	  parties	  and	  independents	  (Others)	  has	  tumbled.	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  number	  of	  councils	  controlled	  by	  Others	  has	  fallen	  consistently	  over	  the	  past	  four	  decades	  and	  they	  now	  make	  up	  an	  increasingly	  smaller	  proportion	  of	  winning	  councillors	  and	   councils.	   Parties	   not	   only	   dominate	   English	   local	   elections,	   but	   also	   the	  electoral	  process.	  Respective	  party	  committees	  select	  their	  local	  candidates	  and	  the	  evidence	  is	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  candidates	  who	  stand	  for	  the	  first	  time	  do	  so	  because	  they	  were	  asked	  to.	  Two	  in	  three	  candidates	  say	  they	  stood	  because	  they	  were	   invited	   to	   do	   so,	   compared	   to	   just	   one	   in	   three	   who	   took	   the	   decision	  entirely	   on	   their	   own	   (Rallings	   et	  al,	   2010,	   pp.369-­‐370).	   These	   candidates	   are	  then	   carried	   by	   the	   party	   campaign	   and	   engage	   with	   the	   public	   through	   the	  prism	  of	  their	  party.	  It	  is	  easy	  then,	  to	  assume	  that	  locally	  elected	  representatives	  are	  mere	  pawns	  of	  the	  party,	  swept	  in	  and	  out	  on	  the	  tides	  of	  national	  political	  partisanship.	   Bearing	   in	   mind	   the	   influence	   of	   parties	   in	   local	   elections,	   what	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value	  do	   incumbent	   candidates	  add	   to	   the	  party	  and	   their	   electoral	   ambitions?	  Does	   it	   matter	   if	   relatively	   inexperienced	   candidates	   are	   fielded	   instead	   of	  councillors?	   Chapter	   5	   seeks	   to	   ascertain	   the	   value	   of	   incumbency.	   Whereas	  chapter	  4	  presents	  data	  to	  illustrate	  the	  high	  rate	  at	  which	  defending	  councillors	  are	  returned,	  this	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  assess	  the	  relative	  performance	  of	  returning	  councillors.	  Methods	  used	  to	  compare	  the	  performance	  of	  councillors	  at	  various	  stages	  of	  their	  incumbency	  with	  other	  candidates.	  In	  a	  crude	  sense,	  the	  chapter	  explores	   the	   gap	   in	   vote	   shares	   between	   incumbent	   and	   freshmen	   candidates	  and	   describes	   trends.	   The	   work	   also	   evaluates	   the	   role	   of	   experience	   in	   local	  elections.	   Does	   experience	   have	   any	   value	   to	   voters	   and	   do	   the	   electorate	  distinguish	  candidates	  of	  varying	  electoral	  experience	  at	  the	  ballot	  box?	  	  Critically,	   the	   chapter	   examines	   whether	   incumbent	   councillors	   with	   greater	  electoral	   experience	   fare	   better	   than	   those	   who	   have	   less.	   There	   is	   some	  evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   they	   do.	   Rallings	   et	   al	   (1998,	   pp.	   119-­‐121)	   use	  multimember	   districts	   to	   confirm	   this	   supposition,	   though	   the	   extent	   of	   the	  differentiation,	   measured	   in	   terms	   of	   candidates’	   finishing	   positions	   and	   vote	  shares,	  varies	  over	  time	  and	  by	  party.	  There	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  small,	  yet	  significant	  gap	   in	   favour	   of	   incumbent	   candidates.	   Rallings	   et	   al	   (2009,	   pp.	   10-­‐12)	   also	  confirm	   the	   presence	   of	   electoral	   variance	   associated	   with	   incumbency,	   but	  confine	  it	  to	  a	  small	  one,	  easily	  influenced	  by	  partisan	  swings	  and	  by	  ballot	  order.	  Incumbency	  can	  of	  course	  prove	  to	  be	  a	  hindrance	  on	  occasion,	  but	  nevertheless	  there	   is	   some	   evidence	   from	   the	   literature	   that	   incumbents	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  treated	  slightly	  differently	  by	  the	  electorate.	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When	   investigating	   these	   effects,	   there	   are	   important	   methodological	  considerations	   that	   narrow	   the	   frame	  of	   analysis	   that	   can	  be	  used	   to	   establish	  any	   estimation	   of	   the	   advantage.	   For	   instance,	   can	   there	   be	   any	   value	   in	  comparing	   the	  performance	  of	   a	   Labour	   councillor	   defending	   their	   seat	   on	   the	  Stoke	   council,	   where	   the	   party	   have	   historically	   dominated,	   with	   a	   losing	  freshman	  party	  colleague	  in	  Cornwall,	  where	  the	  party	  has	  struggled	  at	  times?	  To	  do	  so	   is	   to	   ignore	  England’s	  political	  geography	  and	  ascribe	  greater	  warrant	   to	  the	   performance	   of	   incumbent	   candidates	   than	   is	   deserved.	   The	   aim	   of	   this	  chapter	   is	   to	   identify	   the	   ‘value	   added’	   by	   incumbent	   candidates,	   regardless	   of	  how	  well	   their	   party	   performs.	   For	   this	   reason	   the	   chapter	   offers	   a	   variety	   of	  measures	  that	  consider	  only	  winning	  candidates	  and	  two	  that	  consider	  losers.	  All	  are	  designed	  to	  offer	  a	  less	  biased	  or	  unbiased	  estimation	  of	  incumbency	  effects	  under	  a	  variety	  of	  circumstances.	  	  Sub-­‐chapter	   5.1	   begins	   with	   a	   simple	   comparison	   of	   winners,	   comparing	   the	  performance	  of	  winning	   freshmen	  and	  winning	   incumbent	   candidates	  over	   the	  period.	  Trends	  across	  the	  aggregate	  and	  party-­‐level	  data	  are	  discussed	  to	  more	  accurately	   equate	   the	   gap	   between	   incumbents	   and	   their	   non-­‐incumbent	  colleagues	   nationally.	   Section	   5.2	   introduces	   the	   Standardised	   Incumbent	  Performance	   (SIP)	   estimator	   and	   discusses	   Sophomore	   Surge	   effects.	   Sub-­‐chapter	   5.3	   considers	   the	   Retirement	   Slump	   method	   and	   assesses	   the	   fall	   in	  party	  performance	  using	  the	  constructed	  Standardised	  Retirement	  Slump	  (SRS)	  estimator.	   Section	   5.4	   explores	   experience	   effects.	   Using	   the	   previously	  constructed	   estimators,	   the	   method	   determines	   the	   cumulative	   effect	   of	  incumbency	   and	   the	   value	   of	   council	   experience	   to	   the	   party	   on	   election	   day.	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Finally,	   Sub-­‐chapter	   5.5	   introduces	   two	   estimators	   that	   utilise	   data	   from	  incumbent	   losers;	   the	  Role	  Reversal	  and	  Experienced	  Partner	   Incumbent	  Loser	  Performance	   measures	   (RRILP	   &	   EPILP	   respectively),	   before	   offering	   some	  concluding	  remarks	  in	  section	  5.6.	  	  5.1	  –	  Winners	  Rallings	   et	   al	   (1998)	   present	   data	   on	   the	   difference	   between	   incumbent	   and	  freshman	   electoral	   performance.	   Depending	   on	   the	   party,	   the	   data	   show	   that	  incumbents	   perform	   some	   1.2-­‐3.2%	  better	   than	   freshmen	   in	   the	   Shire	   Council	  and	  London	  Borough	  elections	  of	   the	   early	  1990s.	  To	  mitigate	   the	   influence	  of	  ‘paper	   candidates’	   and	   compare	   candidates	   that	   are	   more	   similar,	   data	   for	  winners	   is	  presented	   in	   figure	  5.1.0.	  The	   chart	   shows	  aggregate	   vote	   shares	  of	  both	   incumbent	   winners	   (IW,	   marked	   in	   red)	   and	   freshmen	   winners	   (NIW,	  marked	   in	   dashed	   black).	   There	   is	   a	   consistent	   gap	   between	   the	   average	   vote	  shares	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  and	  their	  non-­‐incumbent	  counterparts	  over	  the	  entire	   period	   of	   study.	   Although	   there	   are	   clear	   fluctuations	   in	   average	   vote	  share,	  the	  gap	  in	  average	  performance	  for	  both	  groups	  remains.	  The	  two	  groups	  follow	  a	  similar	  overall	  trajectory,	  with	  average	  winning	  vote	  share	  declining	  for	  both	  incumbents	  and	  freshmen	  winners	  (NIW),	  particularly	  since	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  For	   the	   first	   20	   years	   examined,	   average	   winning	   vote	   shares	   for	   both	  incumbents	  and	  freshmen	  were	  well	  above	  50%,	  but	  by	  2010	  averages	  dropped	  to	  less	  than	  50%	  and	  45%	  for	  incumbents	  and	  freshmen	  respectively.	  	  On	   closer	   inspection,	   figure	   5.1.0	   shows	   that	   the	   gap	   between	   incumbent	   and	  freshmen	  winners	  has	  actually	  widened	  over	  the	  period.	  To	  better	  visualise	  the	  
	   153	  
widening	   gap,	   figure	   5.1.1	   plots	   the	   variation	   of	   the	   difference	   in	   winning	  incumbent	  and	  freshmen	  vote	  share	  over	  the	  period.	  The	  number	  of	  cases	  used	  (n)	   is	  marked	   in	  dashed	  grey	  and	  refers	   to	   the	  scale	  on	   the	   left-­‐hand	  side.	  The	  average	  difference	  is	  marked	  in	  red	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  corresponding	  scale	  on	  the	  right.	  Overall,	  the	  data	  confirm	  the	  growing	  trend,	  from	  a	  gap	  of	  around	  3.5%	  in	  the	   mid-­‐1970s	   to	   almost	   6%	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   period.	   Though	   there	   are	  substantial	  temporal	  variations	  in	  the	  data,	  the	  polynomial	  fit	  (marked	  in	  dashed	  black,	  see	  figure	  5.1.1)	  is	  gradual	  and	  upward,	  showing	  growth	  in	  the	  region	  of	  2-­‐2.5%	   over	   the	   years	   observed.	   The	   data	   also	   show	   the	   gap	   to	   be	   particularly	  small	   from	   1981-­‐1984,	   with	   incumbents	   averaging	   just	   1.1-­‐2.6%	   more	   than	  freshmen	  over	  this	  time.	  	  These	   results	  have	  a	  number	  of	   implications.	  First,	   the	  consistent	  gap	  between	  incumbent	   and	   freshmen	   winners	   is	   a	   broad	   indication	   of	   a	   difference	   in	  circumstance	  between	  the	  two	  candidates.	  It	  does	  not	  confirm	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  incumbency	   advantage,	   merely	   that	   incumbents	   do	   better	   on	   average.	   Also,	  interestingly	   for	   both	   incumbent	   and	   freshmen	   winners,	   average	   vote	   share	  recorded	   has	   been	   in	   decline,	   which	   marries	   neatly	   with	   data	   discussed	   in	  chapter	   4	   on	   the	   rise	   in	   seat	   competition.	   The	   introduction	   of	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	   and	   the	   rise	   in	   the	   number	   of	   Other	   candidates	   has	   drawn	   some	  votes,	  but	  more	  importantly	  has	  lowered	  the	  share	  of	  the	  vote	  required	  to	  win	  in	  a	   plurality	   system.	   In	   this	   sense	   the	   fall	   in	   average	   vote	   share	   for	   both	   groups	  does	  not	  necessarily	  hinder	  an	  incumbent’s	  chances	  of	  success,	  but	  can	  actually	  improve	  them,	  as	  a	  divided	  opposition	  can	  serve	  to	  enhance	  the	  position	  of	  the	  leading	  candidate.	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  The	   rising	   gap	   between	   incumbent	   and	   freshmen	   winners	   implies	   that	   the	  average	   winning	   vote	   shares	   of	   incumbent	   candidates	   has	   been	   falling	   at	   a	  slower	  rate	  than	  that	  for	  freshmen.	  This	  widening	  gap	  may	  support	  a	  belief	  that	  the	  rise	  in	  seat	  competition	  will	  help,	  rather	  than	  hinder	  the	  electoral	  prospects	  of	  defending	  councillors.	  	  
	  
[Figure	  5.1.0	  –Incumbent	  Winners	  (IWs)	  Vs	  Freshmen	  Winners	  (NIW)	  Vote	  Share	  (%)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  
=	  182,124)]	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The	   data	   presented	   above	   are	   broad	   and	   do	   not	   take	   into	   consideration	   the	  nuanced	  trends	  for	  each	  of	  the	  parties.	  At	  times	  particular	  parties	  may	  suffer	  at	  the	   national	   polls	   and	   so	   it	   is	   of	   interest	   to	   this	   project	   to	   examine	   how,	   in	  general	   terms,	   incumbents	   fare	  nationally	  when	  compared	  with	   their	   freshmen	  party	  colleagues	  over	   the	  period.	  Figures	  5.1.2-­‐5.1.5	  show	  the	  variation	   in	  vote	  share	  differences	  for	  the	  parties.	  As	  for	  the	  data	  discussed	  above,	  at	  times	  there	  is	   large	   variation,	   both	   in	   the	   number	   of	   cases	   and	   incumbent’s	   superior	  performance.	  However,	  overall	  the	  data	  demonstrate	  that	  incumbent	  winners	  for	  all	  parties	  tend	  to	  outperform	  their	  freshmen	  colleagues.	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Hit	  Rates	  (HRs)	  suffered	  significantly	  in	  1986,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Boroughs.	  The	  case-­‐selection	  procedure	   for	   this	   analysis	   requires	   the	   examination	   of	  winning	  candidates.	   Consequently,	  whilst	   the	   typical	   pool	   of	   incumbents	   examined	  will	  have	  suffered	  a	  backlash	  in	  both	  safe	  and	  marginal	  seats	  alike,	  the	  average	  vote	  shares	   for	   winning	   freshmen	  will	   have	   remained	   largely	   unchanged.	   Typically	  these	   will	   either	   have	   tipped	   over	   the	   required	   level	   to	   win	   and	   thus	   be	  considered,	   or	   fail	   to	   do	   so	   and	   not	   be	   considered	   at	   all.	   Consequently,	   in	  situations	   where	   there	   is	   a	   major	   reaction	   against	   any	   one	   party,	   the	   simple	  comparison	   by	   winners	   may	   not	   illustrate	   the	   full	   extent	   of	   an	   incumbent’s	  advantage.	  	  Aside	   from	   these	   two	   years,	   the	   overall	   trend	   is	   a	   growing	   gap	   for	   the	  Conservatives.	  The	  1980s	  appear	  to	  show	  the	  least	  difference,	  whilst	  the	  2000s	  show	   the	   largest	   difference.	   The	   difference	   between	   incumbent	   and	   freshmen	  winners	  is	  4.7%	  in	  favour	  of	  incumbents	  over	  the	  entire	  period,	  with	  a	  standard	  deviation	   (σ)	   of	   3.15.	   Labour	   results	   paint	   a	   slightly	   different	   picture,	   but	  conform	   to	   the	   general	   trend	   of	   incumbent	   winners	   performing	   considerably	  better	   than	   their	   non-­‐incumbent	   counterparts.	   Figure	   5.1.3	   illustrates	   how	   the	  middle	   of	   the	   period	   exhibited	   the	   greatest	   difference	   between	   Labour	  incumbents	  and	  freshmen.	  However,	  although	  Labour	  incumbents	  do	  better	  than	  their	   freshmen	   colleagues	  more	   often	   than	   not,	   the	   data	   show	   that	   this	   is	   not	  always	   the	   case.	   In	   1982	   the	   average	   vote	   share	   of	   winning	   Labour	   freshmen	  edged	   that	   for	   incumbents,	   by	   around	   0.3%.	   As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   4,	   the	  introduction	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  LD	  candidates	  ahead	  of	  the	  1983	  parliamentary	  election	   is	   likely	   to	  have	   contributed	   to	   the	  9%	  drop	   in	  Labour’s	  national	   vote	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share	  (30.2%	  in	  1986).	  Gains	  made	  by	  the	  SDP-­‐Liberal	  Alliance11	  were	   likely	  to	  be	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  2003).	  Overall,	  Labour	  incumbent	  winners	  performed	  5.1%	  better	  than	  their	  freshmen	  counterparts	  over	  the	  period	  (σ	  =	  2.80).	  Though	  the	  difference	  is	  substantial,	  like	  the	   data	   discussed	   for	   the	   Conservatives,	   there	   appears	   to	   be	   temporal	  dimensions	   to	   these	   differences,	   with	   the	   gap	   being	   widest	   during	   the	   mid-­‐1990s.	  	  
	  
[Figure	  5.1.3	  –Lab	  IWs	  Vs	  NIWs,	  Vote	  Share	  Difference	  (%)	  by	  Years	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  62,968)]]	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  Figure	  5.1.4	  shows	  data	  for	  Lib	  Dem	  incumbent	  winners	  against	  their	  freshmen	  counterparts.	  Similar	  to	  data	  for	  the	  Conservatives,	  there	  is	  a	  slight	  growth	  over	  the	   period	   examined,	   though	   as	   the	   chart	   illustrates	   (marked	   in	   dashed	   grey)	  there	  are	  relatively	  few	  candidates	  for	  comparison	  pre-­‐1982.	  This	  period	  is	  also	  problematic	   as	   it	   pre-­‐dates	   the	   SDP-­‐Liberal	   alliance	   and	   so	  may	   be	   comparing	  competitors	   as	  well	   as	   colleagues.	  The	  1994	   local	   elections	   showed	   the	   largest	  difference	  in	  vote	  shares	  between	  the	  LDs,	  with	  incumbents	  averaging	  some	  8%	  higher	  candidate	  vote	  share	  (CVS)	   than	   freshmen.	  Since	   the	  1990s	  the	  smallest	  gap	  has	  been	  1.7%	  in	  1997.	  Over	  the	  period	  winning	  Lib	  Dem	  incumbents	  have	  averaged	  3.9%	  higher	  vote	  shares	  than	  freshmen.	  This	  difference	  has	  been	  fairly	  consistent	   over	   the	   years	   examined.	   Overall,	   data	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	  provides	   the	   strongest	   evidence	   in	   favour	   of	   incumbency	   effects,	   with	   more	  consistent	   results	   than	   the	   two	  major	  parties.	  Variance	   in	   the	  data	   is	   relatively	  low	  by	  comparison	  with	  a	  standard	  deviation	  (σ)	  of	  just	  1.96.	  	  Overall,	  data	  for	  the	  three	  major	  parties	  suggests	  that	  incumbents	  do	  better	  than	  their	   freshmen	   colleagues,	   though	   with	   considerable	   variance	   over	   the	   period	  examined.	   As	   discussed	   above,	   though	   this	   method	   is	   useful	   because	   of	   its	  simplicity,	  there	  are	  particular	  weaknesses	  with	  the	  approach.	  Accordingly,	  these	  are	  addressed	  in	  sub-­‐chapter	  5.2.	  	  5.2	  –	  Standardised	  Incumbent	  Performance	  (SIP)	  Using	  multimember	  districts	   (MMDs),	  Rallings	  et	  al	  (1998)	   identify	   nuances	   in	  the	   preferences	   of	   the	   electorate	   when	   presented	   with	   a	   ballot	   structure	   that	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offers	   slightly	  more	   choice.	  Where	   there	   is	  more	   than	   one	   candidate	   from	   the	  same	  party	  on	  offer,	   there	  are	  usually	  differences	   in	   the	  vote	   counts	  and	   these	  can	   act	   as	   a	   gentle	   indicator	   of	   voter	   preference.	  Without	   a	   ranking	   structure	  built	   into	   the	   voting	   process,	  we	   are	   able	   instead	   to	   turn	   to	   unused	   votes	   and	  split-­‐ticketing	  to	  indicate	  popular	  preferences.	  	  Using	   wards	   where	   the	   same	   party	   wins	   all	   seats,	   and	   there	   is	   a	   mix	   of	  incumbents	   and	   freshmen	   elected	   allows	   us	   to	   identify	   any	   inherent	   value	   of	  incumbency.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  and	  it	  is	  statistically	  significant,	  we	   can	   be	   reasonably	   confident	   that	   this	   difference	   is	   not	   due	   to	   a	   random	  distribution	  of	  votes,	  but	  instead	  to	  two	  distinct	  normal	  distributions.	  As	  such	  a	  simple	  comparison	  of	  incumbent	  vote	  share	  against	  average	  freshmen	  vote	  share	  within	   these	   wards	   is	   enough	   to	   assess	   whether	   the	   electorate	   have	   been	  distinguishing	   incumbent	   and	   freshmen	   candidates.	   This	   approach	   allows	  freshmen	  to	  act	  as	  a	  rudimentary	  measure	  of	  political	  partisanship	  in	  each	  ward	  and	  any	   incumbency	  effect	  can	  be	  gauged	  or	   ‘standardised’	   into	  what	  has	  been	  termed	   Standardised	   Incumbent	   Performance	   (SIP).	   The	   process	   is	   relatively	  simple.	   Incumbents	   are	   compared	   directly	   against	   the	  mean	   freshmen	   vote	   in	  their	  ward.	  As	   the	  data	   consist	  of	  both	   two-­‐member	  and	   three-­‐member	  wards,	  SIP	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  the	  following:	  	  SIP = 𝑥! − 𝑦!𝑛!!!! 	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Where	  x	  is	  the	  incumbent	  vote	  share	  and	  y	  is	  freshmen	  vote	  share.	  The	  SIP	  model	  is	  explained	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  chapter	  3,	  but	  the	  objective	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  to	  eliminate	   partisan	   inconsistency	   across	   wards.	   The	   premise	   rests	   on	   the	  assumption	   that	   a	   gap	   in	   vote	   share	   is	   linked	   to	   a	   gap	   in	   candidates’	   popular	  appeal.	   In	   their	   work	   on	   assessing	   incumbency	   advantage	   in	   multimember	  districts,	   Hirano	   &	   Snyder	   (2009)	   identify	   two	   potential	   sources	   of	   bias	  when	  selecting	  winners	  in	  multimember	  districts.	  The	  incumbent’s	  tenure	  needs	  to	  be	  considered	   and	   observing	   winners	   may	   result	   in	   some	   form	   of	   selection	   bias	  (Hirano	  &	  Snyder,	  2009,	  p.296-­‐297).	  Both	  of	  these	  issues	  are	  dealt	  with	  later	  in	  sub-­‐chapters	  5.3	  and	  5.5	  respectively.	  	  Results	  indicate	  a	  distinct	  performance	  gap	  between	  the	  two	  groups.	  Incumbents	  outperform	  their	  freshmen	  colleagues	  by	  an	  average	  of	  2.7%,	  and	  when	  plotted	  over	  the	  period,	  the	  trend	  is	  a	  growing	  one	  (see	  figure	  5.2.1).	  At	  its	  lowest,	  SIP	  is	  just	  over	  1.6%,	  during	  the	  1974-­‐78	  electoral	  cycle.	  SIP	  then	  grows	  considerably	  to	  its	  highest	  point	  of	  3.4%	  during	  the	  1995-­‐98	  electoral	  cycle.	  After	  these	  years	  SIP	  dips	  and	  settles	  at	  around	  2.7-­‐2.8%	  between	  the	  1999-­‐02	  and	  2007-­‐10.	  The	  initial	   SIP	   data	   suggest	   that	   incumbents	   have	   performed	   notably	   better	   than	  freshmen	   colleagues,	   in	   the	   same	  ward,	   at	   the	   same	   election	   and	   this	   gap	   has	  widened	  somewhat	  over	  the	  years	  examined.	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incumbent	  and	  freshmen	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  which	  is	  almost	  twice	  the	  SIP	  of	  the	  Conservatives	  and	  1.5%	  higher	  than	  for	  Labour.	  	  
	  
[Figure	  5.2.2	  –	  SIP	  (%)	  by	  Party	  by	  FYC]	  	  	   Year	   Con	  -­‐	  n	   SIP	   Lab	  -­‐	  n	   SIP	   LD	  -­‐	  n	   SIP	  
1974-­‐78	   501	   1.50	   514	   1.55	   24	   4.99	  
1979-­‐82	   426	   1.42	   317	   2.29	   24	   5.80	  
1983-­‐86	   373	   1.89	   327	   2.60	   44	   3.60	  
1987-­‐90	   449	   1.51	   455	   2.57	   84	   3.68	  
1991-­‐94	   592	   1.73	   681	   3.20	   307	   4.92	  
1995-­‐98	   330	   2.02	   1,040	   3.27	   463	   4.37	  
1999-­‐02	   841	   2.24	   950	   2.16	   572	   3.80	  
2003-­‐06	   892	   2.70	   853	   1.96	   575	   3.55	  
2007-­‐10	   956	   2.39	   479	   1.90	   330	   3.45	  
[Table	  5.2.2	  –	  SIP	  (Aggregate	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (%)	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  Party	  by	  Year	  (n	  =13,399)]	  	   Party	   n	  	   SIP	   σ	   t	   df	   Sig.	  
Con	   5,360	   2.05	   4.69	   32.07	   5,359	   .000	  
Lab	   5,616	   2.45	   5.66	   32.42	   5,615	   .000	  
LD	   2,423	   3.97	   5.67	   34.43	   2,422	   .000	  
All	   14,116	   2.70	   5.90	   54.29	   14,115	   .000	  





1974-­‐1978	   1983-­‐1986	   1991-­‐1994	   1999-­‐2002	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tests	  are	  performed	  against	  the	  0%	  SIP	  test	  value	  for	  all	  three	  parties.	  Table	  5.2.3	  displays	  the	  results.	  	  For	  the	  Conservatives,	  the	  mean	  SIP	  of	  2.1%	  has	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  well	  into	  the	  tail,	  at	  32.07.	  With	  5,359	  degrees	  of	   freedom	  the	  corresponding	  p-­‐value	   is	  well	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  For	  Labour	  the	  average	  SIP	  of	  2.5%	  has	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  32.42.	  With	  5,615	  degrees	  of	   freedom	  a	  p-­‐value	  is	  also	  reported	  well	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  Finally,	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	   the	  4%	  average	  SIP	  has	  a	   t-­‐statistic	  of	  34.43	  and	  with	   2,422	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   the	   p-­‐value	   is	   again,	  well	   below	   the	   0.001	  level.	   Overall	   these	   data	   suggest	   that	   we	   can	   be	   confident	   that	   average	   SIP	  deviates	  significantly	  from	  zero.	  Incumbents	  for	  all	  three	  parties	  are	  performing	  significantly	  better	  than	  their	  freshmen	  counterparts.	  	  However,	   Hirano	   &	   Snyder	   (2009)	  maintain	   that	   in	   order	   to	   eliminate	   bias	   in	  results	  and	  isolate	  any	  effect	  solely	  attributed	  to	  incumbency,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  exclude	  the	  effect	  of	  extended	  candidate	   tenure.	  That	   is	   to	  say	  that	  currently,	  a	  group	   of	   varying	   experience	   (i.e.	   short	   and	   long	   serving	   councillors)	   are	   being	  measured	  against	  a	  group	  with	  similar	  electoral	  experience	  (i.e.	  recently	  winning	  freshmen).	  In	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  causal	  mechanism,	  it	  will	  be	  useful	  then	  to	  examine	  the	  results	  for	  sophomore	  candidates	  alone.	  For	  instance,	  what	  is	   the	   value	   of	   serving	   just	   one	   term	   in	   office?	   This	   has	   the	   added	   benefit	   of	  allowing	   us	   to	   compare	   the	   data	   for	   any	   relative	   changes	   in	   the	  measures	   (i.e.	  between	  SIP	  for	  all	  incumbents	  and	  SIP	  just	  for	  sophomores)	  and	  make	  a	  broad	  judgement	  as	  to	  whether	  incumbency	  may	  potentially	  have	  cumulative	  effects.	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Examining	   SIP	   data	   just	   for	   sophomores	   is	   effectively	   a	   different	   approach	   to	  constructing	   a	   ‘Sophomore	   Surge’	   model,	   a	   method	   that	   has	   been	   used	  extensively	   in	   the	  American	   literature	  (Holbrook	  &	  Tidmarch,	  1991;	  Lockerbie,	  1994).	   Comparing	   sophomore	   and	   freshmen	   candidates	   in	   the	   same	   election	  allows	   us	   to	   measure	   any	   ‘surge’	   in	   vote	   share	   as	   changes	   in	   political	  partisanship	  are	  accounted	  for	  in	  the	  SIP	  model	  (refer	  to	  chapter	  3).	  	  Table	   5.2.4	   displays	   the	   results	   of	   SIP	   t-­‐tests	   for	   sophomores.	   Though	   average	  SIP	   falls	  by	   just	  over	  0.55%,	   the	  2.15%	  estimate	   reports	  a	   t-­‐statistic	  of	  19.156.	  With	  2,817	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  this	  has	  a	  p-­‐value	  well	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  are	  set	  at	  1.93-­‐2.36%,	  meaning	  that	  we	  can	  be	  confident	  the	  sophomore	  surge	  is	  above	  1.9%.	  For	  Tory	  sophomores,	  SIP	  averages	  1.6%	  (95%	  U=1.88	  L=1.30,	  σ	  =	  5.06)	  and	  though	  the	  Tories	  are	  the	  worst	  performing	  party,	  the	   t-­‐test	   against	   zero	   is	   statistically	   significant	   with	   a	   reported	   t-­‐statistic	   of	  10.698.	  With	  1,164	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  the	  associated	  p-­‐value	  is	  well	  below	  the	  0.001	   level.	   Labour	   sophomores	   do	   much	   the	   same.	   The	   average	   surge	   for	  Labour	  sophomores	  is	  2%	  (σ	  =	  6.12)	  and	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  11.318	  (df	  =	  1,194)	  has	  a	  p-­‐value	  that	  is	  also	  well	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  Labour	  confidence	  intervals	  range	  from	  1.66%	  to	  2.35%	  meaning	  that	  we	  cannot	  be	  confident	  that	  the	  Labour	  surge	  is	   significantly	   higher	   than	   the	  Conservatives.	  As	   for	   the	  data	  discussed	   above,	  Liberal	   Democrat	   sophomores	   perform	   better	   than	   sophomores	   for	   the	   other	  two	  parties,	  with	  an	  average	  SIP	  of	  3.94%	  (σ	  =	  7.12).	  The	  associated	  t-­‐statistic	  is	  11.832,	   and	   with	   457	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   the	   resultant	   p-­‐value	   is	   below	   the	  0.001	   level.	   LD	   confidence	   intervals	   range	   between	   3.28%	   and	   4.59%.	   This	   is	  well	   above	   the	   ranges	   of	   either	   Labour	   or	   the	   Conservatives,	  meaning	   that	  we	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can	   confidently	   assert	   that	   the	   Liberal	   Democrat	   surge	   is	   significantly	   higher	  than	  that	  for	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives.	  	   Party	   n	   SIP	   σ	   t	   df	   95%	  L	   95%	  U	   Sig.	  
Con	   1,165	   1.59	   5.06	   10.698	   1,164	   1.30	   1.88	   .000	  
Lab	   1,195	   2.00	   6.12	   11.318	   1,194	   1.66	   2.35	   .000	  
LD	   458	   3.94	   7.12	   11.832	   457	   3.28	   4.59	   .000	  
All	   2,818	   2.15	   5.95	   19.156	   2,817	   1.93	   2.36	   .000	  
[Table	  5.2.4	  –	  Sophomore	  SIP	  (One	  Sample	  T-­‐Test)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (t)	  (df)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  Party	  (n	  =	  
2,818)]	  	  The	  data	  presented	  in	  table	  5.2.4	  has	  a	  number	  of	  ramifications	  for	  this	  project.	  
First,	  the	  results	  support	  the	  overall	  narrative	  described	  so	  far	  in	  this	  chapter.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  incumbents	  tend	  to	  attain	  a	  higher	  share	  of	  the	  vote	  than	  freshmen,	  even	  when	  compared	  with	  their	  peers	  at	  the	  same	  election	  and	  in	  the	  same	  ward.	  
Second,	   though	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   incumbents	   have	   outperformed	   freshmen	  has	   varied,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   there	   are	   differences	   between	   the	   parties.	   Third,	  Liberal	  Democrat	  councillors	  consistently	  do	  best;	  reporting	  significantly	  higher	  SIPs	   than	  either	  Labour	  or	   the	  Tories	   in	  both	   incumbent	  and	  sophomore	   tests.	  However,	   it	  must	   also	   be	   noted	   that	   Labour	   has	   tended	   to	   do	   better	   than	   the	  Conservatives.	  Fourth,	  for	  all	  parties	  the	  data	  suggest	  that	  serving	  just	  one	  term	  is	  enough	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  relative	  performance	  of	  candidates,	  with	  sophomores	  averaging	  between	  1.59%	  and	  3.94%	  more	  in	  vote	  share	  than	  their	  colleagues,	  depending	  on	  the	  party.	  Finally,	  because	  the	  SIP	  point	  estimate	  is	  lower	  in	  the	  sophomore	  surge	  results	  (see	  table	  5.2.4)	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  all-­‐encompassing	   incumbent	   analysis	   (see	   table	   5.2.3),	   this	   suggests	   that	   those	  incumbents	  with	   greater	   electoral	   experience	  may	   attain	   even	   higher	   levels	   of	  SIP.	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  From	  these	  data,	  two	  pertinent	  questions	  arise.	  First,	  if	  there	  is	  electoral	  value	  in	  incumbency,	   as	   has	   been	   described	   above,	   then	   political	   parties	   have	   a	   vested	  interest	  in	  encouraging	  councillors	  to	  defend	  their	  seats.	  Does	  this	  mean	  that	  on	  occasions	  when	  councillors	  choose	  not	  to	  stand,	  there	  is	  a	  measurable	  difference	  in	   the	   party’s	   performance?	   Second,	   if	   candidates	   with	   greater	   electoral	  experience	  do	  better,	  then	  is	  this	  effect	  cumulative?	  If	  incumbents	  accrue	  further	  electoral	   advantage	   throughout	   their	   career	   is	   there	   a	   marked	   difference	  between	  those	  with	  more	  experience	  and	  those	  with	  less?	  Both	  these	  questions	  are	  explored	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  sections	  5.3	  and	  5.4	  respectively.	  	  5.3	  –	  Standardised	  Retirement	  Slump	  (SRS)	  Section	  5.2	  identified	  a	  gap	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  incumbents	  and	  freshmen,	  as	  well	   as	   the	   prevalence	   of	   a	   sophomore	   ‘surge’	   in	   English	   local	   elections.	   This	  section	   aims	   to	   build	   on	   the	   previously	   discussed	   findings.	   It	   is	   concerned	  principally	   with	   the	   notion	   of	   corroborating	   the	   SIP	   data,	   by	   measuring	   any	  ‘slump’	  in	  party	  support	  after	  the	  retirement	  of	  an	  incumbent	  councillor.	  Termed	  ‘Retirement	   Slump’	   the	   method	   compares	   a	   party’s	   vote	   share	   in	   an	   electoral	  division	   from	  one	  election	   to	   the	  next	   (Erikson,	  1972;	  Cover	  &	  Mayhew,	  1977;	  Born,	  1979;	  Payne,	  1980;	  Arseneau,	  1984;	  Jacobson,	  1987;	  Gelman	  &	  King,	  1990;	  Stonecash,	  2008).	  The	  fall	  in	  vote	  share,	  or	  ‘slump’,	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  advantage	  an	  incumbent	   brings	   to	   his	   or	   her	   party	   on	   election	   day	   and	   is	   considered	   to	   be	  another	   estimator	   of	   incumbency	   effects.	   The	   established	   notion	   is	   that,	  notwithstanding	  significant	  movements	   in	  partisan	  swing,	  any	  electoral	   ‘slump’	  will	  indicate	  how	  the	  electorate	  may	  value	  the	  presence	  of	  incumbent	  candidates.	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  Table	   5.3.1	   presents	   aggregate	   data	   for	   retiring	   incumbents	   and	   that	   for	  freshmen	   candidates	   from	   the	   same	   party	   who	   follow	   in	   that	   ward.	   The	   data	  presented	  relates	  only	  to	  SMD	  wards	  where	  the	  party	  has	  retained	  a	  seat	  after	  a	  councillor	   decides	   not	   to	   contest	   for	   re-­‐election.	   Comparing	   these	   data	   can	  provide,	  in	  the	  broadest	  view,	  a	  rudimentary	  measure	  of	  performance	  for	  these	  two	  groups	  of	  candidates.	  When	  compared,	  the	  aggregate	  data	  show	  a	  significant	  difference	   between	   retirees	   and	   freshmen.	   Retirees	   average	   some	   57.6%	   vote	  share	  (σ	  =	  11.18),	  whilst	   in	  the	  following	  election	  freshmen	  average	  just	  55.9%	  (σ	   =	   11.13)	   in	   the	   same	   seat.	   The	   difference	   is	  modest,	   just	   1.7%.	   However,	   a	  Levene’s	   independent	   t-­‐test	   shows	   that	   the	   means	   for	   both	   groups	   are	  significantly	   different	   from	   one	   another,	  with	   an	   associated	   p-­‐value	   below	   the	  0.001	  level	  when	  equal	  variances	  are	  assumed	  (df	  =	  4,962,	  see	  table	  5.3.2).	  	   Status	   n	   CVS	   σ	   S.E.	  
Retirees	   2,482	   57.59	   11.18	   0.224	  
Freshmen	   2,482	   55.91	   11.13	   0.223	  
[Table	  5.3.1	  –	  Ret	  vs.	  Fre	  Winners	  VS	  (%)	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	   Levene’s	   F	   Sig	   t	   df	   Sig	   Diff	   S.E.	  
Equal	  Var	  Ass	   .893	   .345	   5.300	   4,962	   .000	   1.68	   0.317	  
Equal	  Var	  Not	   	   	   5.300	   4961.868	   .000	   1.68	   0.317	  
[Table	   5.3.2	   –	   Ret	   vs.	   Fre	  Winners	   VS	   (%)	   (Levene’s	  &	   Indep	  T-­‐Test)	   –	   (F)	   (Sig)	   (t)	   (df)	   (Sig)	   (µ)	  
(Error)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   these	   data	   are	   broad	   and	   there	   are	   some	  methodological	   concerns	   with	   comparing	   the	   group	   data	   directly.	   Without	  accounting	  for	  the	  usual	  endogenous	  factors	  such	  as	  political	  party	  and	  changes	  in	  partisanship,	  there	  is	  potential	  for	  bias	  in	  the	  results.	  However,	  these	  data	  can	  tell	  us	  something	  about	  the	  incumbency	  picture	  more	  generally,	  in	  this	  instance	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that	   retirees	   tend	   to	   finish	   on	   higher	   levels	   of	   CVS	   than	   their	   freshmen	  colleagues,	  who	  follow,	  achieve.	  	  When	  the	  data	  are	  examined	  by	  party	  category	  (see	  tables	  5.3.3-­‐5.3.4)	  the	  results	  are	   in	   line	  with	   those	   discussed	   above.	   There	   are	  moderate	   differences	   in	   the	  share	   of	   candidate	   votes	   between	   retirees	   and	   freshmen,	   in	   that	   for	   all	   three	  party	   categories	   retirees	  do	   significantly	   better	   than	   the	   freshmen	  who	   follow.	  Table	  5.3.3	  shows	  that	  the	  Conservatives	  have	  the	  smallest	  difference,	  at	  around	  1.2%	  (Retirees	  =	  56.9%,	  σ	  =	  11.18;	  Freshmen	  =	  55.8,	  σ	  =	  10.80).	  Labour	  retirees	  do	  slightly	  better	  than	  the	  Tories,	  with	  an	  almost	  1.4%	  higher	  average	  than	  for	  freshmen	  (Retirees	  =	  59.4%,	  σ	  =	  10.70;	  Freshmen	  =	  58.1,	  σ	  =	  11.75).	  The	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  the	  largest	  difference,	  with	  retirees	  averaging	  more	  than	  double	  the	  difference	  of	  either	  the	  Conservatives	  or	  Labour,	  just	  less	  than	  3%	  (Retirees	  =	  54.6%,	  σ	  =	  10.44;	  Freshmen	  =	  51.7,	  σ	  =	  9.87).	  For	  all	  three	  parties,	  these	  data	  suggest	  that	  retirees	  attain	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  candidate	  vote	  share	  (CVS)	  than	  the	  freshmen	  from	  the	  same	  party	  who	  follow.	  	  Table	  5.3.4	  displays	  results	   from	  Levene’s	  and	  independent	  t-­‐tests	  between	  the	  groups	  for	  each	  of	  the	  parties.	  For	  the	  Conservatives	  there	  is	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  2.824	  and	  with	  2,682	  degrees	   of	   freedom	  has	   an	   associated	  p-­‐value	  below	   the	  0.005	  level	   when	   equal	   variances	   are	   assumed.	   The	   difference	   between	   the	   Labour	  groups	  is	  also	  significant.	  The	  test	  reports	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  2.249	  and	  a	  resulting	  p-­‐value	   that	   is	  below	   the	  0.05	   level	  when	  equal	   variances	  are	  not	   assumed	   (df	  =	  1368.048).	  Finally,	   the	  data	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  are	   the	  most	  convincing.	  The	  reported	  t-­‐statistic	  is	  3.784,	  and	  with	  660	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  the	  associated	  
	   169	  
p-­‐value	   is	   below	   the	   0.001	   level	   when	   equal	   variances	   are	   assumed.	   These	  results	  mean	   that	  we	  can	  be	   confident	   that	   the	  group	  means	  differ	   statistically	  from	   one	   another.	   However,	   they	   do	   not	   confirm	   an	   electoral	   ‘slump’	   that	   is	  associated	  with	  incumbency	  as	  such.	  	   Party	   Status	   n	  	   CVS	   σ	   S.E.	  
Con	   Retirees	   1,342	   56.94	   11.08	   0.302	  Freshmen	   1,342	   55.75	   10.80	   0.295	  
Lab	   Retirees	   691	   59.42	   10.70	   0.407	  Freshmen	   691	   58.06	   11.75	   0.447	  
LD	   Retirees	   331	   54.64	   10.44	   0.574	  Freshmen	   331	   51.66	   9.87	   0.542	  
[Table	  5.3.3	  –	  Ret	  vs.	  Fre	  Winners	  VS	  (%)	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	   Party	   Levene’s	   F	   Sig	   t	   df	   Sig	   Diff	   S.E.	  
Con	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	   1.235	   .267	   2.824	   2,682	   .005	   1.19	   0.422	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	   	   2.824	   2680.329	   .005	   1.19	   0.422	  
Lab	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	   4.538	   .033	   2.249	   1,380	   .025	   1.36	   0.604	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	   	   2.249	   1368.048	   .025	   1.36	   0.604	  
LD	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	   1.584	   .209	   3.784	   660	   .000	   2.99	   0.790	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	   	   3.784	   657.897	   .000	   2.99	   0.790	  
[Table	   5.3.4	   –	   Ret	   vs.	   Fre	  Winners	   VS	   (%)	   (Levene’s	  &	   Indep	  T-­‐Test)	   –	   (F)	   (Sig)	   (t)	   (df)	   (Sig)	   (µ)	  
(Error)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  The	  data	  discussed	  above	  suggest	   that	   these	  groups	  have	  significantly	  different	  CVS	  means,	  which	  is	  critical	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  incumbency	  having	  electoral	  value.	  However,	  as	  mooted	  above,	   there	   is	  a	   fundamental	  problem	  with	  assessing	   the	  ‘slump’	   in	   this	   way,	   namely	   that	   it	   is	   susceptible	   to	   partisan	   bias.	   Stonecash	  (2008)	  notes	  explicitly	  the	  inherent	  weakness	  in	  these	  types	  of	  measure,	  stating	  that	   “the	   difficulty	   with	   the	  measure	   is	   that	   it	   does	   not	   involve	   the	   change	   in	  partisan	  vote	  from	  an	  incumbent	  to	  challenger…the	  retirement	  slump	  measure,	  then,	   should	   be	   viewed	   with	   considerable	   caution”	   (Stonecash,	   2008,	   pp.	   56).	  Changes	  in	  partisanship	  from	  one	  year	  to	  the	  next	  can	  influence	  the	  results	  and	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though	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  suspect	  a	  consistent	  influence	  one	  way	  or	  the	  other	  over	  the	  period,	  identifying	  how	  partisanship	  has	  changed	  locally	  will	  benefit	  the	  accuracy	  of	   estimating	   any	   ‘slump’.	  Thus,	   though	   it	   is	   important	   to	  understand	  what	  happens	  to	  CVS	  in	  a	  ward	  after	  the	  exit	  of	  an	  experienced	  incumbent,	  there	  is	   a	   clear	   need	   to	   create	   an	   unbiased	   estimator	   that	   considers	   relative	  performance	   as	   well	   as	   any	   changes	   in	   partisanship	   from	   one	   election	   to	   the	  next.	   The	   conditions	   presented	   in	   English	   local	   elections	   provide	   an	   ideal	  opportunity	  to	  construct	  such	  an	  estimator.	  	  Full	  details	  of	  the	  Standardised	  Retirement	  Slump	  (SRS)	  variable	  are	  explained	  in	  chapter	  3,	  but	  the	  principle	  behind	  the	  model	  is	  relatively	  straightforward.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  control	  for	  any	  influence	  of	  party	  swing	  on	  the	  ‘slump’,	  the	  model	  uses	  information	   from	  other	  elections	   in	   the	  same	   local	  authority	   to	  gauge	  any	   local	  change	   in	   support	   for	   the	   party.	   This	   information	   acts	   as	   a	   ‘yardstick’	   for	  electoral	  performance	  for	  both	  retirees	  and	  freshmen	  in	  each	  election.	  This	  is	  an	  experimental	   method	   of	   partisanship	   control,	   where	   data	   on	   the	   slump	   is	  ‘standardised’	   by	   being	   compared	   against	   a	   ‘local	   party	   swing’.	   The	   control	  comprises	  aggregated	  vote	  share	   for	  all	   seats	   retained	  by	   the	  party,	  other	   than	  those	  already	  under	  examination.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  there	  is	  an	  explicit	  assumption	  in	  the	  model,	  that	  the	  average	  change	  in	  authority	  partisanship	  can	  be	  legitimately	  used	  as	  a	  proxy	  indicator	  for	  ward-­‐level	  changes	  across	  the	  whole	  authority.	  Clearly	  there	  may	  be	  benefits	  in	  doing	  so,	  not	  least	  those	  assertions	  by	  electoral	   geographers	   that	   geographical/neighbourhood	   factors	   act	   as	  determinants	  in	  the	  variation	  of	  political	  partisanship	  (Johnston	  &	  Pattie,	  2006).	  Using	   electoral	   data	   from	   other	   wards	   in	   the	   authority	   is	   meaningful	   then,	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because	   many	   of	   the	   issues	   that	   influence	   levels	   of	   partisanship	   have	   a	   local	  dimension	  such	  as;	  class,	  jobs,	  urbanisation,	  services,	  community	  and	  amenities.	  But	   also,	   from	   a	   purely	   logical	   perspective,	   the	   Schumpeterian	   argument	  must	  hold	  that	  local	  decisions	  are	  made	  at	  the	  authority-­‐level	  and	  therefore,	  residents	  should	  respond	  by	  making	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  controlling	  party’s	  record.	  I	  offer	  the	  following	  model	  as	  an	  unbiased	  estimator	  of	  incumbency	  advantage.	  	  SRS	   considers	   only	   quadrennial	   SMDs,	   examining	   party	   election	   data	   in	   the	  incumbent’s	   final	   election	   year	   against	   the	   freshman	   win	   in	   the	   following	  election.	  SRS	  for	  party	  category	  p	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	  
SRS! = 𝑥!"# − µμ!" − 𝑦!"# − µμ!"𝑛!!!! 	  	  Where	  p	  denotes	  the	  party	  category,	   i	  refers	  to	  election	  1	  (retiree	  final	  election	  year)	  and	  j	  to	  election	  2	  (freshman	  year).	  x	  equals	  the	  CVS	  of	  a	  retiree	  in	  seat	  k	  in	  authority	   l.	  	  y	  refers	  to	  the	  CVS	  of	  a	  winning	  freshman	  that	   follows	   in	  election	   j	  and	  also	   in	  seat	  k.	  µ	  refers	  to	  the	  average	  CVS	  of	  all	  non-­‐selected	  winners	  from	  the	  same	  party	  in	  the	  same	  local	  authority.	  	  Table	   5.3.5	   displays	   relevant	   group	   statistics	   for	   the	   parties	   individually	   and	  combined.	  For	  the	  2,297	  cases	  collected,	  average	  SRS	  is	  just	  over	  2	  (σ	  =	  10.81).	  A	  one	  sample	  t-­‐test	  (table	  5.3.6)	  adds	  weight	  to	  the	  result.	  The	  t-­‐statistic	  is	  9.053,	  and	   with	   2,296	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   has	   an	   associated	   p-­‐value	   well	   below	   the	  0.001	  level.	  This	  result	  means	  that	  we	  can	  be	  confident	  that	  SRS	  is	  greater	  than	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zero.	   The	   estimate	   is	   only	   slightly	   higher	   than	   the	   difference	   between	   retirees	  and	   freshmen	   reported	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter	   and	   is	   in	   line	   with	   sophomore	  surge	  estimates	  detailed	  in	  sub-­‐chapter	  5.2.	  	   Party	   n	  	   SRS	   σ	   S.E.	  
Con	   1,274	   1.73	   10.12	   0.283	  
Lab	   640	   1.35	   9.18	   0.363	  
LD	   289	   4.11	   12.17	   0.716	  
All	   2,297	   2.04	   10.81	   0.226	  
[Table	  5.3.5	  –	  SRS	  (%)	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  Party	  (n	  =	  2,297)]	  	   Party	   n	  	   SRS	   σ	   t	   df	   Sig.	  
Con	   1,274	   1.73	   10.12	   6.109	   1,273	   .000	  
Lab	   640	   1.35	   9.18	   3.705	   639	   .000	  
LD	   289	   4.11	   12.17	   5.742	   288	   .000	  
All	   2,297	   2.04	   10.81	   9.053	   2,296	   .000	  
[Table	  5.3.6	  –	  SRS	  (One	  Sample	  T-­‐Test)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (t)	  (df)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  Party	  (n	  =	  2,297)]	  	  Tables	  5.3.5	  and	  5.3.6	  also	  show	  results	  for	  the	  three	  parties	  considered,	  and	  the	  results	   largely	   chime	   with	   those	   revealed	   earlier.	   For	   the	   1,274	   Tory	   cases	  considered,	   the	  average	  SRS	  of	  1.73	   (σ	  =	  10.12)	   is	   just	  0.19	   less	   than	   the	  Tory	  average	  under	  the	  SIP	  model.	  One-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  (table	  5.3.6)	  return	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	   6.109,	   and	   with	   1,273	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   has	   an	   associated	   p-­‐value	   well	  below	  the	  0.001	   level.	  For	  Labour,	  average	  SRS	   is	   just	  1.35	  (σ	  =	  9.18,	  n	  =	  640),	  which	   is	   0.59	   below	   the	   average	   for	   sophomore	   SIP	   data.	   As	   for	   the	  Conservatives,	  one-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  are	  significant,	  returning	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  3.705,	  that	   has	   an	   associated	   p-­‐value	  well	   below	   the	   0.001	   level	  when	   there	   are	   639	  degrees	  of	  freedom.	  Finally,	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  the	  highest	  average	  SRS	  at	  4.11	  (σ	  =	  12.17,	  n	  =289).	  This	  figure	  is	  0.55	  higher	  than	  that	  for	  the	  SIP	  surge	  model	   and	   yet	   again	   more	   than	   double	   that	   measured	   for	   Labour	   or	   the	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Conservatives.	   The	   t-­‐test	   gives	   a	   t-­‐statistic	   of	   5.742	   and	   with	   288	   degrees	   of	  freedom,	  has	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	   ramifications	   from	   these	   results.	  First,	   like	   the	  SIP	  data	  the	   SRS	   results	   also	   identify	   an	   electoral	   slump.	   The	   results	   imply	   that	   local	  voters	   may	   consider	   the	   individual	   candidate	   over	   the	   party	   at	   times,	   with	   a	  modest	   advantage	   for	   councillors,	   who	   may	   still	   remain	   vulnerable	   to	   any	  significant	  shifts	  in	  political	  partisanship.	  	  The	   second	  key	   finding	   is	   that	   the	   inter-­‐party	   results	   are	   in	   line	  with	   the	   data	  revealed	  earlier	  in	  chapter	  5.	  The	  ‘slump’	  is	  far	  larger	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  (SRS	   =	   4.11)	   than	   either	   the	   Conservatives	   or	   Labour	   (SRS	   =	   1.73	   &	   1.35	  respectively).	   Perhaps	  more	   importantly,	   what	   the	   SRS	   data	   also	   show	   is	   that	  fielding	   an	   incumbent	   candidate	   will	   improve	   the	   chance	   of	   the	   local	   party	  retaining	   the	   seat.	   Though	   there	   is	   every	   chance	   that	   some	   sort	   of	   ‘self-­‐deselection’	   may	   have	   taken	   place	   in	   the	   data,	   SRS	   takes	   partisan	   swing	   into	  account	   and	   eliminates	   the	   bias	   regardless	   of	   retirees’	   motives	   for	   standing	  down.	  So,	  whether	  due	  to	  a	  personal	  decision,	  local	  party	  deselection	  or	  indeed	  anticipation	  of	  electoral	  defeat,	  the	  data	  suggests	  that	  voters	  respond	  positively	  to	  a	  candidate	  with	  electoral	  experience	  on	  the	  ballot	  paper.	  The	   implication	   is	  that	   local	  parties	  stand	   to	  benefit	   from	  encouraging	   their	   councillors	   to	  defend	  their	  seats.	  	  With	  these	  conclusions	  come	  further	  questions	  regarding	  the	  effect	  of	  experience	  on	   incumbent	   performance.	   So	   far,	   chapter	   5	   has	   used	   two	   newly	   constructed	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measures	   to	   identify	   an	   incumbency	   advantage	   in	   English	   local	   elections.	   One	  centred	   on	   short-­‐serving	   councillors	   and	   another	   on	   those	   at	   the	   end	   of	   their	  time	  on	   the	   council.	  Naturally	   then,	   the	  question	   arises,	   does	   experience	   affect	  the	   electoral	   performance	   of	   councillors?	   Do	   longer	   serving	   incumbents	   do	  better	  than	  shorter	  serving	  ones,	  and	  if	  so	  by	  how	  much?	  Sub-­‐chapter	  5.4	  goes	  on	  to	  examine	  experience	  effects	  on	  incumbent	  performance.	  	  	  5.4	  –	  Experience	  Effects	  Sub-­‐chapter	   5.3	   discussed	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   Retirement	   Slump.	   Data	   presented	  supported	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  ‘slump’,	  suggesting	  that	  retiring	  incumbents	  may	  take	  a	   small	   portion	   of	   the	   vote	   with	   them	   as	   they	   leave.	   This	   in	   turn	   raised	   the	  question	  of	  experience	  and	  whether	  it	  has	  any	  significant	  effect	  on	  the	  electoral	  safety	   of	   councillors.	   Rallings	   &	   Thrasher	   (1997)	   present	   a	   case	   for	   further	  research	  into	  the	  effects	  of	  candidates’	  “longevity	  in	  office”	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  pp.	  164),	  but	  remain	  pessimistic	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  councillors	  to	  weather	  any	   substantial	   shifts	   in	   partisanship.	   However,	   examining	   the	   effects	   of	  experience	   can	   provide	   critical	   information,	   not	   only	   in	   the	   assessment	   of	   the	  overall	   notion	  of	   incumbency	   advantage	   in	  English	   local	   elections,	   but	   also	   the	  behavioural	  patterns	  of	  local	  voters,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  more	  accurate	  estimation	  of	  any	  incumbency	  effects	  (Alford	  &	  Hibbing,	  1981).	  	  	  Jeffery	   Stonecash’s	  Reassessing	   the	   Incumbency	  Effect	   discusses	   in	   some	   depth,	  the	  implications	  of	  trends	  in	  incumbents’	  vote	  share	  over	  their	  career.	  Following	  Stonecash’s	  chapter	  on	  cumulative	  career	  changes	  (Stonecash,	  2008,	  Chap	  4,	  pp.	  32-­‐52)	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  examining	  electoral	  trends	  associated	  with	  experience	  may	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help	   the	   project	   assess	   sources	   of	   advantage.	   For	   instance,	   considering	   the	  electoral	  dynamics	  of	  councillors’	  careers	  can	  help	  to	  judge	  whether	  advantages	  associated	  with	   incumbency	  are	   static	   and	   thus	   linked	   to	   their	   status;	  whether	  the	   effects	   are	   linear,	   suggesting	   systemic	   effects;	   or	   whether	   there	   is	   a	  curvilinear	   trend	  where	   the	   share	   of	   votes	   gathered	   over	   a	   candidate’s	   tenure	  wanes	   in	   later	   years.	   The	   interpretation	   of	   career	   trends	  may	   help	   to	   provide	  some	  explanation	  for	  the	  phenomenon.	  	  This	  section	  aims	  to	  examine	  experiential	  effects	  using	  a	  variety	  of	  measures.	  As	  a	   proxy	   for	   candidates’	   length	   of	   service,	   a	   variable	   is	   constructed	   from	   the	  dataset.	   Experience	   is	   measured	   using	   the	   number	   of	   terms	   a	   candidate	   has	  already	  served.	  The	  section	  uses	  the	  constructed	  Experience	  variable	  throughout	  (described	   in	   detail	   in	   chapter	   3)	   to	   distinguish	   between	   more	   and	   less	  experienced	   candidates	   standing	   and	   begins	   by	   providing	   broad	   CVS	   data	   for	  councillors	  of	  different	  experience	  for	  the	  three	  major	  parties.	  The	  section	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  utilise	  the	  constructed	  SIP	  and	  SRS	  measures	  to	  assess	  any	  effects	  in	  greater	  depth.	  	  Table	  5.4.1	  displays	  CVS	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  the	  Experience	  groups	  of	  more	  than	  135,000	  winning	  candidates	  between	  1974	  and	  2010.	  The	  data	  show	  that	  longer	   serving	   councillors	   tend	   to	   achieve	   higher	   vote	   shares	   than	   shorter	  serving	  ones.	  As	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter,	  examining	  group	  averages	  does	  not	  confirm	  any	  effect,	  but	  helps	  to	  illustrate	  a	  trend.	  The	  results	  show	  average	  CVS	  for	  the	  more	  than	  96,000	  winning	  freshmen	  to	  be	  52.5%	  (σ	  =	  11.41).	  This	  is	  more	   than	   4-­‐points	   below	   the	   average	   for	   the	   roughly	   26,000	   winning	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sophomores	   considered.	   The	   mean	   sophomore	   CVS	   is	   56.7%	   (σ	   =	   11.89).	  Continuing	  the	  growing	  trend,	  data	  from	  8,513	  winning	  candidates	  identified	  as	  having	  served	  2	  terms,	  show	  an	  average	  CVS	  of	  58.5%	  (σ	  =	  12.03).	  This	  is	  almost	  2	   points	   higher	   than	   for	   sophomores	   and	   6	   points	   higher	   than	   for	   winning	  freshmen.	   In	  addition,	   the	  disparity	   continues	   for	  3	   term	  winners	  and	  4+	   term	  winners,	   who	   average	   59.9%	   CVS	   (σ	   =	   12.48)	   and	   60.4%	   CVS	   (σ	   =	   12.61)	  respectively.	   These	   are	   between	   7	   and	   8	   points	   higher	   than	   the	   result	   for	  winning	  freshmen.	  	  Figure	   5.4.1	   plots	   these	   data	   and	   the	   chart	   serves	   as	   an	   illustration	   for	   the	  potential	   electoral	   gains	   an	   experienced	   councillor	   stands	   to	   achieve	   when	  directly	   compared	   with	   lesser-­‐experienced	   candidates.	   What	   is	   immediately	  apparent	   is	   the	   diminishing	   rate	   of	   returns	   with	   every	   consecutive	   term	   of	  experience.	   There	   is	   a	   clear	   curvilinear	   trend,	   similar	   to	   that	   described	   by	   the	  existing	   literature	   (Alford	  &	  Hibbing,	   1981,	  pp.	   1,047;	  Hibbing,	   1991,	  pp.	   410).	  Though	  merely	  an	  indication,	  the	  data	  suggest	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  gains	  could	  be	  made	   early	   in	   a	   political	   career,	   with	   any	   further	   rises	   plateauing	   for	   more	  experienced	  councillors.	  	   Experience	   n	  	   CVS	   σ	   S.E.	   95%	  Low	   95%	  Upp	  
Freshmen	   96,376	   52.51	   11.41	   0.037	   52.43	   52.58	  
Sophomores	   25,671	   56.69	   11.89	   0.074	   56.55	   56.84	  
2	  Terms	   8,513	   58.49	   12.03	   0.130	   58.23	   58.75	  
3	  Terms	   3,057	   59.86	   12.48	   0.226	   59.41	   60.30	  
4+	  Terms	   1,432	   60.42	   12.61	   0.333	   59.76	   61.07	  
[Table	  5.4.1	  –	  Mean	  CVS	  (Descriptives)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (Std.	  Error)	  (95%	  Confidence	  Intervals,	  Upper	  &	  
Lower)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  135,049)]	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Table	  5.4.4	  displays	   results	   from	  the	  Tukey	  HSD	   test.	  The	  results	   show	  that	  all	  experience	  groups	  are	  significantly	  distinct	   from	  one	  another,	  apart	   from	  the	  3	  Term	  and	  4+	  Term	  experience	  groups,	  which	  are	  distinct	  from	  all	  others	  but	  not	  from	  each	  other.	  For	  these	  two	  groups	  the	  data	  show	  that	  there	  is	  a	  small	  overlap	  in	   the	   95%	   confidence	   intervals,	   just	   under	   0.45%	   CVS.	   All	   other	   groups	   are	  statistically	  distinct	  from	  one	  another,	  with	  p-­‐values	  well	  below	  the	  0.001	  level,	  but	  the	  comparison	  of	  3	  Term	  and	  4+	  Term	  groups	  means	  has	  a	  p-­‐value	  of	  0.552.	  	  	  The	   data	   revealed	   by	   the	   Tukey	   HSD	   tests	   lend	   weight	   to	   the	   notion	   of	  differences	  in	  the	  mean	  performance	  of	  candidates	  of	  varying	  experience.	  There	  are	  clear	  and	  significant	  disparities	  between	  groups	  and	  a	  difference	  of	  almost	  8	  points	   between	   the	   least	   and	   most	   experienced	   councillors.	   Also,	   although	   3	  Term	   and	   4+	   Term	   groups	   do	   not	   show	   a	   significant	   difference,	   this	   is	   not	  necessarily	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  the	  overall	  picture	  of	  incumbency	  effects	  and	  the	  result	  may	   fit	   the	  overall	   narrative	   that	  has	  been	   constructed	   thus	   far.	  That	   is,	  large	   gains	   are	   made	   initially	   and	   after	   that	   the	   size	   of	   the	   gains	   diminish	   as	  candidates	  become	  more	  experienced.	  Perhaps	  the	  curvilinear	  trend	  is	  a	  facet	  of	  any	  career	  for	  local	  government	  politicians	  in	  England.	  	   Levene	  Statistic	   df1	   df2	   Sig.	  70.460	   4	   135,044	   .000	  
[Table	   5.4.2	   –	  Test	   of	   Homogeneity	   of	   Variances	   -­‐	   (Levene	   Stat)	   (df1)	   (df2)	   (P)	   1974-­‐2010	   (n	   =	  
135,049)]	  	   ANOVA	   Sum	  of	  Squares	   df	   Mean	  Square	   F	   Sig.	  
Between	  Groups	   735494.599	   4	   183873.650	   1370.524	   .000	  
Within	  Groups	   18117915.40	   135,044	   134.163	   	   	  
Total	   18853410.00	   135,048	   	   	   	  
[Table	  5.4.3	  –	  ANOVA	  -­‐	  (Sum	  of	  Squares)	  (df)	  (Mean	  Square)	  (F)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  135,049)]	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Experience	  (i)	   Experience	  (j)	   Diff	  (i-­‐j)	   S.E.	   Sig	   95%	  L	   95%	  U	  
Freshman	   Sophomore	   -­‐4.18*	   0.081	   .000	   -­‐4.41	   -­‐3.96	  2	  Term	  	   -­‐5.98*	   0.131	   .000	   -­‐6.34	   -­‐5.63	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐7.35*	   0.213	   .000	   -­‐7.93	   -­‐6.77	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐7.91*	   0.308	   .000	   -­‐8.75	   -­‐7.07	  
Sophomore	   Freshman	   4.18*	   0.081	   .000	   3.96	   4.41	  2	  Term	  	   -­‐1.80*	   0.145	   .000	   -­‐2.19	   -­‐1.40	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐3.16*	   0.222	   .000	   -­‐3.77	   -­‐2.56	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐3.73*	   0.315	   .000	   -­‐4.58	   -­‐2.87	  
2	  Terms	   Freshman	   5.98*	   0.131	   .000	   5.63	   6.34	  Sophomore	   1.80*	   0.145	   .000	   1.40	   2.19	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐1.37*	   0.244	   .000	   -­‐2.03	   -­‐0.70	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐1.93*	   0.331	   .000	   -­‐2.83	   -­‐1.03	  
3	  Terms	   Freshman	   7.35*	   0.213	   .000	   6.77	   7.93	  Sophomore	   3.16*	   0.222	   .000	   2.56	   3.77	  2	  Term	  	   1.37*	   0.244	   .000	   0.70	   2.03	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐0.56	   0.371	   .552	   -­‐1.57	   0.45	  
4+	  Terms	   Freshman	   7.91*	   0.308	   .000	   7.07	   8.75	  Sophomore	   3.73*	   0.315	   .000	   2.87	   4.58	  2	  Term	  	   1.93*	   0.331	   .000	   1.03	   2.83	  3	  Term	  	   0.56	   0.371	   .552	   -­‐0.45	   1.58	  
	  [Table	  5.4.4	  –	  Post	  Hoc	  Tukey	  HSD	  -­‐	  (Mean	  Diff)	  (Std.	  Error)	  (P)	  (95%	  Confidence	  Intervals,	  Upper	  
&	  Lower)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  135,049)	  (*Mean	  difference	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.001	  level)]	  	  The	   impact	  of	  eroding	  support	   is	  worth	  exploring	  (Stonecash,	  2008,	  pp.	  44).	   In	  order	   to	   clarify	   the	   career	   pattern	   identified	   for	   winning	   candidates,	   as	  illustrated	   by	   figure	   5.4.1,	   it	  may	   be	   useful	   to	   present	   data	   for	   the	   best	   ‘fitted’	  career	   trends.	   Tables’	   5.4.5-­‐7	   present	   the	   best	   fitted	   logarithmic	   regression	  model	  for	  Experience	  on	  CVS.	  Although	  the	  model	  reports	  a	  very	  low	  R	  square	  of	  just	   0.039	   (table	   5.4.5),	   regression	   is	   used	   in	   in	   this	   circumstance	   with	   the	  knowledge	   that	   the	  method	   is	  not	   the	  Best	  Linear	  Unbiased	  Estimator	   (BLUE),	  but	   instead	   is	   used	   simply	   to	   establish	   which	   trend	   fits	   the	   data	   best.	   Even	  though	   the	  model	   implies	   that	  only	  4%	  of	  variance	  of	  CVS	  can	  be	  attributed	   to	  
Experience,	   this	   is	   largely	   irrelevant	   as	  Experience	   in	   this	   instance	   is	   a	   discrete	  variable	   and	   lacks	   the	   capacity	   to	   vary	   enough	   to	   increase	   the	   size	   of	   the	   R	  squared.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  it	  is	  the	  best	  fit	  that	  is	  important	  and	  so	  long	  as	  the	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interaction	  term	  is	  significant	  the	  model	  will	  have	  some	  value	  for	  this	  research.	  ANOVA	  results	  give	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  5445.815	  and	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  below	  0.001.	  Upon	  examining	  the	  coefficients	  displayed	  in	  table	  5.4.7	  the	  beta	  value	  is	  5.543	   and	   both	   the	   logarithm	   of	   Experience	   and	   the	   constant	   of	   52.5%	   are	  significant	  with	  p-­‐values	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  These	  data	  represent	  the	  best	  fit	  from	  a	  series	  of	  different	  fit	  attempts	  and	  indicate	  that	  the	  career	  trend	  for	  local	  election	  winners’	  CVS	  is	  a	  logarithmic	  one	  where	  the	  gains	  become	  progressively	  diminished.	  	   R	   R	  Square	   Adjusted	  R	  Square	   S.E.	  .197	   .039	   .039	   11.584	  
[Table	   5.4.5	   –	  Model	   Summary	   -­‐	   (R)	   (R	   Square)	   (Adj.	   R	   Square)	   (Std.	   Error)	   1974-­‐2010	   (n	   =	  
135,049)]	  	   ANOVA	   Sum	  of	  Squares	   df	   Mean	  Square	   F	   Sig.	  
Regression	   730800.264	   1	   730800.264	   5445.815	   .000	  
Residual	   18122609.736	   135047	   134.195	   	  	   	  	  
Total	   18853410.000	   135048	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
[Table	  5.4.6	  –	  ANOVA	  -­‐	  (Sum	  of	  Squares)	  (df)	  (Mean	  Square)	  (F)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  135,049)]	  	   	  Coefficients	   B	   S.E.	   Standardized	  Beta	   t	   Sig.	  
ln(Experience)	   5.543	   0.075	   .197	   73.796	   .000	  
(Constant)	   52.547	   0.037	   	   1432.955	   .000	  
[Table	   5.4.7	   –	  Logarithmic	  Model	   -­‐	   (B)	   (Std.	   Error)	   (Standardized	   Beta)	   (t)	   (P)	   1974-­‐2010	   (n	   =	  
135,049)]	  	  The	   implications	   of	   these	   findings	   to	   the	   overall	   project	   are	   slight	   but	   notable.	  Winning	  CVS	  rises	  with	  experience	  but	  plateaus	  in	  a	  logarithmic	  fashion.	  Larger	  gains	  made	   early	   in	   a	   politician’s	   career	   become	   smaller.	   In	   his	   analysis	   of	   US	  congressional	  elections	  Stonecash	  (2008)	  cites	  similar	  findings	  as	  supportive	  of	  members’	   ability	   to	   exploit	   the	   perks	   of	   office	   in	   order	   to	   raise	   their	   vote	  percentages	   rapidly	   and	   create	   a	   small	   ‘buffer’	   between	   them	   and	   their	  competitors.	  However,	  as	  members	  tire	  of	   the	   job	  and	  pay	   less	  attention	  to	  the	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district,	  their	  vote	  shares	  suffer	  and	  round	  off	  or	  even	  fall	  (Stonecash,	  2008,	  pp.	  44).	  Though	  the	  results	  from	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  English	  local	  election	  data	  are	  far	  from	  conclusive,	  the	  initial	  picture	  is,	  at	  least,	  in	  line	  with	  this	  view.	  	  At	  this	  point	  it	  must	  be	  acknowledged,	  that	  the	  data	  discussed	  above	  are	  not	  an	  exact	  estimation	  of	  incumbency	  effects	  but	  just	  a	  broad	  indication.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  data	   for	  more	  experienced	   incumbents	  will	   reflect	   the	  electoral	   strength	  of	  respective	   parties	   in	   safer	   seats.	   Though	   the	   data	   are	   spread	   over	   a	   wide	  timespan,	  which	  will	  dampen	  the	  effect	  of	  partisanship,	  it	  is	  inevitable	  that	  there	  will	   be	   some	   form	   of	   positive	   selection	   within	   these	   data.	   Nevertheless,	   these	  data	   remain	   an	   important	   illustration.	   The	   methodological	   concerns	   of	  experience	  estimation	  are	  addressed	  later	  in	  this	  sub-­‐chapter.	  	  Previously	   discussed	   results	   show	   that	   the	   party	   categories	   have	   tended	   to	  experience	   the	   effects	   of	   incumbency	   slightly	   differently.	   Conservative	  incumbent	   candidates	   have	   been	   less	   distinguished	   from	   their	   freshmen	  counterparts,	   whereas	   Labour	   incumbents	   have	   been	   slightly	   more	   so.	   The	  Liberal	   Democrats	   have	   been	   shown	   to	   have	   greatest	   disparity	   thus	   far	   and	  considering	   this,	   the	   following	   discussion	   is	   divided	   into	   three,	   briefer,	  considerations	  of	  career	  CVS	  trends	  for	  the	  three	  major	  parties.	  Looking	  first	  at	  the	  Conservatives,	  this	  section	  then	  moves	  on	  to	  discuss	  results	  for	  Labour	  and	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  	  
Conservatives	  -­‐	  Data	  for	  the	  different	  winning	  Conservative	  groups	  are	  presented	  in	   table	   5.4.8.	   The	   results	   present	   a	   slightly	   different	   picture	   to	   that	   revealed	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above.	   For	   the	  more	   than	   thirty-­‐nine	   thousand	   freshmen	  winners	   the	   average	  CVS	   is	   52.7%	   (σ	   =	   11.13),	   which	   is	   4	   points	   lower	   than	   the	   average	   for	  sophomores.	  The	  ten	  thousand	  winning	  sophomores	  average	  a	  CVS	  of	  56.8%	  (σ	  =	  11.74).	  Unexpectedly,	  data	  for	  the	  more	  experienced	  Conservative	  groups	  show	  a	  slight	  fall	  and	  ‘levelling-­‐off’.	  2	  Terms,	  3	  Terms	  and	  4+	  Terms	  groups	  all	  average	  similar	  CVS	  at	  55.2%,	  55.5%	  and	  55.3%	  respectively	  (σ	  =	  10.79,	  10.89	  &	  11.55	  respectively).	  	  	  Figure	   5.4.8	   plots	   these	   data.	   The	   chart	   illustrates	   an	   almost	   cubic	   pattern,	  suggesting	   that,	   although	   there	   is	   some	   growth	   in	   CVS	   between	   freshmen	   and	  sophomore	  groups,	  longer	  serving	  incumbents	  fail	  to	  build	  on	  this	  and	  settle	  at	  a	  slightly	  lower	  level.	  As	  such,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  Tories	  exhibit	  a	  slightly	  different	  career	  pattern,	  one	  where	  further	  terms	  of	  service,	  beyond	  the	  sophomore	  term,	  fail	  to	  boost	  councillor’s	  CVS	  and	  may	  actually	  result	  in	  a	  slight	  fall.	  The	  average	  CVS	   change	   from	  winning	   sophomores	   to	   the	   2	   term	   incumbents	   is	   a	   drop	   of	  around	  1.5%,	  which	  then	  holds	  for	  3	  Term	  and	  4+	  Term	  winners.	  	   Experience	   n	  	   CVS	   σ	   S.E.	   95%	  Low	   95%	  Upp	  
Freshmen	   39,063	   52.70	   11.13	   0.056	   52.59	   52.81	  
Sophomores	   9,949	   56.82	   11.74	   0.118	   56.59	   57.05	  
2	  Terms	   3,071	   55.23	   10.79	   0.195	   54.85	   55.62	  
3	  Terms	   1,071	   55.46	   10.82	   0.331	   54.81	   56.11	  
4+	  Terms	   463	   55.29	   11.55	   0.537	   54.23	   56.34	  
[Table	   5.4.8	   –	   Con	  Mean	   VS	   (Descriptives)	   -­‐	   (n)	   (µ)	   (σ)	   (Std.	   Error)	   (95%	   Confidence	   Intervals,	  
Upper	  &	  Lower)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  53,617)]	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[Figure	  5.4.8	  –	  Con	  Candidate	  Vote	  Share	  by	  Experience]	  	   Levene	  Statistic	   df1	   df2	   Sig.	  24.005	   4	   53,612	   .000	  
[Table	  5.4.9	  –	  Con	  Test	  of	  Homogeneity	  of	  Variances	  -­‐	  (Levene	  Stat)	  (df1)	  (df2)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  
53,617)]	  	   ANOVA	   Sum	  of	  Squares	   df	   Mean	  Square	   F	   Sig.	  
Between	  Groups	   147506.802	   4	   36876.700	   292.832	   .000	  
Within	  Groups	   6751417.978	   53,612	   125.931	   	   	  
Total	   6898924.779	   53,616	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groups	  have	  p-­‐values	  below	  the	  0.05	  level	  at	   least.	  However,	  as	  expected,	  the	  2	  Terms,	  3	  Terms	  and	  4+	  Terms	  groups	  are	  too	  similar	  to	  one	  another	  and	  a	  Tukey	  test	  fails	  to	  distinguish	  them	  statistically	  significantly.	  The	  implications	  of	  these	  results	   are	   that	   the	   Conservative	   vote	   share	   career	   trend	   is	   neither	   linear	   nor	  cumulative.	  Instead	  Tory	  candidates	  may	  experience	  a	  period	  of	  electoral	  stasis	  or	   decline.	   The	   early	   career	   boost,	   as	   described	   in	   previous	   analysis	   in	   this	  chapter,	   is	   evident	   for	   the	   Tories	   and	   with	   a	   degree	   statistical	   confidence.	  However,	   though	   there	   is	   evidence	   for	   an	   incumbency	   effect	   for	   the	  Conservatives,	   overall	   results	   suggest	   that	   it	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   small,	   with	   many	  councillors	  failing	  to	  build	  on	  the	  initial	  ‘surge’	  in	  vote	  share.	  	   Experience	  (i)	   Experience	  (j)	   Diff	  (i-­‐j)	   S.E.	   Sig	   95%	  L	   95%	  U	  
Freshman	   Sophomore	   -­‐4.12*	   0.126	   .000	   -­‐4.46	   -­‐3.76	  2	  Term	  	   -­‐2.53*	   0.210	   .000	   -­‐3.11	   -­‐1.96	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐2.76*	   0.348	   .000	   -­‐3.70	   -­‐1.81	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐2.58*	   0.525	   .000	   -­‐4.02	   -­‐1.15	  
Sophomore	   Freshman	   4.12*	   0.126	   .000	   3.78	   4.46	  2	  Term	  	   1.59*	   0.232	   .000	   0.96	   2.22	  3	  Term	  	   1.36*	   0.361	   .001	   0.38	   2.35	  4+	  Term	  	   1.54*	   0.534	   .033	   0.08	   2.99	  
2	  Terms	   Freshman	   2.53*	   0.210	   .000	   1.96	   3.11	  Sophomore	   -­‐1.59*	   0.232	   .000	   -­‐2.22	   -­‐0.96	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐0.22	   0.398	   .980	   -­‐1.31	   0.86	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐0.05	   0.559	   1.000	   -­‐1.58	   1.47	  
3	  Terms	   Freshman	   2.76*	   0.348	   .000	   1.81	   3.70	  Sophomore	   -­‐1.36*	   0.361	   .001	   -­‐2.35	   -­‐0.38	  2	  Term	  	   0.22	   0.398	   .980	   -­‐0.86	   1.31	  4+	  Term	  	   0.17	   0.624	   .999	   -­‐1.53	   1.87	  
4+	  Terms	   Freshman	   2.58*	   0.525	   .000	   1.15	   4.02	  Sophomore	   -­‐1.54*	   0.534	   .033	   -­‐2.99	   -­‐0.08	  2	  Term	  	   0.05	   0.559	   1.000	   -­‐1.47	   1.58	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐0.17	   0.624	   .999	   -­‐1.87	   1.53	  
[Table	  5.4.11	  –	  Conservative	  Post	  Hoc	  Tukey	  HSD	  -­‐	  (Mean	  Diff)	  (Std.	  Error)	  (P)	  (95%	  Confidence	  
Intervals,	  Upper	  &	  Lower)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  53,617)	  (*Mean	  difference	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level)]	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Tables	  5.4.12-­‐14	  present	  results	  from	  a	  regression	  model,	  this	  time	  cubic,	  for	  the	  winning	  Conservative	  CVS	  career	  pattern.	  As	  expected,	  the	  model	  reports	  a	  very	  small	  R	  square,	   just	  0.021	  and	  this	   is	   in	   line	  with	  previously	  discussed	  data	   for	  Conservative	   candidates,	   for	   whom	   the	   electoral	   variance	   associated	   with	  experience	  has	  been	  markedly	  less	  than	  for	  the	  other	  party	  groups.	  Table	  5.4.13	  displays	   results	   from	  an	  ANOVA	   test,	  which	  yield	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  382.055	  and	  has	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  	  Table	  5.4.14	  presents	  coefficient	  statistics	  for	  the	  cubic	  fit	  of	  the	  career	  curve.	  All	  components	   of	   the	  model	   have	   significant	   p-­‐values,	   below	   the	  0.001	   level,	   and	  although	  the	  model	   is	  a	  poor	  predictor	   for	   the	  overall	  variance	  of	  Conservative	  winners’	  CVS,	  the	  model	  does	  acts	  as	  an	  indicator	  for	  Tory	  career	  trends.	  	   R	   R	  Square	   Adjusted	  R	  Square	   S.E.	  .145	   .021	   .021	   11.224	  
[Table	  5.4.12	  –	  Con	  Model	  Summary	  -­‐	  (R)	  (R	  Square)	  (Adj.	  R	  Square)	  (Std.	  Error)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  
53,617)]	  	   ANOVA	   Sum	  of	  Squares	   df	   Mean	  Square	   F	   Sig.	  
Regression	   144401.370	   3	   48133.790	   382.055	   .000	  
Residual	   6754523.409	   53613	   125.987	   	   	  
Total	   6898924.779	   53616	   	   	   	  
[Table	  5.4.13	  –	  Con	  ANOVA	  -­‐	  (Sum	  of	  Squares)	  (df)	  (Mean	  Square)	  (F)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  53,617)]	  	   	  Coefficients	   B	   S.E.	   Standardized	  Beta	   t	   Sig.	  (𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞) 	   18.654	   1.065	   1.249	   17.508	   .000	  (𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞)𝟐	   -­‐6.470	   .461	   -­‐2.016	   -­‐14.040	   .000	  (𝐄𝐱𝐩𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐞𝐧𝐜𝐞)𝟑	   .677	   .058	   .912	   11.769	   .000	  
(Constant)	   39.850	   .681	   	   58.552	   .000	  
[Table	   5.4.14	   –	   Con	   Cubic	   Model	   -­‐	   (B)	   (Std.	   Error)	   (Standardized	   Beta)	   (t)	   (P)	   1974-­‐2010	   (n	   =	  
53,617)]	  	  In	  summary,	  the	  data	  presented	  for	  winning	  Conservative	  councillors	  lend	  some	  weight	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   incumbency	   advantage.	   All	   incumbent	   groups	   are	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electorally	   distinct	   from	   their	   freshmen	   colleagues,	   particularly	   sophomores.	  However,	  beyond	  the	  sophomore	  election,	  Conservatives	  appear	  unable	  to	  build	  on	   any	   gains	  made,	   and	   CVS	   stabilises	   for	   the	  more	   experienced	   candidates	   at	  around	  55.5%.	  It	   is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  scope	  for	  experience	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  Conservative	  candidates,	  but	  the	  evidence	  is	  meagre.	  	  
Labour	   -­‐	  Labour	   candidates’	   career	   trends	   tell	   a	   different	   story	   to	   that	   of	   the	  Conservatives,	   one	   closer	   to	   earlier	   discussed	   data	   for	   career	   changes.	   Table	  5.4.15	   displays	   descriptive	   statistics	   for	   the	   Labour	   experience	   groups.	   They	  suggest	  that	  the	  period	  over	  which	  Labour	  incumbents	  make	  electoral	  gains	  from	  experience	  is	  much	  longer	  than	  for	  Conservative	  incumbents.	  The	  mean	  CVS	  for	  the	  thirty-­‐two	  and	  a	  half	  thousand	  Labour	  freshmen	  is	  53.8%	  (σ	  =	  11.74),	  around	  one	   percentage	   point	   higher	   than	   average	   CVS	   for	   Conservative	   freshmen.	   For	  the	  nine	  and	  a	  half	  thousand	  sophomore	  winners	  the	  average	  CVS	  is	  58.2%	  (σ	  =	  11.97),	   some	   4.5	   points	   higher	   than	   Labour	   freshmen	   and	   around	   1.5	   points	  higher	   than	   Conservative	   sophomores.	   The	   stark	   rise	   continues	   for	   2	   Terms	  winners	   with	   a	   mean	   CVS	   of	   62.66%	   (σ	   =	   12.01),	   which	   is	   around	   4.5	   points	  higher	   than	   sophomores	   and	   around	   7.5	   points	   higher	   than	   for	   Tory	   2	   Terms	  winners.	  3	  Terms	  Labour	  winners	  average	  64.8%	  CVS	  (σ	  =	  12.28),	  a	  rise	  of	  more	  than	  2	  points.	  Finally,	  the	  average	  CVS	  for	  winning	  Labour	  incumbents	  who	  have	  served	  for	  four	  or	  more	  terms	  is	  more	  than	  11	  points	  higher	  than	  that	  for	  Labour	  freshmen,	   at	   over	   65%	   (σ	   =	   11.69).	   Conservative	   equivalents	   are	   almost	   10	  points	  lower,	  averaging	  55.3%	  CVS	  (see	  table	  5.4.8).	  	  
	   187	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   figures	   presented	   in	   table	   5.4.15	  will,	   to	   some	  degree,	   be	   influenced	   by	   the	   safety	   of	   the	   seats	   that	   many	   long-­‐serving	  incumbents	  stand	  in.	  As	  such,	  the	  performance	  of	  experience	  groups	  between	  the	  parties	  may	  not	  be	  directly	  comparable.	  Figure	  5.4.15	  illustrates	  the	  career	  vote	  share	  trend	  for	  Labour	  winners.	  As	  for	  the	  ‘All	  Party’	  data	  discussed	  earlier	  (see	  figure	  5.4.1)	   the	   curve	   is	   concave,	   implying	   that	   the	   cumulative	   electoral	   gains	  diminish	  over	  time.	  The	  plotted	  means	  also	  imply	  that	  any	  curve	  estimation	  may	  be	  best	  modelled	  logarithmically.	  	   Experience	   n	  	   CVS	   σ	   S.E.	   95%	  Low	   95%	  Upp	  
Freshmen	   32,453	   53.75	   11.74	   0.065	   53.62	   53.88	  
Sophomores	   9,376	   58.24	   11.97	   0.124	   58.00	   58.48	  
2	  Terms	   3,378	   62.66	   12.01	   0.207	   62.25	   63.06	  
3	  Terms	   1,263	   64.75	   12.28	   0.346	   64.07	   65.43	  
4+	  Terms	   651	   65.03	   11.69	   0.458	   64.13	   65.93	  
[Table	  5.4.15	  –	  Lab	  Mean	   CVS	   (Descriptives)	   -­‐	   (n)	   (µ)	   (σ)	   (Std.	  Error)	   (95%	  Confidence	   Intervals,	  
Upper	  &	  Lower)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  47,121)]	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results	  are	  tabulated	  in	  table	  5.4.17	  and	  show	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  909.126,	  with	  a	  p-­‐value	   below	   the	   0.001	   level.	   The	   ANOVA	   results	   imply	   that	   some	   of	   Labour’s	  experience	   group	   means	   differ	   significantly	   from	   one	   another,	   and	   there	   is	  significant	  variation	  between	  the	  experience	  groups.	  	   Levene	  Statistic	   df1	   df2	   Sig.	  6.906	   4	   47,116	   .000	  
[Table	  5.4.16	  –	  Lab	  Test	  of	  Homogeneity	  of	  Variances	  -­‐	  (Levene	  Stat)	  (df1)	  (df2)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  
=	  47,121)]	  	   ANOVA	   Sum	  of	  Squares	   df	   Mean	  Square	   F	   Sig.	  
Between	  Groups	   507761.355	   4	   126940.339	   909.126	   .000	  
Within	  Groups	   6578756.459	   47,116	   139.629	   	   	  
Total	   7086517.813	   47,120	   	   	   	  
[Table	  5.4.17	  –	  Lab	  ANOVA	  -­‐	  (Sum	  of	  Squares)	  (df)	  (Mean	  Square)	  (F)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  47,121)]	  	   Experience	  (i)	   Experience	  (j)	   Diff	  (i-­‐j)	   S.E.	   Sig	   95%	  L	   95%	  U	  
Freshman	   Sophomore	   -­‐4.49*	   0.139	   .000	   -­‐4.87	   -­‐4.11	  2	  Term	  	   -­‐8.91*	   0.213	   .000	   -­‐9.49	   -­‐8.33	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐11.00*	   0.339	   .000	   -­‐11.93	   -­‐10.08	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐11.28*	   0.468	   .000	   -­‐12.56	   -­‐10.01	  
Sophomore	   Freshman	   4.49*	   0.139	   .000	   4.11	   4.87	  2	  Term	  	   -­‐4.42*	   0.237	   .000	   -­‐5.07	   -­‐3.77	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐6.51*	   0.354	   .000	   -­‐7.47	   -­‐5.54	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐6.79*	   0.479	   .000	   -­‐8.10	   -­‐5.49	  
2	  Terms	   Freshman	   8.91*	   0.213	   .000	   8.33	   9.49	  Sophomore	   4.42*	   0.237	   .000	   3.77	   5.07	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐2.09*	   0.390	   .000	   -­‐3.15	   -­‐1.03	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐2.37*	   0.506	   .000	   -­‐3.75	   -­‐1.00	  
3	  Terms	   Freshman	   11.00*	   0.339	   .000	   10.08	   11.93	  Sophomore	   6.51*	   0.354	   .000	   5.54	   7.47	  2	  Term	  	   2.09*	   0.390	   .000	   1.03	   3.15	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐0.28	   0.570	   .988	   -­‐1.84	   1.27	  
4+	  Terms	   Freshman	   11.28*	   0.468	   .000	   10.01	   12.56	  Sophomore	   6.79*	   0.479	   .000	   5.49	   8.10	  2	  Term	  	   2.37*	   0.506	   .000	   1.00	   3.75	  3	  Term	  	   0.28	   0.570	   .988	   -­‐1.27	   1.84	  
[Table	  5.4.18	  –	  Lab	  Post	  Hoc	  Tukey	  HSD	  -­‐	  (Mean	  Diff)	  (Std.	  Error)	  (P)	  (95%	  Confidence	  Intervals,	  
Upper	  &	  Lower)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  47,121)	  (*Mean	  difference	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level)]	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The	  Tukey	  HSD	   test	   results	   for	   Labour	   experience	   groups	   are	   tabulated	   above	  (see	  table	  5.4.18).	  Results	  show	  that	  all	  experience	  group	  means	  are	  statistically	  distinct	   from	   one	   another,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   3	   Terms	   and	   4+	   Terms	  groups,	   whose	  means	   fail	   to	   be	   confidently	   distinguished.	   The	   p-­‐values	   for	   all	  other	  groups	  and	  interactions	  are	  below	  the	  0.001	  level,	  whereas	  a	  comparison	  of	  means	  between	  3	  Terms	  and	  4+	  Terms	  experience	  groups	  reports	  a	  p-­‐value	  of	  0.988.	  The	  mean	  difference	  between	   these	   groups	   is	   just	  0.28%	  and	   thus	  95%	  confidence	  intervals	  overlap	  significantly.	  These	  results	  mirror	  those	  for	  the	  ‘All	  Party’	   analysis	   discussed	   earlier	   in	   the	   chapter,	   whilst	   conflicting	   with	   career	  trend	  results	  for	  the	  Conservatives.	  There	  is	  a	  much	  more	  linear	  initial	  trend	  for	  Labour	  winners,	  that	  plateaus	  by	  the	  time	  candidates	  have	  acquired	  four	  or	  more	  terms	  experience,	  the	  equivalent	  of	  16	  years	  service	  on	  the	  council.	  	  For	  Labour,	  a	  logarithmic	  regression	  model	  is	  the	  best-­‐fitted	  career	  trend.	  Tables	  5.4.19-­‐21	  display	  the	  model	  summary,	  ANOVA	  and	  coefficient	  statistics.	  Though	  largely	   irrelevant,	   the	   R	   square	   is	   0.071	   (see	   table	   5.4.19).	   ANOVA	   results	   are	  displayed	   in	   table	   5.4.20	   and	   report	   an	   F-­‐statistic	   of	   3,585.558,	   which	   has	   an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  	   R	   R	  Square	   Adjusted	  R	  Square	   S.E.	  .266	   .071	   .071	   11.822	  
[Table	  5.4.19	  –	  Lab	  Model	  Summary	   -­‐	  (R)	  (R	  Square)	  (Adj.	  R	  Square)	  (Std.	  Error)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  
47,121)]	  	   ANOVA	   Sum	  of	  Squares	   df	   Mean	  Square	   F	   Sig.	  
Regression	   501121.085	   1	   501121.085	   3585.558	   .000	  
Residual	   6585396.729	   47119	   139.761	   	   	  
Total	   7086517.813	   47120	   	   	   	  
[Table	  5.4.20	  –	  Lab	  ANOVA	  -­‐	  (Sum	  of	  Squares)	  (df)	  (Mean	  Square)	  (F)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  47,121)]	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  Coefficients	   B	   S.E.	   Standardized	  Beta	   t	   Sig.	  
ln(Experience)	   7.419	   0.124	   .266	   59.880	   .000	  
(Constant)	   53.685	   0.064	   	   834.756	   .000	  
[Table	  5.4.21	  –	  Lab	  Logarithmic	  Model	  -­‐	  (B)	  (Std.	  Error)	  (Standardized	  Beta)	  (t)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  
47,121)]	  	  Table	  5.4.21	  displays	  the	  coefficient	  components	  of	  the	  regression	  model	  fit.	  As	  expected,	   the	   model	   reports	   a	   logarithmic	   beta	   value	   of	   7.419,	   which	   is	  significant,	  with	  a	  p-­‐value	  well	  under	  the	  0.001	  level.	  The	  model	  constant	  of	  53.7	  is	  also	  significant	  with	  a	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  	  In	  summary,	   it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  all	  Labour	   incumbent	  groups	  are	  electorally	  distinct	  from	  their	  freshmen	  colleagues	  and	  there	  is	  more	  than	  an	  11	  point	  gap	  between	   the	   least	   and	  most	   experienced	   Labour	   groups.	   The	   career	   trend	   for	  Labour	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  cumulative	  one.	  	  
Liberal	  Democrats	  -­‐	  Results	   for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  (see	  table	  5.4.22)	  show	  a	  similar	   career	   trend	   to	   Labour	   candidates,	   with	   the	   experience	   groups	   having	  different	  CVS	  means.	  Although	  average	  CVS	   for	   the	  more	   than	   fifteen	   thousand	  LD	  freshmen	  is	  the	  lowest	  of	  the	  three	  parties	  at	  48.5%	  (σ	  =	  9.23),	  the	  data	  show	  CVS	   climbing	   successively	   over	   the	   experience	   groups.	   Average	   CVS	   for	   the	  almost	  four	  and	  a	  half	  thousand	  LD	  sophomores	  is	  52.3%	  (σ	  =	  10.01),	  some	  four	  points	   higher	   than	   for	   LD	   freshmen.	   However,	   the	   mean	   is	   around	   4.5	   and	   6	  points	  less	  than	  that	  of	  Tory	  and	  Labour	  sophomores	  respectively.	  Average	  CVS	  rises	  again	  for	  the	  one	  and	  a	  half	  thousand	  2	  Terms	  winners,	  to	  just	  over	  55%	  (σ	  =	  10.55),	  as	  it	  does	  for	  3	  Terms	  and	  4+	  Terms	  winners,	  with	  CVS	  means	  of	  56.3%	  and	  56.8%	  respectively	  (σ	  =	  11.06	  &	  11.28).	  The	  data	  show	  more	  than	  8	  points	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between	   freshmen	   and	   the	   most	   experienced	   LD	   winners,	   a	   large	   difference;	  though	  it	  must	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  only	  183	  cases	  were	  considered	  for	  the	  LD	  ‘4+	  Terms’	  group.	  	  Figure	  5.4.22	  plots	  the	  experience	  group	  means.	  The	  trend	  illustrated	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  for	  Labour	  groups,	  where	  the	  electoral	  gains	  diminish	  with	  the	  additional	  experience	  of	  winners.	  Bearing	  this	   in	  mind,	   it	   is	   likely	  that	  a	   logarithmic	  fitted	  curve	  will	  most	  accurately	  reflect	  the	  Liberal	  Democrat	  CVS	  career	  trend.	  Figure	  5.4.22	  shows	  that	  the	  LD	  experience	  trend	  is	  similar	  to	  that	   for	  Labour,	   though	  the	  curve	  is	  less	  steep.	  As	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  thesis	  (see	  chapter	  4),	  it	  comes	  as	   no	   surprise	   that	   Liberal	   Democrat	   CVS	   averages	   tend	   to	   be	   lower	   when	  compared	   to	   the	   two	   major	   parties.	   With	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	   mid-­‐way	   through	   the	   period	   examined,	   competition	   for	   seats	   and	  votes	  has	  risen	  whilst	  there	  has	  been	  a	  decline	  in	  the	  average	  winning	  vote	  share	  of	   all	   three	   parties.	   With	   this	   in	   mind,	   we	   can	   expect	   Labour	   and	   the	  Conservatives	  to	  average	  higher	  CVS	  across	  the	  experience	  groups,	  as	  for	  around	  half	   the	   period	   examined	   they	   will	   have	   participated	   under	   less	   competitive	  conditions.	  	   Experience	   n	  	   CVS	   σ	   S.E.	   95%	  Low	   95%	  Upp	  
Freshmen	   15,274	   48.51	   9.23	   0.075	   48.36	   48.65	  
Sophomores	   4,314	   52.29	   10.01	   0.152	   51.99	   52.59	  
2	  Terms	   1,402	   55.02	   10.55	   0.282	   54.46	   55.57	  
3	  Terms	   499	   56.26	   11.06	   0.495	   55.29	   57.23	  
4+	  Terms	   183	   56.82	   11.28	   0.834	   55.17	   58.46	  
[Table	   5.4.22	   –	  Lab	  Mean	  VS	   (Descriptives)	   -­‐	   (n)	   (µ)	   (σ)	   (Std.	   Error)	   (95%	   Confidence	   Intervals,	  
Upper	  &	  Lower)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  21,672)]	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[Figure	  5.4.22	  –	  LD	  Candidate	  Vote	  Share	  by	  Experience]	  	  Tables	   5.4.23-­‐24	   show	   results	   of	   Levene’s	   and	   ANOVA	   tests	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrat	   experience	   groups.	   The	   Levene’s	   statistic	   is	   33.336	   and	   has	   an	  associated	   p-­‐value	   below	   the	   0.001	   level,	  meaning	   that	   homogenous	   variances	  can	   not	   be	   assumed	   (see	   table	   5.4.23).	   ANOVA	   results	   imply	   that	   we	   can	   be	  confident	   that	  some	  of	   the	  experience	  groups	  are	  statistically	  distinct	   from	  one	  another,	  with	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  329.280	  and	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	  level	   (see	   table	   5.4.24).	   A	   Tukey	   HSD	   test	  was	   completed	   to	   identify	  which	   of	  these	  groups	  are	  statistically	  distinct	  and	  results	  are	  tabulated	  in	  table	  5.4.25.	  	   Levene	  Statistic	   df1	   df2	   Sig.	  33.336	   4	   21,667	   .000	  
[Table	  5.4.23	  –	  LD	  Test	  of	  Homogeneity	  of	  Variances	  -­‐	  (Levene	  Stat)	  (df1)	  (df2)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  
21,672)]	  	   ANOVA	   Sum	  of	  Squares	   df	   Mean	  Square	   F	   Sig.	  
Between	  Groups	   119935.749	   4	   29983.937	   329.280	   .000	  
Within	  Groups	   1972974.643	   21,667	   91.059	   	   	  
Total	   2092910.392	   21,671	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These	  data	  support	  earlier	  comments	  about	  the	  electoral	   trend	  of	   the	  LDs	  over	  their	   tenure.	   Freshmen	   and	   sophomore	   groups	   differ	   significantly	   from	   one	  another	   and	   from	   all	   other	   experience	   groups,	   recording	   p-­‐values	   below	   the	  0.001	  level.	  For	  2	  Terms	  incumbents,	  mean	  CVS	  fails	  to	  deviate	  significantly	  from	  the	  3	  Terms	  group	   to	   the	  0.05	   level,	   instead	   reporting	  a	  p-­‐value	  below	   the	  0.1	  level.	   This	   is	   significant	   only	   if	   an	   assumption	   of	   direction	   is	   placed	   on	   the	  premise	  of	   the	  comparison,	   i.e.	  switching	   from	  a	  two-­‐tailed	  to	  a	  one-­‐tailed	  test.	  The	  comparison	  of	  means	  between	  4+	  Terms	  and	  the	  2	  &	  3	  Terms	  groups	  also	  fails	   to	   meet	   a	   significant	   difference,	   with	   p-­‐values	   of	   0.115	   and	   0.962	  respectively.	  The	  Tukey	  HSD	  data	  show	  a	  similar	  picture	  to	  that	  for	  the	  Labour.	  	   Experience	  (i)	   Experience	  (j)	   Diff	  (i-­‐j)	   S.E.	   Sig	   95%	  L	   95%	  U	  
Freshman	   Sophomore	   -­‐3.78*	   0.165	   .000	   -­‐4.23	   -­‐3.34	  2	  Term	  	   -­‐6.51*	   0.266	   .000	   -­‐7.24	   -­‐5.78	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐7.75*	   0.434	   .000	   -­‐8.94	   -­‐6.57	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐8.31*	   0.710	   .000	   -­‐10.25	   -­‐6.37	  
Sophomore	   Freshman	   3.78*	   0.165	   .000	   3.34	   4.23	  2	  Term	  	   -­‐2.73*	   0.293	   .000	   -­‐3.53	   -­‐1.93	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐3.97*	   0.451	   .000	   -­‐5.20	   -­‐2.74	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐4.52*	   0.720	   .000	   -­‐6.49	   -­‐2.56	  
2	  Terms	   Freshman	   6.51*	   0.266	   .000	   5.78	   7.24	  Sophomore	   2.73*	   0.293	   .000	   1.93	   3.53	  3	  Term	  	   -­‐1.24	   0.497	   .090	   -­‐2.60	   0.11	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐1.80	   0.750	   .115	   -­‐3.85	   0.25	  
3	  Terms	   Freshman	   7.75*	   0.434	   .000	   6.57	   8.94	  Sophomore	   3.97*	   0.451	   .000	   2.74	   5.20	  2	  Term	  	   1.24	   0.497	   .090	   -­‐0.11	   2.60	  4+	  Term	  	   -­‐0.56	   0.825	   .962	   -­‐2.81	   1.70	  
4+	  Terms	   Freshman	   8.31*	   0.710	   .000	   6.37	   10.25	  Sophomore	   4.52*	   0.720	   .000	   2.56	   6.49	  2	  Term	   1.80	   0.750	   .115	   -­‐0.25	   3.85	  3	  Term	  	   0.56	   0.825	   .962	   -­‐1.70	   2.81	  
[Table	  5.4.25	  –	   LD	  Post	  Hoc	  Tukey	  HSD	   -­‐	  (Mean	  Diff)	  (Std.	  Error)	  (P)	  (95%	  Confidence	  Intervals,	  
Upper	  &	  Lower)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  21,672)	  (*Mean	  difference	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level)]	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As	   for	  Labour,	   a	   logarithmic	   career	  pattern	   fits	  best.	  Table	  5.4.26	   reports	   an	  R	  square	  of	  just	  0.057.	  As	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  fit	  is	  not	   the	   R	   square	   statistic,	   but	   identifying	   similar	   or	   conflicting	   career	   trends.	  Results	  for	  an	  ANOVA	  test	  are	  presented	  in	  table	  5.4.27	  and	  report	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  1,313.699	  that	  has	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  	  The	  LD	  Logarithmic	  career	  fit	  model	  coefficients	  are	  presented	  in	  table	  5.4.28.	  As	  expected	  the	  logged	  experience	  variable	  has	  a	  beta	  value	  that	  is	  smaller	  than	  for	  Labour	   at	   5.616,	   but	   significant,	   with	   a	   p-­‐value	   below	   the	   0.001	   level.	   The	  constant	  coefficient	  of	  48.5	   is	  also	  smaller	  and	  significant	  with	  the	  p-­‐value	  well	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  	   R	   R	  Square	   Adjusted	  R	  Square	   S.E.	  .239	   .057	   .057	   9.543	  
[Table	  5.4.26	  –	  LD	  Model	   Summary	   -­‐	   (R)	   (R	  Square)	   (Adj.	  R	  Square)	   (Std.	  Error)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  
21,672)]	  	   ANOVA	   Sum	  of	  Squares	   df	   Mean	  Square	   F	   Sig.	  
Regression	   119626.256	   1	   119626.256	   1313.699	   .000	  
Residual	   1973284.136	   21670	   91.061	   	   	  
Total	   2092910.392	   21671	   	   	   	  
[Table	  5.4.27	  –	  LD	  ANOVA	  -­‐	  (Sum	  of	  Squares)	  (df)	  (Mean	  Square)	  (F)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  21,672)]	  	   	  Coefficients	   B	   S.E.	   Standardized	  Beta	   t	   Sig.	  
ln(Experience)	   5.616	   0.155	   .239	   36.245	   .000	  
(Constant)	   48.501	   0.076	   	   639.215	   .000	  
[Table	  5.4.28	  –	  LD	  Logarithmic	  Model	  -­‐	  (B)	  (Std.	  Error)	  (Standardized	  Beta)	  (t)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  
21,672)]	  	  Overall,	  the	  data	  presented	  for	  Liberal	  Democrat	  winner’s	  support	  the	  notion	  of	  incumbency	   advantage	   and	   experiential-­‐effects	   on	   candidate	   performance.	   The	  data	  for	  LDs,	  as	  for	  Labour,	  shows	  diminishing	  electoral	  gains	  that	  ‘round	  off’	  at	  just	   under	   57%	  CVS	   for	   ‘4+	   Terms’	   incumbent	  winners.	   All	   experience	   groups	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differ	   significantly	   from	   winning	   freshmen,	   and	   from	   winning	   sophomores.	  Unlike	  data	  for	  the	  Conservatives,	  the	  plotted	  means	  and	  fitted	  curve	  estimation	  of	  the	  groups	  illustrate	  a	  cumulative	  career	  trend	  where	  the	  gains	  diminish	  from	  the	  outset	  of	  their	  career	  (see	  figure	  5.4.22).	  The	  LDs	  appear	  to	  follow	  a	  similar	  pattern	  to	  Labour	  winners,	  where	  experience	  counts	  for	  more	  in	  the	  initial	  terms	  of	  service.	  	  Though	   Stonecash	   (2008)	   uses	   vote	   shares	   effectively	   to	   consider	   the	  ramifications	   of	   incumbents’	   career	   trends,	   there	   are	   clear	   weaknesses	   in	  accepting	   the	   results	   from	   this	  method	   alone.	   Selection	   bias	   is	   a	  mild	   concern,	  but	  more	   pertinent	   is	   the	   direct	   comparability	   of	   the	   dependent	   variable	   data.	  Beginning	   with	   the	   Standardised	   Incumbent	   Performance	   (SIP)	   measure,	  described	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter	   and	   in	   chapter	   3,	   this	   section	  now	  goes	   on	   to	  measure	   the	   effect	   of	   experience	   on	   candidate	   performance.	   Afterwards,	   the	  Standardised	   Retirement	   Slump	   (SRS)	   model	   is	   used	   to	   measure	   experience	  effects	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  	  Examining	   the	   SIP	   data	   for	   the	   Conservatives,	   table	   5.4.29	   displays	  Experience	  group	   descriptive	   statistics	   and	   confidence	   intervals.	   The	   1,149	   considered	  sophomores	  averaged	  an	  SIP	  of	  just	  1.59%,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  5.06	  as	  detailed	  earlier	  in	  this	   chapter.	   The	   sophomore	   average	   is	   lower	   than	   the	   average	   for	   2	   Terms	  incumbents	  who	  record	  an	  SIP	  of	  2.23%,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  4.57,	  implying	  some	  growth	  between	   the	  groups.	  However,	   for	  3	  Terms	   incumbents,	   there	   is	   a	   slight	   fall	   in	  SIP	   when	   compared	   to	   the	   two	   termers,	   to	   2.03%	   (σ	   =	   5.02).	   There	   is	   little	  difference	   in	   the	   performance	   of	   two	   and	   three	   term	   incumbents.	   For	   the	   4+	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Terms	  incumbents	  examined,	  there	  is	  again	  a	  slight	  fall	  in	  SIP	  to	  just	  1.80%	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  3.52.	  This	  deterioration,	  near	  to	  the	  original	  sophomore	  performance,	  is	  in	  line	   with	   CVS	   data	   discussed	   above	   and	   is	   supportive	   of	   the	   cubic	   career	  performance	  trend	  previously	  discussed	  for	  the	  Conservatives.	  	  	  The	  overall	  trend	  for	  the	  Tories	  indicates	  that	  the	  bulk	  of	  growth	  is	  in	  the	  initial	  two	  terms,	  after	  which	  the	  evidence	  suggests	  there	  may	  be	  little	  or	  no	  marginal	  gain.	  Data	  for	  the	  Tory	  4+	  Terms	  Experience	  category	  considers	  councillors	  who	  have	   already	   served	   for	   16	   years	   (i.e.	   now	   contesting	   their	   fifth	   consecutive	  election)	   and	   considering	   the	   requirements	   for	   the	   SIP	   model	   (detailed	   in	  chapter	  3),	   it	   is	  unsurprising	  that	  there	  are	  relatively	  few	  cases.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  SIP	  model	  will	   tend	   to	  put	   forward	  a	  weaker	  estimation	  of	   the	  performance	  of	  ‘very	   long-­‐serving’	   incumbents.	   But	   perhaps	   more	   importantly,	   because	   the	  
Experience	   variable	   has	   been	   collapsed,	   the	   4+	   Term	   group	   will	   inevitably	   be	  comprised	   of	   incumbents	  with	   varying	  degrees	   of	   experience.	   So	   care	  must	   be	  taken	  in	  the	  interpretation	  of	  these	  results,	  as	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  compare	  this	  group	   to	   others	   with	   any	   accuracy.	   However,	   a	   comparison	   between	   party	  categories	  is	  perhaps	  more	  methodologically	  sound.	  	   Experience	   n	  	   SIP	   σ	   S.E.	   95%	  Low	   95%	  Upp	  
Sophomores	   1,165	   1.59	   5.06	   0.15	   1.30	   1.88	  
2	  Terms	   349	   2.23	   4.57	   0.24	   1.86	   2.82	  
3	  Terms	   159	   2.03	   5.02	   0.40	   1.25	   2.82	  
4+	  Terms	   44	   1.80	   3.52	   0.53	   0.73	   2.87	  
[Table	  5.4.29	  –	  Con	  SIP	  by	  Exp	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (Err)	  1979-­‐2010(n=1,717)]	  	  Table	  5.4.30	  displays	  results	   for	  Labour,	  and	  the	   trend	   is	  markedly	  different	   to	  that	   for	   the	   Conservatives.	   For	   the	   1,195	   Labour	   sophomores	   considered,	   an	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average	  SIP	  of	  2%	  is	  recorded	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  6.12,	  as	  revealed	  in	  the	  SIP	  results	  for	  the	  surge	  analysis	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Like	  the	  Conservatives,	  there	  is	  growth	  between	   the	   initial	   two	   experience	   groups,	   though	   growth	   is	   far	   greater	   for	  Labour.	  The	  396	  2	  Terms	   incumbents	  average	  an	  SIP	  of	  3.4%	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  5.86.	  This	   is	   some	   1.4%	   higher	   than	   for	   sophomores	   and	   1.17%	   higher	   than	  Conservative	  2	  Terms	   incumbents.	  This	  growth	  continues	   for	   the	  124	  3	  Terms	  cases.	  The	  average	  SIP	   for	  3	  Termers	   is	  4.37%	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  7.04,	  almost	  1	  point	  higher	  than	  for	  2	  Terms	  candidates	  and	  2.34%	  higher	  than	  3	  Terms	  Conservative	  incumbents.	   For	   the	   48	   cases	   examined	   in	   Labour’s	   4+	   Terms	   Experience	  category,	   an	   average	   SIP	   of	   5.05%	   is	   reported,	  with	   a	   σ	   of	   8.86.	   This	   is	   0.68%	  higher	   than	   the	   three	   termers,	   though	   as	   there	   are	   relatively	   few	   cases	   the	  results	  for	  this	  group	  must	  be	  interpreted	  carefully.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  also,	  that	  this	  figure	  is	  3.25%	  higher	  than	  for	  equivalent	  Conservatives.	  	  Like	  the	  Conservatives,	  there	  are	  far	  fewer	  cases	  in	  the	  very	  experienced	  groups.	  However,	  unlike	  data	  for	  the	  Conservatives,	  the	  results	  displayed	  in	  table	  5.4.30	  imply	   that	   Labour	   candidates’	   career	   trend	   is	   extended	   and	   experience	   may	  count	  beyond	  just	  two	  terms	  of	  service.	  These	  data	  are	  supportive	  of	  CVS	  trends	  for	   Labour	   discussed	   earlier	   in	   this	   section.	   The	   different	   experience	   groups	  show	  a	  positive,	  almost	   linear	   trend	   initially,	  where	   longer	  serving	   incumbents	  average	   higher	   levels	   of	   SIP	   than	   the	   less	   experienced	   ones	   and	   the	   results	  support	  the	  overall	  notion	  of	  experiential	  effects	  in	  local	  elections.	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Experience	   n	  	   SIP	   σ	   S.E.	   95%	  Low	   95%	  Upp	  
Sophomores	   1,195	   2.00	   6.12	   0.18	   1.66	   2.35	  
2	  Terms	   396	   3.40	   5.86	   0.29	   2.82	   3.98	  
3	  Terms	   124	   4.37	   7.04	   0.63	   3.12	   5.63	  
4+	  Terms	   48	   5.05	   8.86	   1.28	   2.48	   7.62	  
[Table	  5.4.30	  –	  Lab	  SIP	  by	  Exp	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (Err)	  1979-­‐2010	  (n=1,763)]	  	  Table	   5.4.31	   displays	   data	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats.	   Results	   for	   the	   LDs	  demonstrate	   a	   similar	   trend	   in	   ‘experience	   effects’	   to	   Labour.	   As	   for	   the	  sophomore	   surge	   discussion	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter,	   the	   458	   LD	   sophomores	  average	   just	   less	   than	   4%	  SIP	  with	   a	   σ	   of	   7.12.	   This	   figure	   is	  markedly	   higher	  than	   those	   for	  both	  Labour	   and	   the	  Conservatives,	   around	   twice	   that	   recorded	  for	  Labour	  and	  around	  two	  and	  a	  half	   times	  that	   for	  the	  Conservatives.	  For	  the	  149	   2	   Terms	   incumbents	   considered	   for	   the	   LDs,	   the	   data	   suggest	   there	   is	  significant	   growth	   in	   SIP	   between	   the	   experience	   groups.	   SIP	   is	   shown	   to	   be	  5.1%	  with	   a	   σ	   of	   6.77,	  which	   is	   1.16%	  higher	   than	   sophomores,	   2.87%	  higher	  than	  Conservative	  two	  termers	  and	  1.7%	  higher	  than	  Labour.	  Unexpectedly,	  the	  data	   for	  LD	  3	  Terms	   incumbents	  shows	  no	  growth.	  Average	  SIP	   falls	  slightly	   to	  4.95%	  (σ	  =	  7.53),	  which	  is	  still	  higher	  than	  for	  the	  two	  other	  parties	  but	  does	  not	  follow	   the	   expected	   career	   trend	   of	   continued	   cumulative	   growth.	   For	   the	  selected	  4+	  Terms	  incumbents,	  SIP	  rises	  by	  more	  than	  4	  points	  to	  an	  average	  of	  9.23%	   (σ	   =	   5.11).	   However,	   it	   must	   be	   noted	   that	   there	   are	   just	   12	   cases	  considered	  for	  the	  LDs	  4+	  Termers	  and	  acknowledging	  the	  notes	  of	  caution	  made	  above,	   careful	   consideration	  must	   be	  made	  when	   generalising	   from	   these	   data	  alone.	  When	   compared	  with	   the	   two	   other	   parties,	   the	   average	   is	   significantly	  higher,	  by	  4.18%	  when	  compared	  to	  Labour	  incumbents	  and	  7.43%	  higher	  than	  for	  Conservative	  incumbents.	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Data	   discussed	   from	   table	   5.4.31	   provides	   evidence	   in	   favour	   of	   experience	  effects	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   in	   local	   elections,	   but	   also	   supports	   the	  observed	  inter-­‐party	  trend	  evident	  throughout	  the	  data	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis	  in	   that	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   prove	   particularly	   susceptible	   to	   incumbency	  effects,	  compared	  with	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives.	  	   Experience	   n	  	   SIP	   σ	   S.E.	   95%	  Low	   95%	  Upp	  
Sophomores	   458	   3.94	   7.12	   0.33	   3.28	   4.59	  
2	  Terms	   146	   5.10	   6.77	   0.56	   3.99	   6.21	  
3	  Terms	   56	   4.95	   7.53	   1.01	   2.94	   6.97	  
4+	  Terms	   12	   9.23	   5.11	   1.47	   5.98	   12.47	  
[Table	  5.4.31	  –	  LD	  SIP	  by	  Exp	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (Err)	  1979-­‐2010(n=672)]	  	  Figure	   5.4.32	   illustrates	   these	   experience-­‐related	   career	   trends	   for	   all	   three	  parties.	  From	  the	  outset	  there	  are	  clear	  differences	  between	  the	  parties,	  and	  the	  effect	   of	   candidates’	   careers	   exacerbate	   these.	   For	   the	   Conservatives	   there	  remains	  a	  case	  for	  candidate	  experience	  influencing	  the	  relative	  performance	  of	  incumbent	  candidates.	  In	  the	  short	  term	  the	  gap	  is	  greatest	  and	  it	  drops	  in	  later	  years,	   but	   in	   reality	   there	   is	   little	   difference	   between	   the	   groups.	   When	   the	  results	   are	   compared	   to	   those	   for	   Labour	   and	   the	   LDs,	   any	   gains	  made	   by	   the	  Conservatives	   appear	   minor	   by	   comparison.	   For	   Labour,	   SIP	   gains	   are	   almost	  linear	   initially,	   with	   the	   most	   experienced	   councillors	   averaging	   an	   SIP	  significantly	  higher	  than	  their	  sophomore	  counterparts,	  these	  gains	  then	  ‘round-­‐off’	   for	  4+	  Terms	   incumbents.	  As	   for	   the	  Conservatives	   the	   largest	   gains	   in	  SIP	  between	   the	   Experience	   groups	   are	   during	   earlier	   years,	   but	   overall	   the	   data	  show	   that	   candidate	   experience	   has	   greater	   electoral	   value	   for	   Labour	  councillors	  than	  for	  the	  Conservatives.	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For	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   the	   results	   suggest	   that	   there	   are	   large	   gains	  made	  over	   the	   entire	   Experience	   range.	   Regardless	   of	   the	   unexpected	   results	   for	   3	  Terms	   candidates,	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   appear	   to	   be	   most	   susceptible	   to	  experience	   effects.	   Initially,	   at	   least,	   the	   gains	   are	   comparable	   with	   Labour.	  Principally	  however,	   the	  data	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	   support	  an	   inter-­‐party	  trend	  that	  has	  been	  described	  on	  a	  number	  of	  occasions	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  in	   that	   Liberal	   Democrats	   are	  most	   likely	   to	   benefit	   from	   the	   relative	   effect	   of	  incumbency.	   Their	   experience	   group	   averages	   have	   been	   consistently	   higher	  than	  those	  for	  the	  two	  major	  parties.	  	  
	  







Sophomore	   2	  Terms	   3	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if	  an	  incumbent’s	  career	  trend	  is	  cumulative,	  we	  could	  expect	  wards	  that	  contain	  longer	  serving	  councillors,	  to	  experience	  greater	  relative	  falls	  in	  party	  vote	  share	  when	   they	  retire,	   than	   those	  with	  shorter	  serving	  councillors.	  Considering	   this,	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  higher	  SRS	  in	  wards	  with	  more	  experienced	  retirees.	  	  	  As	  for	  the	  SIP	  model,	  the	  Experience	  variable	  has	  been	  collapsed,	  though	  this	  time	  into	  three	  groups,	  due	  to	  fewer	  cases	  being	  available	  for	  analysis.	  These	  groups	  are	   sophomores,	   2	  Terms	   and	  3+	  Terms	   incumbents.	   Tables	   5.4.32-­‐34,	   display	  one-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  of	  mean	  SRS	  deviance	  from	  zero	  by	  Experience	  group,	  for	  each	  of	  the	  three	  major	  parties.	  	  For	   the	   Conservatives,	   table	   5.4.32	   reports	   similar	   results	   to	   those	   for	   the	   SIP	  model.	   For	   the	   879	   wards	   where	   Conservative	   sophomores	   retired	   in	   the	  previous	   election,	   an	   average	   SRS	   of	   1.83%	   (σ	   =	   10.75)	   is	   recorded.	   The	  calculated	  t-­‐value	   for	   this	   figure	   is	  5.293	  and	  with	  878	  degrees	  of	   freedom	  this	  has	   a	  p-­‐value	  below	   the	  0.001	   level.	   This	   strongly	   suggests	   that	   the	  party	  may	  stand	   to	   benefit	   electorally	   from	   councillors	   defending	   their	   seats,	   even	   those	  who	  have	  served	  just	  one	  term	  on	  the	  council.	  For	  wards	  retained	  after	  2	  Terms	  retirees,	  there	  is	  little	  to	  no	  growth,	  with	  the	  194	  considered	  wards	  averaging	  an	  SRS	  of	  just	  1.91	  (σ	  =	  9.57).	  This	  Experience	  group’s	  t-­‐value	  is	  2.794	  and	  with	  193	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  the	  group	  mean	  is	  also	  significantly	  deviant	  from	  zero,	  with	  a	  p-­‐value	  that	  is	  below	  the	  0.01	  level.	  For	  3+	  Terms	  wards	  the	  average	  SRS	  falls	  to	  just	  0.79%	  (σ	  =	  8.15).	  The	  t-­‐statistic	   is	  1.019	  and	  with	  109	  degrees	  of	   freedom	  we	  cannot	  be	  95%	  confident	  that	  the	  mean	  deviates	  significantly	  from	  zero.	  The	  t-­‐statistic	   has	   an	   associated	   p-­‐value	   of	   0.31.	   Overall,	   the	   evidence	   for	   the	  
	  202	  
Conservatives	   suggests	   that	   the	   gap	   in	   the	   performance	   of	   incumbents	   and	  freshmen	   is	   at	   its	   height	   in	   the	   earlier	   years	   of	   incumbency.	   These	   data	   are	   in	  step	  with	  CVS	  and	  SIP	  data	  described	  earlier,	  describing	  a	  candidate	  career	  trend	  that	  has	  initial	  gains	  before	  rounding-­‐off	  or	  falling	  away.	  	   Terms	  Served	   n	   SRS	   σ	   Std.	  Error	   t	   df	   Sig.	  
Sophomore	   879	   1.83	   10.25	   0.346	   5.293	   878	   .000	  
2	  Terms	   194	   1.91	   9.57	   0.687	   2.794	   193	   .006	  
3+	  Terms	   110	   0.79	   8.15	   0.777	   1.019	   109	   .310	  
[Table	  5.4.32	  –	  Con	  -­‐	  SRS	  by	  Exp	  (One	  Sample	  t-­‐test)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (t)	  (df)	  (p)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  Table	  5.4.33	  reports	  SRS	  data	  for	  Labour	  wards.	  The	  Experience	  trend	  for	  Labour	  wards	  is	  markedly	  different	  to	  that	  discussed	  for	  the	  Conservatives.	  For	  the	  408	  wards	   that	   have	   been	   retained	   after	   a	   retiring	   Labour	   sophomore,	   an	   average	  SRS	  of	  just	  0.8%	  is	  displayed	  (σ	  =	  9.38).	  This	  figure	  is	  small,	  and	  has	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	   just	   1.733	   that,	   with	   407	   degrees	   of	   freedom,	   has	   an	   associated	   p-­‐value	   of	  0.084,	  which	  is	  below	  the	  0.1	  level.	  Unlike	  data	  discussed	  for	  the	  Conservatives,	  this	   implies	   that	   we	   can	   be	   95%	   confident	   of	   inferring	   that	   SRS	   deviates	  significantly	   from	   zero,	   only	   if	   we	   are	   assume	   that	   SRS	   should	   be	   higher	   than	  zero	   (i.e.	   if	  we	  perform	  a	   single-­‐tailed	   rather	   than	   two-­‐tailed	   test).	   As	   a	   result,	  there	  remains	  a	  case	  for	  wards	  that	  are	  retained	  after	  sophomores	  stand	  down,	  experiencing	   a	   significant	   decline	   in	   the	   party’s	   share	   of	   the	   vote.	   For	   the	   133	  considered	  wards	  with	  2	  Terms	  retirees,	   there	   is	   significant	  growth	   in	  average	  SRS,	  up	  by	  almost	  1%	   to	  1.71%	  (σ	  =	  8.54).	  The	  group’s	   t-­‐statistic	   is	  2.308	  and	  with	   132	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   the	   group	   mean	   does	   significantly	   deviate	   from	  zero,	  with	  a	  p-­‐value	   that	   is	  below	   the	  0.05	   level.	   For	  3+	  Terms	  wards,	   average	  SRS	  rises	  again,	  this	  time	  by	  more	  than	  1%	  to	  2.82%	  (σ	  =	  8.01).	  The	  associated	  t-­‐
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statistic	  is	  3.008	  and	  with	  72	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  the	  p-­‐value	  is	  below	  the	  0.005	  level	   indicating	   that	   we	   can	   be	   confident	   that	   the	   group	   mean	   deviates	  significantly	  from	  zero.	  	  Overall,	   the	   evidence	   for	   Labour	  wards	   by	  Experience	   groups	   follows	   a	   similar	  trend	  to	  previous	   findings	  discussed	   for	  Labour	  experience	  effects.	  For	  Labour,	  the	  electoral	  slump	  in	  seats	  held	  after	  the	  departure	  of	  longer	  serving	  retirees	  is	  considerably	  higher	  than	  in	  those	  held	  after	  shorter	  serving	  incumbents.	  There	  is	  more	   than	   a	   2%	   difference	   in	   slump	   between	  wards	   where	   sophomores	   have	  retired	  when	  compared	   to	  wards	  where	   retirees	  who	  have	   served	   for	   three	  or	  more	  terms.	  This	  implies	  that	  for	  Labour,	  councillors	  who	  are	  more	  experienced	  have	  more	  electoral	   ‘value’	  for	  the	  party.	  The	  trend	  also	  supports	  data	  revealed	  by	  SIP	  estimation	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  sub-­‐chapter,	  with	  results	  at	  a	  roughly	  similar	   level.	   The	   overall	   narrative,	   of	   a	   difference	   in	   incumbency’s	   value	  between	  the	  parties,	  is	  also	  maintained	  by	  these	  data,	  with	  Labour	  wards	  tending	  to	  be	  more	  susceptible	  to	  incumbency	  and	  experience	  effects	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  Conservatives.	  	   Terms	  Served	   n	   SRS	   σ	   Std.	  Error	   t	   df	   Sig.	  
Sophomore	   408	   0.80	   9.38	   0.464	   1.733	   407	   .084	  
2	  Terms	   133	   1.71	   8.54	   0.741	   2.308	   132	   .023	  
3+	  Terms	   73	   2.82	   8.01	   0.937	   3.008	   72	   .004	  
[Table	  5.4.33	  –	  Lab	  -­‐	  SRS	  by	  Exp	  (One	  Sample	  t-­‐test)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (t)	  (df)	  (p)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  As	  expected,	  data	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  provide	  the	  most	  striking	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  experience	  effects.	  Table	  5.4.34	  presents	  one-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	   results	   for	   the	   SRS	   deviance	   of	   LD	   experience	   group’s	   from	   zero.	   The	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results	   far	  exceed	  those	  for	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives,	   following	  what	   is	  an	  emerging	  inter-­‐party	  trend.	  Seats	  held	  by	  the	  LDs	  after	  sophomore	  retirees	  have	  stood	  down	  are	  shown	  to	  average	  an	  SRS	  of	  3.39%	  (σ	  =	  12.31),	   the	  highest	   for	  the	   three	   parties	   considered.	   The	   t-­‐statistic	   of	   3.834	   is	   significant	   with	   194	  degrees	  of	  freedom,	  and	  a	  p-­‐value	  well	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  For	  seats	  held	  after	  2	  Terms	  councillors	  have	   retired,	   a	  mean	  SRS	  of	  4.3%	   is	   recorded	   (σ	  =	  11.82).	  The	  associated	  t-­‐statistic	  is	  shown	  as	  2.695	  and	  with	  55	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  the	  p-­‐value	  is	  below	  the	  0.01	  level.	  It	  is	  perhaps	  worth	  highlighting	  at	  this	  point,	  that	  average	  SRS	  for	  LD	  2	  Terms	  incumbent	  wards	  is	  more	  than	  twice	  that	  of	  either	  the	  Conservatives	  or	  Labour	  wards.	  Finally,	   for	   the	  3+	  Terms	  Experience	   group	  an	  average	  SRS	  of	  5.87%	  is	  found	  (σ	  =	  10.97),	  again	  far	  higher	  than	  for	  the	  other	  two	  party	  categories,	  and	  with	  a	  reported	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.01	  level.	  Though	  there	   are	   just	   27	   cases	   studied	   for	   this	   group,	   and	   caution	   clearly	   must	   be	  exercised	  in	  generalising	  from	  such	  data,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study	  the	  data	  provide	   some	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	   larger	   experience	   effects	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats.	  	  Across	  the	  experience	  groups	  the	  results	  suggest	  there	  are	  similar	  overall	  gains	  to	   Labour	   incumbents,	   roughly	   2.5%	   SRS	   between	   wards	   retained	   after	  sophomores	   and	   those	   retained	   after	   3+	   Terms	   incumbents.	   Results	   from	   the	  SRS	  model	  demonstrate	  that	  both	  incumbency	  status	  and	  experience	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  a	  Lib	  Dem	  candidate’s	  chance	  of	  electoral	  success.	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Terms	  Served	   n	   SRS	   σ	   Std.	  Error	   t	   df	   Sig.	  
Sophomore	   194	   3.39	   12.31	   0.884	   3.834	   193	   .000	  
2	  Terms	   55	   4.30	   11.82	   1.594	   2.695	   54	   .009	  
3+	  Terms	   27	   5.87	   10.97	   2.111	   2.780	   26	   .010	  
[Table	  5.4.34	  –	  LD	  -­‐	  SRS	  by	  Exp	  (One	  Sample	  t-­‐test)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (t)	  (df)	  (p)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  Figure	  5.4.35	  illustrates	  the	  Experience	  trends	  for	  all	  three	  parties,	  using	  the	  SRS	  model	   of	   incumbency	   advantage	   estimation.	   The	   chart	   highlights	   the	   disparity	  between	   the	   parties.	   For	   the	   Conservatives	   the	   chart	   makes	   a	   case	   for	   initial	  effects,	   where	   the	   candidates’	   initial	   experience	   influences	   their	   relative	  performance.	  However,	  this	  advantage	  goes	  on	  to	  fall	  for	  more	  experienced	  Tory	  candidates.	  The	  trend	  is	  indicative	  of	  change;	  perhaps	  a	  waning	  of	  the	  attention	  paid	  towards	  voters.	  When	  results	  for	  the	  Conservatives	  are	  compared	  to	  those	  of	   Labour	   and	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats,	   this	   ‘falling’	   trend	   is	   exacerbated	   and	  suggests	   that	   there	   may	   be	   wider	   behavioural	   difference	   between	   candidates	  from	  the	  three	  parties.	  For	  instance,	  the	  gains	  for	  Labour	  are	  much	  clearer.	  More	  experienced	   councillors	   average	   an	   SRS	   that	   is	   more	   than	   three	   times	   their	  sophomore	  counterparts,	   as	   it	  does	   for	   the	  SIP	  model	  discussed	  above.	  Overall	  the	   data	   suggest	   that	   experience	   may	   be	   of	   more	   electoral	   value	   for	   Labour	  councillors	  than	  for	  the	  Conservatives,	  particularly	  for	  councillors	  with	  three	  or	  more	  terms	  experience.	  Where	  Conservative	  gains	  come	  earlier,	  then	  fade	  away,	  for	  Labour	  wards	  the	  gains	  appear	  to	  be	  cumulative,	  akin	  to	  the	  data	  discussed	  for	  SIP	  and	  CVS	  trends	  earlier	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  Finally,	   figure	   5.4.35	   also	   illustrates	   the	   clear	   difference	   between	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	   and	   the	   two	  major	  parties.	  As	   for	  Labour,	   the	  gains	  are	   substantial,	  some	  2.5%,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  difference	  between	  wards	  retained	  after	  the	  exit	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of	  a	  sophomore	  and	  after	  the	  retirement	  of	  a	  councillor	  who	  has	  served	  for	  12	  or	  more	  years.	  Overall,	   the	  SRS	  results	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  has	  consistently	  exceeded	   that	   for	   the	   two	   major	   parties	   and	   suggest	   that	   incumbency	   and	  electoral	  experience	  are	  of	  great	  value	  to	  Liberal	  Democrat	  candidates.	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for	   the	   two	   other	   parties,	   with	   the	   Conservatives	   having	   the	   smallest.	   Data	  shown	   for	   the	   career	   trends	   only	   serves	   to	   amply	   the	   differences	   between	   the	  parties.	  	  So	  far,	  data	  described	  in	  chapter	  5	  has,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  compare	  candidates	  that	  are	   similar,	   considered	   only	   winners.	   Sub-­‐chapter	   5.5	   expands	   this	   remit	   by	  including	   data	   for	   losing	   councillors.	   The	   section	   outlines	   two	   alternative	  methods	   of	   incumbency	   estimation,	   comparing	   the	   electoral	   performance	   of	  incumbents	  who	  lose.	  	  5.5	  –	  Incumbent	  Loser	  Performance	  (ILP)	  Analysis	  thus	  far	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  utilise	  data	  for	  those	  incumbents	  who	  have	  failed	  to	  win.	  Information	  on	  how	  incumbent	  losers	  perform	  is	  a	  potentially	  rich	  resource	  that	  can	  help	  contribute	  to	  the	  techniques	  and	  results	  already	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis.	  Two	  methods	  to	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  incumbency	  advantage	  are	  proposed.	  However,	   there	   are	   two	  major	  problems	   that	   need	   to	   be	   considered	  when	   comparing	   losers.	   First,	   the	   prevalence	   of	   the	   ‘paper	   candidate’	   is	   a	  common	   occurrence	   throughout	   English	   local	   elections.	   When	   analysing	   data	  that	   includes	   losers,	   it	   is	   important	  to	  attempt	  to	  distinguish	  candidates	  fielded	  for	   reasons	   of	   electoral	   principle,	   with	   little	   expectation	   of	   actually	   winning	   a	  seat,	  from	  more	  competitive	  candidates.	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  the	  two	  models	  proposed	   consider	   data	   only	   from	   two-­‐member	   wards	   (2MDs)	   where	   both	  candidates	  from	  the	  same	  party	  compete,	  but	  only	  one	  wins.	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The	   second	   problem	   when	   comparing	   losers	   concerns	   observations	   and	  relativity.	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	   incumbents	  are	  much	  more	   likely	   to	  win	  rather	  than	   lose,	   should	   they	   choose	   to	   stand	   again.	   Whilst	   reporting	   data	   from	   a	  scenario	  where	  a	   freshman	  wins	  but	   their	   incumbent	  party	  colleague	   loses	   is	  a	  crucial	  criteria	  of	  the	  first	  model	  proposed	  in	  this	  chapter,	  inevitably	  the	  number	  of	   observations	   for	   this	   scenario	   will	   be	   smaller	   than	   when	   the	   roles	   are	  reversed.	  So,	  reporting	  data	  from	  this	  type	  of	  scenario	  can	  be	  problematic,	  as	  it	  is	  a	   relatively	   rare	   occurrence.	   Also,	   the	   fact	   that	   these	   scenarios	   happen	  infrequently	   tells	   us	   something	   about	   incumbent	   performance	   on	   its	   own.	  Regardless,	  the	  models	  can’t	  be	  too	  ‘imbalanced’	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  used	  to	  calculate	  each	  scenario,	  as	  this	  will	  limit	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  we	  can	  make	  any	  generalisations.	  Finally,	  adding	  to	  the	  list	  of	  concerns	  is	  partisan	  swing.	  For	  this	  reason	  two	  different	  methods,	  rather	  than	  one,	  have	  been	  constructed.	  	  As	  for	  previous	  models,	  mediating	  changes	  in	  partisanship	  is	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  an	   accurate	  measurement	  of	   incumbency	  advantage.	  Previously	  discussed	  data	  indicate	   that	  any	  advantage	   is	   likely	   to	  be	  small,	   so	  accurate	  control	   structures	  need	   to	   be	   included	   in	   models	   to	   eliminate	   any	   effect.	   For	   this	   reason	   both	  models	   use	   data	   collected	   from	   2MDs,	   which	   allows	   the	   comparison	   of	  candidates	   from	   the	   same	  party	   at	   the	   same	  election.	  The	  model	   includes	  only	  data	  from	  wards	  in	  which	  parties	  field	  both	  the	  required	  candidates	  and	  where	  one	   is	   elected.	   This	   is	   an	   important	   component	   of	   the	   model	   that	   acts	   as	   a	  yardstick	  against	  which	  the	  results	  can	  be	  compared.	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The	  Role	  Reversal	  method	  of	  estimating	  Incumbent	  Loser	  Performance	  (RRILP)	  compares	  data	  from	  two	  circumstances.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  model	  averages	  the	  Candidate	  Vote	  Share	  (CVS)	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  candidates	  fielded	  by	  a	  party	   in	   wards	   where	   the	   incumbent	   candidate	   won	   a	   seat	   and	   the	   freshman	  candidate	   did	   not	   win.	   Next,	   this	   average	   is	   offset	   against	   the	   average	   CVS	  difference	  between	  candidates	  of	   the	  same	  party	   in	  wards	  where	   the	   freshman	  candidate	  wins	  and	  the	  incumbent	  candidate	  loses.	  Previous	  analysis	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  former	  scenario	  tends	  to	  occur	  much	  more	  frequently	  than	  the	  latter,	  so	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  we	  can	  expect	  for	  the	  i	  scenario	  of	  the	  model	  will	  probably	  be	   more	   than	   for	   the	   latter	   j	   scenario.	   RRILP	   for	   party	   category	   p	   can	   be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	  	  
RRILP(!) = 𝜑! − 𝜔!𝑛!!!!!! − 𝜔! − 𝜑!𝑛!!!!!! 	  	  Where	   φ	   refers	   to	   the	   CVS	   of	   an	   incumbent	   candidate	   and	   ω	   the	   CVS	   for	   a	  freshman	   in	  ward	   i	  where	   the	   lone	  winner	   is	  an	   incumbent	  or	   in	  ward	   j	  where	  the	  lone	  winner	  is	  a	  freshman.	  Chapter	  3	  provides	  greater	  detail.	  	  Table	  5.5.1	  shows	  the	  mean	  differences	  for	  each	  scenario.	  For	  the	  1,332	  cases	  of	  scenario	   i	   the	  mean	  CVS	  difference	   is	   13.25%,	   compared	   to	   just	   6.63%	   for	   the	  178	   cases	   considered	   for	   scenario	   j.	  The	   reported	   standard	   deviation	   (σ)	   for	   i	  and	   j	   is	  11.85	  and	  7.38	   respectively.	  Table	  5.5.2	  displays	   results	   for	  a	  Levene’s	  tests	   and	   independent	   t-­‐test	   for	   the	   two	   scenarios.	   The	   table	   reports	   an	   F-­‐statistic	   of	   31.958.	   This	   figure	   means	   we	   can	   reject	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   of	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homogeneity	  of	  variances,	  assuming	  instead	  that	  variances	  are	  not	  equal.	  The	  t-­‐test	   for	   the	   reported	  RRILP	   of	   6.62%	  has	   a	   t-­‐statistic	   of	   10.324.	  With	   315.076	  degrees	  of	   freedom	  the	  associated	  p-­‐value	   is	  below	  the	  0.001	   level.	  The	  results	  suggest	   that	   the	   scenario	   means	   deviate	   significantly	   from	   one	   another,	   and	  provide	   substantial	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	   the	   idea	   that	   losing	   incumbents	   do	  better	  than	  losing	  freshmen.	  	   	   n	  	   CVS	  Diff	   σ	   S.E.	  
Inc(W)-­‐Fre(L)	  i	   1,332	   13.25	   11.85	   0.325	  
Fre(W)-­‐Inc(L)	  j	   178	   6.63	   7.38	   0.553	  
[Table	  –	  5.5.1	  RRILP	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (Mean	  CVS	  Diff)	  (σ)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  	  Levene’s	  	   F	   Sig	   t	   df	   Sig	   RRILP	   S.E.	  
Equal	  Var	  Ass	   31.958	   .000	   7.267	   1508	   .000	   6.62	   0.911	  
Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   10.324	   315.076	   .000	   6.62	   0.641	  
[Table	  –5.5.2	  RRILP	  (Levene’s	  &	  Indep	  T-­‐Test)	  –	  (F)	  (Sig)	  (t)	  (df)	  (Sig)	  (ILP)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  Table	  5.5.3	  displays	  mean	  differences	  for	  each	  scenario	  by	  political	  party.	  As	  data	  for	  candidates	  categorised	  as	  Other	  are	  not	  considered,	  there	  is	  a	  slight	  drop	  in	  the	   total	   number	   of	   cases	   involved.	   Data	   for	   the	   Conservatives	   shows	   a	  mean	  difference	  for	  the	  398	  cases	  of	  scenario	  i	  of	  9.26%	  (σ	  =	  7.32).	  In	  comparison,	  the	  mean	  difference	  for	  the	  62	  cases	  of	  scenario	  j	  is	  just	  5.11%	  (σ	  =	  5.28).	  As	  with	  the	  results	  described	  above,	  these	  data	  suggest	  that	  when	  incumbents	  lose,	  they	  tend	  to	  lose	  by	  less.	  For	  Labour	  the	  differences	  are	  slightly	  larger	  for	  both	  scenarios,	  but	  broadly	  similar.	  For	  the	  341	  cases	  of	  scenario	  i	  the	  difference	  is	  10.77%	  (σ	  =	  9.37),	  whilst	  the	  51	  cases	  of	  scenario	  j	  have	  a	  difference	  of	  just	  6.98%	  (σ	  =	  7.43).	  The	  results	   for	  Labour	   imply	  also,	   that	   incumbents	   lose	  by	   less	   than	   freshmen.	  For	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  the	  difference	  recorded	  for	  scenario	  i	  is	  the	  largest	  of	  all	  three	  major	  parties,	  with	  the	  351	  cases	  having	  a	  mean	  of	  12.27%	  (σ	  =	  9.18).	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These	  data	  are	   in	   line	  with	  data	  described	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  earlier	   in	  this	   thesis,	   incumbent	   candidates	   do	   markedly	   better	   than	   their	   freshman	  counterparts.	   Conversely,	   the	   mean	   difference	   for	   Lib	   Dem	   scenario	   j	   has	   the	  smallest	  difference	  of	  the	  three	  parties,	  just	  4.22%	  (σ	  =	  3.11),	  which	  also	  signals	  the	  strong	  relative	  performance	  of	  Lib	  Dem	  incumbent	  candidates.	  	   Party	   Status	   n	  	   CVS	  Diff	  %	   σ	   S.E.	  
Con	   Inc(W)-­‐Fre(L)	  i	   398	   9.26	   7.32	   0.367	  Fre(W)-­‐Inc(L)	  j	   62	   5.11	   5.28	   0.670	  
Lab	   Inc(W)-­‐Fre(L)	  i	   341	   10.77	   9.37	   0.507	  Fre(W)-­‐Inc(L)	  j	   51	   6.98	   7.43	   1.040	  
LD	   Inc(W)-­‐Fre(L)	  i	   351	   12.27	   9.18	   0.490	  Fre(W)-­‐Inc(L)	  j	   41	   4.22	   3.11	   0.486	  
[Table	  –5.5.3	  RRILP	  by	  Party	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (Mean	  CVS	  Diffs)	  (σ)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  Table	  5.5.4	  displays	  results	  from	  Levene’s,	  and	  independent	  t-­‐tests	  between	  the	  scenarios	   for	   all	   three	   major	   parties.	   The	   data	   reveal	   a	   familiar	   trend.	   The	  Conservative	  scenarios	  report	  an	  RRILP	  of	  4.15%,	  with	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  5.435	  and	  a	  p-­‐value	   below	   the	   0.001	   level	   when	   equal	   variances	   are	   not	   assumed	   (df	   =	  101.597).	   The	   RRILP	   estimate	   is	   higher	   than	   previous	   assessments	   of	  incumbency	  advantage	  for	  the	  Conservatives.	  These	  data	  are	  similar	  for	  Labour,	  where	  the	  scenarios	  differ	  by	  some	  3.78%.	  The	  associated	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  2.757	  has	  a	   p-­‐value	   below	   the	   0.01	   level	   when	   equal	   variances	   are	   assumed	   (df	   =	   390).	  Comparing	   this	   with	   previous	   results,	   the	   RRILP	   estimation	   is	   similar	   to	   Tory	  results,	  though	  slightly	  lower	  in	  this	  instance.	  As	  expected,	  results	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  reveal	  the	  greatest	  disparity	  between	  the	  two	  scenarios.	  Table	  5.5.4,	  reports	   an	  RRILP	   of	   8.04%	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats,	  which	   is	   around	  double	  that	  for	  either	  the	  Conservatives	  or	  Labour.	  The	  t-­‐statistic	  is	  11.645	  and	  has	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	  level	  when	  equal	  variances	  are	  not	  assumed	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(df	   =	   145.474).	   The	  RRILP	   estimate	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	   is	   supportive	   of	  those	  described	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter.	  	  Party	   Levene’s	   F	   Sig	   t	   df	   Sig	   RRILP	   S.E.	  
Con	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	  	   6.695	   .010	   4.297	   458	   .000	   4.15	   0.967	  Equal	  Var	  Not	  	   	  	   	  	   5.435	   101.597	   .000	   4.15	   0.764	  
Lab	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	  	   .624	   .430	   2.757	   390	   .006	   3.78	   1.373	  Equal	  Var	  Not	  	   	  	   	  	   3.271	   76.010	   .002	   3.78	   1.157	  
LD	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	   18.933	   .000	   5.563	   390	   .000	   8.04	   1.445	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   11.645	   145.474	   .000	   8.04	   0.690	  
[Table	  -­‐	  5.5.4	  RRILP	  by	  Party	  (Levene’s	  &	  Indep	  T-­‐Test)	  –	  (F)	  (Sig)	  (t)	  (df)	  (Sig)	  (ILP)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐
2010]	  	  These	   results	   imply	   that,	   even	   when	   losing,	   incumbents	   perform	   significantly	  better	   than	   their	   freshmen	   colleagues.	   Estimates	   range	   from	   3.8-­‐8%	   and	  maintain	  previously	  discussed	  trends,	  with	  incumbency	  having	  greater	  electoral	  value	   for	   Lib	   Dem	   candidates	   than	   either	   Labour	   or	   the	   Conservatives.	   The	  estimates,	  though	  similar	  in	  proportion	  between	  the	  parties,	  are	  roughly	  double	  those	  estimated	  using	  SIP	  and	  SRS	  measures.	  	  The	  RRILP	  model	  has	  effectively	  compared	  two	  opposing	  scenarios;	  one	  where	  an	   incumbent	   candidate	   wins,	   whilst	   a	   freshman	   colleague	   loses,	   and	   another	  scenario	  where	  an	  incumbent	  candidate	  loses,	  whilst	  a	  freshman	  colleague	  wins.	  These	   scenarios	   are	  mutually	   comparable	   because	   of	   their	   requirements	   for	   a	  single	  winning	  candidate	  and	  because	  they	  only	  compare	  the	  relative	  difference	  between	  winning	  and	  losing	  candidates.	  As	  such,	  if	  incumbency	  were	  to	  have	  no	  effect	   on	   candidate	   performance,	  we	   could	   expect	   the	   differences	   between	   the	  two	  candidates	   in	   each	   scenario	   to	  be	   similar	   and	  balance.	   In	   this	   instance	   the	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model	  would	  report	  no	  difference.	  Nevertheless,	   for	  all	   the	  three	  major	  parties,	  the	  data	  reveals	  deviations	  that	  are	  statistically	  significant.	  	  However,	  the	  model’s	  inherent	  weakness	  is	  its	  lop-­‐sidedness.	  As	  outlined	  above,	  there	   are	   far	   fewer	   instances	   of	   incumbents	   losing	   whilst	   their	   freshman	  colleague	   wins.	   Although	   independent	   t-­‐tests	   take	   this	   imbalance	   into	  consideration,	  readers	  must	  be	  reminded	  that	  the	  model	  is	  essentially	  selecting	  random	  rare	  events	  and	  thus	  may	  be	  over	  representing	  a	  small	  number	  of	  cases	  in	  the	  j	  scenario	  of	  the	  model.	  The	  number	  of	  cases	  for	  these	  scenarios	  is	  just	  62	  for	  the	  Conservatives,	  51	  for	  Labour	  and	  just	  41	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  The	  number	  of	  cases	  used	  to	  calculate	  these	  figures	   is	  not	  sufficient	   for	  widespread	  generalisation.	   Consequently,	   though	   the	   results	   from	   the	   RRILP	   method	   are	  interesting	   and	   important	   in	   their	   own	   right,	   particularly	   as	   they	   support	   the	  narrative	  established	  earlier	  in	  chapter	  5,	  the	  results	  are	  not	  definitive	  on	  their	  own.	  For	  this	  reason,	  as	  well	  as	  others	  detailed	  below,	  I	  offer	  a	  second	  estimator.	  	  The	   Experienced	   Partner	   Method	   of	   estimating	   Incumbent	   Loser	   Performance	  (EPILP)	  operates	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  the	  RRILP	  model,	  except	  for	  one	  key	  detail.	  The	   latter	   half	   of	   the	  model,	   this	   time	   denoted	   as	   the	   k	  half,	   compares	   wards	  where	  both	  the	  winner	  and	  loser	  for	  the	  party	  are	   incumbents.	  EPILP	  for	  party	  category	  p	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	  EPILP(!) = 𝜑! − 𝜔!𝑛!!!!!! − 𝜑!! − 𝜑!!𝑛!!!!!! 	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Where	   φ	   refers	   to	   the	   CVS	   of	   an	   incumbent	   candidate	   and	   ω	   the	   CVS	   for	   a	  freshman	  in	  ward	   i	  where	  the	  lone	  winner	  is	  an	  incumbent	  or	   in	  ward	  k	  where	  the	   lone	   winner	   is	   also	   an	   incumbent,	   but	   ran	   with	   an	   incumbent	   colleague.	  Chapter	  3	  provides	  greater	  detail.	  	  The	  EPILP	  model	   is	   slightly	  different	   to	   the	  RRILP	   in	   that	   it	   does	  not	   compare	  two	  opposing	  scenarios;	  rather	  it	  compares	  two	  different	  types	  of	  loser.	  Scenario	  
i	   of	   this	   model	   is	   the	   same	   scenario	   i	   from	   the	   RRILP	   method,	   where	   the	  incumbent	  candidate	  wins	  whilst	  a	  freshman	  colleague	  loses.	  But	  the	  k	  scenario	  also	   includes	   a	   winning	   incumbent,	   but	   to	   compare	   against	   an	   incumbent	  candidate	  who	  fails	  to	  win.	  The	  model	  uses	  incumbent	  candidates	  as	  the	  winning	  benchmark	   in	  both	   segments	  and	   takes	   the	  difference	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	   control	  for	  variations	  in	  winner	  performance.	  As	  before,	  if	  incumbency	  were	  to	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  candidate	  performance	  then	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  scenarios	  would	  balance	  and	  the	  model	  would	  report	  no	  difference.	  	  Table	  5.5.5,	  shows	  group	  statistics	  for	  i	  and	  k	  scenarios	  in	  the	  EPILP	  model.	  The	  i	  scenario	   statistics	   remain	   unchanged	   from	   the	  RRILP	  model,	  with	   a	  mean	  CVS	  difference	   of	   13.25%	   and	   (σ	   =	   11.85).	   The	   425	   cases	   considered	   for	   the	   k	  scenario	  have	  a	  mean	  CVS	  difference	  of	  6.9%(σ	  =	  6.77),	  which	   is	  similar	   to	   the	  result	   for	   scenario	   j	  reported	   in	   the	  RRILP	  model,	   just	  0.3%	   larger.	  Table	  5.5.6	  shows	  data	  from	  Levene’s	  and	  independent	  t-­‐tests	  for	  the	  scenarios.	  The	  results	  report	  an	  EPILP	  of	  6.35%	  with	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  88.985,	  which	  is	  significant.	  The	  associated	   t-­‐statistic	   is	   13.748	   and	   resulting	   p-­‐value	   is	   below	   the	   0.001	   level	  when	  equal	  variances	  are	  not	  assumed	  (df	  =	  1,270.257).	  The	  EPILP	  results	  are	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similar	  to	  those	  reported	  for	  the	  RRILP	  model,	  and	  further	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  incumbents	  do	  better	  than	  their	  freshmen	  colleagues,	  even	  when	  they	  lose.	  	   Status	   n	  	   CVS	  Diff	   σ	   S.E.	  
Inc(W)-­‐Fre(L)	  i	   1,332	   13.25	   11.85	   0.325	  
Inc(W)-­‐Inc(L)	  k	   425	   6.90	   6.77	   0.329	  
[Table	  –	  5.5.5	  EPILP	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (Mean	  CVS	  Diff)	  (σ)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  
	  Levene’s	  	   F	   Sig	   t	   df	   Sig	   EPILP	   S.E.	  
Equal	  Var	  Ass	   88.985	   .000	   10.514	   1755	   .000	   6.35	   0.604	  
Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   13.748	   1270.257	   .000	   6.35	   0.462	  
[Table	  –	  5.5.6	  EPILP	  (Levene’s	  &	  Indep	  T-­‐Test)	  –	  (F)	  (Sig)	  (t)	  (df)	  (Sig)	  (ILP)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  Table	   5.5.7,	   shows	   group	   statistics	   for	   i	   and	   j	   scenarios	   by	   party.	   Again	   the	   i	  scenario	   statistics	   remain	   unchanged	   from	   the	   RRILP	   model,	   and	   the	   total	  number	   of	   cases	   drop	   slightly	   as	   candidates	   categorised	   as	  Other	   are	   now	  not	  considered.	  For	  the	  k	  scenarios	  the	  number	  of	  useable	  cases	  is	  more	  than	  double	  that	  for	  any	  of	  the	  j	  scenarios	  in	  the	  RRILP	  model.	  	  	  For	   the	   159	   Conservative	   cases	   collated	   for	   scenario	   k,	   the	  mean	   difference	   is	  6.41%	  (σ	  =	  6.72),	  which	  is	  slightly	  higher	  than	  reported	  under	  the	  RRILP	  model.	  For	  Labour	  this	  time	  the	  mean	  difference	  is	  slightly	  less	  at	  6.05%	  (σ	  =	  5.63).	  As	  expected	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  registered	  the	   lowest	  difference	   for	  scenario	  k,	  5.90%	  (σ	  =	  4.29),	  though	  the	  difference	  appears	  to	  be	  slightly	  larger	  than	  under	  the	  RRILP	  model.	   Though	   there	   are	   slight	   differences	   between	   the	  k	   scenarios	  under	   the	   EPILP	   model	   and	   j	   scenarios	   under	   the	   RRILP	   model,	   overall	   the	  results	  are	  similar	  enough	  to	  suggest	  that	  they	  tell	  the	  same	  story.	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Party	   Status	   n	   CVS	  Diff	  %	   σ	   S.E.	  
Con	   Inc(W)-­‐Fre(L)	  i	   398	   9.26	   7.32	   0.367	  Inc(W)-­‐Inc(L)	  k	   159	   6.41	   6.72	   0.533	  
Lab	   Inc(W)-­‐Fre(L)	  i	   341	   10.77	   9.37	   0.507	  Inc(W)-­‐Inc(L)	  k	   144	   6.05	   5.63	   0.469	  
LD	   Inc(W)-­‐Fre(L)	  i	   351	   12.27	   9.18	   0.490	  Inc(W)-­‐Inc(L)	  k	   77	   5.90	   4.29	   0.489	  
[Table	  –	  5.5.7	  EPILP	  by	  Party	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (Mean	  CVS	  Diffs)	  (σ)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  Table	  5.5.8	  shows	  results	   from	  Levene’s	  and	  independent	  t-­‐tests	  for	  the	   i	  and	  k	  scenarios	  and	  as	  for	  RRILP	  results,	  the	  EPILP	  data	  confirms	  previously	  discussed	  analysis	   in	   this	   chapter.	   For	   the	   Conservatives	   the	   Levene’s	   test	   reports	   an	   F-­‐statistic	  of	  5.348,	   that	   is	  below	   the	  0.05	   level	  and	   therefore	  significant.	  For	   the	  Tories,	  EPILP	  is	  the	  smallest	  of	  the	  three	  major	  parties,	  at	  just	  2.85%.	  This	  result	  is	  1.3%	   less	   than	   for	   the	  Tories	  under	   the	  RRILP	  method.	  However,	   the	  2.85%	  figure	  is	  much	  more	  comparable	  with	  the	  SIP	  and	  SRS	  data	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  chapter	  5.	  The	  scenario	  point	  estimates	  deviate	  significantly	   from	  one	  another,	  with	   a	   t-­‐statistic	   of	   4.411	   and	   a	   corresponding	   p-­‐value	   below	   the	   0.001	   level	  when	  equal	  variances	  are	  not	  assumed.	  	  For	  Labour	  candidates,	  the	  Levene’s	  results	  show	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  16.658,	  which	  is	  below	  the	  0.001	  level	  and	  significant.	  Interestingly,	  for	  Labour	  candidates	  the	  EPILP	   method	   gives	   a	   greater	   difference	   than	   under	   the	   RRILP	   method,	   by	  almost	   1%.	   These	   data	   place	   estimations	   of	   the	   magnitude	   of	   incumbency	  advantage	   more	   in	   line	   with	   the	   SIP	   and	   SRS	   data	   described	   earlier.	   For	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  as	  for	  the	  RRILP	  method,	  Liberal	  Democrat	  incumbents	  score	  the	   highest	   EPILP.	   Levene’s	   test	   results	   show	   an	   F-­‐statistic	   of	   23.313	   that	   is	  significant,	   as	   it	   is	   below	   the	   0.001	   level.	   The	   EPILP	   figure	   of	   6.37%	   has	   an	  associated	   t-­‐statistic	  of	  9.191	  and	  a	  p-­‐value	   that	   is	  below	  the	  0.001	   level	  when	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equal	   variances	   are	   not	   assumed.	   Though	   the	   EPILP	   figure	   is	   1.67%	   less	   than	  under	  the	  RRILP	  method,	  the	  results	  indicate	  yet	  again,	  that	  Lib	  Dem	  incumbent	  losers	  do	  best	  relatively.	  Also	  of	  interest	  is	  that	  the	  results	  for	  the	  EPILP	  method	  are	   within	   a	   reasonable	   range	   of	   those	   described	   for	   previous	   estimations	   of	  incumbency	  effects.	  	   Party	   	  Levene’s	  	   F	   Sig	   t	   df	   Sig	   EPILP	   S.E.	  
Con	   Equal	   Var	  Ass	   5.348	   .021	   4.253	   555	   .000	   2.85	   0.671	  Equal	   Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   4.411	   315.105	   .000	   2.85	   0.647	  Lab	   Equal	   Var	  Ass	   16.658	   .000	   5.621	   483	   .000	   4.71	   0.838	  Equal	   Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   6.821	   427.456	   .000	   4.71	   0.691	  LD	   Equal	   Var	  Ass	   23.313	   .000	   5.940	   426	   .000	   6.37	   1.072	  Equal	   Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   9.191	   250.107	   .000	   6.37	   0.693	  [Table	  –	  5.5.8	  EPILP	  by	  Party	  (Levene’s	  &	  Indep	  T-­‐Test)	  –	  (F)	  (Sig)	  (t)	  (df)	  (Sig)	  (ILP)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐
2010]	  	  Overall,	   the	   data	   reported	   in	   table	   5.5.8	   is	   encouraging	   and	   corresponds	   with	  results	   described	   under	   the	   RRILP	   method	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter.	   The	   key	  differences	  between	  the	  EPILP	  and	  RRILP	  models	  are	  the	  k	  and	  j	  scenarios.	  These	  scenarios	   are	   different	   methods	   of	   measuring	   the	   relative	   performance	   of	  councillors	  who	  lose.	  A	  second	  glance	  at	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  models	  can	  help	   to	   explain	   why	   there	   is	   an	   observed	   lower	   figure	   in	   the	   EPILP	   model	  compared	  to	  the	  RRILP	  method.	  	  Changing	   the	   yardstick	  will,	   to	   some	  extent,	   change	   the	  output;	   so	   in	   changing	  half	   the	  model	   from	   a	   freshmen	  winner	   vs.	   incumbent	   loser	   scenario	   (j)	   to	   an	  incumbent	  winner	  vs.	  incumbent	  loser	  scenario	  (k)	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  there	  will	  be	  consequences	   for	   the	   results.	   If	   the	   general	   hypothesis	   is	   that	   incumbents	  perform	  better	  than	  freshmen,	  then	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  model	  will	  inherently	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be	   larger	   in	   the	   EPILP	   than	   the	   RRILP	  method.	   It	   is	   already	   known	   from	   data	  described	   so	   far	   in	   this	   chapter,	   that	   incumbent	   winners	   perform	   better	   than	  freshmen	  winners,	   and	   so	   in	   scenario	   j	  the	  prerequisite	   of	   a	   freshmen	  winner,	  being	  measured	  against	  an	  incumbent	  loser,	  means	  that	  the	  gap	  will	  probably	  be	  smaller	   when	   compared	   to	   the	   k	   scenario;	   where	   an	   incumbent	   winner,	   is	  measured	   against	   an	   incumbent	   loser.	   We	   can	   confirm	   this	   supposition	   by	  comparing	  data	  in	  tables	  5.5.3	  and	  5.5.7.	  	  For	  the	  Conservatives	  the	  scenario	  j	  estimation	  in	  the	  RRILP	  method	  was	  5.11%.	  This	  is	  less	  than	  the	  6.41%	  reported	  for	  scenario	  k	  in	  the	  EPILP	  method.	  For	  the	  Liberal	   Democrats,	   the	   scenario	   j	  estimation	   in	   the	   RRILP	  method	  was	   4.22%,	  which	   is	   also	   less	   than	   the	   5.90%	   recorded	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   for	  scenario	  k	  in	  the	  EPILP	  method.	  Unexpectedly,	  for	  Labour	  the	  score	  for	  scenario	  j	  in	   the	   RRILP	  method	  was	   almost	   1%	   higher	   than	   reported	   for	   k	   in	   the	   EPILP	  model,	  with	  6.98%	  and	  6.05%	  respectively.	  	  	  Though	   there	   is	   no	   sign	   of	   bias	   within	   either	   model,	   care	   should	   be	   taken	   in	  making	   any	   wide-­‐ranging	   generalisations	   from	   these	   results	   in	   isolation,	  particularly	  as	   there	  are	  relatively	   few	  cases	  considered	  at	   times.	  Nevertheless,	  the	   results	   for	   both	   these	   models	   show	   that	   incumbent	   councillors	   perform	  better	   than	   their	   freshmen	   colleagues	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   circumstances.	   This	   sub-­‐chapter	   has	   a	   number	   of	   key	   findings.	   First,	   the	   section	   has	   been	   a	   successful	  exercise	  of	  data	  utilisation;	  ensuring	  that	  a	  valuable	  resource	  has	  been	  exploited	  and	   providing	   the	   project	   with	   two	   alternative	   models	   of	   estimating	   the	  performance	   of	   incumbents.	   Second,	   the	   analyses	   in	   sub-­‐chapter	   5.5	   have	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supported	  the	  overall	  premise	  of	  an	  incumbency	  advantage	  and	  those	  assertions	  made	  earlier	  in	  chapter	  5	  about	  its	  magnitude	  and	  inter-­‐party	  comparison.	  These	  data	  corroborate	  results	  discussed	  under	  SIP	  and	  SRS	  models,	  though	  there	  are	  some	  slight	  differences	  in	  the	  magnitude	  of	  estimations.	  	  	  5.6	  –	  Concluding	  Remarks	  Chapter	  5	  has	   sought	   to	  establish	   the	  presence	  and	  magnitude	  of	  any	  electoral	  advantage	   associated	   with	   being	   an	   incumbent	   councillor	   in	   English	   local	  elections.	   The	   evidence	   presented	   supports	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   incumbency	  advantage	   that	   is	   small	   yet	   significant.	   The	   chapter	   began	   by	   examining	  disparities	  in	  the	  vote	  shares	  of	  incumbent	  and	  freshmen	  winners,	  showing	  that	  incumbents	   do	  better	   than	   their	   freshmen	   counterparts	   throughout	   the	  period	  examined	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  Building	   on	   these	   data,	   sub-­‐chapter	   5.2	   went	   on	   use	   the	   constructed	  Standardised	   Incumbent	   Performance	   (SIP)	   measure	   to	   show	   that	   incumbent	  candidates	   consistently	  outperform	   their	   freshmen	  colleagues.	  The	  SIP	  method	  used	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  able	  to	  control	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  external	  effects,	   including	  partisan	   swing.	   The	   results	   show	   not	   only	   that	   incumbent	   candidates	   are	  electorally	   distinguished	   from	   their	   freshman	   colleagues,	   but	   also	   that	   many	  councillors	   acquire	   a	   small	   electoral	   buffer	   on	   election	   day,	   that	   serves	   to	  prolong	  their	  political	  career.	  Average	  SIP	  for	  incumbent	  winners	  between	  1974	  and	  2010	  is	  2.7%,	  with	  some	  variation	  between	  the	  parties.	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This	  result	  suggests	  that	  thousands	  of	   incumbent	  candidates	  will	  have	  retained	  their	   seats	   on	   the	   council	   because	   of	   their	   incumbency.	   For	   the	   Conservatives,	  average	   SIP	   over	   the	   period	   is	   2.05%,	  meaning	   that	   some	   1,166	   Conservative	  councillors	  will	  have	   returned	   to	   their	   respective	  councils	   over	   the	  period	  as	  a	  result	   of	   their	   incumbency	   status.	   Likewise,	   the	   2.45%	   average	   SIP	   for	   Labour	  suggests	  that	  1,271	  Labour	  councillors	  may	  have	  returned	  to	  the	  council	  because	  of	   the	   advantage	   associated	  with	   their	   incumbency	   status.	   And	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats,	   an	  average	  SIP	  of	  3.97%	  means	   that	  986	  LD	   incumbents	  may	  have	  retained	  their	  seat	  on	  the	  council,	  also	  because	  of	  incumbency	  effects.	  	  Sub-­‐chapter	   5.2	   has	   also	   described	   SIP	   data	   for	   incumbent	   sophomores,	  estimating	   the	   ‘surge’.	   These	   data	   proved	   supportive	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  Sophomore	   Surge,	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   substantial	   rise	   in	   relative	   candidate	  performance	  between	  a	  candidate’s	  freshman	  victory	  and	  their	  first	  election	  as	  a	  councillor.	  The	  analyses	  showed	  that	  incumbent	  sophomores	  experience	  a	  minor	  electoral	  surge	  after	  just	  a	  single	  term	  of	  service,	  though	  its	  size	  differs	  between	  the	   three	   parties.	   The	   major	   implication	   from	   this	   finding	   is	   that	   incumbent	  effects	  are	   likely	   to	  have	  an	   immediate	   impact,	   and	   this	   impact	   is	   the	  principal	  contribution	   to	   the	   overall	  magnitude	  of	   incumbency	   advantage	   for	   all	   parties.	  Whether	  the	  effect	  is	  determined	  by	  candidate	  behaviour	  or	  status,	  for	  all	  three	  parties	   the	   SIP	  measure	   estimates	   the	   ‘surge’	   to	   be	   a	  moderate	   but	   significant	  influence	  on	  defending	  candidates’	  electoral	  performance,	  helping	  them	  to	  retain	  their	  seats.	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  Sub-­‐chapter	  5.3	  focused	  on	  the	  opposite	  end	  of	  a	  councillor’s	  career,	  comparing	  retirees	  with	   freshmen	  candidates.	  The	  chapter	  presented	  an	  adaptation	  of	   the	  Retirement	   Slump	   method	   of	   estimation,	   the	   Standardised	   Retirement	   Slump	  (SRS).	  The	  results	  showed	  that	  in	  seats	  retained	  after	  an	  incumbent	  retires,	  the	  party	   experienced	   a	   relative	   electoral	   ‘slump’.	   This	   drop,	   in	   relative	  party	   vote	  share,	   is	   attributed	   to	   the	   retiring	   councillor’s	   personal	   contribution	   to	   the	  party’s	   overall	   vote	   share.	   The	   SRS	   model	   is	   another	   way	   of	   assessing	   the	  electoral	   value	   of	   incumbency,	   but	   instead,	   estimating	   at	   the	   point	   where	   the	  incumbent	   chooses	   to	   stand	  down	   from	   the	   council.	   Although	   the	  data	   are	  not	  directly	   comparable,	   the	   results	   substantiate	   those	   trends	   observed	   under	   the	  SIP	  method	  described	  in	  sub-­‐chapter	  5.2.	  Overall,	  the	  SRS	  results	  are	  supportive	  of	  the	  inter-­‐party	  trends	  established	  by	  the	  SIP	  data,	  the	  slump	  being	  smallest	  for	  the	   Tories,	   slightly	   larger	   for	   Labour	   and	   significantly	   larger	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats.	  This	   inter-­‐party	   configuration	   is	   an	   increasingly	   recognised	   feature	  of	   all	   results	   throughout	   chapter	   5.	   Notably,	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   can,	   once	  more,	  be	  singled	  out	  as	  the	  party	  that	  is	  particularly	  susceptible	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  incumbency.	  	  Sub-­‐chapter	   5.4	   utilised	   previously	   discussed	   SIP	   and	   SRS	   measures	   of	  incumbency	   advantage	   to	   described	   data	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   experience	   on	  incumbent	   performance.	   The	   analyses	   not	   only	   supported	   the	   premise	   of	   an	  incumbency	   advantage	   in	   English	   local	   elections,	   but	   also	   demonstrated	   that	  candidates’	   level	   of	   experience	   may	   have	   significant	   effects.	   Using	   vote	   share	  data,	   the	   sub-­‐chapter	   established	   candidate	   career	   trends	   whilst	   discussing	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results	   that	  revealed	   familiar	  differences	  between	  the	  parties.	  The	  chapter	  also	  presented	  SIP	  and	  SRS	   results	   for	   the	  experience	  groups,	  which	   indicated	   that,	  for	   Labour	   and	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   at	   least,	   longer	   serving	   incumbents	  performed	  better	   than	   shorter	   serving	   ones.	   Interestingly,	   of	   the	   three	  parties,	  longer	   serving	  Conservative	   incumbents	  performed	  worst	   and	  often	  did	  worse	  than	   shorter	   serving	   Tories.	   Although,	   experience	   had	   a	   significant	   effect	   on	  Labour	  candidates’	  performance,	  at	  times	  showing	  drastically	  greater	  sensitivity	  to	   electoral	   experience	   than	   for	   the	   Conservatives,	   data	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	  showed	  the	  greatest	  gaps	  between	  experience	  groups.	  These	  differing	  trends	  for	  the	  parties	  are	  illustrated	  in	  figures	  5.4.32	  and	  5.4.35.	  	  Sub-­‐chapter	  5.5	  was	  principally	  an	  exercise	  in	  data	  utilisation,	  ensuring	  that	  an	  unused	   resource	  has	  been	  exploited,	  but	   also	   ensuring	   that	  previous	  estimates	  are	  corroborated	  by	  a	  different	  set	  of	  data.	  The	  models	  provided	  the	  project	  with	  two	   alternative	   ways	   of	   estimating	   the	   performance	   of	   defending	   councillors.	  The	   section	   presented	   two	   different	   methods	   of	   estimating	   any	   electoral	  advantage	  in	  situations	  where	  incumbents	  were	  unsuccessful.	  Data	  for	  both	  the	  RRILP	   and	  EPILP	  methods	   implied	   that	   incumbents	   significantly	   outperformed	  freshmen	  under	  different	   circumstances,	   by	   between	  2.9%	  and	  8%,	   depending	  on	   the	   party	   and	   model	   used.	   The	   findings	   from	   sub-­‐chapter	   5.5	   support	  assertions	   made	   earlier	   in	   the	   chapter,	   following	   previously	   described	  observations	  for	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effect	  and	  inter-­‐party	  trend.	  	  On	  a	  final	  note,	  results	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  been	  striking	  throughout	  this	  chapter,	  particularly	  when	  compared	  with	  results	  for	  the	  two	  other	  parties.	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The	  difference	  is	  marked	  and	  consistent.	  Results	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  suggested	   that	   incumbency	   and	   experience	   may	   be	   of	   significant	   value	   to	   the	  party’s	  electoral	  fortune.	  These	  data	  are	  in	  tune	  with	  some	  established	  research	  on	  the	  Liberal	  Democrat’s	  electoral	  strategy	  and	  progress	  throughout	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (Johnston	  &	  Pattie,	  1997;	  Dorling	  et	  al,	  1998;	  McAllister	  et	  al,	  2002	  &	  Cutts,	  2006),	  namely,	   the	  attempts	   to	  bridge	   the	  parliamentary	   ‘credibility	  gap’	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  strong	  and	  successful	  local	  government	  leadership.	  Targeted	  and	  effective	  local	  government	  campaigns	  are	  key	  to	  the	  party’s	  wider	  success.	   Successfully	   identifying,	   campaigning	   and	   developing	   a	   positive	  reputation	   in	   and	   around	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘Liberal	   Heartlands’	   are	   the	   key	  components	  to	  the	  “where	  we	  work	  we	  win”	  perspective,	  as	  is	  neatly	  summed	  in	  the	   title	   for	   Cutts’	   (2006)	   research	   into	   the	   efficacy	   of	   local	   Liberal	   Democrat	  campaigns.	   In	   light	   of	   this,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   notion	   of	   incumbency	   effects	   is	  central	   to	   the	   party’s	   ability	   to	   grow,	   utilising	   popular	   personalities	   in	   local	  politics	   to	   attract	   and	   retain	   parliamentary	   support.	   This	   is	   a	   facet	   of	   the	   data	  that	  will	  certainly	  require	  further	  investigation.	  	  Chapter	  5	  has	  taken	  a	  candidate-­‐centred	  approach	  to	  testing	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  incumbency	  advantage	  in	  English	  local	  elections.	  The	  chapter	  has	  presented	  a	  significant	  body	  of	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  incumbency	  advantage	  is	  a	  very	  real	  phenomenon,	   estimating	   it	   as	   a	   small	   effect	   that	   varies	   for	   the	   three	   major	  parties.	  Chapter	  6	  takes	  a	  slightly	  different	  approach.	  Focusing	  on	  administrative	  differences,	   the	   chapter	   examines	   the	   consequences	   of	   district	   magnitude	   and	  electoral	   cycles.	   The	   primary	   aim	   of	   the	   chapter	   is	   to	   identify	   whether	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incumbency	   effects	   are	   in	   any	   way	   moderated,	   or	   facilitated	   by,	   the	  administrative	  conditions	  that	  councillors	  compete	  within.	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Chapter	   6	   -­‐	   Administrative	   Influences	   on	   Incumbent	  
Performance	  	  	  Chapter	   5	   discussed	   data	   that	   assessed	   the	   magnitude	   of	   local	   election	  incumbency	   advantage	   and	   compared	   the	   different	   status	   of	   candidates	   who	  stand	   for	   local	   elections.	   Looking	   to	   identify	   whether	   incumbency	   holds	   any	  electoral	   value,	   the	   chapter	  went	   on	   to	   compare	   incumbents,	   sophomores	   and	  retirees	  against	   the	  performance	  of	   freshmen	  by	  various	  methods.	  The	  chapter	  presented	  substantial	  evidence	  in	  favour	  of	  incumbent	  and	  experience	  effects	  on	  candidate	  performance.	  	  Chapter	  6	  has	  the	  principal	  objective	  of	  assessing	  any	  administrative	  effects	  on	  incumbent	  performance	  in	  local	  elections.	  There	  are	  two	  sub-­‐sections	  within	  the	  chapter	   covering	   components	   of	   local	   elections	   that	   may	   influence	   how	  incumbents	  perform.	  These	  components	  are	  district	  magnitude	  and	  the	  electoral	  cycle.	  First,	  sub-­‐chapter	  6.1	  discusses	  data	  on	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  district	  magnitude	  on	  incumbent	  performance.	  Duverger’s	  well-­‐established	  law	  on	  the	  influence	  of	  district	   magnitude	   on	   party	   systems	   implies	   that	   district	   magnitude	   affects	  choice.	   American	   research	   by	   Cox	  &	  Morgenstern	   (1995)	   suggests	   that	   it	  may.	  They	   say	   that	   although	   incumbency	   advantage	   has	   increased	   in	   states	   “with	  multimember	  districts,	  it	  has	  done	  so	  at	  a	  substantially	  lower	  average	  rate	  than	  in	   states	   with	   single-­‐member	   districts”	   (Cox	   &	   Morgenstern,	   1995,	   pp.	   344).	  Therefore,	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   assessing	   how	   the	   choice	   structure	   affects	   the	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success	  of	   incumbent	  candidates	   is	  an	   important	   feature	  worth	   investigating	   in	  more	  detail,	  especially	  in	  a	  national	  arrangement	  of	  local	  authorities	  that	  contain	  different	  district	  magnitudes.	  The	  question	  is,	  do	  incumbents	  fare	  better	  in	  single	  member	  districts	  or	  multimember	  districts?	  	  After	  this,	  sub-­‐chapter	  6.2	  goes	  on	  to	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  electoral	  cycles	  on	  the	  performance	   of	   incumbents.	   The	   section	   seeks	   to	   identify	   any	   discrepancy	  between	   the	   performances	   of	   incumbent	   candidates	   in	   the	   different	   types	   of	  electoral	  structure.	  Two	  types	  of	  electoral	  cycle	  are	  compared,	  quadrennial	  and	  elections	  by	  thirds.	  The	  section	  aims	  to	  compare,	  in	  a	  like-­‐with-­‐like	  manner,	  the	  differences	   in	   the	   relative	   performance	   of	   incumbents	   in	   both	   these	   electoral	  structures.	  Do	   incumbents	   fare	  better	   in	   the	  all	  out	  quadrennial	  elections	  or	   in	  elections	   by	   thirds?	   Finally,	   section	   6.3	   will	   offer	   a	   summary	   and	   some	  concluding	  remarks.	  	  6.1	  –	  District	  Magnitude	  This	   section	   introduces	   the	   examination	   of	   differences	   in	   incumbent	  performance	   under	   different	   district	   magnitudes.	   It	   begins	   by	   introducing	   SIP	  data	  for	  2MD	  and	  3MD	  elections	  across	  the	  period	  and	  then	  for	  each	  party.	  After	  this,	   the	   chapter	   moves	   on	   to	   present	   cross-­‐tabulated	   data	   on	   incumbent	  finishing	   positions,	   discussing	   the	   inter-­‐party	   trends	   for	   lone-­‐incumbent	  finishing	   positions	   across	   the	   district	   magnitudes.	   The	   section	   then	   presents	  cross-­‐tabulations	   that	   control	   for	   variation	   associated	   with	   the	   three	   major	  parties,	  plotting	  trends	  to	  demonstrate	  these	  differences.	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SIP	  results	  plotted	  by	  figure	  5.2.1	  in	  chapter	  5,	  show	  a	  slight	  growth	  in	  SIP	  over	  the	  period,	  from	  below	  2%	  to	  around	  3%.	  However,	  delving	  deeper	  into	  the	  data,	  discrepancies	   are	   revealed	   between	   the	   district	   magnitudes.	   Figure	   6.1.1	  illustrates	   the	   gap	   between	   incumbent	   performance	   in	   both	   2MDs	   and	   3MDs.	  Table	  6.1.1	  displays	  one-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  for	  the	  average	  SIP	  of	  different	  magnitude	  groups.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  average	  SIP	  for	  3MDs	  over	  the	  period	  to	  be	  2.23%	  (σ	  =	  5.16),	  which	  is	  some	  1.4%	  lower	  than	  average	  SIP	  for	  2MDs	  over	  the	  period.	  (3.65%,	   σ	   =	   7.11).	   The	   one	   sample	   t-­‐test	   results	   also	   show	   that	   we	   can	   be	  confident	  that	  both	  these	  figures	  deviate	  significantly	  from	  zero.	  The	  t-­‐statistics	  for	  the	  3MDs	  and	  2MDs	  are	  42.29	  and	  34.84	  respectively.	  As	  a	  result	  both	  have	  associated	  p-­‐values	  well	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  	  For	  both	  magnitudes	   incumbents	  have,	   in	  general,	  experienced	  a	  growth	   in	   the	  SIP	  estimate	  over	  the	  period,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  2MDs	  have	  had	  consistently	  higher	  levels	  of	  SIP.	  It	  is	  also	  clear	  that	  the	  2MDs	  have	  experienced	  a	  greater	  rise	  in	  SIP	  over	  the	  period.	  Consequently,	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  magnitudes	  has	  been	  widening,	   from	  around	  0.5%	  in	   the	  1974-­‐1978	  cycle	   to	  more	  than	  1.5%	  by	  the	  2007-­‐2010	  cycle.	  The	  implication	  of	  these	  results	  is	  that	  district	  magnitude	  may	  have	  an	  inverse	  effect	  on	  incumbent	  performance.	  If	  a	  councillor	  defends	  a	  seat	  in	   a	   3MD,	   they	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   be	   significantly	   distinguished	   from	   their	  colleagues	   than	   if	   they	   were	   standing	   in	   a	   2MD.	   Unfortunately	   there	   is	   no	  comparative	  measure	  to	  estimate	  any	  disparity	  between	  single	  member	  districts	  (SMDs)	   and	   MMDs	   and	   therefore	   we	   are	   unable	   to	   compare	   SIP	   data	   for	  candidates	   who	   stand	   in	   SMDs.	   However,	   these	   data	   are	   to	   some	   extent	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supported	   by	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   district	   magnitude	   on	  incumbent	  performance	  (Cox	  &	  Morgenstern,	  1995).	  	  
	  
[Figure	  6.1.1	  –	  SIP	  by	  FYC	  by	  District	  Magnitude]	  	   	  Dist	  Mag	   n	  	   SIP	   σ	   t	   df	   Sig.	  
2MDs	   4,597	   3.65	   7.11	   34.84	   4,596	   .000	  
3MDs	   9,519	   2.23	   5.16	   42.29	   9,518	   .000	  







1974-­‐1978	   1983-­‐1986	   1991-­‐1994	   1999-­‐2002	   2007-­‐2010	  
2MDs	   3MDs	   Linear	  (2MDs)	   Linear	  (3MDs)	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Average	  SIP	  for	  Labour	  in	  the	  3MDs	  is	  2.11%	  (σ	  =	  5.25).	  The	  t-­‐statistic	  is	  25.48	  (df	  =	  4,021)	  and	  has	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  well	  below	  the	  0.001	   level.	  Average	  Labour	  SIP	  in	  the	  2MDs	  is	  1.2%	  higher	  than	  for	  the	  3MDs,	  at	  3.31%	  (σ	  =	  6.52).	  The	  t-­‐statistic	  is	  20.72	  (df	  =	  1,593)	  and	  has	  a	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  Like	  the	  Conservatives,	  these	  data	  are	  plotted	  over	  the	  period	  by	  figure	  6.1.3.	  Finally,	  for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   the	   SIP	   data	   show	   a	   noteworthy	   gap	   between	   the	  party’s	  SIP	  averages	  over	  the	  magnitudes.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  the	  difference	  is	  larger	  than	  that	  reported	  for	  both	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives.	  Average	  SIP	  for	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  in	  the	  3MDs	  is	  3.44%	  (σ	  =	  5.11)	  and	  has	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  26.34	  (df	  =	  1,533)	  and	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  The	  score	  for	  the	  2MDs	  is	  almost	  1.5%	  higher	  than	  for	  the	  3MDs,	  at	  4.88%	  (σ	  =	  6.43).	  This	  figure	  has	  a	  t-­‐statistic	   of	   22.63	   (df	   =	   888)	   and	   an	   associated	   p-­‐value	   below	   the	   0.001	   level.	  These	  data	  not	  only	  support	  the	  notion	  of	  incumbency	  effects,	  but	  also	  show	  that	  the	   effect	   is	   significantly	   greater	   in	   2MDs	   than	   the	   3MDs.	   The	   results	   are	  consistent	   with	   existing	   literature	   on	   the	   topic	   (Cox	   &	   Morgenstern,	   1995).	  Interestingly,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  magnitudes	  was	  broadly	  similar	  for	  the	  parties,	  between	  1%	  and	  1.5%.	  However,	  though	  these	  results	  were	  similar,	  the	  inter-­‐party	  trend	  that	  has	  emerged	  from	  data	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  this	  thesis	  has	  arisen	   once	  more.	   One	  more,	   the	   Tory	   difference	   is	   the	   smallest;	   with	   Labour	  slightly	   larger	  while	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  the	   largest	  difference	  between	  the	  magnitudes.	  	   Party	   n	  	   SIP	   σ	   t	   df	   Sig.	  
Con	   1,797	   2.69	   5.69	   20.06	   1,796	   .000	  
Lab	   1,594	   3.31	   6.52	   20.72	   1,593	   .000	  
LD	   889	   4.88	   6.43	   22.63	   888	   .000	  
[Table	  6.1.2	  –	  SIP	  (2MD	  One	  Sample	  T-­‐Test)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (t)	  (df)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  Party	  (n	  =	  4,281)]	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   Party	   n	  	   SIP	   σ	   t	   df	   Sig.	  
Con	   3,563	   1.73	   4.05	   25.50	   3,562	   .000	  
Lab	   4,022	   2.11	   5.25	   25.48	   4,021	   .000	  
LD	   1,534	   3.44	   5.11	   26.34	   1,533	   .000	  
[Table	  6.1.3	  –	  SIP	  (3MD	  One	  Sample	  T-­‐Test)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (µ)	  (σ)	  (t)	  (df)	  (P)	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  Party	  (n	  =	  9,120)]	  	  When	  SIP	  data	  for	  the	  different	  magnitudes	  are	  plotted	  across	  the	  period,	  again	  significant	   differences	   in	   the	   temporal	   trend	   of	   SIP	   between	   the	   magnitudes	  emerges	   for	   the	   parties.	   Data	   for	   the	   Conservatives	   are	   plotted	   in	   figure	   6.1.2.	  The	  chart	  shows	  a	  widening	  trend,	  similar	  to	  that	  described	  by	  figure	  6.1.1.	  For	  both	  magnitudes	   SIP	   has	   risen	   over	   the	   period,	   but	   SIP	   has	   risen	  most	   in	   the	  2MDs,	  from	  1.5%	  in	  the	  first	  cycle	  to	  around	  3.5%	  in	  the	  final	  one.	  For	  the	  3MDs	  it	  has	  risen	  from	  roughly	  1.5%	  in	  the	  years	  immediately	  after	  reorganisation,	  to	  around	  2%	  by	  the	  2007-­‐10	  cycle,	  a	  rise	  of	  more	  than	  0.5%.	  This	  growth	  suggests	  not	   only	   that	   incumbency	   effects	   are	  not	   static,	   but	   also	   that	   they	   change	  over	  time,	  and	  change	  differently	  for	  the	  different	  parties.	  	  Results	  for	  the	  Labour	  party	  are	  plotted	  in	  figure	  6.1.3	  and	  it	  is	  immediately	  clear	  that	   there	  are	  differences	  when	  compared	   to	   the	  Tories.	  At	   times	   there	   is	  very	  little	  difference	  in	  SIP	  between	  the	  different	  district	  magnitudes.	  At	  other	  times	  there	   is	   a	   large	   difference,	   particularly	   during	   the	   1990s.	   For	   Labour	   3MDs,	  figure	  6.1.3	  shows	  that	  average	  SIP	  varies	  between	  1.5%	  and	  3%.	  At	   its	   lowest,	  SIP	  is	  around	  1.5%	  in	  the	  1974-­‐1978	  cycle,	  whilst	  at	  its	  highest	  Labour	  SIP	  in	  the	  3MDs	  is	  around	  2.9%,	  during	  the	  1995-­‐1998	  cycle.	  For	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  period	  Labour’s	   2MD	   SIP	   average	   varies	   significantly	   from	   the	   3MDs,	   reaching	   their	  peak	   during	   the	   1990’s	   at	   around	   4.1%,	   before	   slumping	   considerably	   during	  later	  cycles.	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  [Figure	  6.1.2	  –	  Con	  SIP	  by	  FYC	  by	  District	  Magnitude]	  	  	  
[Figure	  6.1.3	  –	  Lab	  SIP	  by	  FYC	  by	  District	  Magnitude]	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  Results	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  are	  plotted	  in	  figure	  6.1.4.	  The	  plot	  illustrates	  that	   average	   SIP	   for	   Lib	   Dem	   incumbents	   is	   consistently	   different	   across	   the	  district	  magnitudes.	  The	  data	   also	   show	   that	   average	  SIP	  has	   fallen	   for	   the	  Lib	  Dems	  over	  the	  period,	  in	  both	  the	  2MDs	  and	  3MDs.	  Whereas	  average	  SIP	  is	  some	  5.5%	  in	  the	  2MDs	  during	  the	  1991-­‐1994	  cycle,	  there	  is	  a	  steady	  fall	  throughout	  and	   by	   2007-­‐2010	   it	   had	   fallen	   by	   around	   1	   point	   to	   4.4%.	   The	   pattern	   is	  remarkably	   similar	   to	   that	   for	   the	   3MDs,	   though	   the	   drop	   is	   larger	   by	   three	  quarters	   of	   a	   point	   over	   the	   same	   time	   frame,	   so	   that	   there	   has	   been	   a	   slight	  widening	   in	   the	   gap	  between	   the	  magnitudes.	  Average	   SIP	   for	   the	  Lib	  Dems	   is	  4.5%	  in	  the	  1991-­‐1994	  cycle,	  but	  just	  2.7%	  during	  by	  2007-­‐2010.	  	  Overall,	  the	  SIP	  data	  across	  the	  magnitudes	  raises	  a	  number	  of	  interesting	  points	  about	   developments	   in	   the	   effect	   of	   incumbency,	   for	   all	   the	   parties.	   First,	   the	  gradual	  fall	  in	  SIP	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  since	  the	  1991-­‐1994	  cycle	  suggests	  that	  incumbency	  effects	  are	  not	  on	  the	  rise	  for	  all	  parties.	  Instead,	  the	  effects	  of	  incumbency	   appear	   to	   be	   more	   fluid,	   and	   to	   some	   extent	   dependent	   on	   a	  candidate’s	  party.	  Lib	  Dem	  SIP	  averaged	  some	  5.5%	  in	  1991-­‐1994,	  around	  1.5%	  more	  than	  for	  Labour	  (4.1%)	  and	  more	  than	  3%	  higher	  than	  the	  Conservatives	  (2.4%).	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	   period	   this	   gap	   had	   been	   severely	   reduced	   when	  compared	   to	   the	   rising	   Tories	   but	   was	   largely	   unchanged	   when	   compared	   to	  Labour.	  During	  the	  2007-­‐2010	  cycle,	  average	  SIP	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  was	  around	   4.4%,	   some	   1.5%	   higher	   than	   for	   Labour	   incumbents	   (2.9%),	   but	   only	  1.2%	   higher	   than	   the	   average	   SIP	   for	   the	   Tories	   (3.2%).	   The	   data	   described	  above,	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   and	   for	   the	   two	   major	   parties	   show	   that	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incumbency	  effects	  change	  over	   time	  and	   that	   the	  change	  varies	  across	  parties	  differently.	  This	  notion,	  of	  a	  growing	  incumbency	  advantage,	  is	  established	  in	  the	  American	  literature	  (Alford	  &	  Hibbing,	  1981;	  Gelman	  &	  King,	  1990;	  Cox	  &	  Katz,	  1996;	  Stonecash,	  2008)	  and	  part	  of	  the	  discussion	  was	  presented	  in	  chapter	  2	  of	  this	  thesis.	  	  The	  second	  implication	  from	  these	  data	  concerns	  the	  effect	  of	  district	  magnitude	  on	  incumbent	  performance.	  For	  all	  parties	  there	  is	  clear	  difference	  between	  the	  average	  SIP	  of	  candidates	  in	  the	  2MDs	  and	  3MDs,	  suggesting	  that	  magnitude	  may	  dampen	   the	   relative	   advantage	   of	   being	   an	   incumbent	   candidate.	   This	   gap	  appears	  to	  have	  widened	  for	  all	  parties	  over	  the	  period.	  One	  explanation	  for	  this	  may	  be	  shared	  campaigning.	  During	  a	  campaign	  in	  a	  multimember	  district	  where	  there	  are	  multiple	  vacancies,	  candidates	  often	  pool	  their	  resources	  and	  campaign	  together,	  leaving	  voters	  less	  able	  to	  distinguish	  between	  candidates.	  As	  Rallings	  
et	  al	  note,	  “research	  has	  shown	  that	  more	  women	  are	  elected	  under	  PR	  systems	  with	   larger	   district	   magnitudes	   than	   in	   those	   which	   employ	   single	   member	  systems”	  (Rallings	  et	  al,	  1998,	  pp.	  122).	  Perhaps	  the	  same	  could	  be	  said	  too	  for	  freshmen	   candidates	   of	   both	   genders.	   In-­‐effect,	   these	   results	   could	   be	   the	  consequence	   of	   freshmen	   candidates	   sharing	   their	   ballot	   with	   incumbent	  candidates,	   something	   akin	   to	   a	   coattails	   effect	   that	   has	   been	   described	   in	   the	  American	  literature.	  	  Third,	   the	  data	  discussed	  above	  remains	  supportive	  of	  differences	  between	  the	  parties	   described	   earlier	   in	   this	   thesis,	   advancing	   the	   discussion	   by	   adding	   a	  temporal	   dimension	   to	   those	   assertions.	   The	   impression	   that	   Tory	   councillors	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have	  the	  smallest	  electoral	  advantage,	  may	  hold	  true	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  entire	  period	   (i.e.	   1974-­‐2010),	   but	   may	   be	   invalid	   for	   any	   one	   cycle.	   For	   instance,	  Conservative	   SIP	   is	   slightly	   higher	   than	   SIP	   for	   Labour	   in	   the	  2007-­‐2010	   cycle	  and	  in	  the	  same	  cycle	  there	  is	   less	  difference	  between	  the	  Tories	  and	  Lib	  Dems	  than	  there	  was	  in	  1991-­‐1994.	  	  Another	  way	   to	  assess	   the	  relative	  performance	  of	   incumbents	  across	  different	  district	  magnitudes	  is	  by	  examining	  their	  finishing	  position,	  or	  rank.	  An	  analysis	  of	  finishing	  position	  data,	  though	  less	  powerful,	  can	  also	  help	  assess	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  councillors’	  electoral	  advantage	  influences	  their	  finishing	  positions.	  Table	  6.1.5	   presents	   finishing	   position	   data	   for	   all	  wards	  where	   only	   one	   incumbent	  stood	   for	   re-­‐election.	  Data	   tabulated	  are	   lone	   incumbent	   finishing	  positions	   for	  the	   entire	   1974	   to	   2010	   period,	   by	   district	   magnitude.	   From	   these	   data	   the	  ‘spread’	  of	  incumbent	  performance	  across	  the	  magnitudes	  can	  be	  easily	  assessed.	  Also,	   the	   data	   illustrate	   a	   more	   equitable	   comparison	   of	   performance	   by	  reporting	   a	   ‘Not-­‐Elected’	   (NE)	   percentage	   in	   the	   final	   column.	   Therefore,	  comparing	   the	   NE	   rate	   allows	   us	   to	   equate	   the	   relative	   performance	   of	  incumbents	  in	  an	  absolute	  fashion.	  	  The	   table	   shows	   that	   the	   spread	   of	   finishing	   positions	   differs	   for	   each	   of	   the	  magnitudes,	  with	  just	  16.3%	  of	  the	  57,293	  incumbents	  who	  sought	  re-­‐election	  in	  the	  SMDs,	  failing	  to	  take	  the	  top	  spot,	  and	  nearly	  all	  the	  rest	  finishing	  in	  second	  place	   (14.6%).	   Only	   1.6%	   of	   incumbents	   finished	   in	   third	   or	   below	   over	   the	  entire	  period	  examined.	  For	  the	  2MDs	  the	  spread	  widens	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  SMDs.	  The	  number	  of	  incumbents	  finishing	  in	  first	  drops	  dramatically,	  by	  almost	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25	  points	  (from	  83.7%	  to	  59%),	  and	  even	  when	  district	  magnitude	  is	  accounted	  for	  (by	  examining	  the	  NE	  figure),	  the	  portion	  of	  lone	  incumbents	  who	  were	  not	  elected	  decreases,	  though	  only	  slightly.	  The	  number	  of	  second	  placers	  increases	  by	   over	   10	   percentage	   points	   from	   14.6%	   to	   25.3%.	   Whereas	   third	   or	   lower	  finishers	  make	  up	  only	  1.6%	  of	  incumbents	  running	  in	  the	  SMDs,	  for	  2MDs	  this	  portion	  is	  almost	  15.7%.	  For	  the	  3MDs	  the	  results	  follow	  the	  trend.	  Only	  45%	  of	  lone	  incumbents	  finish	  in	  first	  place,	  whilst	  22.1%	  finish	  in	  second.	  These	  aren’t	  necessarily	  directly	  comparable	  however,	  as	  third	  place	  candidates	  win	  a	  seat	  in	  the	  3MDs.	  Almost	  one	  in	  three	  lone	  incumbents	  finished	  in	  third	  place	  or	  lower.	  The	  NE	  portion	  of	  lone	  incumbents	  is	  the	  largest	  of	  the	  three	  district	  magnitudes	  considered,	  at	  18.1%.	  	   District	  Magnitude	   	   1st	  	   2nd	  	   3rd	  	   4th	  	   5th	  +	   n	  /	  NE	  
1	   Count	   47,951	   8,366	   823	   128	   25	   57,293	  %	   83.7	   14.6	   1.4	   0.2	   0.0	   NE	  –	  16.3	  
2	   Count	   3,519	   1,510	   652	   198	   86	   5,965	  %	  	   59.0	   25.3	   10.9	   3.3	   1.4	   NE	  –	  15.7	  
3	   Count	   1,171	   576	   386	   262	   207	   2,602	  %	  	   45.0	   22.1	   14.8	   10.1	   8.0	   NE	  –	  18.1	  
All	   Count	   52,641	   10,452	   1,861	   588	   318	   65,860	  %	  	   79.9	   15.9	   2.8	   0.9	   0.5	   	  
[Table	  –	  6.1.5	  (Finishing	  Position	  by	  n	  &	  %	  &	  NE	  by	  District	  Magnitude)	  1974-­‐2010]	  	  There	  are	  obvious	  consequences	  when	  comparing	  different	  district	  magnitudes,	  such	  as,	   the	  number	  of	  vacancies	  and	   the	   total	  number	  of	   candidates	   standing.	  Both	   of	   these	   influence	   the	   different	   options	   voters	   face	   in	   their	   respective	  electoral	   circumstances.	   However,	   taking	   these	   into	   consideration,	   the	   data	  described	  above	  has	  a	  couple	  of	  implications	  for	  this	  project.	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First,	   though	   the	   effect	   of	   incumbency	   is	   evident,	   it	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   data	  presented	  in	  table	  6.1.5	  that	  it	  is	  weak.	  If	  political	  incumbents	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  control	   over	   their	   electoral	   fate,	   then	   it	   is	   unlikely	   that	   the	   data	   would	   have	  shown	   such	   a	   major	   widening	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	   lone	   incumbent	   finishing	  positions.	  If	  incumbents	  were	  always	  clear	  favourites	  i.e.	  if	  the	  effect	  was	  strong,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  so	  many	  incumbents	  would	  have	  finished	  in	  second	  and	  third.	  	  Second,	  when	  considering	  the	  shares	  of	  those	  lone	  incumbents	  who	  were	  elected	  in	   the	   2MDs	   and	   3MDs,	   many	   more	   finished	   in	   1st	   than	   the	   other	   elected	  positions.	  In	  a	  scenario	  where	  incumbency	  would	  have	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  electoral	  performance	   of	   candidates	   there	  would	   be	   an	   even	   distribution	   of	   incumbents	  finishing	   across	   all	   the	   elected	   positions.	   If	   voters	   were	   not	   distinguishing	  incumbents	   from	   freshmen,	   then	  we	  would	   expect	   to	   see	   no	   difference	   in	   the	  finishing	  positions	  of	  elected	  candidates,	  incumbent	  or	  otherwise.	  Evidently	  this	  isn’t	  the	  case,	  and	  the	  distributions	  are	  clearly	  skewed	  in	  favour	  of	  incumbents,	  no	  matter	   the	  magnitude.	   For	  both	   the	  2MDs	  and	   the	  3MDs	   the	  distribution	   is	  skewed	   towards	   first	   place,	   meaning	   that	   lone	   incumbents	   are	   more	   likely	   to	  finish	   in	   the	   higher	   elected	   positions	   than	   lower	   ones.	   Interestingly	   the	   data	  show	  that	  lone	  incumbents	  fare	  best,	  by	  a	  slight	  margin,	  in	  the	  2MDs.	  Not	  Elected	  (NE)	  rates	  in	  the	  2MDs	  are	  lowest	  at	  15.7%,	  some	  0.6%	  lower	  than	  in	  the	  SMDs.	  However,	   in	   the	  3MDs,	  18.1%	  of	   lone	   incumbents	   failed	  to	  secure	  their	  seat	  on	  the	  council.	  	  	  As	   described	   earlier	   in	   this	   chapter,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   consider	   the	  differences	  between	   the	  parties	  when	  assessing	   incumbency	  effects.	  Tables	  6.1.6-­‐6.1.8	  and	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figures	  6.1.6-­‐6.1.11	  compare	  and	  illustrate	  finishing	  position	  data	  for	  the	  parties	  across	   the	   magnitudes	   for	   the	   entire	   period.	   Table	   6.1.6	   presents	   finishing	  position	   data	   for	   lone	   Conservative	   incumbents.	   Of	   the	   21,713	   Conservative	  incumbents	   who	   stood	   for	   re-­‐election	   in	   SMDs	   throughout	   the	   1974-­‐2010	  period,	   fewer	   than	   15%	   failed	   to	   win,	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   whom	   finished	   in	  second	   place.	   Only	   0.7%	   finished	   in	   third	   place	   or	   lower.	   For	   the	   2,150	   lone	  incumbents	  in	  the	  2MDs	  just	  57.2%	  of	  incumbents	  finished	  in	  first	  place,	  whilst	  28.1%	   finished	   second	   and	   14.7	   %	   finished	   third	   or	   lower.	   For	   the	   882	   lone	  Conservative	  incumbents	  standing	  in	  3MDs,	  the	  trend	  continues.	  41.4%	  finished	  first,	  24.1%	  finished	  second,	  whilst	  34.5%	  finished	  third	  or	  lower.	  	  Comparing	  tables	  6.1.5	  and	  6.1.6	  it	  appears	  that	  Conservative	  incumbents	  in	  the	  SMDs	  have	  finished	  first	  in	  higher	  proportions	  than	  the	  average	  throughout	  the	  period,	   with	   almost	   1.5%	   more	   incumbents	   being	   elected.	   For	   the	   2MDs	   and	  3MDs	   the	  picture	   is	   slightly	  different.	  Though	  1%	  more	   than	   the	  average	  were	  elected,	  Conservative	  incumbents	  tended	  to	  finish	  in	  slightly	  lower	  than	  average	  positions,	  with	  almost	  2%	  fewer	  lone	  incumbents	  finishing	  in	  first.	  For	  the	  3MDs	  the	   results	   are	   similar.	   Lone	   Conservative	   incumbents	   tend	   to	   finish	   in	   lower	  positions,	  with	  3.6%	   fewer	   finishing	   in	   first.	  The	  pattern	   for	   lone	  Conservative	  incumbents	   is	  broadly	   similar	   to	   the	  data	   for	   all	   parties,	   but	   the	  Conservatives	  tend	  to	  do	  slightly	  better	  than	  average	  in	  SMDs,	  and	  slightly	  worse	  than	  average	  in	  2MDs	  and	  3MDs.	  	  	  	  
	  238	  
District	  Magnitude	   	   1st	  	   2nd	  	   3rd	  	   4th	  	   5th	  +	   n	  /	  NE	  
1	   Count	   18,478	   3,070	   158	   7	   0	   21,713	  %	   85.1	   14.2	   .7	   0.0	   0.0	   NE	  -­‐	  14.9	  
2	   Count	   1,228	   605	   235	   72	   10	   2,150	  %	  	   57.2	   28.1	   10.9	   3.3	   .5	   NE	  -­‐	  14.7	  
3	   Count	   365	   213	   140	   102	   62	   882	  %	  	   41.4	   24.1	   15.9	   11.6	   7.0	   NE	  -­‐	  18.6	  
All	   Count	   20,071	   3,888	   533	   181	   72	   24,745	  %	  	   81.1	   15.7	   2.2	   0.7	   0.3	   	  	  
[Table	  –	  6.1.6	  (Conservative	  Finishing	  Position	  by	  n	  &	  %	  &	  NE	  by	  District	  Magnitude)	  1974-­‐10]	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incumbents,	  the	  influence	  is	  slight	  and	  lone	  incumbents	  in	  3MDs	  are	  only	  half	  as	  likely	  to	  finish	  first	  as	  they	  would	  do	  in	  SMDs.	  	  Table	  6.1.7	  shows	  finishing	  position	  distributions	  for	  lone	  Labour	  incumbents.	  As	  for	  Conservative	   incumbents,	   of	   those	   standing	   in	   the	  SMDs	  around	  85%	  were	  successfully	  re-­‐elected.	  However,	  for	  the	  2MDs	  almost	  three	  in	  five	  lone	  Labour	  incumbents	   finished	   in	   first	   place,	   2.6%	  more	   than	   for	   the	   Conservatives.	   The	  pattern	  is	  similar	  in	  the	  3MDs	  where	  Labour	  incumbents	  finish	  more	  frequently	  in	  first	  place	  than	  the	  Conservatives.	  45.4%	  of	  lone	  Labour	  incumbents	  finish	  in	  the	  top	  spot.	  But	  more	  striking	  perhaps	  is	  the	  comparison	  between	  Labour	  and	  Conservative	   election	   rates	   in	   the	   3MDs.	   3.5%	   more	   lone	   Labour	   incumbents	  were	  elected	  in	  the	  3MDs	  than	  were	  Conservatives,	  with	  NEs	  for	  both	  parties	  of	  15.1%	  and	  18.6%	  respectively.	  This	  may	  be	  a	  symptom	  of	  Labour’s	  dominance	  in	  the	   Metropolitan	   Boroughs,	   as	   described	   in	   chapter	   4.	   Interestingly	   like	   the	  Conservatives,	  the	  NE	  figure	  is	  lowest	  in	  the	  2MDs	  at	  14.3%.	  Overall,	  the	  analysis	  of	  Labour	  incumbent	  finishing	  positions	  across	  the	  different	  district	  magnitudes	  supports	   the	   notion	   of	   an	   incumbency	   advantage,	   suggesting	   that	   Labour	  incumbents	  perform	  slightly	  better	  than	  the	  Conservatives	  in	  the	  MMDs.	  Slightly	  more	   Labour	   incumbents	   tend	   to	   finish	   in	   first	   place	   and	   more	   Labour	  incumbents	  are	  successfully	  re-­‐elected	  in	  the	  3MDs.	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District	  Magnitude	   	   1st	  	   2nd	  	   3rd	  	   4th	  	   5th	  +	   n	  /	  NE	  
1	   Count	   17,247	   2,845	   203	   8	   1	   20,304	  %	   84.9	   14.0	   1.0	   0.0	   0.0	   NE	  -­‐	  15.1	  
2	   Count	   1,194	   518	   191	   74	   20	   1,997	  %	  	   59.8	   25.9	   9.6	   3.7	   1.0	   NE	  -­‐	  14.3	  
3	   Count	   504	   262	   176	   97	   70	   1,109	  %	  	   45.4	   23.6	   15.9	   8.7	   6.3	   NE	  -­‐	  15.1	  
All	   Count	   18,945	   3,625	   570	   179	   91	   23,410	  %	  	   80.9	   15.5	   2.4	   0.8	   0.4	   	  	  
[Table	  –	  6.1.7	  (Labour	  Finishing	  Position	  by	  n	  &	  %	  &	  NE	  by	  District	  Magnitude)	  1974-­‐10]	  	  Figure	   6.1.7	   charts	   the	   distribution	   of	   lone	   incumbent	   finishing	   positions	   for	  Labour	   across	   the	   different	   district	   magnitudes.	   The	   chart	   illustrates	   not	   only	  how	   the	   finishing	   positions	   change,	   but	   also	   how	   Labour	   incumbents	   perform	  slightly	   better	   the	  Conservatives.	   Finishing	  positions	   for	   Labour	   incumbents	   in	  the	  SMDs	  fall	  fairly	  sharply	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  2MDs	  and	  even	  more	  so	  in	  the	  3MDs.	  As	  for	  the	  Conservatives,	  this	  pattern	  indicates	  not	  only	  that	  incumbency	  has	   some	   influence	  on	   the	   success	  of	   Labour	   candidates,	   be	   it	   a	  weak	  one,	   but	  also	   that	   incumbency	   is	  worth	   slightly	  more	   to	   Labour	   incumbents	   electorally.	  The	  first	  place	  spread	  across	  the	  magnitudes	  for	  Labour	  is	  39.5%.	  Though	  this	  is	  still	   a	   large	   spread,	   the	   difference	   is	   about	   4%	   smaller	   than	   that	   for	   the	  Conservatives.	  Like	  the	  Conservatives,	  although	  incumbency	  clearly	  has	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  finishing	  position	  of	   lone	  Labour	   incumbents,	   the	   influence	  also	  appears	  to	  be	  small.	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higher	  for	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  than	  for	  the	  other	  parties,	  at	  19.5%.	  This	   is	  almost	  1%	  higher	  than	  the	  Conservatives	  and	  4.5%	  higher	  than	  for	  Labour.	  	   District	  Magnitude	   	   1st	  	   2nd	  	   3rd	  	   4th	  	   5th	  +	   n	  /	  NE	  
1	   Count	   7,760	   1,551	   168	   6	   0	   9,485	  %	   81.7	   16.4	   1.8	   0.1	   0.0	   NE	  -­‐	  18.3	  
2	   Count	   711	   222	   133	   32	   17	   1,115	  %	  	   63.8	   19.9	   11.9	   2.9	   1.5	   NE	  -­‐	  16.3	  
3	   Count	   209	   69	   40	   39	   38	   395	  %	  	   52.9	   17.5	   10.1	   9.9	   9.6	   NE	  -­‐	  19.5	  
All	   Count	   8,680	   1,842	   341	   77	   55	   10,995	  %	  	   78.9	   16.8	   3.1	   0.7	   0.5	   	  	  
[Table	  –	  6.1.8	  (Liberal	  Democrat	  Finishing	  Positions	  by	  n	  &	  %	  &	  NE	  by	  District	  Mag)	  1974-­‐10]	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3MDs,	  is	  much	  smaller	  for	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  than	  for	  the	  other	  parties,	  at	  just	  28.8%.	  This	  is	  compared	  to	  39.5%	  for	  Labour	  and	  43.7%	  for	  the	  Conservatives.	  	  There	   are	   a	   number	   of	   implications	   from	   these	   data.	   The	   first	   is	   that	   district	  magnitude	   clearly	   has	   less	   of	   an	   effect	   on	   lone	   Lib	   Dem	   incumbent’s	   finishing	  position	  than	  for	  the	  other	  parties.	  From	  this	  we	  can	  infer	  that	  incumbency	  may	  have	  a	  stronger	  effect	  for	  the	  Lib	  Dems.	  Across	  all	  district	  magnitudes,	   lone	  Lib	  Dem	  incumbents	  are	  more	  likely	  than	  not	  to	  finish	  in	  first	  place.	  The	  same	  cannot	  be	   said	   for	   the	   other	   two	   parties.	   Second,	   the	   notion	   of	   greater	   incumbency	  effects	  for	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  in	  previous	  chapters.	  Whilst	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  show	  the	  highest	  NE	  for	  all	  magnitudes,	  the	  first	  place	  spread	  for	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  is	  far	  lower	  than	  for	  the	  other	  two	  parties	  and	  this	  only	  serves	  to	  support	  inter-­‐party	  differences	  discussed	  throughout	  the	  thesis	  thus	  far.	  	  Figures	   6.1.9-­‐6.1.11	   chart	   the	   same	   data,	   but	   this	   time	   for	   each	  magnitude	   by	  party.	  The	  charts	  have	  been	  reconfigured	  in	  this	  way	  to	  highlight	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  parties	  across	  respective	  SMD,	  2MD	  and	  3MD	  incumbent	   finishing	  positions.	  Whilst	  data	  for	  the	  SMDs	  shows	  little	  disparity	  between	  the	  parties,	  in	  the	  2MDs	  and	  3MDs	   there	   is	  a	   ‘distancing’	  between	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  and	  the	  two	  other	  parties.	  Figure	  6.1.10	  shows	  data	  for	  the	  SMDs	  and	  there	  are	  only	  slight	   differences	   between	   the	   parties,	   Labour	   and	   Tories	   following	   a	   broadly	  similar	  pattern	  whilst	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  have	  slightly	  more	  incumbents	  finishing	  first	  and	  fewer	  in	  second.	  Figure	  6.1.11	  shows	  the	  distributions	  for	  the	  3MDs,	  where	  the	   difference	   between	   Lib	   Dems	   and	   the	   other	   parties	   is	   more	   pronounced.	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Labour	  and	  Tory	  distributions	  are	  shallower,	  whilst	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  retain	  a	  greater	  elevation.	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Interestingly,	  for	  all	  parties,	  2MDs	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  optimum	  magnitude	  for	  lone	  incumbents	  to	  win,	  having	  the	  lowest	  NE	  rate	  of	  all	  the	  magnitudes	  for	  all	  three	  parties.	  	  Section	   6.1	   has	   presented	   data	   for	   the	   effects	   of	   district	   magnitude	   on	   the	  performance	  of	  incumbents	  in	  local	  elections.	  The	  analyses	  support	  the	  notion	  of	  incumbency	   effects,	   showing	   that	   lone	   incumbents	   tend	   to	   finish	   in	   higher	  positions	   than	   their	   competitors.	   Data	   discussed	   also	   support	   previously	  presented	  results	  on	  the	  effects	  of	   incumbency	  and	  district	  magnitude	  with	  SIP	  and	   finishing	   position	   data	   broadly	   in	   line.	   The	   advantages	   associated	   with	  incumbency	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  pronounced	  for	  the	   lower	  magnitudes,	  acting	  as	  a	  catalyst	   for	   incumbency	  effects.	  Results	   indicate	   that	  SMDs	  are	  most	  conducive	  for	   incumbents,	   whilst	   2MDs	   and	   3MDs	   offer	   progressively	   less	   favourable	  conditions.	   The	  data	   have	   shown	   that	   if	   an	   incumbent	   is	   defending	   an	   SMD	  or	  2MD	   ward,	   they	   fared	   better	   than	   if	   they	   were	   to	   stand	   in	   a	   3MD.	   Clearly	  elections	  to	  SMDs	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  focused	  on	  the	  individual	  rather	  than	  the	  party,	   so	   special	   consideration	   may	   be	   needed	   when	   generalising	   from	   these	  findings.	  The	  analyses	  demonstrate	  how	  a	  slight	  change	  to	  the	  electoral	  system	  can	   alter	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   elections	   and	   perhaps	   the	   fortunes	   of	  candidates.	   Considering	   these	   explanations,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   gap	   between	  incumbent	   and	   freshmen	   is	  mitigated	  by	  district	  magnitude,	   though	   to	   varying	  degrees.	   Nonetheless,	   lone	   incumbents	   are	  most	   likely	   to	   finish	   first	   across	   all	  magnitudes	  and	  for	  all	  parties.	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As	   well	   as	   the	   influence	   of	   district	   magnitude	   on	   relative	   incumbent	  performance,	   another	   aspect	   of	   the	   data	   discussed	   in	   sub-­‐chapter	   6.1	   is	   the	  difference	   between	   the	   three	  major	   parties.	   A	   familiar	   order	   has	   emerged.	   For	  Conservatives,	   incumbency	   appears	   to	   be	   rewarded	   least,	   whilst	   Labour	  incumbents	  tend	  to	  perform	  slightly	  better.	  Perhaps	  most	  striking	  is	  the	  data	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  whose	   incumbents	  appear	   to	  do	  better	  when	  compared	  with	   the	   other	   two	   parties,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   SIP	   estimations	   and	   finishing	  positions.	   Continuing	   to	   assess	   the	   structural	   mitigations	   of	   incumbent	  performance,	  sub-­‐chapter	  6.2	  will	  go	  on	  to	  discuss	  data	  for	  the	  different	  electoral	  cycles	  used	  in	  English	  local	  elections.	  	  6.2	  –	  Electoral	  Cycle	  Section	   6.1	   used	   SIP	   and	   finishing	   position	   data	   to	   measure	   the	   influence	   of	  district	   magnitude	   on	   incumbency	   effects.	   Sub-­‐chapter	   6.2	   takes	   a	   slightly	  different	   approach	   in	   examining	   administrative	   procedures,	   focusing	   on	   the	  electoral	   cycle	   and	  how	   it	  may	  effect	   councillors’	   chances	  of	   re-­‐election.	  Under	  section	  7	  paragraphs	  3,	  8	  and	  9	  of	  the	  1972	  Local	  Government	  Act,	  Metropolitan	  Boroughs	   (MBs)	   and	   non-­‐metropolitan	   districts	   (SDs)	  were	   allowed	   to	   choose	  between	   two	  methods	  of	  electing	   their	  council,	   these	  are	  quadrennial	  elections	  or	  election	  by	  thirds.	  The	  Act	  states	  that:	  	  
“where	  such	  an	  order	  is	  in	  force,	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  whole	  number	  of	  councillors	  in	  each	  ward	  
returning	  a	  number	  of	  councillors	  which	  is	  divisible	  by	  three	  and,	  as	  nearly	  as	  may	  be,	  one-­‐
third	  of	  the	  whole	  number	  of	  the	  councillors	  in	  the	  other	  wards,	  being	  those	  who	  have	  been	  
councillors	   of	   the	   district	   for	   the	   longest	   time	   without	   re-­‐election,	   shall	   retire	   in	   every	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ordinary	   year	   of	   election	   of	   such	   councillors	   on	   the	   fourth	  day	  after	   the	   ordinary	   day	   of	  
election	  of	  such	  councillors,	  and	  in	  every	  such	  year	  the	  newly	  elected	  councillors	  shall	  come	  
into	  office	  on	  the	  day	  on	  which	  their	  predecessors	  retire”	  	  (Local	  Government	  Act	  1972,	  part	  1,	  sub-­‐section	  7,	  paragraph	  9c)	  	  Although	   the	   number	   has	   changed	   over	   the	   years,	   especially	   after	   the	  introduction	  of	  Unitary	  Authorities	  in	  1995,	  today	  there	  are	  201	  Shire	  Districts,	  67	   of	   which	   are	   elected	   by	   thirds	   and	   7	   by	   halves.	   Also,	   there	   are	   55	   Unitary	  Authorities,	   where	   19	   are	   elected	   by	   Thirds.	   Using	   data	   from	   the	   Unitary	  Authorities	  (UAs)	  and	  Shire	  Districts	  (SDs),	  this	  sub-­‐chapter	  goes	  on	  to	  compare	  vote	   shares	   of	   incumbent	   and	   freshmen	   candidates	   for	   single	   vacancy	   wards,	  where	  the	  electoral	  cycles	  are	  quadrennials	  and	  elections	  by	  thirds.	  The	  section	  presents	   vote	   share	  data	   for	   incumbent	   and	   freshmen	  winners	   in	   the	  different	  cycles,	  before	  making	  a	  comparison	  between	  the	  three	  major	  parties.	  Finally	  the	  sub-­‐chapter	  will	  offer	  some	  concluding	  remarks	  before	  moving	  on	  to	  summarise	  chapter	  6.	  	  In	   both	   quadrennial	   and	   thirds	   electoral	   cycles,	   incumbent	   winners	   tend	   to	  average	   a	   higher	   CVS	   than	   freshmen.	   Table	   6.2.1	   presents	   average	   CVS	   for	  winning	   incumbents	   and	   freshmen	   in	   the	   different	   electoral	   cycles.	   For	   the	  quadrennials,	   freshmen	  winners	   average	   a	  CVS	  of	   just	   over	  58.5%,	  with	   a	  σ	  of	  12.06.	  Incumbents	  in	  the	  same	  cycle	  average	  a	  CVS	  of	  62.31%,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  12.11,	  some	  3.78%	  higher	  than	  for	  freshmen.	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The	   thirds	   present	   a	   slightly	   different	   picture	   than	   that	   detailed	   for	   the	  quadrennials,	  with	  winning	  freshmen	  averaging	  just	  over	  54%	  of	  the	  vote	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  11.44.	  This	  average	  is	  some	  four	  and	  a	  half	  points	  less	  than	  for	  freshmen	  in	  the	   quadrennials.	   For	   incumbents	   in	   the	   thirds	   there	   is	   a	   similar	   pattern,	  incumbent	   winners	   average	   58.47%	   with	   a	   σ	   of	   11.83,	   which	   is	   almost	   four	  points	  lower	  than	  incumbents	  in	  the	  quadrennials.	  For	  the	  thirds	  the	  difference	  between	   winning	   incumbent	   and	   freshmen	   vote	   shares	   is	   4.42%	   in	   favour	   of	  incumbents.	  This	  is	  slightly	  larger	  than	  in	  the	  quadrennials.	  	  UA	  &	  SD	  SMDs	   Incumbent	  Status	   n	   Avg	  CVS%	   σ	   Inc	  Vs.	  Fre	  (%)	  
Quadrennials	  	   Freshmen	   9,936	   58.52	   12.06	   3.78	  Incumbents	   6,079	   62.31	   12.11	  
Thirds	   Freshmen	   18,873	   54.05	   11.44	   4.42	  Incumbents	   16,071	   58.47	   11.83	  
[Table	  6.2.1	  –1Vacancy	  Inc	  &	  Fre	  Winners	  in	  UA	  &	  SD	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  Electoral	  Cycle	  (n	  =	  50,959)]	  	  Two	   interesting	   facets	   of	   the	   data	   presented	   in	   table	   6.2.1	   are,	   first,	   the	   data	  displayed	   support	   the	   notion	   of	   incumbent	   performance	   surpassing	   freshmen.	  For	  both	  the	  quadrennials	  and	  thirds	  cycles,	  there	  are	  marked	  differences	  in	  the	  vote	  shares	  of	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  winners,	  around	  4%.	  Second,	  vote	  shares	  between	  the	   two	  electoral	   cycles	  differ	  markedly.	  The	  average	   incumbent	  winner	   in	   the	  quadrennials	  could	  expect	  to	  attain	  a	  vote	  share	  8.25%	  higher	  than	  freshmen	  in	  the	  thirds,	  and	  though	  there	  are	   fundamental	  differences	  between	  the	  districts,	  these	  data	   tell	  us	   that	   incumbents	  do	  well	   in	  both	   types	  of	   electoral	   cycle.	  The	  data	  suggest	  that	  both	  freshmen	  and	  incumbent	  winners	  average	  a	  higher	  CVS	  in	  quadrennials	   than	   their	   counterparts	   that	   are	   elected	   by	   thirds.	   When	  incumbents	  are	  compared	  to	  freshmen	  in	  their	  respective	  election	  cycle,	  the	  data	  show	  that	  incumbents	  do	  only	  slightly	  better	  in	  the	  thirds	  than	  the	  quadrennials.	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Incumbents	  average	  a	  4.35%	  higher	  CVS	  in	  the	  thirds,	  and	  a	  3.05%	  higher	  CVS	  in	  the	  quadrennials,	  a	  difference	  of	  1.3%	  between	  the	  electoral	  arrangements.	  	  Table	  6.2.2	  presents	  average	  vote	   shares	   for	  Conservative	  winning	   incumbents	  and	   freshmen	   in	   the	   different	   electoral	   cycles.	   As	   for	   data	   presented	   above,	  incumbent	  winners	  perform	  better	  than	  winning	  freshmen	  from	  the	  same	  party.	  For	  the	  quadrennials,	  incumbents	  averaged	  63.16%	  of	  the	  vote	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  11.55.	  This	  is	  3.05%	  higher	  than	  freshmen,	  who	  averaged	  60.11%,	  with	  an	  σ	  of	  11.92.	  	  	  For	   the	   thirds	   electoral	   cycle,	   incumbents	   performed	   relatively	   better	   again.	  Incumbent	   winners	   averaged	   59.44%	   of	   the	   vote	   with	   a	   σ	   of	   11.45,	   which	   is	  4.35%	  higher	  than	  winning	  freshmen	  who	  averaged	  just	  55.09%	  CVS,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  11.42.	  	  UA	  &	  SD	  SMDs	   Incumbent	  Status	   n	   Avg	  CVS	  %	   σ	   Inc	  Vs.	  Fre	  (%)	  
Quadrennials	  	   Freshmen	   4,666	   60.11	   11.92	   3.05	  Incumbents	   3,000	   63.16	   11.55	  
Thirds	   Freshmen	   7.797	   55.09	   11.42	   4.35	  Incumbents	   6,269	   59.44	   11.45	  
[Table	  6.2.2	  –	  Conservative	  1Vacancy	  Inc	  &	  Fre	  Winners	  in	  UA	  &	  SD	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  Electoral	  Cycle	  (n	  
=	  21,732)]	  	  The	  data	  presented	   in	   table	  6.2.2	  are	   in	   line	  with	   those	   revealed	   in	   table	  6.2.1,	  where	   incumbent	  winners	   perform	   roughly	   4%	  better	   than	   freshmen	   for	   both	  types	  of	  electoral	  cycle.	  Winners	  for	  the	  quadrennials	  average	  a	  higher	  share	  of	  the	  vote	  than	  winners	  from	  the	  thirds.	  For	  the	  Conservatives,	  incumbent	  winners	  in	   the	   quadrennials	   perform	   relatively	   worse	   when	   compared	   to	   their	  counterparts	  in	  the	  thirds.	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  Table	   6.2.3	   presents	   average	   vote	   shares	   for	   Labour	   winning	   incumbents	   and	  freshmen	   in	   the	   different	   types	   of	   electoral	   cycle.	   As	   for	   the	   Conservatives,	  incumbent	  winners	  do	  better	  than	  freshmen	  from	  the	  same	  party	  for	  both	  types.	  For	  the	  quadrennials,	  Labour	  incumbents	  averaged	  59.97%	  of	  the	  vote	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  12.06.	  This	  is	  5.63%	  higher	  than	  freshmen,	  who	  averaged	  54.34%	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  11.07.	  	  	  For	   the	   thirds	   electoral	   cycle,	   incumbents	   and	   freshmen	   performed	   almost	  identically	  to	  the	  Conservatives.	  Incumbent	  winners	  averaged	  59.42%	  of	  the	  vote	  with	   a	   σ	   of	   12.68,	   some	   4.36%	   higher	   than	   the	   2,757	  winning	   freshmen,	  who	  averaged	  just	  55.06%	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  11.79.	  	  UA	  &	  SD	  SMDs	   Incumbent	  Status	   n	   Avg	  CVS	  %	   σ	   Inc	  Vs.	  Fre	  (%)	  
Quadrennials	  	   Freshmen	   1,123	   54.34	   11.07	   5.63	  Incumbents	   627	   59.97	   12.06	  
Thirds	   Freshmen	   5,962	   55.06	   11.79	   4.36	  Incumbents	   5,547	   59.42	   12.68	  
[Table	  6.2.3	  –	  Labour	  1Vacancy	   Inc	  &	  Fre	  Winners	   in	  UA	  &	  SD	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  Electoral	  Cycle	  (n	  =	  
13,259)]	  	  The	  data	  presented	  in	  table	  6.2.3	  support	  the	  results	  discussed	  from	  tables	  6.2.1	  and	  6.2.2,	  in	  that	  incumbent	  winners	  perform	  better	  than	  freshmen	  for	  both	  the	  quadrennials	   and	   thirds	   electoral	   arrangements.	   Labour	   winners	   perform	  similarly	   across	   the	   different	   cycles,	   freshmen	   at	   around	  55%	  and	   incumbents	  around	  60%	  of	   the	  vote.	  Also,	  unlike	   the	  Conservatives,	  Labour	   incumbents	  do	  better	   relatively	   in	   the	  quadrennials,	   averaging	  a	  higher	   share	  of	   the	  vote	   than	  winners	   in	   the	   thirds,	   5.63%	   and	   4.36%	   respectively.	   Data	   shown	   for	   Labour	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winners	  across	  the	  different	  cycles	  indicate	  either	  that	  Labour	  and	  Conservative	  incumbents	  respond	  differently	  to	  the	  electoral	  cycles,	  or	  that	  the	  method	  used	  to	  analyse	  incumbent	  performance	  across	  the	  cycles	  is	  not	  an	  accurate	  estimator	  of	  incumbent	  performance,	  and	  may	  need	  some	  reconsideration,	  a	  concern	  that	  is	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  section.	  	  The	  data	  presented	  in	  table	  6.2.4	  show	  average	  vote	  shares	  for	  Liberal	  Democrat	  incumbents	  and	  freshmen	  across	  the	  cycles.	  As	  for	  the	  Conservatives	  and	  Labour,	  incumbents	  do	  significantly	  better	  than	  freshmen	  for	  both	  types	  of	  cycle.	  For	  the	  quadrennials,	   Lib	   Dem	   winners	   performed	   similarly	   to	   Labour	   winners.	  Incumbents	  averaged	  59.17%	  of	  the	  vote	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  11.13.	  This	  is	  5.09%	  higher	  than	   for	   freshmen,	  who	  averaged	  54.08%	  with	  an	  σ	  of	  9.79.	  For	   the	   thirds,	  Lib	  Dem	   winners	   averaged	   5%	   fewer	   votes	   than	   Labour	   and	   the	   Conservatives.	  Incumbent	  winners	  averaged	  54.77%	  of	  the	  vote,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  9.63.	  This	  is	  4.91%	  higher	  than	  winning	  freshmen,	  who	  averaged	  just	  49.86%,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  8.64.	  	  UA	  &	  SD	  SMDs	   Incumbent	  Status	   n	   Avg	  CVS	  %	   σ	   Inc	  Vs.	  Fre	  (%)	  
Quadrennials	  	   Freshmen	   1,390	   54.08	   9.79	   5.09	  Incumbents	   1,116	   59.17	   11.13	  
Thirds	   Freshmen	   3,533	   49.86	   8.64	   4.91	  Incumbents	   3,232	   54.77	   9.63	  
[Table	  6.2.4	  –	  Liberal	  Democrat	  1Vacancy	   Inc	  &	  Fre	  Winners	   in	  UA	  &	  SD	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  Electoral	  
Cycle	  (n	  =	  9,263)]	  	  The	  data	   presented	   in	   table	   6.2.4	   support	   previous	  data	   described	   from	   tables	  6.2.1,	  6.2.2	  and	  6.2.3.	  Incumbent	  winners	  continue	  to	  attain	  higher	  shares	  of	  the	  vote	   than	   freshmen	   in	  both	   the	  quadrennial	  and	  thirds	  electoral	  arrangements.	  Unlike	  for	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives,	  incumbent	  Lib	  Dems	  perform	  similarly	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in	   both	   cycles,	   some	  5.09%	   to	   4.91%	  better	   than	   freshmen	   in	   the	   quadrennial	  and	   thirds	   cycles	   respectively.	   This	   suggests,	   as	   for	   the	  Conservatives,	   that	   Lib	  Dem	  performance	  may	  be	   less	  susceptible	  any	  difference	   in	   the	  electoral	   cycle.	  The	  data	  does	   imply,	   however,	   that	  Liberal	  Democrat	  winners	  do	  better	   in	   the	  quadrennials	  than	  the	  thirds,	  averaging	  some	  5%	  higher	  CVS.	  	  So	  far,	  results	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  electoral	  cycles	  on	  incumbent	  performance	  for	  the	  major	  parties	  have	  produced	  a	  rather	  mixed	  picture.	  For	  all	  parties,	  incumbents	  continue	  to	  do	  better	  than	  freshmen,	  but	  no	  conclusive	  pattern	  has	  emerged	  to	  suggest	   that	  quadrennial	   cycles	   are	   any	   safer	   for	   councillors	   looking	   to	  defend	  their	  seat,	  or	  for	  that	  matter,	  election	  by	  thirds.	  	  Another	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  the	  data	  are	  the	  different	  winning	  vote	  shares	  for	  the	  parties.	  One	  potential	  explanation	  for	  this	  facet	  of	  the	  data	  could	  be	  electoral	  contestation.	  Not	  every	  ward	  is	  contested	  by	  candidates	  for	  all	  three	  of	  the	  major	  parties	  and	  as	  such,	  winning	  candidates	  in	  single	  vacancy	  wards,	  where	  only	  one	  or	   two	   of	   the	   major	   parties	   are	   contesting,	   are	   likely	   to	   drag	   the	   average	   up	  somewhat.	   In	   light	   of	   this,	   sub-­‐chapter	   6.2	   now	   considers	   single	   vacancy	  elections	   in	   the	   different	   electoral	   cycles,	   but	   this	   time	   where	   all	   three	   major	  parties	  are	  contesting.	  	  Table	  6.2.5	  presents	  average	  vote	  shares	  for	  winning	  incumbents	  and	  freshmen	  in	   the	  different	  electoral	  cycles,	  where	  all	   three	  major	  parties	  are	  contesting.	  A	  first	  note	  on	  the	  data	  is	  that	  the	  total	  number	  of	  cases	  has	  been	  severely	  reduced;	  halving	  to	  25,760	  cases.	  For	  the	  2,235	  freshmen	  winners	  in	  the	  quadrennials,	  the	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average	  share	  of	   the	  vote	   is	  51.25%,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  9.94.	  The	  1,754	  incumbents	   in	  the	  same	  cycle	  average	  55.76%,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  10.92.	  This	  is	  some	  4.5%	  higher	  than	  for	   freshmen.	   Both	   freshmen	   and	   incumbent	  winners	   average	   around	   7%	   less	  CVS	  than	  equivalent	  data	  presented	   in	   table	  6.2.1.	  These	   figures	  have	  no	  doubt	  dropped	  due	  to	  the	  new	  criteria	  of	  three-­‐party	  contestation	  being	  imposed.	  	  	  For	  the	  thirds,	  winning	  freshmen	  average	  just	  over	  just	  50.75%	  of	  the	  vote	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  9.72.	  This	  average	  is	  half	  a	  point	  less	  than	  for	  freshmen	  in	  the	  quadrennials.	  For	   incumbents	   there	   is	   a	   similar	   pattern.	   Incumbent	   winners	   average	   just	  55.14%	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  10.37,	  which	  is	  again	  just	  half	  a	  point	  lower	  than	  incumbents	  in	   the	   quadrennials.	   Incumbents	   in	   the	   thirds	   average	   4.38%	   higher	   CVS	   than	  winning	  freshmen,	  a	  result	  that	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  quadrennials.	  	  UA	  &	  SD	  SMDs	   Incumbent	  Status	   n	   Avg	  CVS	  %	   σ	   Inc	  Vs.	  Fre	  (%)	  
Quadrennials	  	   Freshmen	   2,235	   51.25	   9.94	   4.50	  Incumbents	   1,754	   55.76	   10.92	  
Thirds	   Freshmen	   11,380	   50.75	   9.72	   4.38	  Incumbents	   10,391	   55.14	   10.37	  
[Table	  6.2.5	  –1Vacancy	  3PartyContested	  Inc	  &	  Fre	  Winners	  in	  UA	  &	  SD	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  Electoral	  Cycle	  (n	  =	  25,760)]	  	  The	  data	  presented	  in	  table	  6.2.5	  have	  two	  major	  implications	  for	  consideration.	  First,	  average	  vote	  share	  for	  both	  cycles	  and	  incumbent	  statuses	  has	  fallen,	  more	  so	   for	   the	   quadrennials,	   but	   relatively	   evenly	   for	   incumbents	   and	   freshmen.	  These	  data	  imply	  that	  the	  original	  method	  used	  for	  measuring	  cycle	  effects,	  may	  be	   biased,	   particularly	   in	   the	   quadrennials.	   Second,	   relative	   incumbent	  performance	   is	   largely	   unchanged	   for	   both	   types	   of	   electoral	   cycle.	   There	   is	   a	  small	  growth	  of	  0.72%	  in	  the	  quadrennials	  and	  almost	  no	  change	   in	   the	  thirds,	  
	   255	  
but	   the	   results,	   4.5%	  and	  4.38%	   respectively,	   indicate	   that	   there	   is	   little	   to	   no	  effect	  on	  relative	  incumbent	  performance.	  	  Table	  6.2.6	  presents	  average	  vote	   shares	   for	  Conservative	  winning	   incumbents	  and	  freshmen	  in	  the	  different	  electoral	  cycles,	  where	  all	  three	  major	  parties	  are	  contesting.	  As	  for	  the	  data	  presented	  in	  table	  6.2.5,	  incumbent	  winners	  perform	  better	  than	  winning	  freshmen	  from	  the	  same	  party	  for	  both	  the	  quadrennials	  and	  thirds.	  For	  the	  quadrennials,	  the	  1,229	  freshmen	  included,	  average	  53.05%	  of	  the	  vote	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  10.10.	  The	  918	  winning	  incumbents	  average	  57.07%	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  10.99.	  This	  is	  4%	  higher	  than	  winning	  freshmen	  in	  the	  same	  cycle.	  Average	  CVS	  for	   the	   Conservatives	   in	   the	   Quadrennials	   is	   lower	   than	   the	   results	   shown	   in	  table	  6.2.2,	   around	  7%	   lower	   for	  winning	   freshmen	  and	  6%	   lower	   for	  winning	  incumbents.	  	  For	   the	   thirds	   electoral	   cycle,	   incumbents	   performed	   better	   still.	   The	   3,996	  incumbent	  winners	  averaged	  56.33%	  of	  the	  vote	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  10.48.	  This	  is	  4.52%	  higher	  than	  the	  average	  for	  the	  4,688	  winning	  freshmen,	  who	  had	  a	  mean	  CVS	  of	  51.81%,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  9.89.	  Average	  vote	  shares	  for	  the	  Conservatives	  in	  the	  Thirds	  are	  lower	  than	  the	  results	  shown	  in	  table	  6.2.2,	  some	  3%	  lower	  for	  both	  winning	  freshmen	  and	  incumbents.	  	  UA	  &	  SD	  SMDs	   Incumbent	  Status	   n	   Avg	  CVS	  %	   σ	   Inc	  Vs.	  Fre	  (%)	  
Quadrennials	  	   Freshmen	   1,229	   53.05	   10.10	   4.01	  Incumbents	   918	   57.07	   10.99	  
Thirds	   Freshmen	   4,688	   51.81	   9.89	   4.52	  Incumbents	   3,996	   56.33	   10.48	  
[Table	  6.2.6	  –	  Conservative	  1Vacancy	  3PartyContested	  Inc	  &	  Fre	  Winners	  in	  UA	  &	  SD	  1974-­‐2010	  by	  
Electoral	  Cycle	  (n	  =	  10,831)]	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  It	   is	  clear	  that	   three	  party	  contestation	  data	  revealed	  for	  the	  Conservatives	  has	  provided	   the	  project	  with	  a	   couple	  of	  points	   to	  discuss.	  First,	   vote	   shares	  have	  dropped	  for	  both	  freshmen	  and	  incumbents.	  Freshmen	  differ	  by	  less	  than	  1.25%	  across	  the	  cycles,	  and	  incumbents	  less	  that	  0.75%.	  This	  has	  removed	  any	  of	  the	  perceived	   performance	   gaps	   across	   the	   electoral	   cycles,	   which	   was	   evident	   in	  data	   described	   earlier	   in	   this	   sub-­‐chapter.	   Second,	   the	   data	   also	   show	   that	  incumbent	  performance	  is	  not	  meaningfully	  different	  across	  the	  cycles.	  Earlier	  in	  this	  section,	  data	  had	  indicated	  that	  Conservative	  incumbents	  performed	  better	  when	   compared	   to	   their	   counterparts	   in	   the	   Thirds	   electoral	   cycle.	   The	   new	  three-­‐party	  contestation	  requirement	  has	  now	  shown	  that	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  	  Table	   6.2.7	   presents	   three-­‐party	   contestation	   data	   for	   Labour	   in	   the	   different	  electoral	   cycles.	   Incumbents	  perform	  better	   than	   freshmen	   for	  both	  cycles.	  For	  the	   quadrennials,	   the	   389	   freshmen	   averaged	   48.50%	   of	   the	   vote,	   with	   a	   σ	   of	  9.47.	  However,	  the	  242	  incumbents	  averaged	  57.07%	  with,	  a	  σ	  of	  10.99.	  This	  is	  6.12%	  higher	   than	  winning	   freshmen	   in	   the	   same	  cycle.	  The	  mean	  vote	   shares	  for	   the	   quadrennial	   cycles	   are	  much	   lower	   than	   the	   results	   described	   in	   table	  6.2.3,	  roughly	  6.25%	  lower	  for	  both	  freshmen	  and	  incumbents.	  	  The	   change	   in	   average	   vote	   shares	   is	   similar	   for	   the	   thirds	   cycle,	   though	  incumbents	   still	   do	   better.	   The	   3,562	   incumbents	   average	   55.65%	  of	   the	   vote,	  with	   a	   σ	   of	   11.11.	   This	   is	   some	   3.84%	   higher	   than	   the	   average	   for	   the	   3,613	  freshmen,	  who	  have	  a	  mean	  CVS	  of	  51.81%,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  10.42.	  Like	  the	  data	  for	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the	  quadrennials,	   the	  mean	  vote	  shares	   for	  Labour	  candidates	   in	   the	  thirds	  are	  lower	  than	  the	  results	  describe	  in	  table	  6.2.3.	  	  UA	  &	  SD	  SMDs	   Incumbent	  Status	   n	   Avg	  CVS	  %	   σ	   Inc	  Vs.	  Fre	  (%)	  
Quadrennials	  	   Freshmen	   389	   48.50	   9.47	   6.12	  Incumbents	   242	   54.62	   11.20	  
Thirds	   Freshmen	   3,613	   51.81	   10.42	   3.84	  Incumbents	   3,562	   55.65	   11.11	  
[Table	   6.2.7	   –	   Labour	   1Vacancy	   3PartyContested	   Inc	   &	   Fre	   Winners	   in	   UA	   &	   SD	   1974-­‐2010	   by	  
Electoral	  Cycle	  (n	  =	  7,806)]	  	  For	   Labour,	   three-­‐party	   contestation	   results	   have	   had	   similar	   implications	   to	  those	  discussed	  for	  the	  Conservatives.	  Vote	  shares	  for	  both	  the	  quadrennials	  and	  the	   thirds	   dropped	   for	   freshmen	   and	   incumbents,	   balancing	   out	   to	   levels	   that	  were	  barely	  distinguishable.	  Freshmen	  differ	  by	  around	  1.3%	  across	  the	  cycles,	  and	   incumbents	   by	   around	  1%,	  which	   as	   before	   removes	   any	  of	   the	  perceived	  performance	  gaps	  across	  the	  cycle	  types.	  Unlike	  data	   for	  the	  Conservatives,	   the	  difference	   in	   incumbent	   performance	   has	   become	  more	   pronounced.	   The	   data	  shown	   in	   table	   6.2.7	   suggest	   that	   the	   relative	   performance	   for	   Labour	  incumbents,	   when	   compared	   to	   freshmen,	   is	   better	   in	   the	   quadrennials.	   The	  three-­‐party	   data	   has	   widened	   the	   gap,	   from	   1.27%	   in	   table	   6.2.3	   to	   2.28%	   in	  table	  6.2.7.	  However,	  a	  measure	  of	  scepticism	  should	  remain	  about	  this	  figure	  as	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  used	  for	  the	  quadrennial	  estimations	  is	  much	  smaller	  than	  for	  the	  two	  other	  parties,	  particularly	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  Tories	  (see	  tables	  6.2.3	  and	  6.2.7).	  	  Table	  6.2.8	  presents	  three-­‐party	  contestation	  data	  for	  winning	  Liberal	  Democrat	  candidates	   in	   the	   different	   electoral	   cycles.	   As	   for	   the	   data	   presented	   for	   the	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Conservatives	  and	  Labour	   (tables	  6.2.6	  and	  6.2.7),	   incumbent	  winners	  perform	  better	   than	  winning	   freshmen	   from	   the	   same	  party	   across	  both	   cycles.	   For	   the	  quadrennials,	  the	  559	  freshmen	  selected	  averaged	  49.92%	  of	  the	  vote,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  8.33	  whereas;	  the	  536	  winning	  incumbents	  averaged	  55.17%	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  9.92.	  This	  result	  is	  5.25%	  higher	  than	  winning	  freshmen	  in	  the	  same	  cycle.	  The	  mean	  vote	   shares	   for	   the	   quadrennials	   are	   significantly	   lower	   than	   the	   results	   that	  were	  discussed	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	   in	   table	   6.2.4,	   roughly	   4%	   lower	   for	  both	  freshmen	  and	  incumbent	  winners.	  	  For	   the	   thirds,	   incumbents	   perform	   better	   than	   freshmen	   too;	   with	   the	   2,836	  freshmen	  winners	   selected	  averaging	  48.24%	  of	   the	  vote	  and	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  7.63.	  This	   result	   is	   some	   4.75%	   lower	   than	   the	   2,637	   winning	   incumbents	   whose	  mean	   CVS	   is	   52.99%,	   with	   a	   σ	   of	   8.49.	   The	   mean	   vote	   share	   for	   Lib	   Dem	  candidates	  in	  the	  thirds	  is	  lower	  than	  the	  results	  described	  in	  table	  6.2.4,	  by	  just	  over	  1%	  for	  both	  incumbents	  and	  freshmen.	  	   UA	  &	  SD	  SMDs	   Incumbent	  Status	   n	   Avg	  CVS	  %	   σ	   Inc	  Vs.	  Fre	  (%)	  
Quadrennials	  	   Freshmen	   559	   49.92	   8.33	   5.25	  Incumbents	   536	   55.17	   9.92	  
Thirds	   Freshmen	   2,836	   48.24	   7.63	   4.75	  Incumbents	   2,637	   52.99	   8.49	  
[Table	   6.2.8	   –	   Liberal	  Democrat	   1Vacancy	   3PartyContested	   Inc	  &	   Fre	  Winners	   in	  UA	  &	   SD	  1974-­‐
2010	  by	  Electoral	  Cycle	  (n	  =	  6,568)]	  	  Though	   three-­‐party	   contestation	  data	   for	  Liberal	  Democrat	   candidates	   support	  the	  notion	  of	   incumbents	  performing	  better	   than	   freshmen,	   earlier	   in	   this	   sub-­‐chapter,	   data	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   suggested	   that	   incumbents	   performed	  about	   the	   same	  across	   the	  different	   cycles	   (see	   table	  6.2.4).	  As	   for	   Labour,	   the	  
	   259	  
three	   party	   results	   in	   table	   6.2.8	   show	   that	   the	   relative	   performance	   of	  incumbents	  compared	  to	  freshmen	  is	  greater	  in	  the	  quadrennials	  than	  the	  thirds,	  though	   this	   time	   only	   slightly	   at	   0.5%.	   However,	   when	   comparing	   data	   for	  freshmen	   and	   incumbents	   across	   the	   cycles,	   the	   gap	   in	   performance	   discussed	  earlier	   in	   this	   sub-­‐chapter	   has	   been	   greatly	   reduced	   due	   to	   the	   added	  requirement	   of	   only	   examining	  wards	   that	  were	   contested	   by	   the	   three	  major	  parties.	  Freshmen	  differ	  by	  around	  1.5%	  across	  the	  cycles,	  48.24%	  in	  the	  thirds	  and	  49.92%	  in	  the	  quadrennials.	  Incumbents	  differ	  by	  around	  2.25%,	  52.99%	  in	  the	  thirds	  and	  55.17%	  in	  the	  quadrennials.	  As	  for	  the	  other	  two	  parties,	  using	  the	  three-­‐party	  contestation	  data	  removes	  most	  of	  the	  perceived	  performance	  gaps	  that	  was	  evident	  in	  data	  presented	  earlier	  in	  this	  section.	  	  Section	   6.2	   has	   discussed	   data	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   electoral	   cycle	   on	   the	  performance	   of	   incumbent	   candidates	   in	   local	   elections	   and	   the	   initial	   results	  show	  three	  key	  features.	  First,	   the	  results	  support	  the	  earlier	  discussed	  notions	  of	   incumbents	   performing	   better	   than	   freshmen,	   for	   all	   parties	   and	   for	   both	  electoral	   cycles.	   Second,	   results	   discussed	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   sub-­‐chapter	   6.2	  implied,	   at	   first	   glance,	   that	   freshmen	   and	   incumbents	   in	   the	   quadrennials	  performed	   significantly	   better	   than	   their	   counterparts	   in	   the	   thirds.	   However,	  when	   the	   analyses	   narrowed	   to	   include	   only	  wards	   that	  were	   contested	   by	   all	  three	   major	   parties;	   nearly	   all	   of	   the	   difference	   was	   eliminated.	   Third,	   as	   for	  trends	   previously	   discussed	   in	   this	   thesis,	   Conservative	   incumbents	   tended	   to	  perform	   least	   well	   when	   compared	   to	   their	   freshmen	   counterparts.	   The	   gap	  between	   incumbents	   and	   freshmen	   for	   Labour	   and	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	  was	  significantly	  wider	  than	  that	  for	  the	  Conservatives.	  	  
	  260	  
	  Overall,	   the	  evidence	   for	   the	  electoral	  cycle	  having	  any	  significant	  effect	  on	   the	  performance	  of	  incumbents	  remains	  unclear.	  Conservative	  incumbents	  appear	  to	  perform	  slightly	  better	  in	  the	  thirds,	  by	  0.5%,	  whereas	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  do	  slightly	  better	   in	  the	  quadrennials,	  again	  by	  0.5%.	  Labour	   incumbents	  also	  do	  better	   in	  the	   quadrennials,	   though	   more	   so	   at	   2.28%.	   However,	   the	   evidence	   is	   not	  convincing	   and	   there	   appears	   to	   be	   no	   substantiated	   explanation	   from	   the	  literature	  as	  to	  why	  the	  electoral	  cycle	  should	  affect	  the	  three	  major	  parties	  any	  differently	   from	  one	  another.	  A	  more	   likely	  explanation	  perhaps,	   resides	   in	   the	  consequence	   of	   what	   Rallings	   and	   Thrasher	   describe	   as	   the	   cycle	   choice	  bestowed	   to	   authorities	   following	   the	   1972	   Local	   Government	   Act	   (Rallings	   &	  Thrasher,	  1997a).	  The	  difference	  between	  incumbent	  performances	  in	  the	  cycles,	  between	   the	   different	   parties,	   is	   perhaps	   more	   plausibly	   accounted	   for	   by	  assessing	  the	  underlying	  support	  for	  the	  party	  in	  authorities	  with	  those	  cycles.	  It	  is	   possible	   that	   the	   Conservatives	   have	   tended	   to	   dominate	   single	   vacancy	  elections,	   thus	   the	   underlying	   party	   support	   and	   resulting	   freshmen	  performance	  may	  be	  higher	  on	  average	  than	  for	  the	  other	  two	  parties,	  cancelling	  out	  any	  difference.	  	  	  Sub-­‐chapter	   6.2	   has	   failed	   to	   provide	   sufficient	   evidence	   in	   favour	   of	   electoral	  cycle	   effects	   on	   incumbent	   performance.	   For	   all	   parties,	   there	   is	   little	   to	   no	  difference	   in	   the	   relative	   performance	   of	   councillors	   defending	   their	   seats	   and	  thus	  no	  firm	  conclusion	  has	  emerged	  from	  the	  data.	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6.3	  –	  Concluding	  Remarks	  Chapter	   6	   has	   focused	   on	   two	   aspects	   of	   aggregate	   data	   for	   English	   Local	  Elections.	   Sub-­‐chapter	   6.1	  was	   concerned	  with	   district	  magnitude.	   The	   section	  discussed	   tests	   for	   the	   effects	   of	   district	   magnitude	   on	   average	   SIP	   and	   the	  finishing	  positions	  of	  incumbent	  councillors.	  Data	  were	  presented	  that	  supports	  the	   notion	   of	   incumbency	   influencing	   electoral	   performance,	   but	   one	   where	  district	   magnitude	   has	   moderating	   effects.	   For	   all	   parties	   there	   was	   a	   clear	  difference	   between	   the	   performance	   of	   incumbents	   across	   the	   district	  magnitudes	   and	   this	   finding	   is	   supported	   by	   the	   American	   literature	   (Cox	   &	  Morgenstern,	  1995).	  The	  evidence	  also	  suggests	  that	  lone	  incumbents	  contesting	  a	  ward	  will	  tend	  to	  achieve	  higher	  finishing	  positions	  at	  the	  ballot.	  	  The	   results	   indicate	   that	   district	  magnitude	  mitigates	   the	   effect	   of	   incumbency	  advantage.	  Following	  previously	  described	  trends,	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  did	  best	  across	  all	   the	   magnitudes	   however,	   the	   SIP	   results	   also	   suggested	   that	   the	   Lib	   Dem	  advantage	  has	  been	   in	  decline	   in	  both	   the	  2MDs	  and	  3MDs,	  whilst	  at	   the	   same	  time	   it	   has	   been	   on	   the	   rise	   for	   the	   Conservatives.	   Incumbency	   advantage	  appears	  to	  be	  inversely	  related	  to	  district	  magnitude,	  with	  the	  lower	  magnitudes	  showing	   higher	   rates	   of	   success.	   It	   may	   be	   the	   case	   that	   SMDs	   foster	   better	  conditions	  for	  electoral	  defence,	  whilst	  2MDs	  and	  3MDs	  offer	  progressively	  less	  favourable	  conditions.	  	  Finally,	   chapter	   6.2	   discussed	   data	   on	   the	   impact	   that	   the	   electoral	   cycle	  may	  have	   on	   relative	   level	   of	   incumbent	   performance.	   Though	   incumbents	  consistently	  outperform	  their	   freshmen	  counterparts	   in	  all	   three	  major	  parties,	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the	   evidence	   for	   electoral	   cycles	   having	   any	   noteworthy	   effect	   on	   the	  performance	   of	   incumbents	   did	   not	   manifest	   itself.	   There	   was	   no	   discernible	  difference	   in	   incumbent	   performance	   between	   the	   cycles.	   Only	   Unitary	  Authorities	  (UAs)	  and	  Shire	  Districts	  (SDs)	  were	  selected	  for	  the	  analyses	  to	  help	  eliminate	   any	   underlying	   support	   for	   any	   one	   party	   in	   the	   different	   electoral	  arrangements.	   As	   only	   two	   of	   the	   five	   types	   of	   authority	  were	   included	   in	   the	  sample,	   technically	   the	   sample	   may	   not	   have	   been	   sufficient	   in	   its	   breadth	   to	  detect	   any	   significant	   effect.	   Consequently,	   there	   remains	   scope	   for	   an	   effect,	  though	   narrowed.	   However,	   for	   now	   these	   comments	   remain	   speculative	   and	  require	  further	  investigation	  to	  substantiate	  them.	  	  Where	   chapter	   6	   has	   examined	   the	  more	   administrative	   effects	   on	   advantages	  associated	  with	   incumbency,	  chapter	  7	  widens	  the	  breadth	  of	  the	  investigation,	  going	  on	  to	  examine	  the	  structural	  influences	  on	  incumbent	  performance.	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Chapter	  7	  –	  Structural	  Effects	  	  	  Chapter	   6	   discussed	   analyses	   that	   compared	   the	   administrative	   effects	   on	   the	  performance	  of	  incumbent	  councillors	  in	  England.	  Chapter	  7	  goes	  on	  to	  consider	  the	  more	  structural	  factors	  that	  affect	  incumbent	  performance;	  such	  as	  turnout,	  ward	  size	  and	  the	  rural/urban	  classification	  of	  the	  ward.	  Beginning	  with	  turnout,	  the	   section	   assesses	   the	   impact	   of	   councillors	   standing	   again	   on	   ward-­‐level	  turnout.	  The	  aim	  of	  section	  7.1	   is	   to	  assess	  whether	   fielding	  a	  councillor	  draws	  ‘extra	   votes’	   on	   election	   day.	   Following	   Hansford	   &	   Gomez’s	   (2010)	   anti-­‐incumbent	  hypothesis,	  which	  links	  higher	  turnout	  to	  the	  relative	  performance	  of	  an	   incumbent	   party’s	   candidate,	   this	   section	   presents	   a	  model	   to	   estimate	   the	  relative	   change	   in	   turnout	   as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   change	   in	   incumbency	   status	   of	   a	  candidate.	   The	   method	   examines	   the	   freshmen-­‐sophomore	   electoral	   cycle	   to	  assess	  whether	  districts	  with	  first	  time	  incumbents	  encourage	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  voters	  participating.	  Following	  this,	  sub-­‐chapter	  7.2	  looks	  to	  identify	  the	   effect	   of	  ward	   size	   on	   the	   re-­‐election	   rate	   of	   councillors.	   There	   have	   been	  numerous	  studies	  showing	  that	  ward	  size	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  elections,	  that	  a	   sense	   of	   community	   is	   usually	   felt	   to	   greater	   extent	   in	   relatively	   small	  geographical	  areas	  (Foladare,	  1968;	  O’Loughlin,	  1981;	  Eagles	  &	  Erfle,	  1989).	  This	  section	  assesses	  the	  notion	  that	  smaller	  wards	  foster	  more	  favourable	  conditions	  for	  councillors	  to	  defend	  their	  elected	  position.	  Fewer	  voters	  mean	  that	  the	  task	  may	  also	  be	   smaller.	   It	  would	  be	  more	  manageable	   for	   councillors	   to	  maintain	  some	   personal	   contact	  with	   their	   residents	   over	   their	   term	   of	   office.	   But	   also,	  these	  conditions	  may	  assist	  a	  candidate	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  ‘scare-­‐off	  effect’	  that	  has	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been	  detailed	  in	  chapter	  2.	  Next,	  section	  7.3	  goes	  on	  to	  investigate	  the	  notion	  of	  urban-­‐effects	   on	   the	   performance	   of	   incumbents	   for	   all	   the	   parties.	   Employing	  the	  Standardised	  Incumbent	  Performance	  (SIP)	  model	  detailed	  in	  chapter	  5,	  the	  section	   assesses	   relative	   incumbent	   performance	   in	   different	   geographies	  throughout	   England.	   The	   SIP	   data	   are	   compared	   across	   Office	   for	   National	  Statistics	   (ONS)	   rural/urban	   classifications	   to	   see	   if	   there	   are	   any	   noteworthy	  differences.	   Finally,	   some	   concluding	   remarks	   are	   made	   regarding	   the	  implications	   of	   results	   discussed	   throughout	   chapter	   7,	   whilst	   offering	   some	  explanations	  from	  the	  literature.	  	  7.1	  –	  Turnout	  Turnout	  in	  in	  sub-­‐national	  elections	  tends	  to	  be	  lower	  than	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  For	  English	   local	  elections	   turnout	  varies,	  but	   there	   is	  evidence	   to	  suggest	   that	  turnout	   can	   be	   greatly	   influenced	   by	   exogenous	   factors,	   such	   as	   national	  elections	  or	  economic	  crises.	  The	  obvious	  example	   is	   the	  1979	  general	  election	  called	  by	  the	  then	  Prime	  Minister	  James	  Callaghan	  for	  the	  same	  day	  as	  the	  local	  elections.	   At	   almost	   74%,	   turnout	   was	   far	   higher	   than	   usual	   as	   the	   general	  election	   was	   perceived	   to	   be	   more	   salient.	   Rallings	   and	   Thrasher	   (1997)	   also	  suggest	   that	   the	   proximity	   of	   a	   general	   election	   also	   has	   an	   effect	   on	   local	  election	  turnout;	  tending	  to	  be	  above	  average	  for	  years	  just	  before	  an	  anticipated	  general	   election,	   then	   falling	   sharply	   the	   year	   after.	   To	   illustrate	   this	   point	  Rallings	  &	  Thrasher	  remind	  us	  that,	  “in	  both	  1983	  and	  1987	  Mrs	  Thatcher	  used	  the	   local	   elections	   as	   a	   test	   of	   her	   government’s	   popularity	   before	   calling	   a	  general	  election	  and	  in	  1991	  John	  Major	  made	  it	  clear	  he	  too	  was	  contemplating	  a	   summer	   general	   election	   and	   turnout	   rose	   once	   again,	   although	   on	   this	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occasion	  the	  results	  were	  such	  that	   the	  Conservatives	  put	  back	  the	  election	   for	  another	  year”	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  p.50).	  	  As	  well	   as	   the	   perceived	   salience	   of	   elections,	   particular	   groups	   in	   society	   are	  more	   likely	   than	   others	   to	   vote.	   Using	   survey	   data	   between	   1966	   and	   1974,	  Crewe	  et	  al	  (1977)	   show	   that	   age;	   residential	  mobility	   and	  housing	   tenure	   are	  important	   factors	   in	   estimating	   the	   likelihood	   of	   participating	   in	   elections	   in	  Britain.	  The	  more	  transient	  the	  population	  of	  an	  electoral	  constituency	  or	  ward,	  the	   less	   likely	   that	  residents	  will	  participate	   in	  elections.	  Abstention	   is	  greatest	  among	  newcomers	  and	  there	  are	  a	  few	  potential	  explanations.	  Newcomers	  have	  fewer	   vested	   interests	   in	   an	   area	   and	   as	   such,	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   participate	   in	  shaping	  its	  future.	  But	  also,	  as	  Rallings	  and	  Thrasher	  put	  it,	  “the	  costs	  of	  voting,	  in	  applying	  for	  postal	  votes	  or	  returning	  to	  a	  former	  ward	  to	  vote	  were	  greater	  for	   such	   electors	   and	   may	   have	   outweighed	   the	   perceived	   benefits	   of	   voting”	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  p.	  48).	  Both	  of	  these	  themes	  fit	  in	  with	  the	  Downsian	  perspective	   of	   turnout	   estimation;	   one	   where	   the	   likelihood	   of	   public	  participation	   rests	   heavily	   on	   the	   perceived	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   doing	   so.	  Rallings	   et	  al’s	   ‘Seasonal	   factors,	   voter	   fatigue	  and	   the	   costs	   of	   voting’	   (Rallings,	  Thrasher	  &	  Borisyuk,	  2003)	  is	  an	  article	  that	  neatly	  illustrates	  the	  very	  real	  cost	  of	   physically	   being	   at	   the	   ballot	   box	   in	   local	   elections.	   But	   it	   is	   not	   only	   the	  perceived	  costs	  and	  benefits	  that	  are	  important	  factors	  in	  determining	  whether	  citizens	  will	  turn	  up	  to	  vote.	  The	  perceived	  closeness	  of	  elections	  or	  marginality	  also	   has	   a	   significant	   impact	   (Downs,	   1957;	   Cox	   &	   Munger,	   1982;	   Rallings	   &	  Thrasher,	  1990;	  Rosenstone	  &	  Hansen,	  1993;	  Funk,	  2008).	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Drawing	  on	  data	  previously	  discussed	  in	  this	  project,	  it	  is	  certainly	  a	  possibility	  that	   the	   type	   of	   candidates	   standing	   will	   have	   some	   effect	   on	   turnout.	   This	  premise	   relies	  on	   the	  assumption	   that	   there	   is	   some	  recognition	  of	   candidates.	  Incumbents	  have	  already	  been	  shown	  to	  accrue	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  the	  vote	  than	  freshmen,	   but	   it	   is	   unclear	   whether	   these	   votes	   are	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   other	  candidates,	  or	  are	   instead	   ‘extra	  votes’	  with	  voters	   turning	  out	  on	  election	  day	  who	  would	  not	  have	  done	  so,	   if	   the	   incumbent	  had	  not	  stood.	  Assessing	  wards	  where	  freshmen	  win	  and	  then	  go	  on	  to	  defend	  their	  seat	  at	  the	  next	  election	  may	  allow	  us	  to	  identify	  where	  incumbents	  get	  their	  electoral	  advantage	  from.	  If	  there	  is	  significant	  growth	  in	  turnout,	  relative	  to	  other	  wards	  won	  by	  the	  same	  party	  in	  that	  authority,	   it	   is	  possible	   that	   some,	   if	  not	  all,	   of	   those	  extra	  votes	  are	   ‘new’	  votes	  and	  not	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  other	  candidates	  standing.	  	  In	  order	  to	  test	  for	  this	  phenomenon,	  it	  is	  important	  that	  the	  data	  are	  controlled	  for	   a	   number	   of	   potential	   biases	   on	   results.	   As	   previously	   discussed,	   there	   are	  many	  exogenous	   influences	  on	   turnout,	  which	  will	   fluctuate	   from	  year-­‐to-­‐year.	  Considering	   this,	   a	   local	   ‘yard-­‐stick’	   needs	   to	   be	   created	   in	   order	   to	   offset	  measurements	   of	   fluctuations	   associated	   with	   the	   candidate’s	   change	   in	  incumbency	   status.	   The	   Sophomore	  Turnout	   Surge	   (STS)	  model	   for	   estimating	  incumbency	  related	  changes	  in	  turnout	  is	  detailed	  below.	  	  	  The	  model	  operates	  in	  a	  similar	  way	  to	  the	  EPILP	  and	  RRILP	  models,	  which	  are	  detailed	   in	   chapter	   3	   and	   implemented	   in	   chapter	   5.	   However,	   rather	   than	  comparing	  two	  different	  scenarios,	  the	  model	  aims	  to	  assess	  any	  relative	  impact,	  during	   the	   freshman-­‐sophomore	   electoral	   cycle,	   on	   ward-­‐level	   turnout.	   The	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model	  compares	  two	  measures	  over	  two	  consecutive	  elections.	  Concentrating	  on	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  model,	  denoted	  by	  i,	  this	  segment	  concerns	  data	  recorded	  in	  the	  freshman	  year	  of	  the	  candidate’s	  electoral	  career.	  The	  first	  measure	  consists	  simply	   of	   turnout	   in	   a	   ward	   won	   by	   a	   freshman,	   in	   a	   safe	   seat,	   which	   in	   this	  instance	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  seat	  that	  is	  won	  by	  more	  than	  20%	  of	  the	  vote.	  Denoted	  by	   τ,	   the	   measure	   is	   simply	   the	   recorded	   turnout	   of	   an	   electorally	   safe	   ward	  where	  a	  freshman	  wins	  and	  chooses	  to	  defend	  their	  seat	  at	  the	  next	  election.	  The	  other	   measure	   required	   is	   the	   ‘participatory	   yard-­‐stick’,	   which	   in	   this	   case	   is	  defined	  as	  the	  average	  turnout	  of	  all	  wards	  won	  for	  that	  same	  party,	  that	  haven’t	  been	   considered	   already,	   in	   the	   same	   authority	   and	   in	   the	   same	   election	   year.	  This	   average	   measure	   of	   local	   turnout	   for	   the	   party	   is	   compared	   with	   the	  selected	  freshman	  ward	  to	  return	  a	  relative	  measure	  of	  ward-­‐level	  turnout.	  The	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  model,	  this	  time	  denoted	  j,	  compares	  the	  same	  ward	  measures,	  though	   at	   the	   sophomore	   point	   of	   the	   cycle	   where	   the	   candidate	   chooses	   to	  defend	  the	  seat.	  STS	  for	  party	  category	  p	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  	  
STS ! = 𝜏!"# − 𝜑!"𝑛!!!!!! − 𝜏!!" − 𝜑!"𝑛!!!!!! 	  	  Where	  φ	  refers	  to	  the	  average	  turnout	  of	  all	  unselected	  safe	  seat	  wards	  in	  local	  authority	  k	  at	  the	  i	  point	  of	  the	  freshman-­‐sophomore	  electoral	  cycle	  or	  point	  j.	  τ	  signifies	   turnout	   of	   the	   ward	   for	   the	   selected	   candidate	   l	   at	   either	   the	   i	   or	   j	  elections	  where	  the	  candidate	  is	  a	  winning	  freshman.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  compare	  like-­‐with-­‐like	   wards,	   the	   model	   only	   considers	   wards	   that	   were	   won	   by	   an	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electorally	  ‘safe’	  margin	  for	  the	  party,	  which	  in	  this	  instance	  is	  set	  as	  in	  excess	  of	  20%	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  freshman	  year	  of	  election.	  There	  is	  no	  pre-­‐requisite	  for	  the	  candidate	   to	   go	   on	   and	  win	   their	   sophomore	   election.	   The	  model	   controls	   for	  variation	  of	   turnout	  within	   the	   local	  authority.	  Cases	  are	  not	  considered	  where	  average	   turnout	   data	   for	   the	   party	   within	   the	   local	   authority	   is	   missing	   or	  partially	   missing,	   a	   factor	   that	   has	   severely	   limited	   the	   number	   of	   cases	  considered	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats.	   Uncontested	   elections	   are	   also	   not	  considered.	  	  Table	   7.1.1	   displays	   the	   ward-­‐level	   turnout	   group	   statistics	   for	   the	   different	  incumbent’s	  status	  by	  party.	  The	  data	  displayed	  indicate	  the	  average	  difference	  in	  turnout	  between	  the	  selected	  ward	  and	  the	  average	  for	  that	  party	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  authority.	  For	   the	  1,124	  Conservative	  wards	  considered,	   the	   freshmen	  year	  of	  the	  cycle	  averaged	  some	  0.94%	  below	  the	  average	  for	  the	  local	  authority,	  with	  a	   σ	   of	   6.08.	   For	   the	   same	  wards,	   turnout	   was	   only	  marginally	   lower	   than	   the	  average	   for	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   authority	   in	   the	   respective	   sophomore	   years,	  recording	  -­‐0.17%	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  5.98.	  As	  a	  result,	  STS	  is	  0.77%,	  a	  small	  increase	  in	  turnout	  over	  the	  cycle.	  The	  rise	  is	  roughly	  equivalent	  to	  1.7%	  of	  the	  variation	  of	  average	   Conservative	   turnout,	   or	   38	   voters	   in	   wards	   considered	   (average	  electorate	  in	  the	  2,248	  Conservative	  wards	  considered	  =	  4,910).	  	  	  For	   Labour,	   ward	   turnout	   appears	   to	   be	   slightly	   more	   susceptible	   to	   the	  candidate’s	  status	  than	  for	  the	  Conservatives.	  A	  glance	  at	  table	  7.1.1	  shows	  that	  of	  the	  2,008	  wards	  considered,	  the	  freshmen	  years	  averaged	  some	  0.04%	  above	  the	   average	   turnout	   for	   Labour	  within	   respective	   local	   authorities,	  with	   a	   σ	   of	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5.23.	   In	  the	  sophomore	  year	  of	   the	  cycle,	   turnout	  has	  been	   increased,	   to	  0.88%	  (with	  a	  σ	  of	  4.85).	  Consequently,	  STS	  for	  Labour	  is	  equal	  to	  a	  0.84%	  increase	  in	  turnout	  over	  the	  cycle.	  This	  is	  in	  turn	  is	  equivalent	  to	  some	  2.4%	  of	  the	  variation	  of	  average	  Labour	  turnout	  or	  roughly	  65	  extra	  voters	  (average	  electorate	  in	  the	  3,988	  Labour	  wards	  considered	  =	  7,738).	  	  For	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  considered	  is	  much	  smaller	  when	  compared	   to	   Labour	   and	   the	   Conservatives.	   Table	   7.1.1	   shows	   that	   just	   246	  wards	   (and	   thus	   492	   data	   points)	   are	   available	   for	   consideration	   after	   the	  requirements	  stipulated	  above	  are	  imposed	  on	  the	  data.	  For	  wards	  considered	  in	  the	   freshman	   year	   of	   the	   electoral	   cycle,	   turnout	   averaged	   0.59%	   below	   the	  mean	   for	   respective	   local	   authorities,	   with	   a	   σ	   of	   6.91.	   Like	   the	   data	   for	   the	  Conservatives	   and	   Labour,	   the	   sophomore	   year	   of	   the	   cycle	   averaged	   a	   higher	  relative	   turnout,	   though	   not	   to	   the	   same	   extent.	   Mean	   turnout	   in	   incumbent	  wards	  was	  0.02%	  lower	  than	  the	  average	  for	  respective	  local	  authorities,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  7.43.	  STS	  is	  0.62%	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  The	  relative	  value	  of	  the	  STS	  estimation	  for	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  puts	  it	  equivalent	  to	  1.4%	  of	  the	  variation	  of	  average	  Lib	   Dem	   turnout,	   or	   31	   extra	   voters	   (average	   electorate	   in	   the	   492	   Lib	   Dem	  elections	  considered	  =	  4,996).	  	   Party	   Cycle	  Point	   n	  	   Turnout	  Diff	  %	   σ	   S.E.	  
Con	   Σ	  (τ-­‐φ)/n	  (i)	   1,124	   -­‐0.94	   6.08	   0.181	  Σ	  (τ-­‐φ)/n	  (j)	   1,124	   -­‐0.17	   5.98	   0.178	  
Lab	   Σ	  (τ-­‐φ)/n	  (i)	   1,994	   0.04	   5.23	   0.117	  Σ	  (τ-­‐φ)/n	  (j)	   1,994	   0.88	   4.85	   0.109	  
LD	   Σ	  (τ-­‐φ)/n	  (i)	   246	   -­‐0.59	   6.91	   0.441	  Σ	  (τ-­‐φ)/n	  (j)	   246	   0.02	   7.43	   0.473	  
[Table	  –7.1.1	  (%)	  (STS	  Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (Mean	  Turnout	  Diff	  %)	  (σ)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  6,478)]	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For	  all	  parties,	  relative	  turnout	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  rise	  to	  some	  degree	  over	  the	  freshman-­‐sophomore	  electoral	  cycle.	  The	  increases	  are	  less	  than	  one	  percentage	  point	  of	  turnout,	  but	  between	  1.4%	  and	  2.4%	  of	  the	  variation	  of	  average	  turnout	  for	   respective	   parties.	   This	   variation	   accounts	   for	   the	   rough	   equivalent	   of	  between	  31	  and	  65	  extra	  voters	  in	  a	  ward,	  depending	  on	  the	  party.	  The	  variation	  in	  turnout	  over	  the	  freshman-­‐sophomore	  electoral	  cycle	  can	  help	  explain	  some	  of	  the	  results	  previously	  discussed	  for	  data	  on	  the	  electoral	  effects	  of	  incumbency.	  The	  STS	  model	  suggests	  that	  the	  increase	  in	  turnout	  may	  account	  for	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  the	  rise	  in	  votes	  accrued	  by	  winning	  sophomores,	  though	  not	  all.	  However,	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  whether	  this	  rise	  is	  statistically	  significant	  for	  each	  of	  the	  parties,	  a	  comparison	  of	  means	  for	  the	  two	  points	  of	  the	  electoral	  cycle	  is	  required.	  	  Table	  7.1.2	  displays	  results	  from	  Levene’s	  tests	  and	  t-­‐tests	  for	  the	  two	  points	  of	  the	  freshman-­‐sophomore	  electoral	  cycle	  in	  the	  STS	  model.	  For	  the	  Conservatives	  the	   Levene’s	   test	   results	   suggest	   that	   equality	   of	   variances	   can	   be	   assumed	  reporting	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  0.38	  with	  a	  significance	  of	  0.538.	  The	  0.77%	  increase	  in	   Sophomore	  Turnout	   Surge	   (STS)	   for	   the	  Tories	   reports	   a	   t-­‐statistic	   of	   3.018	  that	  is	  significant	  and	  below	  the	  0.005	  level,	  when	  equal	  variances	  are	  assumed.	  For	   Labour	   wards	   there	   are	   slightly	   different	   results.	   Levene’s	   test	   results	  suggest	   that	   equality	   of	   variances	   cannot	   be	   assumed	   and	   has	   an	   F-­‐statistic	   of	  7.68	  with	  a	  significance	  of	  0.006,	  well	  below	  the	  0.05	  level	  required	  to	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  equality	  of	  variance.	  The	  0.84%	  increase	  in	  STS	  has	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  5.228	  that	   is	  significant	  and	  below	  the	  0.001	  level,	  when	  equal	  variances	  are	  not	   assumed.	   Table	   7.1.2	   also	   details	   results	   for	   Liberal	   Democrat	   wards.	   A	  Levene’s	   test	   suggests	   that	   equality	   of	   variances	   can	   be	   assumed,	   giving	   an	   F-­‐
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statistic	  of	  0.488	  with	  a	  significance	  of	  0.485.	  The	  0.62%	  increase	  in	  STS	  has	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  0.952	  and	  a	  p-­‐value	  of	  0.342.	  The	  test	  fails	  to	  report	  a	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  required	  level	  to	  be	  statistically	  confident	  that	  the	  means	  differ	  significantly.	  	  Party	   	  Levene’s	  	   F	   Sig	   t	   df	   Sig	   STS	   S.E.	  
Con	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	  	   .380	   .538	   3.018	   2246	   .003	   0.77	   0.254	  Equal	  Var	  Not	  	   	  	   	  	   3.018	   2245.316	   .003	   0.77	   0.254	  
Lab	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	  	   7.68	   .006	   5.228	   3986	   .000	   0.84	   0.160	  Equal	  Var	  Not	  	   	  	   	  	   5.228	   3963.188	   .000	   0.84	   0.160	  
LD	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	   .488	   .485	   .952	   490	   .342	   0.62	   0.647	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   .952	   487.476	   .342	   0.62	   0.647	  
[Table	  –	  7.1.2	  (%)	  (Levene’s	  &	  Indep	  T-­‐Test)	  –	  (F)	  (Sig)	  (t)	  (df)	  (Sig)	  (STS)	  (Error)	  1974-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  
6,478)]	  	  Though	   small,	   for	   both	   Labour	   and	   the	   Conservative	   wards,	   turnout	   has	   been	  shown	   to	   increase	   significantly	   over	   the	   freshman-­‐sophomore	   electoral	   cycle.	  For	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   this	   rise	   is	   not	   statistically	   significant,	   though	   this	  could	  be	  due	  to	  the	  relatively	  small	  number	  of	  cases	  that	  met	  the	  criteria	  to	  be	  considered	  for	  analysis.	  At	  this	  point	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  trying	  to	  maintain	  a	  sufficient	   number	   of	   Liberal	   Democrat	   cases	   was	   one	   of	   the	   motivations	   for	  including	   local	   election	   turnout	   data	   in	   General	   Election	   (GE)	   years.	   Local	  Election	   turnout	  has	  been	  shown	   to	   increase	  markedly	   in	  GE	  years	   (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997;	  Rallings	  et	  al,	  2003).	  However,	  because	  of	  the	  way	  the	  model	  has	  been	   designed,	   fluctuations	   in	   turnout	   across	   the	   cycle	   are	   accounted	   for	   and	  these	   movements	   should	   not	   affect	   the	   results.	   As	   detailed	   above,	   the	   model	  takes	  relative	  turnout	  into	  consideration,	  so	  including	  GE	  year	  data	  in	  the	  model,	  does	  not	  in	  theory,	  alter	  any	  of	  the	  broad	  inferences	  made	  from	  the	  results12.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  In	  order	  to	  test	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  model,	  the	  procedure	  was	  run	  again,	  this	  time	  excluding	  data	  where	  either	  the	  freshman	  or	  sophomore	  years	  fell	  on	  a	  General	  Election	  year.	  This	  severely	  reduced	  the	  number	  of	  cases,	  but	  the	  results,	  though	  slightly	  different,	  told	  a	  similar	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  There	  are	  two	  major	  implications	  from	  the	  results	  discussed.	  The	  first,	  relates	  to	  where	   incumbents	   accrue	   their	   ‘extra’	   votes.	   The	   data	   revealed	   suggest	   that	  fielding	   incumbents	   may	   encourage	   some	   residents	   to	   turn	   out	   who	   wouldn’t	  have	   done	   so	   otherwise.	   Even	   though	   the	   numbers	   are	   relatively	   small,	   the	  results	   imply	   that	   incumbents	   are	   net	   contributors	   to	   turnout	   and	   this	   has	   a	  number	  of	  ramifications	  for	  the	  overall	  picture	  of	  how	  they	  manage	  to	  do	  better	  than	  both	  their	  colleagues	  and	  competitors.	  If	  turnout	  increases	  marginally	  over	  the	  freshman-­‐sophomore	  electoral	  cycle	  in	  what	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  electorally	  safe	   seats,	   one	   explanation	   could	   be	   that	   incumbents	   are	   able	   to	   encourage	  voters	   to	   turn	   up	   and	   vote	   for	   them.	   However,	   it	   must	   be	   stressed	   that	   the	  evidence	  presented	  here	  does	  not	   confirm	   that	   those	   ‘extra	  voters’	   are	   turning	  out	  in	  support	  of	  the	  incumbent	  councillor.	  	  The	  second	  implication	  refers	  to	  the	  perceived	  marginality	  of	  wards	  contested	  by	  incumbents.	   According	   to	   literature	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   marginality	   on	   turnout	  (Downs,	   1957;	   Cox	  &	  Munger,	   1982;	  Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	   1990;	  Rosenstone	  &	  Hansen,	   1993;	   Funk,	   2008),	   any	   influence	   on	   the	   perceived	   closeness	   of	   an	  election	   result	   is	   likely	   to	   depress	   turnout	   as	   it	   reduces	   the	   chance	   of	   voters	  being	  pivotal	  to	  the	  outcome.	  Considering	  this,	  could	  it	  be	  the	  case	  that	  when	  a	  well-­‐known	   and	   popular	   incumbent	   candidate	   stands,	   it	   deters	   voters	   from	  turning	   out?	   Results	   discussed	   in	   this	   chapter	   do	   not	   imply	   that	   incumbency	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  story	  to	  those	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Labour	  and	  Conservative	  wards	  experienced	  a	  significantly	  increased	  level	  of	  turnout,	  whilst	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  failed	  to	  meet	  the	  significance	  required	  to	  confidently	  assert	  so.	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reduces	  turnout,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  turnout	  increases	  relatively	  over	  the	  freshman-­‐sophomore	  cycle.	  	  This	   may	   be	   the	   case	   for	   a	   couple	   of	   reasons.	   First,	   as	   local	   elections	   are	  traditionally	   considered	   to	   be	   low	   information	   elections	   (Rallings	   &	   Thrasher,	  1997),	   the	   change	   in	   a	   candidate’s	   status,	   from	   a	   freshman	   to	   an	   incumbent	  sophomore,	   may	   not	   have	   affected	   the	   perceived	   marginality	   of	   the	   ward.	  Second,	  as	  only	  safe	  seats	  are	  considered	  for	  the	  STS	  measure,	  the	  likelihood	  is	  that	   these	   elections	   would	   never	   have	   been	   electorally	   competitive	   for	   the	  opposition	  anyway.	  	  Finally,	   section	   7.1	   has	   discussed	   data	   that	   support	   the	   notion	   of	   incumbency	  having	  an	  effect	  on	  turnout	  at	   local	  elections	  in	  England.	  Inferences	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  results	  range	  from	  voter	  mobilization	  to	  electoral	  strategy.	  The	  data	  shown	  suggest	  that,	  for	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  at	  least,	  sophomores	  seeking	   re-­‐election	   are	  more	   likely	   than	   freshmen	   to	   encourage	   voters	   to	   turn	  out.	  They	  are	  net	  contributors	   to	   turnout,	  which	   leaves	  scope	   for	   the	  view	  that	  sophomores	  are	  better	  at	  ‘getting	  out	  the	  vote’	  on	  election	  day.	  	  7.2	  –	  Ward	  Size	  Ward	   size	   is	   another	   important	   feature	   in	   the	   study	  of	   incumbency	   advantage.	  Given	   that	   local	   democracy	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   a	   sense	   of	   community	  identity,	   the	   ability	   of	   councillors	   to	   drum	   up	   support	   requires	   an	   ability	   to	  contact	   potential	   voters.	   How	   engaged	   and/or	   transient	   the	   local	   electorate	   is	  will	   clearly	   affect	   the	   efficacy	  of	   their	   efforts.	  However,	   the	   size	  of	   an	  electoral	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ward	  is	  a	  very	  real	  and	  practical	  influence	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  councillors	  to	  contact	  residents	   they	   wish	   to	   represent.	   Larger	   wards	   will	   require	   greater	   effort	   to	  contact	  the	  same	  proportion	  of	  voters.	  	  	  There	  have	  been	  numerous	  studies	  showing	  that	  ward	  size	   is	   important,	   that	  a	  sense	  of	  identity	  is	  usually	  felt	  to	  greater	  extent	  in	  relatively	  small	  geographical	  areas.	   In	   the	   United	   States	   Cutright	   &	   Rossi	   (1958)	   found	   that	   candidates	  performed	   better	   in	   their	   home	   precincts	   than	   elsewhere	   in	   a	   district,	   which	  indicates	  that	  voters	  may	  be	  more	  inclined	  to	  support	  someone	  that	  they	  know,	  or	   are	   likely	   to	   have	   met,	   by	   recognising	   their	   name	   on	   the	   ballot	   paper	   or	  meeting	   them	  during	   the	   campaign.	  Drawing	   on	   this	   research,	  we	   can	   imagine	  that	  wards	  with	  smaller	  electorates	  may,	  bar	  some	  exceptionally	  sparse	  wards,	  be	  easier	  for	  incumbents	  to	  ‘manage’	  in	  terms	  of	  contact	  time	  with	  residents	  and	  the	   likelihood	  of	  knowing	  voters.	  Building	  on	   this,	  Foladare	   (1968),	  O’Loughlin	  (1981)	   and	   Eagles	   &	   Erfle	   (1989)	   have	   all	   pointed	   out	   the	   importance	   of	  community	   cohesion,	   or	   what	   is	   termed	   a	   ‘friends	   and	   neighbours	   effect’	   on	  turnout	   and	   voting	   patterns.	   Indeed,	   Herbert	   Tingsten	   referred	   to	   the	  phenomenon	  as	  ‘the	  law	  of	  the	  social	  centre	  of	  gravity’	  (Tingsten,	  1938,	  pp.126-­‐127),	   suggesting	   that	   the	   level	   of	   political	   engagement	   is	   influenced	   by	   the	  homogeneity	  or	  heterogeneity	  of	  the	  neighbourhood	  where	  candidates	  live.	  Put	  another	  way,	   the	   level	  of	  community	  cohesion,	  or	   lack	  of	   it,	  can	  have	  a	  marked	  influence.	   We	   can	   expect	   therefore,	   that	   smaller	   electorates	   are	   by	   definition	  more	  likely	  to	  ‘capture’	  a	  homogenous	  group	  that	  may	  interact	  with	  one	  another	  to	   a	   greater	   degree	   than	   larger	   and	   more	   transient	   wards,	   “living	   in	   a	  neighbourhood	   with	   high	   concentrations	   of	   people	   of	   the	   same	   status	   will	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accentuate	  the	  effect	  of	  that	  status	  as	  a	  source	  of	  political	  behaviour”	  (Foladare,	  1968,	  pp.529).	  	  	  We	   might	   expect	   then,	   that	   smaller	   wards	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   exhibit	   greater	  levels	   of	   electoral	   engagement	   and	   participation	   in	   local	   politics.	   Kevin	   Cox’s	  assessment	  of	  different	  environments’	  effects	  on	  voting	  behaviour	  supports	  this	  claim,	   suggesting	   that	   different	   urban	   sizes	   are	   a	   factor	   that	   moderates	   the	  ‘neighbourhood	  effect’.	  This	  implies	  that	  smaller	  rural	  spaces	  may	  exhibit	  greater	  levels	  of	  engagement	  than	  larger	  and	  more	  urban	  ones	  (Cox,	  1971).	  For	  instance,	  Malcolm	  Moseley	   (2007)	   goes	   on	   to	   explain	   that	   residents	   of	   small	   and	  more	  remote	  communities	  (i.e.	  towns	  and	  villages)	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  demanding	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  having	  a	  say	  in	  decisions	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  affect	  them.	  They	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  involved	  in	  the	  support	  and	  delivery	  of	  local	  services	  and	  are,	  proportionally	  at	  least,	  more	  engaged	  with	  local	  politics	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  larger	  and	  more	  urban	  city	  environments.	  There	  are	  various	  explanations	  for	  this	  difference,	  but	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  more	  compelling	  is	  the	  notion	  of	  mutual	  benefits.	  Local	  authorities	   in	   these	  areas	   frequently	  encourage	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  civic	  engagement	  and	  community	  delivery	  of	  services	  because	  of	  the	  ‘relief’	  such	  resources	   offer	   to	   an	   authority’s	   budgetary	   constraints.	   Explanations	   from	   the	  literature	   suggest	   that	   there	   is	   a	   quid	   pro	   quo	   for	   authorities	   and	   residents	   to	  engage	  with	   one	   another	   and	   that	   small	   towns	   and	   villages	   are	  more	   likely	   to	  exhibit	   forms	   of	   community	   spirit	   and	   civic	   engagement.	   Verba	   &	   Nie	   (1972)	  claim	   that	   as	   local	   authorities	   grow	   in	   size	   and	   lose	   the	   sense	   of	   a	   close-­‐knit	  community,	   interest	   in	   local	   elections	   dwindles.	   But	   Rallings	   &	   Thrasher	   also	  note	   that	   ‘it	   can	   be	   the	   case	   that	   small	   communities	   discourage	   competition’	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(Rallings	   &	   Thrasher,	   1997,	   pp.59),	   which	   is	   in	   line	   with	   Zaller’s	   (1998)	  assertions	   of	   incumbency	   working	   as	   a	   deterrent	   or	   ‘scare-­‐off’	   to	   any	   serious	  opposition	  candidates,	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  greater	  electoral	  advantage.	  	  	  Using	  data	   from	  3MD	  quadrennial	  wards	   for	   the	  London	  Boroughs	  (LBs),	  Shire	  Districts	   (SDs)	   and	   Unitary	   Authorities	   (UAs),	   the	   Standardised	   Incumbent	  Performance	   (SIP)	   model,	   as	   described	   in	   chapter	   3,	   can	   be	   used	   to	   indicate	  relative	   incumbent	   performance	   across	   the	  ward	   sizes.	   The	   expectation	   is	   that	  relative	  SIP	  will	  decline	  as	   the	   size	  of	   the	  ward	   increases.	  As	   it	   is	  unlikely	   that	  ward	   size	   will	   be	   evenly	   distributed,	   in	   order	   to	   accurately	   test	   the	   assertion,	  electorate	  groups	  must	  be	  established	  for	  comparison.	  	  	  Below	   is	  a	  histogram	  of	  electorate	   sizes	   for	  wards	  considered	   for	  analysis	   (see	  figure	   7.2.1).	   There	   is	   a	   clear	   bimodal	   distribution	   along	   the	   electorate	   size	  variable	  and	  as	  indicated	  in	  the	  histogram	  below	  (see	  figure	  7.2.1)	  this	  is	  entirely	  due	  to	  the	  different	  ranges	  of	  the	  ward	  types.	  The	  London	  Boroughs	  and	  Unitary	  Authorities	   average	   an	   electorate	   of	   8,354	   and	   7,973	   respectively,	   whilst	   the	  Shire	   Districts	   average	   a	   ward	   size	   of	   just	   4,850.	   Rallings	   &	   Thrasher	   (1997)	  assess	   turnout	   and	   electoral	   behaviour	   across	   all	  ward	   types	   in	   England	   using	  four	   electorate	   groups	   within	   each	   type.	   However,	   as	   this	   analysis	   combines	  wards	  with	  a	  similar	  electoral	  cycle	  and	  number	  of	  vacancies,	  and	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  electorate	  for	  these	  wards	  are	  small,	  the	  electorate	  groups	  have	  been	  roughly	  divided	  into	  quartiles.	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[Figure	  –	  7.2.1	  Histogram	  Electorate	  for	  LBs	  SDAs	  UAAs	  1979-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  9,854)]	  	   Quartile	   n	   Electorate	  
1st	  Quartile	   1,976	   <	  4,492	  
2nd	  Quartile	   2,232	   >=	  4,492	  
3rd	  Quartile	   2,357	   >=	  6,111	  
4th	  Quartile	   2,397	   >=	  8,111	  
[Table	  –7.2.1	  (Quartile	  Stats	  –	  Excluding	  ‘Others’)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (Electorate	  Size)	  1979-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  8,816)]	  	  Table	  7.2.1	  displays	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  included	  and	  electorate	  sizes.	  The	  first	  quartile	   group	   comprises	   wards	   with	   electorate	   sizes	   of	   less	   than	   4,492	   and	  totals	  1,976	  cases.	  The	  second	  includes	  ward	  sizes	  between	  4,492	  and	  6,111	  and	  is	  made	  up	  of	  2,232	  cases.	  The	  third	  quartile	  group	  includes	  electorate	  sizes	  from	  6,111	   to	   below	   8,111	   and	   has	   2,357	   cases.	   Finally,	   the	   fourth	   quartile	   has	   the	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most	   cases,	   at	   2,397.	   This	   group	   includes	   electorate	   sizes	   of	   8,111	   and	   above.	  When	  the	  data	  are	  controlled	  by	  party,	  again	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  the	  number	  of	   cases	   within	   each	   group.	   This	   is	   because	   the	   parties	   are	   spread	   slightly	  differently	   across	   types	   of	   authority	   in	   England	   (i.e.	   the	   Conservatives	   in	   the	  Shires	  and	  Labour	  in	  the	  Metropolitan	  Boroughs).	  Also,	  as	  figure	  7.2.1	  details,	  the	  authority	   types	   tend	   to	   have	   different	   electorate	   sizes.	  However,	   as	   table	   7.2.2	  shows,	  the	  imbalance	  is	  not	  severe.	  Table	  7.2.2	  also	  displays	  the	  mean	  SIP	  and	  σ	  for	  the	  quartiles	  by	  party.	  The	  data	  show	  a	  decline	  in	  SIP	  as	  the	  size	  of	  electorate	  increases,	  for	  all	  the	  parties.	  Figure	  7.2.2	  illustrates	  these	  results.	  	   Party	   Ward	  Size	   n	   SIP	   σ	  
Con	  
1st	  Quartile	   621	   2.97	   7.54	  2nd	  Quartile	   1,004	   1.82	   5.42	  3rd	  Quartile	   897	   1.18	   3.41	  4th	  Quartile	   994	   0.98	   3.21	  
Lab	  
1st	  Quartile	   849	   2.99	   8.62	  2nd	  Quartile	   636	   2.82	   5.66	  3rd	  Quartile	   979	   1.56	   4.61	  4th	  Quartile	   1,094	   1.45	   4.19	  
LD	  
1st	  Quartile	   407	   5.84	   9.38	  2nd	  Quartile	   552	   4.04	   7.09	  3rd	  Quartile	   476	   2.47	   3.93	  4th	  Quartile	   307	   2.11	   3.83	  
[Table	  –7.2.2(Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (Mean	  SIP)	  (σ)	  1979-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  8,816)]	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For	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  consistent	  with	  previously	  discussed	  data,	  SIP	  tends	  to	  be	  higher,	  though	  a	  similar	  trend	  to	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives,	  of	  declining	  SIP	  is	  revealed.	  For	  the	  first	  quartile,	  SIP	  is	  reported	  as	  5.84%,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  9.38.	  For	  the	  second	  quartile	  group	  there	  is	  a	  fall	  of	  1.8%,	  to	  4.04%	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  7.09.	  The	  rate	  of	  fall	  continues	  in	  the	  third	  quartile,	  this	  time	  dropping	  1.47%	  to	  2.47%	  SIP,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  3.93.	  Finally,	   the	   fourth	  quartile	  has	   the	  smallest	  decline	   in	  SIP	  reporting	  2.11%	  SIP,	  with	  a	  σ	  of	  3.83.	  This	  is	  just	  0.36%	  less	  than	  that	  reported	  for	  the	  third	  quartile	  group.	  	  For	  all	  parties	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  decline	   in	  the	  average	  SIP	  as	  the	  size	  of	  a	  ward’s	  electorate	  increases.	  The	  greatest	  fall	  in	  SIP	  over	  the	  quartiles	  is	  experienced	  by	  the	   Liberal	   Democrats.	   However,	   for	   all	   party	   categories	   the	   decline	   in	   SIP	   is	  fairly	   flat	   between	   the	   third	   and	   fourth	   quartiles	   suggesting	   that	   any	   effect	   is	  likely	   to	   be	   greater	   in	   the	   smaller	  wards	   and	   ‘tail-­‐off’	   somewhat,	   as	  wards	   get	  larger.	  To	  assess	  the	  effect	  in	  more	  detail,	  a	  fixed	  effects	  ANOVA	  procedure	  was	  run	  for	  the	  quartile	  groups	  on	  SIP.	  	  Table	  7.2.3	  displays	  the	  results	  for	  the	  3,516	  Conservative	  cases.	  The	  data	  show	  an	   F-­‐statistic	   of	   23.236	   with	   significance	   below	   the	   0.001	   level.	   ANOVA	   data	  show	  that	  grouping	  the	  data	  in	  such	  a	  way	  does	  affect	  the	  average	  SIP	  variable	  to	  a	   significant	   degree,	   as	   SIP	   varies	   considerably.	   However,	   as	   discussed	   above,	  differences	   between	   the	   third	   and	   fourth	   quartiles	   for	   all	   parties	   are	   minimal	  when	   compared	   to	   the	   other	   groups,	   and	   so	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   clearly	   assess	  whether	   the	   electorate’s	   effect	   plateaus	   for	   larger	   groups,	   a	   post	   hoc	   Tukey	  Honestly	  Significant	  Difference	  (HSD)	  test	  is	  performed.	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  Party	   	   Sum	  of	  Squares	   df	   Mean	  Square	   F	   Sig.	  
Con	  
Between	  Groups	   1694.744	   3	   564.915	   23.236	   .000	  Within	  Groups	   85384.063	   3512	   24.312	   	  	   	  	  Total	   87078.807	   3515	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
[Table	  –7.2.3	  (ANOVA)	  -­‐	  (Sum	  of	  Squares)	  (df)	  (Mean	  Square)	  (F)	  (Sig)	  1979-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  3,516)]	  	  Table	   7.2.4	   displays	   results	   from	   a	   post	   hoc	   Tukey	   HSD	   test	   for	   the	   assigned	  Conservative	  electorate	  groups.	  The	  data	  suggest	  that	  all	  groups	  are	  significantly	  distinct	   from	  one	  another,	  having	  p-­‐values	  below	  the	  0.05	   level,	  aside	   from	  the	  third	  and	   fourth	  quartiles	   that	  have	  a	  p-­‐value	  of	  0.820.	  The	  data	   shown	   in	   this	  table	  support	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  ‘plateauing’	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  ward	  size	  and	  average	   SIP.	   One	   of	   the	   implications	   from	   these	   data	   is	   that	   the	   effect	   of	  incumbency	   may	   be	   exacerbated	   in	   wards	   with	   smaller	   electorate	   sizes,	  particularly	   for	   the	  Conservatives.	  That	   is	   to	   say	   that	  Conservative	   incumbents	  may	   perform	   particularly	   well	   in	   smaller	   wards	   when	   compared	   to	   their	  freshmen	  colleagues.	  	  Quartile	  (i)	   Quartile	  (j)	   Avg	  SIP	   S.E.	   Sig	   95%	  Low	   95%	  Upp	  
1st	  Quartile	   2nd	  Quartile	   1.06*	   0.25	   .000	   0.42	   1.70	  3rd	  Quartile	   1.74*	   0.26	   .000	   1.07	   2.40	  4th	  Quartile	   1.93*	   0.25	   .000	   1.29	   2.58	  
2nd	  Quartile	   1st	  Quartile	   -­‐1.06*	   0.25	   .000	   -­‐1.70	   -­‐0.42	  3rd	  Quartile	   0.68*	   0.23	   .015	   0.09	   1.26	  4th	  Quartile	   0.88*	   0.22	   .000	   0.31	   1.44	  
3rd	  Quartile	   1st	  Quartile	   -­‐1.74*	   0.26	   .000	   -­‐2.40	   -­‐1.07	  2nd	  Quartile	   -­‐0.68*	   0.23	   .015	   -­‐1.26	   -­‐0.09	  4th	  Quartile	   0.20	   0.23	   .820	   -­‐0.39	   0.79	  
4th	  Quartile	   1st	  Quartile	   -­‐1.93*	   0.25	   .000	   -­‐2.58	   -­‐1.29	  2nd	  Quartile	   -­‐0.88*	   0.22	   .000	   -­‐1.44	   -­‐0.31	  3rd	  Quartile	   -­‐0.20	   0.23	   .820	   -­‐0.79	   0.39	  
	  [Table	  7.2.4	  –	   Conservative	   Post	  Hoc	   Tukey	  HSD	   -­‐	   (Mean	  SIP)	   (Std.	  Error)	   (P)	   (95%	  Confidence	  
Intervals,	  Upper	  &	  Lower)	  1979-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  3,516)	  (*Mean	  difference	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level)]	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For	  Labour,	  the	  overall	  thrust	  of	  the	  data	  tells	  a	  similar	  story.	  Table	  7.2.5	  displays	  results	   from	   a	   fixed	   effects	   ANOVA	   for	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   assigned	   electorate	  quartiles	   on	   SIP	   variance.	   The	   data	   indicate	   that	   the	   groups	   are	   significantly	  distinct,	  with	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  16.660	  and	  a	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	  level.	  	  Party	   	   Sum	  of	  Squares	   df	   Mean	  Square	   F	   Sig.	  
Lab	  
Between	  Groups	   1735.077	   3	   578.359	   16.660	   .000	  Within	  Groups	   123377.233	   3554	   34.715	   	  	   	  	  Total	   125112.310	   3557	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
[Table	  –7.2.5	  (ANOVA)	  -­‐	  (Sum	  of	  Squares)	  (df)	  (Mean	  Square)	  (F)	  (Sig)	  1979-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  3,558)]	  	  Table	  7.2.6	  displays	  results	  from	  a	  post	  hoc	  Tukey	  HSD	  for	  the	  assigned	  Labour	  quartile	  groups.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  all	  groups	  are	  significantly	  distinct	   from	  one	  another	  having	  p-­‐values	  below	  the	  0.001	  level,	  apart	  from	  the	  first	  quartile	  to	  the	  second,	  and	  the	  third	  quartile	  to	  the	  fourth,	  which	  have	  p-­‐values	  of	  0.993	  and	  0.973	  respectively.	  There	  are	  a	  few	  implications	  from	  these	  results.	  Firstly,	  unlike	  the	  Conservative	  results,	  the	  major	  fall	  in	  SIP	  comes	  between	  the	  second	  and	   third	   quartile	   groups,	   suggesting	   that	   Labour	   incumbents	   are	   able	   to	  outperform	   their	   freshman	   counterparts,	   to	   a	   higher	  degree,	   in	  wards	   that	   are	  slightly	   larger.	   Also,	   as	   for	   the	   Conservatives,	   there	   is	   no	   significant	   difference	  between	   the	   third	   and	   fourth	   quartile	   groups,	   again	   implying	   that	   there	   is	   a	  natural	  point	  at	  which	  ward	  size	  effects	  plateau.	  It	  may	  be	  the	  case	  that	  smaller	  electorates	  are	  better	  suited	  to	  a	  particular	  electoral	  strategy	  than	  larger	  ones.	  	  	  	  	  
	   283	  
Quartile	  (i)	   Quartile	  (j)	   Avg	  SIP	   S.E.	   Sig	   95%	  Low	   95%	  Upp	  
1st	  Quartile	   2nd	  Quartile	   0.08	   0.31	   .993	   -­‐0.71	   0.88	  3rd	  Quartile	   1.39*	   0.28	   .000	   0.68	   2.10	  4th	  Quartile	   1.50*	   0.27	   .000	   0.81	   2.19	  
2nd	  Quartile	   1st	  Quartile	   -­‐0.08	   0.31	   .993	   -­‐0.88	   0.71	  3rd	  Quartile	   1.30*	   0.30	   .000	   0.53	   2.08	  4th	  Quartile	   1.42*	   0.29	   .000	   0.66	   2.17	  
3rd	  Quartile	   1st	  Quartile	   -­‐1.39*	   0.28	   .000	   -­‐2.10	   -­‐0.68	  2nd	  Quartile	   -­‐1.30*	   0.30	   .000	   -­‐2.08	   -­‐0.53	  4th	  Quartile	   0.11	   0.26	   .973	   -­‐0.55	   0.78	  
4th	  Quartile	   1st	  Quartile	   -­‐1.50*	   0.27	   .000	   -­‐2.19	   -­‐0.81	  2nd	  Quartile	   -­‐1.42*	   0.29	   .000	   -­‐2.17	   -­‐0.66	  3rd	  Quartile	   -­‐0.11	   0.26	   .973	   -­‐0.78	   0.55	  
	  [Table	  7.2.6	  –	  Labour	  Post	  Hoc	  Tukey	  HSD	  -­‐	  (Mean	  SIP)	  (Std.	  Error)	  (P)	  (95%	  Confidence	  Intervals,	  
Upper	  &	  Lower)	  1979-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  3,558)	  (*Mean	  difference	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  0.05	  level)]	  	  Although	  SIP	   is	   larger	  on	  average	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	   analysis	   reveals	  a	  similar	   pattern	   to	   that	   for	   Labour	   and	   the	   Conservatives.	   Table	   7.2.7	   displays	  results	  from	  a	  fixed	  effects	  ANOVA	  test	  for	  the	  variance	  of	  SIP	  in	  and	  between	  the	  Lib	   Dem	   quartiles.	   The	   data	   tabulated	   indicates	   that	   some	   of	   the	   groups	   are	  significantly	   distinct	   from	   one	   another,	   with	   an	   F-­‐statistic	   of	   25.835	   and	   a	   p-­‐value	   below	   the	   0.001	   level.	   However,	   as	   for	   the	   results	   for	   the	   Conservatives	  and	  Labour,	  the	  ANOVA	  test	  only	  examines	  if	  there	  is	  group	  dispersion	  and	  not	  if	  all	  groups	  are	  statistically	  distinct	  from	  one	  another.	  So,	  in	  order	  to	  better	  assess	  the	  spread	  of	  any	  effect	   that	  ward	  size	  may	  have	  on	   incumbent	  performance,	  a	  post	  hoc	  Tukey	  HSD	  test	  was	  undertaken.	  	  Party	   	   Sum	  of	  Squares	   df	   Mean	  Square	   F	   Sig.	  
LD	  
Between	  Groups	   3356.913	   3	   1118.971	   25.835	   .000	  Within	  Groups	   75276.304	   1738	   43.312	   	  	   	  	  Total	   78633.217	   1741	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
[Table	  –7.2.7	  (ANOVA)	  -­‐	  (Sum	  of	  Squares)	  (df)	  (Mean	  Square)	  (F)	  (Sig)	  1979-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  1,742)]	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Table	   7.2.8	   shows	   results	   from	   a	   post	   hoc	   Tukey	   HSD	   test	   for	   the	   Liberal	  Democrat	   quartile	   groups.	   The	   data	   suggest	   that,	   as	   for	   the	   Conservatives,	   all	  quartile	  groups	  are	  significantly	  distinct	  from	  one	  another,	  with	  p-­‐values	  below	  the	   0.005	   level,	   aside	   from	   the	   third	   and	   the	   fourth	   quartiles	  which	   have	   a	   p-­‐value	   of	   0.872	   between	   one	   another.	   The	   implications	   from	   these	   result	   are,	  firstly,	  as	  for	  the	  Conservatives	  the	  major	  fall	  in	  SIP	  comes	  between	  the	  first	  and	  second	   quartile	   groups,	   a	   fall	   of	   1.82%	   SIP.	   However,	   there	   is	   also	   a	   large	   fall	  between	  the	  second	  and	  third,	  dropping	  some	  1.52%	  SIP.	  Second,	  as	  for	  Labour	  and	   the	  Conservatives,	   there	   is	  no	   significant	  difference	  between	   the	   third	  and	  fourth	  quartile	  groups.	  These	  data	  support	  assertions	  previously	  made	  that	  there	  may	  be	  a	  ‘natural’	  threshold	  where	  any	  effect	  the	  electorate	  size	  has	  on	  relative	  incumbent	  performance	   falls	  away	  entirely.	  This	  could	  suggest	  either	  a	  general	  change	  in	  the	  strategy	  of	  incumbent	  councillors	  (and	  perhaps	  candidates)	  when	  wards	   reach	   this	   size,	   or	   simply	   that	   wards	   of	   this	   size	   or	   above	   become	  impractical	  for	  councillors	  to	  attain	  higher	  levels	  of	  electoral	  distinction.	  	  Quartile	  (i)	   Quartile	  (j)	   Avg	  SIP	   S.E.	   Sig	   95%	  Low	   95%	  Upp	  
1st	  Quartile	   2nd	  Quartile	   1.82*	   0.43	   .000	   0.73	   2.92	  3rd	  Quartile	   3.33*	   0.45	   .000	   2.19	   4.48	  4th	  Quartile	   3.70*	   0.50	   .000	   2.43	   4.97	  
2nd	  Quartile	   1st	  Quartile	   -­‐1.82*	   0.43	   .000	   -­‐2.92	   -­‐0.73	  3rd	  Quartile	   1.51*	   0.41	   .002	   0.44	   2.57	  4th	  Quartile	   1.88*	   0.47	   .000	   0.68	   3.08	  
3rd	  Quartile	   1st	  Quartile	   -­‐3.33*	   0.45	   .000	   -­‐4.48	   -­‐2.19	  2nd	  Quartile	   -­‐1.51*	   0.41	   .002	   -­‐2.57	   -­‐0.44	  4th	  Quartile	   0.37	   0.48	   .872	   -­‐0.88	   1.61	  
4th	  Quartile	   1st	  Quartile	   -­‐3.70*	   0.50	   .000	   -­‐4.97	   -­‐2.43	  2nd	  Quartile	   -­‐1.88*	   0.47	   .000	   -­‐3.08	   -­‐0.68	  3rd	  Quartile	   -­‐0.37	   0.48	   .872	   -­‐1.61	   0.88	  
	  [Table	   7.2.8	   –	   Liberal	   Democrat	   Post	   Hoc	   Tukey	   HSD	   -­‐	   (Mean	   SIP)	   (Std.	   Error)	   (P)	   (95%	  
Confidence	  Intervals,	  Upper	  &	  Lower)	  1979-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  1,742)	  (*Mean	  difference	  is	  significant	  at	  the	  
0.05	  level)]	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The	  data	  reported	  above	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  relative	  incumbent	  performance	  is	  moderated	   by	  ward	   size.	   There	   is	   a	   pattern	   for	   all	   three	  major	   parties	   that	  suggests	   that	   smaller	  wards,	   in	  particular	  wards	   that	   contain	   less	   than	   around	  4,500	  voters,	   foster	   better	   conditions	   for	   incumbents	   to	   retain	   their	   seat.	  Also,	  the	  data	   imply	  that	   there	  may	  be	  a	  natural	   threshold,	  at	  around	  6,000	  electors,	  where	  the	  relative	  performance	  of	  incumbents	  bottoms	  out,	  at	  between	  1%	  and	  2.5%	  SIP.	  Although	  SIP	  falls	  initially	  for	  all	  parties	  and	  then	  flattens	  in	  the	  third	  and	  fourth	  quartile	  groups	  (~>6,000),	  for	  Labour	  the	  major	  drop	  comes	  between	  the	   second	   and	   third	   quartiles.	   As	   for	   other	   data	   on	   incumbent	   performance	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis,	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  perform	  better	  that	  both	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  across	  all	  quartiles.	  	  The	   size	   of	   a	   ward’s	   electorate	   is	   a	   simplistic	   indicator	   of	   the	   task	   that	   faces	  incumbents	   who	   seek	   re-­‐election,	   and	   fails	   to	   consider	   more	   nuanced	  information	   about	   the	   local	   electoral	   conditions	   successful	   and	   unsuccessful	  incumbent’s	   experience,	   such	   as	   community	   and	   the	   rural/urban	   ward	  classification.	  However,	  for	  incumbents	  who	  seek	  to	  preserve	  their	  elected	  status	  either	  on	  the	  doorstep	  or	  through	  their	  role	  as	  a	  councillor,	  it	  is	  undeniable	  that	  the	  scale	  of	  that	  task	  increases	  as	  the	  number	  of	  potential	  voters	  within	  the	  ward	  rises	   and,	   although	   there	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   many	   confounding	   variables	   with	   a	  simple	  comparison	  of	  groups,	  as	  used	  in	  this	  analysis,	  the	  data	  discussed	  in	  this	  chapter	  appear	  to	  be	  at	  least	  in	  line	  with	  the	  theory.	  	  All	   the	   analysis	   above	   has	   ignored	   a	   simple	   yet	   interesting	   facet	   of	   electorate	  size;	  that	  due	  to	  the	  discrete	  nature	  of	  a	  vote	  (i.e.	  they	  come	  in	  1’s),	  each	  counts	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for	  a	  greater	  share	  in	  smaller	  wards	  than	  in	  larger	  ones.	  Table	  7.2.9	  displays	  the	  mean	   SIP	   based	   on	   votes	   cast	   rather	   than	   vote	   share.	   The	   data	   show	   that	   the	  number	   of	   votes	   advantage	   an	   incumbent	   achieves	   remains	   fairly	   constant	   for	  both	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives,	  varying	  by	  only	  a	  few	  votes	  either	  side	  of	  30	  and	   25	   respectively.	   The	   effect	   appears	   only	   to	   have	   been	   dampened	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  and	  some	  variation	  remains.	  The	  Lib	  Dems	  average	  almost	  60	  votes	  in	  the	  first	  quartile	  group,	  falling	  to	  around	  40	  in	  the	  third,	  which	  follows	  differences	   established	   between	   the	   parties	   earlier	   in	   this	   thesis.	   These	   data	  present	  an	  interesting	  set	  of	  implications.	  Not	  only	  do	  the	  data	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  little	  variation	  in	  the	  number	  of	  votes	  an	  incumbent	  receives,	  when	  compared	  to	   freshmen,	   but	   also	   that	   the	   Lib	   Dems	   are	   the	   only	   party	   to	   make	   any	  considerable	  gain	  in	  the	  number	  of	  votes	  in	  smaller	  wards.	  	   Party	   Ward	  Size	   n	   SIP	  (Votes)	   σ	  
Con	  
1st	  Quartile	   621	   29.86	   72.18	  2nd	  Quartile	   1,004	   24.39	   69.14	  3rd	  Quartile	   897	   20.42	   59.98	  4th	  Quartile	   994	   25.31	   85.18	  Total	   3,516	   24.60	   72.52	  
Lab	  
1st	  Quartile	   849	   32.27	   75.21	  2nd	  Quartile	   636	   34.61	   65.45	  3rd	  Quartile	   979	   25.41	   66.37	  4th	  Quartile	   1,094	   30.23	   84.40	  Total	   3,558	   30.17	   74.33	  
LD	  
1st	  Quartile	   407	   59.10	   93.63	  2nd	  Quartile	   552	   47.91	   79.88	  3rd	  Quartile	   476	   40.09	   63.85	  4th	  Quartile	   307	   42.73	   80.72	  Total	   1,742	   47.47	   79.82	  
[Table	  –7.2.9(Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (Mean	  SIP	  Votes)	  (σ)	  1979-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  8,816)]	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Where	  the	  analyses	  presented	  in	  this	  section	  discuss	  the	  effect	  of	  ward	  size,	  sub-­‐chapter	   7.3	   goes	   on	   to	   describe	   the	   effect	   of	   Rural/Urban	   classification	   on	   the	  performance	  of	  incumbent	  councillors.	  	  7.3	  –	  Rural/Urban	  Classification	  Section	  7.2	   introduced	   the	   examination	  of	  ward	   characteristics	   as	   an	   influence	  on	   the	   performance	   of	   incumbent	   councillors	   by	   presenting	   Standardised	  Incumbent	  Performance	  (SIP)	  data	  by	  variations	  in	  the	  size	  of	  ward	  electorates.	  The	  results	   indicated	   that	  councillors	   in	  wards	  with	  smaller	  electorates	   tended	  to	   perform,	   relatively	   better	   than	   their	   colleagues	   in	   wards	   with	   larger	  electorates.	  This	  led	  to	  the	  assertion	  that	  scale	  may	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  incumbent	  success,	   but	   only	   to	   a	   minor	   degree	   as	   effects	   were	   largely	   eroded	   when	  compared	  to	  the	  absolute	  values.	  To	  build	  on	  these	  data,	  section	  7.3	  introduces	  evidence	  from	  some	  of	  the	  literature	  concerned	  with	  geographical	  influences	  on	  elections	   in	  Britain.	  Using	   standard	  Rural/Urban	   classifications,	   determined	  by	  the	   Office	   for	   National	   Statistics	   (ONS),	   the	   sub-­‐chapter	   goes	   on	   to	   assess	  whether	  incumbents,	  for	  all	  the	  parties,	  are	  better	  suited	  for	  re-­‐election	  in	  wards	  of	   differing	   urban	   class.	   The	   section	   then	   uses	   SIP	   data	   to	   assess	   any	   urban-­‐effects	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  incumbents	  for	  the	  three	  major	  parties.	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  geography	  matters	  in	  English	  local	  elections.	  It	  is	  well	  established	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  geographical	  effects	  lead	  to	  the	  parties	  dominating	  different	  areas	   of	   England,	   or	   at	   least	   being	   electorally	   competitive	   to	   different	   extents	  across	   the	   country	   (Johnston	  &	  Pattie,	  2006;	  Gardiner	  &	  Matthews,	  2007).	  The	  effect	   is	   such	   that	   some	   communities	   have	   a	   history	   of	   one-­‐party	   control,	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effectively	  eliminating	  any	  serious	  opposition	  in	  their	  authority.	  For	  instance	  the	  Labour	  party	  has	  dominated	   the	  London	  Borough	  of	  Newham	  since	   the	  1970s,	  occupying	  at	  least	  90%	  of	  seats	  and	  frequently	  all	  of	  them.	  Geographical	  effects	  can	  also	   reduce	   the	   contest	   to	   a	   two	  horse	   race,	   as	   in	   the	  Unitary	  Authority	  of	  Plymouth,	  where	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  regularly	  exchange	  control	  of	  the	  council,	  but	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  not	  managed	  to	  secure	  more	  than	  two	  or	  three	  seats	  since	  1990,	  and	  often	  fail	  to	  win	  any.	  	  	  Even	   looking	  more	   broadly,	   by	   comparing	   types	   of	   authority,	   we	   can	   observe	  slight	  differences	  in	  party	  competitiveness.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  North	  of	  England,	  the	  MBs	  have	  traditionally	  been	  dominated	  by	  the	  Labour	  party,	  which	  is	  a	  result	  in	  part,	  of	  Britain’s	  industrial	  heritage.	  These	  niches	  are	  the	  equivalent	  of	  home	  and	  away	   turf	   for	   the	  parties,	   illustrating	  how	   the	   local	   economic,	   cultural	   and	  community	  environment	  has	  an	  effect	  on	   the	  political	  geography	  of	   the	  nation.	  Far	   from	  a	  simplistic	  North-­‐South	  divide,	   the	  geography	  of	  England	  is	  nuanced,	  and	   it	   is	   important	   to	   emphasise	   that	   there	   are	   strong	   local	   patterns	   in	   voting	  behaviour	   that	   follow	   as	   a	   result.	  What	  we	   observe	   nationally	   is	   the	   sum	   of	   a	  large	  number	  of	  interacting	  processes	  locally,	  and	  because	  of	  this,	  similar	  sorts	  of	  places	  tend	  to	  have	  similar	  electoral	  outcomes.	  There	  are	  geographies	  of	  voting	  that	   are	   built	   from	   the	   bottom-­‐up	   (Johnston	  &	   Pattie,	   2006,	   pp.42).	   This	   is	   an	  important	   concept	   when	   assessing	   local	   electoral	   outcomes,	   that	   there	   is	   a	  complexity	  to	  local	  politics,	  part	  of	  which	  is	  explained	  by	  where	  people	  live.	  It	  is	  clear	  not	  only	  that	  geography	  matters	  in	  shaping	  people’s	  partisan	  perspectives,	  but	   also	   that	   engagement	   in	   a	   community	   and	   local	   politics	   has	   an	  ‘environmental’	   dimension.	   That	   is,	   a	   number	   of	   local	   conditions	   can	   influence	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residents’	   political	   behaviour	   and	   ultimately	   electoral	   outcomes;	   the	  Rural/Urban	  classification	  is	  one	  of	  these	  dimensions.	  	  In	   terms	   of	   the	   lifestyles	   and	   values	   of	   residents,	   distinctions	   have	   become	  blurred,	  but	  differences	  between	  rural	  and	  urban	  dwellers	  still	  persist	  (Herbert,	  2006,	  pp.194).	  In	  their	  research	  on	  the	  attitudes	  of	  rural	  residents,	   ‘Living	  Lives	  
in	   Different	   Ways?	   Deprivation,	   Marginalization	   &	   Changing	   Lifestyles	   in	   Rural	  
England;	  Cloke	  et	  al	   (1997)	   found	  that	  rural	   inhabitants,	  particularly	   long-­‐term	  residents,	   felt	   as	   though	   they	   belonged	   to	   a	   rural	   community.	   They	   also	   found	  that	  long-­‐term	  residents	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  a	  local	  dialogue,	  which	  can	  at	   times,	   exhibit	  mildly	   hostile	   attitudes	   towards	   newcomers	  who	   are	   deemed	  not	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	   local	  community.	  Demographically	  also,	  rural	  Britain	   is	  different	   to	   the	   cities.	  Residents	   tend	   to	  be	  older,	   are	  more	   likely	   to	  own	   their	  homes,	  to	  be	  middle	  class	  and	  less	  ethnically	  mixed	  (Moseley,	  2007,	  pp.214).	  So	  it	  is	  apparent	  then,	  that	  there	  are	  clear	  divides	  between	  the	  broad	  definitions	  of	  rural	   and	   urban	   life.	   The	   implications	   for	   this	   research	   are	   that	   rural	  communities	  can	  be	  considered	  more	  likely	  to	  offer	  a	  suitable	  ‘environment’	  for	  councillors	  to	  join	  or	  build	  networks	  between	  engaged	  residents	  who	  participate	  in	  local	  politics	  and	  their	  elections.	  	  Drawing	   on	   this	   theme,	   I	   propose	   an	   ‘urban’	   and	   ‘rural’	   distinction	   in	   local	  political	   behaviour.	  Not	   simply	   in	   terms	  of	   party	   success,	   but	   also	   in	   how	  well	  incumbents	  of	  all	  parties	  perform.	  The	  literature	  has	  presented	  strong	  evidence	  in	   support	   of	   a	   rural/urban	   dimension	   for	   electoral	   outcomes,	   and	   so	   this	  chapter	   aims	   to	   build	   on	   the	   established	   research,	   asking	   whether	   the	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characteristics	   of	   rural	   areas	   permeate	   partisan	   preferences	   and	   offer	   a	   better	  outcome	   for	   incumbent	   councillors.	   If	   rural	   communities	   are	  more	   engaged	   in	  local	   politics,	   then	   incumbent	   councillors,	   for	   all	   the	   parties,	   would	   stand	   to	  benefit.	   The	   analysis	   begins	   by	   presenting	   re-­‐election	   rates	   for	   the	   different	  parties	  throughout	  the	  three	  classifications.	  	  Table	   7.3.1	   shows	   average	   success	   rates	   for	   incumbents	   in	   the	   different	  rural/urban	  classes.	  There	   is	  a	  clear	  difference	   in	  the	  number	  of	  cases	   for	  each	  party	   category	   within	   the	   classifications	   and	   this	   is	   for	   a	   number	   of	   reasons,	  which	  will	  be	  briefly	  outlined.	  First,	  the	  classifications	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  2001	  census,	   which	   restricts	   the	   temporal	   frame	   within	   which	   the	   analysis	   can	  operate.	  As	  such,	  2001	  has	  arbitrarily	  been	  taken	  as	  the	  mid-­‐point	  to	  which	  the	  classifications	  are	  generalized.	  The	  analysis	  only	  considers	  cases	  between	  1991	  and	   2010.	   Second,	   as	   well	   as	   missing	   classification	   data	   for	   the	   Metropolitan	  Boroughs,	   due	   to	   redistricting	   in	   2004,	   linking	   classifications	   to	   all	   wards	  throughout	  the	  20	  year	  period	  has	  proven	  difficult,	  and	  so	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  skew	   in	   the	   number	   of	   cases	   towards	   the	   later	   rather	   than	   earlier	   years.	   This	  isn’t	  too	  problematic,	  but	  must	  be	  considered	  when	  interpreting	  data	  discussed	  later	  in	  this	  section.	  A	  further	  discussion	  of	  the	  rationale	  behind	  the	  construction	  of	   the	   rural/urban	   dataset	   can	   be	   found	   in	   chapter	   3.	   Nevertheless	   there	   is	   a	  sufficient	  number	  of	  cases	  to	  draw	  broad	  inferences	  on	  the	  fortunes	  of	  defending	  councillors	  within	  the	  various	  classifications.	  	  For	  the	  Conservatives,	   incumbents	  who	  choose	  to	  stand	  again	  are	  successful	   to	  differing	   degrees	   across	   the	   classifications.	   Urban	   wards	   exhibit	   an	   86.3%	   re-­‐
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election	   rate	   for	   the	   almost	   seven	  and	  a	  half	   thousand	   incumbents	   considered.	  This	   figure	  rises	  almost	  three	  points	   in	  the	  Town	  &	  Fringe	  wards,	   to	  89.2%	  for	  the	  more	  than	  two	  thousand	  cases	  considered.	  In	  the	  Village,	  Hamlet	  &	  Isolated	  Dwellings	   (VHID)	   wards,	   some	   nineteen	   out	   of	   every	   twenty	   councillors	   who	  stood	  for	  re-­‐election	  were	  successful,	  more	  than	  5%	  higher	  than	  for	  the	  Town	  &	  Fringe	  wards.	  For	   the	  Conservatives	   there	  was	  a	  more	  than	  8%	  increase	   in	   the	  probability	  of	  success	  between	  the	  classes	  considered.	  	  For	   the	  almost	  eight	   thousand	  Labour	   incumbents	   in	  urban	  wards,	  a	  76.6%	  hit	  rate	  (HR)	   is	  reported.	  Although	  this	   figure	  appears	   low,	  especially	  compared	  to	  Conservatives	   for	   the	   same	   class,	   we	   must	   note	   that	   the	   missing	   MB	   data,	  discussed	  above,	  are	  mostly	  dense	  urban	  areas.	  In	  the	  MBs	  Labour	  have	  a	  86.7%	  HR	   for	   the	   almost	   seven	   thousand	   Labour	   incumbents	   who	   have	   sought	   re-­‐election.	   This	   is	   compared	   to	   just	   79.2%	   for	   the	   more	   than	   two	   thousand	  Conservatives	  and	  86.1%	  for	  a	  similar	  number	  of	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  So	  Labour	  HR	   figures	   for	  urban	  wards	  are	  almost	   certainly	  an	  underestimate.	  For	  Labour	  incumbents	  contesting	  Town	  &	  Fringe	  wards	  this	  figure	  drops	  slightly	  to	  74.3%	  and	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  drop	  significantly	  in	  the	  VHID	  wards	  to	  just	  51.3%,	  though	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  drop	  dramatically	  also,	  to	  just	  189.	  This	  suggests	  that	  there	  may	  be	  an	  overwhelming	  natural	  selection	  bias	  to	  consider.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  fair	  to	  say	  that	   the	  overall	  pattern	   for	  Labour	   incumbents	   is	  opposite	   to	   that	  of	   the	  Tories,	  showing	  that	  Labour	  councillors	  tend	  to	  win	  more	  in	  urban	  wards	  than	  in	  rural	  ones.	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The	  results	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	   fall	   squarely	  between	  the	   two	  other,	  and	  ideologically	  opposed	  parties.	  For	  the	  LDs,	  urban	  wards	  report	  a	  HR	  of	  80.9%	  for	  the	  more	  than	   five	   thousand	   incumbent	  councillors	  considered,	  whilst	   this	  rate	  dips	  by	  more	   than	   three	  points	   for	   the	   just	   over	   one	   thousand	  Town	  &	  Fringe	  wards	  considered,	  to	  just	  77.8%.	  For	  the	  VHID	  wards,	  just	  over	  71%	  of	  the	  more	  than	   seven	   hundred	   incumbents	   were	   successful	   in	   their	   electoral	   defence,	  roughly	  six	  and	  a	  half	  points	  lower	  than	  for	  Town	  &	  Fringe	  wards.	  For	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	   variation	   between	   the	   urban	   classifications	   appears	   similar	   to	   that	  for	  Conservatives,	  at	  just	  under	  10-­‐points.	  	   Party	   Rural/Urban	  Class	   n	   Inc.	  HR	  %	  
Con	  
Village,	  Hamlet	  &	  Isolated	  Dwellings	   2,561	   94.4	  Town	  &	  Fringe	   2,027	   89.2	  Urban	   7,496	   86.3	  
Lab	  
Village,	  Hamlet	  &	  Isolated	  Dwellings	   189	   51.3	  Town	  &	  Fringe	   921	   74.3	  Urban	   7,916	   76.6	  
LD	  
Village,	  Hamlet	  &	  Isolated	  Dwellings	   716	   71.1	  Town	  &	  Fringe	   1,066	   77.8	  Urban	   5,014	   80.9	  
[Table	  –7.3.1	   (Group	  Stats)	   -­‐	   (n)	   (Incumbent	  HRs	  %)	  All	  District	  Types	  Excl.	  MBs	  1991-­‐2010	   (n	  =	  
27,906)]	  	  Whilst	   table	   7.3.1	   shows	   variation	   in	   the	   re-­‐election	   rates	   of	   incumbent	  councillors	  in	  England,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  these	  percentages	  are	  statistically	  distinct	   from	  one	  another,	   as	   the	  Chi-­‐Squared	   tests	   in	   table	  7.3.2	  detail.	   For	  all	  three	  major	  parties	  considered,	  Pearson	  Chi-­‐Squared	  tests	  have	  a	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	   level	  with	   two	  degrees	  of	   freedom,	  an	   indication	   that	   the	   re-­‐election	  rates	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  relatively	  distinct	  from	  one	  another.	  However,	  although	  an	  indicator	   of	   sorts,	   in	   this	   instance	   the	   Chi-­‐Squared	   test	   is	   not	   the	   best	   tool	   for	  electoral	  analysis	  without	  an	  illustration	  of	  the	  directional	  effect	  for	  each	  of	  the	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parties.	  The	  test	  reveals	  merely	  the	  statistical	  deviance	  between	  the	  subgroups.	  To	  assist,	  figure	  7.3.1	  shows	  the	  figures	  for	  each	  party.	  	   Party	   Rural/Urban	  Class	   Value	   df	   Sig.	  
Con	  
Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	   123.524	   2	   .000	  Likelihood	  Ratio	   139.587	   2	   .000	  
n	  of	  valid	  cases	   12,084	   	   	  
Lab	  
Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	   65.452	   2	   .000	  Likelihood	  Ratio	   56.654	   2	   .000	  
n	  of	  valid	  cases	   9,026	   	   	  
LD	  
Pearson	  Chi-­‐Square	   38.352	   2	   .000	  Likelihood	  Ratio	   36.046	   2	   .000	  
n	  of	  valid	  cases	   6,796	   	   	  
[Table	  –7.3.2	  Rural/Urban	  groups	  by	  Party	  (Chi-­‐Square	  Tests)	  -­‐	  (Value	  &	  n)	  (df)	  (Asymp.	  Sig	  2-­‐Sided	  
1991-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  27,906)]	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which	  fall	  squarely	  and	  consistently	  between	  them.	  Before	  proceeding	  a	  note	  of	  caution	  must	  be	  made.	  As	  previously	  indicated,	  re-­‐election	  rates	  can	  be	  a	  biased	  indicator	  of	  performance,	  particularly	  over	  small	  time	  frames.	  The	  SIP	  measure	  developed	   and	   discussed	   earlier	   in	   this	   thesis	   is	   a	   more	   objective	  measure	   of	  incumbent	   performance.	   Table	   7.3.3	   shows	   SIP	   group	   statistics	   for	   the	  classifications	  for	  the	  three	  major	  parties.	  	  	  As	   explained	   in	   previous	   chapters,	   the	   SIP	   model	   is	   an	   unbiased	   estimator	   of	  relative	  incumbent	  performance	  in	  elections	  and	  indicates	  the	  disparity	  between	  incumbent	  and	   freshman	  performance.	  Data	  presented	   in	   table	  7.3.3	  show	  that	  the	   rural	   classes	   of	  wards	   have	   a	   higher	   average	   SIP.	   In	   turn,	   rural	   conditions	  may	   be	   more	   favourable	   for	   incumbents	   of	   all	   parties.	   For	   the	   Conservatives,	  urban	   classified	  wards	   average	   a	   SIP	   of	   just	   1.88%,	  whilst	   Town	  &	  Fringe	   and	  VHID	   wards	   average	   markedly	   higher	   SIP,	   at	   3.85%	   and	   4.11%	   respectively.	  Although	  there	  is	  little	  difference	  between	  the	  more	  rural	  ward	  classifications	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  a	  large	  difference	  between	  urban	  wards	  and	  the	  more	  rural	  ones,	  in	  the	  region	  of	  2%	  SIP.	  	  For	   Labour	   the	   results	   are	   similar.	   Average	   SIP	   in	   urban	   classified	   wards	   is	  1.84%,	   whereas	   SIP	   is	   significantly	   higher	   in	   more	   rural	   wards	   at	   4.93%	   and	  5.63%	  for	  the	  Town	  &	  Fringe	  and	  VHID	  classifications	  respectively.	  Like	  data	  for	  the	  Conservatives,	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  gap	  between	  the	  SIP	  of	  urban	  wards	  and	  the	   SIP	   of	   more	   rural	   ones,	   in	   this	   instance	   around	   3%.	   However,	   it	   must	   be	  noted	   that	   there	   are	   few	   cases	   considered	   for	   Labour	   VHID	  wards.	   So,	   in	   this	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instance	   the	   SIP	   result	   for	   Town	   &	   Fringe	   wards	   can	   support	   a	   more	   general	  estimation	  for	  VHID	  wards.	  	  For	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  the	  results	  are	  similar	  to	  those	  for	  the	  Conservatives	  and	  Labour,	  though	  as	  expected	  SIP	  is	  higher	  for	  all	  ONS	  classifications.	  For	  the	  Urban	   class,	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   report	   an	   average	   SIP	   of	   3.15%,	   which	   is	  around	  1.3%	  higher	  than	  for	  Labour	  and	  the	  Conservatives.	  This	  difference	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  SIP	  findings	  discussed	  earlier.	  For	  the	  Town	  &	  Fringe	  and	  the	  VHID	  classifications,	  as	  for	  the	  two	  major	  parties,	  SIP	  is	  markedly	  higher	  at	  6.61%	  and	  5.83%	  respectively,	  a	  gap	  of	  around	  2.7-­‐3.5%	  SIP	  although,	  as	  for	  Labour	  results,	  a	  note	  of	  caution	  is	  required	  due	  to	  the	  low	  number	  of	  cases	  for	  the	  VHID	  wards	  considered.	  	   Party	   Rural/Urban	  Class	   n	   SIP	   σ	  
Con	  
Village,	  Hamlet	  &	  Isolated	  Dwellings	   235	   4.11	   6.91	  Town	  &	  Fringe	   395	   3.85	   6.80	  Urban	   1,766	   1.88	   4.41	  
Lab	  
Village,	  Hamlet	  &	  Isolated	  Dwellings	   14	   5.63	   8.55	  Town	  &	  Fringe	   129	   4.93	   8.31	  Urban	   1,710	   1.84	   5.01	  
LD	  
Village,	  Hamlet	  &	  Isolated	  Dwellings	   41	   5.83	   8.46	  Town	  &	  Fringe	   142	   6.61	   7.99	  Urban	   1,052	   3.15	   4.92	  
[Table	  –7.3.3	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (SIP)	  (σ)	  1991-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  5,485)]	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  Table	  7.3.4	  displays	  group	  statistics	  for	  the	  new	  Rural	  and	  Urban	  classified	  ward	  groups	  for	  the	  parties.	  Though	  the	  Urban	  classified	  statistics	  are	  familiar,	  Rural	  SIP	  averages	  for	  the	  parties	  are	  3.95%	  for	  the	  Conservatives,	  5%	  for	  Labour	  and	  6.44%	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  This	  follows	  previous	  patterns	  for	  the	  parties,	  though	   standard	   deviations	   have	   widened	   slightly.	   The	   new	   table	   (7.3.4)	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  an	  almost	  2.06%	  gap	  in	  SIP	  between	  the	  classifications	  for	  the	  Conservatives,	  which	  is	  less	  than	  the	  reported	  3.15%	  for	  Labour	  incumbents	  and	   also	   less	   than	   the	   3.29%	   reported	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   also.	   These	  estimates	  can	  now	  be	  compared	  using	  independent	  t-­‐tests.	  	   Party	   Rural	  -­‐	  Urban	   n	   SIP	   σ	   S.E.	  
Con	   Rural	   630	   3.95	   6.84	   0.272	  Urban	   1,766	   1.88	   4.41	   0.105	  
Lab	   Rural	   143	   5.00	   8.30	   0.694	  Urban	   1,710	   1.84	   5.01	   0.121	  
LD	   Rural	   183	   6.44	   8.08	   0.597	  Urban	   1,053	   3.15	   4.92	   0.152	  
[Table	  –7.3.4	  (Group	  Stats)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (SIP)	  (σ)	  1991-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  5,485)]	  	  Table	  7.3.5	  displays	   the	  results	   from	  Levene’s	   tests	  and	   independent	   t-­‐tests	   for	  SIP	   between	   the	   reclassified	   Rural	   and	   Urban	   groups	   for	   the	   parties.	   For	   the	  Conservatives	   a	   Levene’s	   test	   reports	   an	   F-­‐statistic	   of	   133.117,	   which	   has	   a	  corresponding	   p-­‐value	   well	   below	   the	   0.001	   level,	   the	   assumption	   of	   equal	  variances	  can	  be	  rejected.	  The	  resulting	  t-­‐value	  is	  high	  at	  7.073	  and	  with	  823.328	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  the	  2.06	  difference	  in	  means	  is	  statistically	  significant,	  with	  a	  p-­‐value	  well	   below	   the	   0.001	   level.	   For	   Labour	   the	   Levene’s	   test	   reports	   an	   F-­‐statistic	  of	  62.306	  with	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.001	  level,	  meaning	  that	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the	   null	   hypothesis	   can	   also	   be	   rejected.	   So,	   the	   t-­‐statistic	   of	   4.476	   has	   a	  corresponding	   p-­‐value	   well	   below	   the	   0.001	   level,	   with	   150.783	   degrees	   of	  freedom.	  As	  for	  the	  Conservatives,	  the	  group	  means	  are	  statistically	  distinct	  from	  one	   another	   when	   equal	   variances	   are	   not	   assumed.	   The	   data	   show	   a	   similar	  story	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  The	  Levene’s	  test	  returns	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  74.682	  and	   corresponding	   a	   p-­‐value	   that	   is	   below	   the	   0.001,	   meaning	   that	   equal	  variances	  for	  the	  groups	  cannot	  be	  assumed.	  Considering	  this,	  the	  t-­‐test	  reports	  a	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  5.340,	  and	  with	  206.089	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  a	  p-­‐value	  less	  than	  the	  0.001	   level.	   Similar	   to	   results	   described	   for	   the	   Conservatives	   and	   for	   Labour,	  these	  data	  also	  show	  that	   the	  group	  averages	  are	  statistically	  distinct	   from	  one	  another	  and	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  urban-­‐effects	  on	  the	  relative	  performance	  of	   incumbents	   for	   all	   parties.	   Independent	   t-­‐tests	   show	   significant	   distinctions	  between	  the	  classifications,	  by	  between	  2.1%	  and	  3.3%	  SIP.	  	  Before	  discussing	   the	   implications,	   it	   is	  best	   to	   clarify	   their	   limitations	  and	   the	  rationale	  for	  doing	  so.	  First,	  as	  previously	  discussed	  analyses	  for	  the	  SIP	  and	  SRS	  constructed	   measures	   have	   consistently	   revealed,	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   have	  tended	  to	  exhibit	  greater	  levels	  of	  relative	  incumbent	  performance	  than	  Labour,	  as	   they	   both	   have	   over	   the	   Conservatives.	   This	   suggests,	   not	   that	   the	  Conservatives	  do	  worse	   than	  Labour	  or	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	   but	   rather	   that	  incumbency	   has	   less	   electoral	   value	   for	   Conservative	   incumbents	   when	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  parties.	  But	  as	  table	  7.3.5	  shows,	  the	  gap	  in	  SIP	  between	  the	   classifications	   is	   far	   less	   for	   the	  Conservatives	   than	   for	  Labour	  and	   the	  Lib	  Dems.	  This	  does	  not	  automatically	   imply	  that	  urban-­‐effects	  are	  weakest	   for	  the	  Conservatives	  and	  greatest	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  We	  know	   from	  previous	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examinations	  that	  Conservative	  SIP	  is	  less	  ‘elastic’	  than	  it	  is	  for	  the	  other	  parties,	  and	  as	  such	  when	  considering	  any	  effect,	  it	  is	  the	  relative	  change	  in	  SIP	  that	  we	  are	   interested	   in	   reporting	   (i.e.	   the	   pattern).	   As	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   cases	  considered	   are	   from	  wards	   classified	   as	   Urban,	   the	   difference	   in	   performance	  across	   the	   classifications	   can	   be	   compared	   in	   another	   way.	   This	   time	   by	  measuring	  the	  change	  in	  SIP	  as	  a	  ratio	  of	  the	  party’s	  urban	  average,	  what	  can	  be	  termed	   as	   the	   ‘Urban-­‐Effects	   Coefficient’.	   The	   results	   reveal	   that	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	   and	   the	   Conservatives	   exhibit	   the	   least	   relative	   growth	   in	   SIP	  between	   the	   rural/urban	   classes.	   ‘Urban-­‐Effects	   Coefficients’	   for	   the	   Lib	   Dems	  and	  the	  Conservatives	  are	  1.04	  and	  1.10	  respectively.	  Labour’s	   is	  greatest,	  with	  an	   ‘Urban-­‐Effects	   Coefficient’	   of	   1.71.	   These	   coefficients	   are	   a	   more	   accurate	  reflection	   of	   the	   relative	   effect	   that	   the	   rural/urban	   conditions	   have	   on	   the	  average	  SIP	  for	  each	  party.	  	  Party	   	  Levene’s	  	   F	   Sig	   t	   df	   Sig	   SIP	   S.E.	  
Con	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	  	   133.117	   .000	   8.621	   2394	   .000	   2.06	   0.239	  Equal	  Var	  Not	  	   	  	   	  	   7.073	   823.328	   .000	   2.06	   0.292	  
Lab	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	  	   62.306	   .000	   6.788	   1851	   .000	   3.15	   0.465	  Equal	  Var	  Not	  	   	  	   	  	   4.476	   150.783	   .000	   3.15	   0.705	  
LD	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	   74.682	   .000	   7.467	   1234	   .000	   3.29	   0.441	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   5.340	   206.089	   .000	   3.29	   0.616	  
[Table	  -­‐	  7.3.5	  (Levene’s	  &	  Indep	  t-­‐test)	  –	  (F)	  (Sig)	  (t)	  (df)	  (Sig)	  (SIP)	  (Error)	  1991-­‐2010	  (n	  =	  5,485)]	  	  The	   objective	   of	   this	   section	   has	   been	   to	   reveal	   the	   effect	   that	   a	   ward’s	  rural/urban	  classification	  has	  on	  the	  relative	  performance	  of	  incumbents	  for	  all	  the	  parties.	   It	   has	   tested	  whether	   councillors	   from	  more	   rural	   communities	  do	  better	  than	  those	  in	  cities	  and	  more	  densely	  populated	  areas.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Conservatives	   dominate	   the	   countryside,	   where	   almost	   nineteen	   out	   of	   every	  twenty	   councillors	   who	   stood	   again,	   in	   the	   VHID	   classified	   wards,	   were	   re-­‐
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elected.	  For	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats,	  incumbents	  do	  less	  well	  in	  the	  VHIDs	  though	  in	   the	   Town	   &	   Fringe	   districts	   the	   HR	   improves.	   Both	   the	   Conservatives	   and	  Liberal	  Democrats	  do	  considerably	  better	   than	  Labour	   for	  whom	   just	  over	  half	  are	  re-­‐elected	  in	  the	  VHIDs	  and	  less	  than	  three	  quarters	  are	  successful	  in	  Town	  &	  Fringe	  wards.	  Though	  it	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  fewer	  Labour	  candidates	  win	  in	  the	  first	   place	   in	   order	   to	   be	   able	   to	   stand	   for	   re-­‐election	   (see	   figure	   7.3.1).	  While	  tory	   incumbent	   candidates	   tend	   to	   experience	   higher	   re-­‐election	   rates	   in	   the	  countryside,	  Labour	  do	  comparatively	  better	  in	  the	  cities.	  The	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  been	  ascribed	  their	  own	  established	  areas,	  the	  so-­‐called	  Liberal	  ‘heartlands’	  (Dorling	  et	  al,	  1998;	  MacAllister	  et	  al,	  2002).	  Once	  described	  as	  the	  Celtic	  fringe,	  these	  areas	  comprise;	  north	  west	  Scotland,	  central	  Wales	  and	  the	  south	  west	  of	  England.	   These	   data	   are	   simply	   a	   reflection	   of	   English	   electoral	   geography,	  supporting	  the	  already	  well-­‐established	  literature	  on	  the	  success	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  different	  areas	  across	  the	  country.	  	  However,	  what	  is	  most	  striking	  is	  that	  relative	  incumbent	  performance	  (SIP),	  for	  all	  parties,	  is	  considerably	  better	  in	  rural	  wards	  when	  compared	  to	  more	  urban	  ones.	   For	   all	   the	   parties,	   rural	   wards	   exhibit	   higher	   levels	   of	   SIP,	   with	   t-­‐tests	  confirming	   the	   differences	   are	   significant.	   The	   data	   are	   consistent	   with	   those	  discussed	   earlier	   in	   the	   thesis.	   SIP	   averages	   for	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   in	   both	  rural	   and	   urban	   districts	   exceed	   that	   for	   Labour	   and	   the	   Conservatives.	  Estimated	  urban-­‐effects	  coefficients	  indicate	  that	  Labour	  candidates	  are	  affected	  most	  by	   the	  classifications,	  but	   the	  most	  notable	   facet	  of	   the	   results	   is	   that	   the	  effect	   is	   clearly	   relevant	   to	   all	   parties.	   Regardless	   of	   a	   party’s	   overall	   success	  across	  the	  classifications,	  the	  analyses	  have	  provided	  strong	  evidence	  in	  support	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of	   the	   notion	   that	   rural	   communities	   offer	   more	   favourable	   conditions	   for	  councillors	  to	  defend	  their	  seats.	  	  7.4	  –	  Concluding	  Remarks	  Chapter	  7	  has	  discussed	  what	  can	  be	  considered,	  the	  structural	  factors	  that	  affect	  an	   incumbent’s	   performance	   in	   local	   elections;	   turnout,	   ward	   size	   and	  rural/urban	   classification.	   Beginning	   with	   turnout,	   the	   chapter	   introduced	   the	  Sophomore	  Turnout	  Surge	  (STS)	  constructed	  model.	  The	  estimator	  was	  used	  to	  assess	   the	   impact	   of	   incumbency	   on	   ward-­‐level	   turnout.	   Although	   small,	   for	  Labour	   and	   the	  Conservatives	   turnout	  has	  been	   shown	   to	   increase	   statistically	  significantly	   over	   the	   freshman-­‐sophomore	   electoral	   cycle.	   For	   the	   Liberal	  Democrats	  this	  rise	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant,	  though	  this	  could	  be	  due	  to	  the	  small	  number	  of	  cases	  that	  met	  the	  model’s	  criteria.	  Implications	  of	  these	  results	  include	   understanding	   where	   incumbency	   advantage	   comes	   from,	   where	  incumbents	  accrue	  their	  ‘extra	  votes’.	  The	  analyses	  suggest	  that	  incumbents	  may	  be	   able	   to	   encourage	   a	   small	   number	   of	   people	   to	   turnout,	   in	   which	   case	  incumbents	   are	   net	   contributors	   to	   turnout.	   When	   a	   councillor	   stands	   for	   re-­‐election,	  between	  30	  and	  65	  extra	  voters	  to	  turn	  out.	  	  Chapter	   7	   then	   went	   on	   to	   identify	   the	   effect	   that	   ward	   size	   may	   have	   on	  incumbent	   performance.	   Using	   multimember	   wards	   the	   chapter	   assessed	   the	  hypothesis	   that	   smaller	   wards	   exhibited	   more	   favourable	   conditions	   for	  councillors	  to	  defend	  their	  position.	  Section	  7.2	  showed	  that	  SIP	  varied	  according	  to	   the	   size	   of	   the	   electorate.	   For	   all	   three	   major	   parties,	   smaller	   wards,	   in	  particular	   wards	   that	   contain	   less	   than	   4,500	   voters,	   appeared	   to	   exhibit	   the	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highest	   SIP.	   Also,	   there	   appeared	   to	   be	   a	   threshold	   at	   roughly	   the	   6,000	  mark	  where	  the	  performance	  of	  incumbents	  levelled	  out	  for	  all	  the	  parties.	  Results	  also	  revealed	   that	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   performed	   better	   than	   Labour	   and	  Conservative	   incumbents	   across	   all	   electorate	   sizes.	   However,	   when	   assessing	  the	   effect	   of	   electorate	   size	   using	   absolute	   votes,	   the	   difference	   across	   the	  electorate	  groups	  was	  almost	  entirely	  eliminated,	  except	  for	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  where	  the	  effect	  was	  only	  dampened.	  	  Finally,	   sub-­‐chapter	   7.3	   considered	   urban-­‐effects	   on	   councillors’	   performance.	  Results	   revealed	   that	   SIP	   varies	   considerably	   over	   the	   ONS	   classifications,	   by	  roughly	  2.1%	  to	  3.3%,	  depending	  on	  the	  party.	  There	  is	  extensive	  evidence	  in	  the	  literature	   to	   support	   these	   results,	   that	   rural	   wards	   have	   significantly	   higher	  levels	   of	   SIP	   than	   urban	   ones.	   Labour	   incumbents	   were	   most	   susceptible	   to	  urban-­‐effects,	   reporting	  an	   ‘Urban-­‐Effects	  Coefficient’	  of	  1.71,	   compared	   to	   just	  1.1	   for	   the	  Conservatives	  and	  1.04	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  The	  concept	  of	  a	  rural	   ‘community’	   in	   the	  countryside	   fits	  neatly	  with	  potential	  explanations	   for	  these	   results.	   Such	   as,	   differences	   in	   the	   local	   environment	   may	   affect	   and	  possibly	  homogenise	  the	  behaviour	  of	  those	  groups	  within	  different	  geographies.	  	  The	  overall	   narrative	  of	   chapter	  7	   suggests	   that	   there	   are	   structural	   effects	   on	  the	   performance	   of	   councillors	   defending	   their	   seats.	   Incumbent	   performance	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  vary	  alongside	  changes	  in	  the	  ward-­‐level	  environment.	  This	  is	  important	   as	   it	   suggests	   that	   councillors	   have	   a	   connection	   with	   their	   wards’	  characteristics,	  and	  their	  electoral	  fortunes	  are	  shaped	  by	  them.	  Analyses	  in	  this	  chapter	  suggest	  that	  incumbency	  not	  only	  encourages	  participation,	  but	  also	  that	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some	  environments	  offer	  improved	  electoral	  conditions	  for	  candidates.	  Chapter	  8	   develops	   these	   discussions,	   presenting	   results	   from	   candidate-­‐level	   survey	  data,	  on	  their	  methods	  of	  campaigning	  and	  perceptions	  of	  incumbency	  effects	  in	  local	  elections.	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Chapter	  8	  –	  Candidates’	  Attitudes	  &	  Behaviour	  	  	  Chapter	  7	  discussed	  some	  of	  the	  structural	  influences	  on	  councillors’	  re-­‐election	  prospects	  in	  England.	  The	  chapter	  revealed	  a	  sophomore	  effect	  on	  turnout,	  how	  incumbents	  fare	  in	  smaller	  wards	  and	  how	  well	  they	  perform	  in	  communities	  of	  varying	   rural/urban	   classification.	   The	   results	   suggest	   that	   small,	   rural	  communities	  demonstrate	  better	  conditions	  for	  incumbent	  councillors	  to	  mount	  a	   successful	   electoral	   defence.	   In	   summary,	   chapter	   7	   proposed	   that	   a	  councillor’s	   social	   environment	   has	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	   their	   electoral	  fortune.	  	  Chapter	   8	   aims	   to	   paint	   a	   broad	   picture	   of	   the	   electoral	   value	   of	   incumbency	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  those	  who	  actually	  contest	  local	  elections.	  Moving	  away	  from	  the	  utilisation	  of	  aggregate	  local	  election	  data,	  used	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	  the	  chapter	  presents	  results	  from	  a	  set	  of	  seven	  questions	  asked	  in	  the	  2011	  and	  2012	  Annual	  Local	  Election	  Candidate	  Survey,	  conducted	  by	  The	  Election	  Centre	  at	   Plymouth	   University.	   Data	   are	   compared	   across	   groups	   of	   candidates	   with	  varying	   levels	   of	   experience	   in	   order	   to	   ‘triangulate’	   perspectives.	   Questions	  asked	   were	   based	   on	   a	   number	   of	   existing	   explanations	   for	   incumbency	  advantage	  detailed	  in	  the	  literature.	  This	  allowed	  us	  to	  categorise	  chapter	  8	  into	  three	   consistent	   themes;	   Experience,	   Connectivity	   and	   Campaigns.	   For	   the	  surveys,	   a	   statement	   about	   the	   electoral	   fortunes	   of	   incumbent	   councillors	  precedes	  the	  seven	  questions:	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“Incumbents	   seeking	   re-­‐election	   are	   often	   successful.	   Below	   is	   a	   list	   of	   possible	  
explanations	  for	  why	  this	  might	  be	  the	  case”	  	  
(Annual	  Candidate	  Survey,	  2011-­‐2012)	  	  The	   statement	   is	   followed	  by	   several	   explanations,	  which	  quiz	   respondents	   for	  their	   perspective.	   They	   are	   asked	   to	   respond	  on	   a	  5-­‐point	   Likert	   scale	   ranging	  from	   strongly	   agree	   to	   strongly	   disagree.	   Further	   information	   regarding	   the	  survey	  and	  methodology	  can	  be	  found	  in	  chapter	  3.	  This	  chapter	  aims	  to	  reveal	  candidates’	   perceptions	   of	   incumbency,	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   informing	   the	   general	  discussion	   of	   possible	   explanations	   of	   the	   electoral	   advantage,	   as	   well	   as	   any	  behavioural	   differences	   that	   may	   arise.	   It	   has	   become	   clear,	   from	   evidence	  presented	  thus	  far	   in	  this	  thesis	  that	  councillors	  defending	  seats	  do	  better	  than	  their	   challengers.	   As	   such,	   questions	   directed	   at	   those	   competing	   with	   one	  another	  for	   local	  government	  may	  offer	  an	   ‘insider’s	  view’	  as	  to	  why	  this	   is	   the	  case	  and	  help	  to	  direct	  further	  research	  on	  the	  topic.	  	  The	  dataset	  used	  for	  this	  chapter’s	  investigation	  is	  comprised	  of	  responses	  from	  candidates	  in	  England	  &	  Wales,	  split	  roughly	  evenly	  over	  2011	  and	  2012.	  A	  close	  examination	   of	   survey	   responses	   has	   revealed	   little	   to	   no	   variation	   of	   results	  over	  both	  years	  and	  over	  all	  the	  parties,	  for	  all	  seven	  questions.	  As	  there	  is	  little	  variation	  there	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  few	  methodological	  implications	  when	  combining	  the	   two	   datasets.	   However,	   data	   have	   been	   broken	   down	   by	   respondents’	  experience	  status	  in	  order	  to	  identify	  any	  meaningful	  differences	  between	  them.	  This	   should	   allow	   the	   scrutiny	   and	   comparison	   of	   opinions	   between	   those	  
	   307	  
groups	   and	   distinguish	   those	   with	   a	   relevant	   perspective	   from	   those	   without.	  These	  experience	  groups	  are	  as	  follows:	  	  
• Incumbent	  (a	  councilor	  defending	  their	  seat)	  
• Freshman	  (first	  time	  candidate,	  no	  previous	  experience	  as	  a	  councilor)	  
• Experienced	  Freshman	  (candidate,	  previous	  experience	  as	  a	  councilor)	  
• Serial	  Freshman	  (candidate,	  stood	  previously,	  no	  councilor	  experience)	  	  	  More	   importantly,	   as	   the	  survey	   is	   conducted	  post-­‐election,	   the	  possibility	   that	  candidates’	   responses	   may	   be	   affected	   by	   the	   election	   result	   must	   also	   be	  considered.	  For	  all	  statements,	  and	  categories	  of	  candidate,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  response	  proportions	  were	  broadly	  even	  suggesting	  that	  whether	  a	  respondent	  won	  or	  lost	  in	  the	  election	  had	  little	  effect	  on	  their	  answer.	  The	  exceptions	  to	  this	  finding	   are	   the	   responses	   of	   Incumbents	   for	   two	   questions;	   one	   regarding	  incumbency	   advantage,	   and	   the	   other	   local	   support.	   These	   discrepancies	   are	  discussed	   in	   sub-­‐chapter	   8.1.	   Other	   than	   these,	   the	   post-­‐election	   outcome	   is	  presumed	  to	  have	  little	  to	  no	  effect	  on	  the	  results.	  	  	  Regarding	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  advantages	  associated	  with	  incumbency,	  what	  has	  become	  clear	  from	  the	  literature	  is	  that	  the	  investigation	  of	  differences	  in	  the	  electoral	  performance	  of	   candidates	  may	  be	  greatly	   informed	  by	  an	  analysis	  of	  candidates’	  status	  and	  behaviour.	  In	  previous	  surveys,	  researchers	  demonstrated	  that	   there	   is	   little	   difference	   in	   the	   social	   characteristics	   of	   candidates	   and	  councillors.	   Even	   if	   every	   incumbent	   councillor	  were	   defeated	   at	   the	   polls	   the	  councillor	  demographic	  would	   change	   little	   (Rallings	  et	  al,	  2010,	  pp.	   376-­‐377).	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Considering	   this,	   utilising	   candidate	   survey	   data	   to	   identify	   differences	   in	   the	  behaviour	   of	   candidates	   and	   whether	   incumbency	   status	   might	   be	   electorally	  advantageous,	  offers	  this	  project	  a	  potentially	  rich	  vein	  of	  investigation	  into	  the	  potential	  explanations	  for	  an	  advantage	  in	  local	  elections.	  	  Table	  8.0.1	  displays	   the	  number	  of	  candidates	  who	  responded	  to	   the	  2011	  and	  2012	  candidate	  surveys	  and	   their	  Hit	  Rate	   (HR	  %),	  broken	  down	  by	  party	  and	  electoral	  experience	  before	  their	  respective	  elections.	  What	  is	  immediately	  clear	  is	   that	   electoral	   experience	   matters.	   Almost	   three	   quarters	   of	   Incumbent	  respondents	   to	   the	   survey	   returned	   to	   the	   council	   (72.4%,	   234/323),	  which	   is	  more	  than	  three	  times	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  Freshman	  survey	  respondent	  winning	  (23.6%,	  177/750).	  Experienced	  Freshman	  have	  a	  HR	  of	  31.1%,	  (51/164),	  which	  is	  seven	  and	  a	  half	  points	  higher	  than	  Freshmen,	  and	  roughly	  18%	  higher	  than	  Serial	  Freshmen	  (12.4%,	  82/662).	  	  Incumbent	   respondents	   have	   a	   greater	   chance	   of	   winning	   than	   their	  counterparts.	  Even	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  different	  parties,	  incumbency	  appears	  to	   offer	   more	   favourable	   odds	   of	   success.	   For	   instance,	   84.6%	   (99/117)	   of	  Conservative	   Incumbent	   survey	   respondents	  were	   re-­‐elected,	  more	   than	   twice	  that	  for	  Tory	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  (39.4%,	  13/33).	  This	  figure	  is	  two	  and	  a	  half	  times	  the	  share	  of	  Conservative	  Freshmen	  (33.9%,	  64/189)	  and	  over	  five	  times	  the	   portion	   of	   Serial	   Freshmen	   for	   the	   Conservatives	   (16.7%,	   20/120).	   The	  results	  for	  Labour	  candidates	  are	  almost	  identical.	  Four	  of	  every	  five	  Incumbent	  Labour	   respondents	   were	   successfully	   re-­‐elected	   (79.7%,	   55/69).	   As	   for	   the	  Conservatives,	   this	   share	   is	   more	   than	   twice	   that	   for	   Experienced	   Freshmen	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(36.1%,	   22/61),	   two	   and	   a	   half	   times	   the	   proportion	   of	   Labour	   Freshmen	  (31.6%,	  68/215),	  and	  more	  than	  three	  and	  a	  half	  times	  the	  success	  rate	  of	  Serial	  Freshmen	  (21.9%,	  40/183).	  	  	  Finally,	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  the	  results	  suggest	  that	  three	  out	  of	  every	  five	  Incumbent	  survey	  respondents	  successfully	  defended	  their	  seat	  (59.5%,	  50/84).	  Although	   this	   success	   rate	   is	  worse	   than	   for	   the	   two	  major	   parties,	   relative	   to	  other	   types	  of	  Liberal	  Democrat	  candidate	   it	   is	   far	  higher.	  For	   instance,	   the	  re-­‐election	   rate	   of	   Lib	   Dem	   Incumbents	   is	   around	   four	   and	   a	   half	   times	   that	   for	  Freshmen	   and	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   (13.3%,	   16/120	   &	   12.8%,	   5/39	  respectively).	  Also,	  the	  success	  of	  Lib	  Dem	  Incumbents	  far	  exceeds	  that	  for	  Serial	  Freshmen,	   by	   a	   factor	   of	   six	   (9.7%,	   13/134).	   In	   this	   sense,	   even	   though	   the	  Liberal	   Democrats	   appear	   to	   do	   worse	   than	   the	   two	   major	   parties,	   a	  circumstance	  that	  may	  have	  been	  shaped	  by	  the	  party’s	  relatively	  poor	  national	  performance	   in	   the	   2011	   and	   2012	   elections,	   relatively	   speaking,	   incumbency	  appears	  to	  be	  worth	  more	  to	  Lib	  Dem	  respondents	  than	  the	  two	  other	  parties.	  	  The	  most	  interesting	  aspect	  of	  the	  data	  revealed	  in	  table	  8.0.1	  is	  that,	  of	  all	  non-­‐incumbent	  respondents,	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  tended	  to	  do	  better.	  This	  signals	  that	   electoral	   experience	   may	   be	   a	   factor	   to	   consider	   in	   the	   estimation	   of	  electoral	  success	  between	  the	  different	  types	  of	  candidate.	  At	  a	  glance	  we	  can	  see	  that	  those	  Freshmen	  respondents	  with	  previous	  experience	  on	  the	  council	  were	  almost	  one	  and	  a	  half	  times	  more	  likely	  to	  win	  (31.1%,	  51/164)	  than	  Freshmen	  candidates	   (23.6%,	  177/750),	  and	   two	  and	  a	  half	   times	  more	   likely	   than	  Serial	  Freshmen	  (12.4%,	  82/662).	  This	  pattern	  continues	  when	  we	   take	   the	  different	  
	  310	  
party	   categories	   into	   account.	   For	   the	   Conservatives	   table	   8.0.1	   shows	   that	  39.4%	  (13/33)	  of	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  respondents	  were	  elected	  at	  the	  2011	  and	   2012	   elections.	   This	   is	   almost	   one	   and	   a	   quarter	   times	   the	   HR	   of	   Tory	  Freshmen	   candidates	   (33.9%,	   64/189),	   and	   again	   almost	   two	   and	   a	   half	   times	  the	  HR	  of	  Serial	  Freshmen	  (16.7%,	  20/120).	  	  The	   pattern	   is	   again	   similar	   for	   Labour	   respondents,	   with	   36.1%	   (22/61)	   of	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  winning	  their	  electoral	  contests,	  compared	  to	  just	  31.6%	  (68/215)	   for	   Labour’s	   Freshmen.	   As	   for	   the	   Conservatives,	   the	   gap	   is	   wider	  between	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   and	   Serial	   Freshmen.	   Those	  who	   have	   served	  some	  time	  on	  the	  council	  have	  a	  success	  rate	  one	  and	  a	  half	  times	  that	  of	  those	  who	  have	  stood	  on	  multiple	  occasions	  but	  never	  won	  (21.9%,	  40/183).	  For	  the	  Liberal	   Democrats	   the	   evidence	   is	   less	   clear.	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   and	  Freshmen	   have	   largely	   similar	   results	   (12.8%,	   5/39	   and	   13.3%,	   16/120	  respectively),	   though	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   still	   outperform	   their	   Serial	  Freshmen	  counterparts	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  almost	  one	  and	  a	  half	  (9.7%,	  13/134).	  	  As	  a	  note	  of	  caution,	  at	  times	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  considered	  for	  comparison	  of	  these	  subgroups	   is	  rather	  small	  (see	  table	  8.0.1)	  and	  therefore	  these	  data	  must	  be	  interpreted	  with	  a	  wider	  margin	  of	  error.	  As	  such,	  the	  most	  that	  can	  be	  said	  about	   the	   findings	   discussed	   is	   that	   they	   are	   supportive	   of	   the	   notion	   of	  experience-­‐effects.	   Incumbents	   clearly	   do	   best,	   and	   Experienced	   Freshmen	  consistently	  do	  better	  than	  both	  types	  of	  non-­‐experienced	  Freshmen.	  However,	  further	  research	  will	  be	  required	  to	  clarify	  the	  extent	  of	  these	  findings.	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…elected	   in	  
2011	  or	  2012?	   Incumbent	   Freshmen	   Experienced	  Freshmen	   Serial	  Freshmen	   Total	  n	  
All	   72.4	   323	   23.6	   750	   31.1	   164	   12.4	   662	   1,899	  
Con	   84.6	   117	   33.9	   189	   39.4	   33	   16.7	   120	   459	  
Lab	   79.7	   69	   31.6	   215	   36.1	   61	   21.9	   183	   528	  
LD	   59.5	   84	   13.3	   120	   12.8	   39	   9.7	   134	   377	  
Other	   55.8	   52	   11.1	   217	   35.5	   31	   4.1	   221	   521	  
[Table	  –	  8.0.1	  (Elected	  %)	  (Respondent	  Experience	  Group	  n)	  (Total	  n)	  2011-­‐2012]	  	  Sub-­‐chapter	   8.1	   discusses	   results	   from	   three	   of	   the	   seven	   questions	   put	   to	  respondents.	  These	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  experience	  gained	  from	  working	  on	  a	  council,	  whether	   incumbents	  have	  more	   reliable	   support	   from	   local	  voters	  and	  whether	   they	   believe	   incumbents	   still	   have	   an	   electoral	   advantage	   over	   their	  challengers.	   Section	   8.2	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   profile	   of	   incumbents	   amongst	  local	  residents	  as	  well	  as	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  local	  media.	  Sub-­‐chapter	  8.3	  deals	  with	   local	   election	   campaigning,	   seeking	   to	   identify	   candidates’	   views	  on	  any	   differences	   in	   the	   level	   of	   effort	   and	   support	   between	   types	   of	   candidate.	  Finally,	  section	  8.4	  will	  offer	  some	  concluding	  remarks,	  accompanied	  by	  relevant	  explanations	  from	  the	  literature.	  	  8.1	  –	  Experiential	  Advantage	  The	  experience	  that	  incumbents	  accrue	  is	  one	  of	  the	  predominant	  and	  often	  cited	  explanations	   for	   electoral	   advantages	   associated	   with	   incumbency	   (Levitt	   &	  Wolfram,	   1997;	   Zaller,	   1998).	   The	   theory	   suggests	   that	   incumbency	   offers	  candidates	   the	   opportunity	   to	   accrue	   a	   number	   of	   skills;	   including	   public	  speaking,	   dealing	  with	   bureaucracy	   and	   campaigning,	   and	   that	   these	   skills	   are	  transferable	   to	   the	   electoral	   context.	   Table	   8.1.1	   displays	   results	   from	   the	  statement	   put	   to	   candidates;	   “Incumbents	   have	  greater	   experience,	   gained	   from	  
working	   on	   the	   council”.	   Of	   the	   1,774	   respondents,	   more	   than	   three	   quarters	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(1,377)	  either	  agreed	  or	  strongly	  agreed	  with	   the	  statement.	  This	   is	  more	   than	  ten	  times	  the	  share	  of	   those	  who	  either	  disagreed	  or	  strongly	  disagreed	  (7.4%,	  132	  respondents).	  Some	  15%	  of	  respondents	  (266)	  reported	  a	  neutral	  position.	  The	   response	   from	   candidates	   to	   this	   question	   gives	   a	   clear	   indication	   from	  candidates	   that	   they	   feel	   incumbents	   are	   successful	   in	   local	   elections	   because,	  incumbency	  bestows	  greater	  experience	   to	   the	  candidate.	  Of	   those	   surveyed,	   it	  was	   Incumbents	   themselves	   who	   felt	   most	   strongly	   that	   experience	   plays	   a	  significant	   role	   in	   their	   high	   success	   rate.	   In	   total	   87%	   of	   incumbents	   (268)	  either	   agreed	   or	   strongly	   agreed,	   which	   is	   almost	   eighteen	   times	   the	   share	   of	  those	   who	   felt	   otherwise	   (4.9%,	   15).	   Over	   a	   third	   of	   incumbents	   questioned	  indicated	  that	   they	  strongly	  agreed	  with	   the	  suggestion	  that	  greater	  experience	  gained	  from	  working	  on	  the	  council	  contributes	  to	  the	  advantage	  associated	  with	  incumbency.	  	  
…have	  greater	   experience	  gained	  
from	  working	  on	  the	  council	   Str.	  Agr	   Agree	   Neutral	   Disagree	   Str.	  Dis	   Total	  n	  
All	   24.9	   52.7	   15.0	   5.6	   1.8	   1,774	  
Incumbent	   37.3	   49.7	   8.1	   3.6	   1.3	   308	  
Freshmen	   24.2	   53.8	   14.3	   6.3	   1.4	   694	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   17.3	   51.3	   23.3	   5.3	   2.7	   150	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   21.2	   53.2	   17.2	   6.1	   2.3	   622	  
[Table	  –	  8.1.1	  (%	  5pt	  Likert	  Scale	  Agr/Dis)	  (n)	  2011-­‐2012]	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between	  those	  candidates	  who	  may	  have	  a	  self-­‐serving	  interest	  in	  responding	  a	  particular	  way,	  with	  those	  who	  may	  not.	  	  Another	   interesting	   facet	   of	   the	   survey	  data	   is	  how	  candidates’	   assessments	  of	  incumbency	  advantage	  differ	  across	  the	  experience	  groups.	  The	  top-­‐line	  results	  for	   responses	   to	   the	   statement	   “incumbents	   no	   longer	   have	   an	   advantage”	  indicate	   that	   candidates	  mostly	   disagreed.	   Table	   8.1.2	   shows	   that	   of	   the	   1,746	  respondents	   to	   the	   question,	   64%	   (1,117)	   disagreed	   or	   strongly	   disagreed;	  which	   is	   almost	   five	   and	   a	   half	   times	   more	   than	   those	   who	   either	   agreed	   or	  strongly	  agreed	  (11.7%,	  204).	  Figure	  8.1.2	  illustrates	  these	  results.	  A	  substantial	  number,	   almost	   one	   quarter	   (23.4%)	   of	   respondents	   (409)	   left	   a	   neutral	  response	  in	  this	  case.	  This	  is	  possibly	  an	  indication	  that	  the	  question	  could	  have	  been	   framed	   differently,	   or	   and	   indication	   of	   an	   artefact	   of	   underlying	  uncertainty	   amongst	   candidates.	   Delving	   deeper	   into	   the	   data	   does	   reveal	  differences	   in	   the	   level	   of	   disagreement.	   Serial	   Freshmen	   disagreed	   most	  strongly	   with	   the	   statement.	   Table	   8.1.2	   shows	   that	   almost	   70%	   of	   Serial	  Freshmen	   either	   disagree	   or	   strongly	   disagree	   with	   the	   statement,	   which	   is	  seven	   times	  more	   than	   those	  who	   expressed	   the	   opposite	   opinion	   (9.9%,	   61).	  Interestingly,	  this	  percentage	  falls	  for	  Freshmen	  and	  for	  Experienced	  Freshmen,	  and	  again	  for	  Incumbents	  (see	  table	  8.1.2).	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…no	   longer	   have	   an	  
advantage	   Str.	  Agr	   Agree	   Neutral	   Disagree	   Str.	  Dis	   Total	  n	  
All	   2.8	   9.9	   23.4	   48.8	   15.2	   1,746	  
Incumbent	   2.3	   14.4	   24.8	   45.0	   13.4	   298	  
Freshmen	   3.1	   9.6	   25.6	   46.1	   15.6	   687	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   3.4	   12.2	   21.6	   53.4	   9.5	   148	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   2.6	   7.3	   20.6	   52.5	   17.0	   613	  
[Table	  –	  8.1.2	  (%	  5pt	  Likert	  Scale	  Agr/Dis)	  (n)	  2011-­‐2012]	  	  
	  
[Figure	  –	  8.1.2	  (%	  5pt	  Likert	  Scale	  Agr/Dis)	  2011-­‐2012	  (n	  =	  1,746)]	  	  Table	   8.1.2,	   shows	   that	   61.7%	   of	   Freshmen	   respondents	   (424)	   disagree	   or	  strongly	  disagree	  with	  the	  statement,	  almost	  five	  times	  the	  number	  who	  agreed	  or	  strongly	  agreed	  (12.7%,	  87).	  Freshmen	  candidates	  exhibit	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  neutral	   respondents,	  at	  more	   than	  one	  quarter	  (25.6%,	  176).	  This	   is	  a	  possible	  reflection	  of	  their	  unfamiliarity	  with	  local	  elections	  compared	  with	  other	  groups.	  When	  compared	  to	  other	  groups,	  fewer	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  expressed	  some	  level	   of	   disagreement	   with	   the	   statement	   (62.9%,	   93),	   four	   times	   the	   number	  who	  disagree	  or	  strongly	  disagree	  (15.6%,	  23).	  	  It	  is	  Incumbents	  who	  report	  the	  least	  disagreement	  (58.4%,	  174).	  The	  number	  of	  Incumbents	  who	  disagreed	  is	  three	  and	  a	  half	  times	  the	  number	  who	  expressed	  the	   opinion	   that	   Incumbents	   no	   longer	   have	   an	   advantage	   (16.7%,	   50).	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Compared	  to	  Serial	  Freshmen,	  the	  data	  for	  Incumbent	  respondents	  suggest	  that	  the	   perception	   of	   incumbency	   advantage	   is	   stronger	   for	   those	   candidates	  who	  have	  no,	  or	   less	   immediate	  experience	  on	  the	  council.	  However,	   for	  all	   types	  of	  candidate,	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   respondents	   believe	   there	   is	   an	   electoral	  advantage	  to	  being	  a	  defending	  councillor.	  Though	  the	  data	   in	   table	  8.1.2	  show	  that	  respondents’	  experiential	  group	  does	  affect	  their	  responses	  to	  some	  degree.	  	  Table	   8.1.3	   displays	   responses	   to	   the	   statement	   that	   Incumbents	   seeking	   re-­‐election	   are	   successful	   because	   “support	   among	   local	   voters	   is	   consistent	   and	  
reliable”,	  essentially	  framing	  the	  incumbency	  advantage	  statement	  in	  a	  different	  way.	  The	  question	  is	  designed	  to	  crosscheck	  responses	  to	  the	  statement	  in	  table	  8.1.2,	   whilst	   gauging	   candidates’	   opinions	   of	   the	   relationship	   councillors	   have	  with	  resident	  voters	  and	  how	  it	  translates	  into	  votes	  on	  election	  day.	  Clearly,	  any	  advantage	  incumbents	  are	  perceived	  to	  have	  in	  local	  elections	  must	  ultimately	  be	  supported	  by	  voters.	  As	  such,	  the	  statement	  represents	  a	  slightly	  different	  way	  of	  asking	  the	  same	  question.	  Although	  we	  could	  expect	  some	  variation	  in	  responses	  due	   to	   the	   way	   it	   is	   framed,	   broadly,	   results	   should	   support	   those	   already	  revealed.	  	  Of	   the	   1,787	   respondents	   surveyed,	   65.2%	   (1,165)	   agreed	   or	   strongly	   agreed	  with	  the	  statement.	  This	  is	  almost	  five	  times	  the	  number	  who	  either	  disagreed	  or	  strongly	   disagreed	   (13.1%,	   234).	   22%	   of	   candidates	   responding	   had	   a	   neutral	  position	   on	   the	   statement.	   The	   results	   almost	  mirror	   those	   described	   in	   table	  8.1.2,	  with	  similar	  proportions	  for	  the	  inverse	  of	  all	  responses.	  These	  results	  are	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a	   strong	   indication	   that	   candidates	   do	   believe	   that	   incumbents	   are	   supported	  well	  by	  voters.	  	  Looking	   at	   the	   data	   across	   the	   experience	   groups,	   unsurprisingly	   Serial	  Freshmen	  felt	  most	  strongly	  that	  Incumbents	  are	  supported	  well	  by	  local	  voters,	  with	  almost	  two	  thirds	  of	  these	  respondents	  (416)	  indicating	  that	  they	  agreed	  or	  strongly	  agreed	  with	  the	  statement.	  This	  is	  nearly	  six	  times	  the	  proportion	  who	  thought	   the	   opposite	   (11.4%,	   70).	   Serial	   Freshmen	   are	   closely	   followed	   by	  Freshmen	  of	  whom,	   around	   two	   thirds	   (473)	   either	   agreed	   or	   strongly	   agreed	  with	  the	  statement.	  This	  is	  five	  and	  a	  half	  times	  the	  number	  of	  Freshmen	  who	  felt	  otherwise	   (12.3%,	  86).	   It	   is	   clear	   from	  the	  data	   in	   table	  8.1.3	   that	   respondents	  with	   no	   council	   experience	   feel	  most	   strongly	   that	   voters	   support	   incumbents	  well,	  and	  this	  is	  in	  line	  with	  data	  shown	  in	  table	  8.1.2.	  	  
…support	  among	  local	  voters	  is	  
consistent	  and	  reliable	   Str.	  Agr	   Agree	   Neutral	   Disagree	   Str.	  Dis	   Total	  n	  
All	   17.9	   47.3	   21.7	   11.9	   1.2	   1,787	  
Incumbent	   21.1	   43.5	   19.8	   14.6	   1.0	   308	  
Freshmen	   18.3	   49.4	   20.0	   11.3	   1.0	   699	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   12.5	   38.2	   30.9	   15.1	   3.3	   152	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   17.0	   49.2	   22.3	   10.4	   1.1	   628	  
[Table	  –	  8.1.3	  (%	  5pt	  Likert	  Scale	  Agr/Dis)	  (n)	  2011-­‐2012]	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those	  who	  felt	  the	  opposite	  by	  almost	  three	  to	  one.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  results	  are	  still	   a	   convincing	   indication	   that	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   tend	   to	   support	   the	  premise	   that	   incumbents	   do	   better	   because	   they	   are	   supported	   well	   by	   local	  voters.	  	  Overall,	  sub-­‐chapter	  8.1	  has	  considered	  two	  themes	  that	  underpin	  explanations	  for	   an	   incumbency	   advantage	   in	   local	   elections;	   experience	   and	   local	   support.	  For	  all	  types	  of	  candidate	  the	  responses	  suggest	  that	  the	  vast	  number	  think	  that	  incumbents	  are	  indeed	  advantaged	  and	  that	  their	  experience	  and	  strong	  support	  from	  local	  voters	  are	  key	  factors	  in	  preserving	  it.	  	  	  The	   data	   have	   also	   shown	   that	   different	   types	   of	   respondent	   have	   conflicting	  opinions,	   they	   agree	   and	   disagree	   to	   different	   extents.	   To	   some	   degree	   these	  differences	  appear	   to	  be	  a	  product	  of	   their	  electoral	  experience.	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	   Freshmen	   tended	   to	   support	   statements	   that	   implied	   Incumbents	   were	  advantaged	   strongly.	   However,	   Incumbents	   and	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   were	  more	  likely	  to	  play	  these	  assertions	  down,	  though	  only	  slightly.	  There	  remained	  a	  consensus	  across	  all	  experience	  groups,	  that	  having	  some	  council	  experience	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  a	  candidate’s	  chance	  of	  electoral	  success.	  	  The	   survey	   results	   provide	   evidence	   in	   support	   of	   the	   overall	   narrative	  within	  this	  thesis;	  that	  incumbents	  are	  advantaged	  because	  voters	  appear	  to	  value	  their	  experience.	  So	  by	  extension,	   this	  suggests	   that	  candidates	   think	   that	  voters	  see	  experience	   as	   an	   indicator	   of	   candidate	   quality.	   There	   is	   a	   large	   body	   of	  established	   literature	   on	   candidate	   quality	   and	   scare-­‐off	   effects	   as	   detailed	   in	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chapter	  2	  (Cox	  &	  Katz,	  1996;	  Levitt	  &	  Wolfram,	  1997;	  Ansolabehere	  et	  al,	  2007;	  Carson,	   Engstrom	   &	   Roberts,	   2007;	   Hirano	   &	   Snyder,	   2009).	   Considering	   that	  those	  candidates	  with	  no	  experience	  serving	  on	  the	  council	  were	  most	   likely	  to	  play	  up	  the	  support	  incumbents	  have	  locally,	  the	  data	  above	  suggest	  that	  scare-­‐
off	  may	  have	  a	  role	  in	  English	  local	  elections.	  	  	  Sub-­‐chapter	   8.2	   moves	   on	   from	   notions	   of	   experience	   and	   local	   support,	   to	  explore	   candidates’	   perceptions	   of	   how	   incumbency	  may	   elevate	   a	   candidate’s	  local	  profile	  and	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  media.	  	  8.2	  –	  Councillors’	  Profile	  &	  the	  Media	  In	  section	  8.1	  respondent’s	  attitudes	  towards	  statements	  of	  experience	  and	  local	  support	   as	   a	   source	   of	   incumbency	   advantage,	   were	   discussed.	   The	   results	  showed	   that	   all	   types	   of	   candidate	   strongly	   supported	   the	   idea	   that	   these	   two	  explanations	  help	  councillors	  defend	  their	  seats	  successfully,	   though	  to	  varying	  degrees.	   This	   sub-­‐chapter	   considers	   respondents’	   perceptions	   of	   the	   role	   of	  incumbency	   in	   enhancing	   a	   candidate’s	   relative	   ‘profile’,	   as	  well	   as	   councillors’	  relationship	  with	   the	   local	  media.	   Candidates	  were	   asked	   for	   their	   insight	   into	  whether	  a	  councillor’s	  experience	  elevated	  their	  profile	  and	  whether	  that	  in	  turn	  helped	  them	  to	  defend	  their	  seat.	  	  Table	   8.2.1	   displays	   responses	   to	   the	   statement	   that	   incumbents	   do	   better	  because	   they	   “enjoy	   a	   higher	   local	   profile	   than	   their	   challengers”.	   The	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  respondents	  either	  agreed	  or	  strongly	  agreed	  with	  the	  assertion,	  some	  90.4%	  (1,618).	  This	  number	  is	  almost	  30	  times	  the	  number	  who	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disagreed	   or	   strongly	   disagreed	   (3.1%,	   55).	   Nearly	   four	   out	   of	   every	   ten	  respondents	  strongly	  agreed	  that	  incumbents	  enjoyed	  a	  higher	  local	  profile	  than	  their	   challengers.	   Only	   a	   small	   portion	   of	   respondents	   left	   a	   neutral	   response,	  some	  6.6%	  (118),	  indicating	  that	  respondents	  were	  generally	  more	  confident	  in	  making	   their	   response	   to	   this	   question.	   Figure	   8.2.1	   illustrates	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  respondents	  supported	  the	  statement.	  	  
…enjoy	   a	   higher	   local	   profile	  
than	  their	  challengers	   Str.	  Agr	   Agree	   Neutral	   Disagree	   Str.	  Dis	   Total	  n	  
All	   38.4	   52.0	   6.6	   2.6	   0.5	   1,790	  
Incumbent	   39.2	   51.8	   4.8	   3.5	   0.6	   311	  
Freshmen	   40.3	   50.1	   7.2	   2.0	   0.4	   697	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   30.7	   57.5	   8.5	   2.6	   0.7	   153	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   37.7	   52.8	   6.4	   2.7	   0.5	   629	  
[Table	  –	  8.2.1	  (%	  5pt	  Likert	  Scale	  Agr/Dis)	  (n)	  2011-­‐2012]	  	  
	  
[Figure	  –	  8.2.1	  (%	  5pt	  Likert	  Scale	  Agr/Dis)	  2011-­‐2012	  (n	  =	  1,790)]	  	  Another	   striking	   facet	   of	   the	   data	   (see	   table	   8.2.1)	   is	   that	   the	   proportions	   of	  responses	  alter	  little	  across	  the	  types	  of	  respondent.	  The	  data	  reveal	  a	  consensus	  among	   respondents.	   All	   types	   strongly	   indicate	   that	   the	   advantage	   councillors	  have	  in	  the	  defence	  of	  their	  seat	  can	  be	  explained,	  in	  part	  at	  least,	  because	  of	  the	  elevated	   local	   profile	   councillors	   assume.	   Even	   for	   incumbent	   respondents	   the	  
38%	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results	  are	  overwhelming.	  Incumbents	  think,	  more	  than	  other	  types	  of	  candidate,	  that	   their	   higher	   local	   profile	   helps	   them	   against	   opposition	   candidates.	   One	  explanation	  is	  that	  voters	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  know	  them	  as	  a	  councillor,	  as	  for	  the	   previous	   four	   years	   they	   have	   been	   the	   official	   representative	   of	   that	  community,	  whereas	   the	  opposition	   candidate	  may	  not	   even	  be	  known	   for	   the	  majority	   of	   that	   period.	  More	   than	   nine	   of	   every	   ten	   incumbents	   surveyed	   felt	  that	  their	  higher	  profile	  advantaged	  them	  (91%,	  283),	  this	  is	  more	  than	  22	  times	  the	   number	   who	   felt	   the	   opposite	   (4.1%,	   13).	   Few	   incumbents	   left	   a	   neutral	  response,	   just	   4.8%	   (15),	   implying	   once	  more	   that	   there	   is	   consensus	   on	   this	  issue.	  For	  all	  other	  types	  of	  candidate	  the	  response	  is	  similar.	  The	  data	  suggests	  that	   all	   types	   of	   candidate	   overwhelmingly	   support	   the	   statement	  with	   90.4%	  (630),	   88.2%	   (135)	   and	   90.5%	   (570)	   either	   agreeing	   or	   strongly	   agreeing	   for	  Freshmen,	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	  Freshmen	  respectively.	  	  Two	   implications	   from	   the	   findings	  need	   to	  be	  discussed.	  First,	   there	   is	  a	   clear	  indication	   from	   all	   experience	   groups,	   that	   incumbency	   raises	   the	   profile	   of	   a	  candidate	  and	  as	  such,	  any	  electoral	  advantage	  can	  be	  considered	  a	  systemic	  one,	  a	  perk	  or	  consequence	  of	  having	  had	  experience	  and	  responsibility	  as	  a	  serving	  council	   official.	   It	   is	   rare	   for	   challengers	   to	   elections,	   to	   have	   a	   familiar	   and	  extended	   political	   ‘platform’	   from	   which	   to	   campaign	   on	   issues	   that	   concern	  their	  community.	  As	  such,	  only	  councillors	  have	  had	  the	  vested	  authority	  to	  help	  residents	  with	  their	  concerns	  and	  raise	  issues	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  community	  to	  the	  council	  for	  the	  entirety	  of	  their	  term.	  It	  is	  councillors	  whom	  are	  endowed	  with	  a	  legitimate	  motive	  to	  communicate	  with	  residents	  on	  the	  specifics	  of	  their	  duties,	  perhaps	  with	  a	  newsletter	  detailing	   their	  efforts	  and	   their	   contact	   information.	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Local	  issues	  and	  concerns	  can	  often	  influence	  the	  vote	  over	  either	  the	  entire	  area	  of	  a	  council	  or	  in	  individual	  wards	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher,	  1997,	  pp.	  168).	  In	  that	  sense,	  councillors	  may	  be	  repositioning	  themselves,	  from	  ‘facilitators’	  of	  services,	  to	  incumbent	   ‘lobbyists’	  during	  elections,	  on	  behalf	  of	   locals	  and	  local	  interests.	  This	  can	  be	  an	  effective	  electoral	  strategy	  as	  Rallings	  &	  Thrasher	  clarify,	   “some	  local	  electorates	  resolutely	  refuse	  to	  follow	  the	  pattern	  set	  elsewhere	  because	  for	  them	  the	  saliency	  of	  a	  local	  issue	  overshadows	  all	  other	  considerations.	  In	  some	  ways	  the	  task	  of	  identifying	  such	  opportunities	  for	  voting	  locally	  are	  aided	  by	  the	  media.	  As	  coverage	  of	  the	  issue	  graduates	  from	  the	  local	  to	  the	  national	  level	  so	  many	   more	   people	   begin	   to	   follow	   the	   story”	   (Rallings	   &	   Thrasher,	   1997,	  pp.164).	   These	   comments	   lead	   us	   neatly	   to	   the	   second	   implication	   of	   these	  results,	  which	   concern	   the	   practical	   consequence	   of	   an	   elevated	   profile,	  media	  attention.	  	  The	  local	  media	  can	  easily	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  candidates	  are	  portrayed	   to	   residents	   (Rallings	   &	   Thrasher,	   1997,	   pp.169).	   Coming	   across	  positively	   in	  material	   produced	   by	   various	   outlets;	   like	   newspapers,	   parish	   or	  community	  newsletters,	  radio	  or	   television	  programmes,	  could	  prove	  crucial	   in	  helping	   to	   connect	   voters	   with	   candidates	   and	   can	   even	   determine	   electoral	  outcomes.	   These	   outlets	   can	   provide,	   coverage	   of	   and	   support	   for,	   candidates’	  leadership	   on	   salient	   local	   issues,	   to	   which	   voters	   frequently	   respond.	   So	  identifying	   the	   relationship	   that	   candidates	   have	   with	   the	   local	   media	   could	  prove	   an	   insightful	   exercise,	   perhaps	   explaining	   why	   it	   is,	   that	   candidates	  perceive	  incumbents	  to	  have	  a	  raised	  local	  profile.	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Table	  8.2.2	  shows	  the	  proportion	  of	  candidates’	  responses	  to	  the	  statement	  that	  incumbents	  are	  so	  successful	  because	  they	  “have	  a	  stronger	  relationship	  with	  the	  
local	  media”.	  Almost	  two	  thirds	  of	  respondents	  (1,157)	  either	  agreed	  or	  strongly	  agreed	   with	   the	   statement.	   This	   is	   more	   than	   seven	   times	   the	   number	   who	  disagreed	   or	   strongly	   disagreed	   (9.3%,	   165).	   It	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   unlike	  results	  for	  the	  statement	  on	  a	  candidates’	   local	  profile,	  discussed	  above,	  a	   large	  proportion	   of	   respondents	   left	   a	   neutral	   response,	   more	   than	   one	   quarter	  (25.6%,	  454).	  These	  data	   could	  be	   a	   symptom	  of	   genuine	  uncertainty	   amongst	  candidates,	  as	   it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  or	  gauge	  any	  relationship.	  Another	  explanation	   could	   be	   that	   the	   results	   may	   be	   an	   artefact	   of	   poor	   question	  construction.	  A	  large	  proportion	  of	  candidates	  may	  be	  failing	  to	  understand	  what	  the	  question	  is	  asking	  them.	  Either	  way,	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  respondents	  gave	  no	   indication	   as	   to	   whether	   councillors	   benefit	   from	   the	   attention	   focused	   on	  their	  activities.	  The	  large	  number	  of	  neutral	  responses	  is	  evident	  for	  all	  types	  of	  candidate,	   with	   proportions	   ranging	   between	   23%	   and	   35%.	   Interestingly,	  Incumbent	   respondents	   felt	   least	   strong	   on	   the	   issue,	   with	   just	   47.8%	   (146)	  either	   agreeing	   or	   strongly	   agreeing;	   the	   lowest	   share	   of	   all	   respondents.	  Correspondingly,	  some	  17.1%	  (52)	  of	  Incumbents	  disagreed	  to	  some	  extent	  with	  the	   statement,	  which	   is	   the	   largest	   share	   of	   all	   respondents.	   Incumbents	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  give	  a	  neutral	  response,	  with	  more	  than	  one	  third	  doing	  so	  (35.1%,	  107).	  Though	  these	  data	  suggest	  that	  incumbents	  are	  less	  inclined	  than	  others	  to	  feel	   that	   they	   have	   a	   stronger	   relationship	   with	   the	   local	   media,	   it	   must	   be	  reiterated	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  incumbent	  respondents	  still	  suggest	  that	  they	  do.	  This	   is	   in	  effect	  an	  admission	   from	  incumbent	  candidates	  that	   they	  do	   feel	   that	  they	  benefit	  from	  a	  privileged	  electoral	  position.	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  For	   all	   other	   types	   of	   candidate	   the	   results	   suggest,	   as	   previously,	   that	   a	  candidate’s	   experience	  may	   influence	   on	   their	   perceptions.	   As	   expected,	   Serial	  Freshmen	  were	  the	  most	  likely	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  making	  significant	  gains	  from	  their	  elevated	  profile,	  with	  seven	  out	  of	  every	  ten	  doing	   so	   (70.5%,	   442).	   This	   is	   more	   than	   ten	   times	   the	   number	   who	   felt	  otherwise	  (6.5%,	  41).	  Clearly	  a	  good	  number	  of	  Serial	  Freshmen	  will	  be	  familiar	  with	  the	  campaign	  process,	  yet	  have	  no	  experience	  with	  the	  duties	  of	  councillors.	  Freshmen	  were	  slightly	  less	  in	  agreement,	  with	  just	  over	  two	  thirds	  (68.6%,	  474)	  agreeing	   that	   incumbent	  candidates	  have	  a	  stronger	  relationship	  with	   the	   local	  media.	  This	  is	  more	  than	  eight	  times	  the	  number	  who	  disagreed	  to	  some	  extent	  (8.1%,	   56).	   Finally,	   though	   still	   strongly	   in	   agreement,	   Experienced	   Freshmen	  report	  a	  slightly	  weaker-­‐still	  response	  than	  either	  Freshmen	  or	  Serial	  Freshmen.	  Three	   fifths	   of	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   respondents	   (61.9%,	   94)	   agreed	   or	  strongly	   agreed	   with	   the	   statement,	   which	   is	   around	   six	   times	   those	   who	   felt	  otherwise	   (10.5%,	  16).	  Their	   time	  spent	  as	  a	   councillor	  would	  have	   influenced	  their	  view.	  	  For	  all	   types	  of	   candidate,	   the	   results	   indicate	   that	   there	   is	   a	   strong	  sense	   that	  incumbent	  candidates	  are	  able	  to	  benefit	  from	  their	  position	  in	  the	  way	  they	  are	  portrayed	   in	   the	   media.	   An	   interesting	   facet	   of	   the	   data	   in	   table	   8.2.2	   is	   the	  difference	   between	   Incumbent	   and	   non-­‐incumbent	   respondents.	   Non-­‐incumbents	  feel	  most	  strongly	  that	  councillors’	  relationship	  with	  the	  local	  media	  facilitates	   their	   electoral	   strength.	   One	   explanation	   for	   this	   derives	   from	  comments	  made	  earlier	  in	  this	  chapter	  (section	  8.1)	  on	  the	  sincerity	  of	  responses	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to	   this	   questionnaire	   in	   general.	   But	   another	   may	   be	   that	   the	   reality	   of	   this	  relationship	  is	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword.	  Incumbents	  may	  feel	  that	  although	  they	  do	  have	   a	   stronger	   relationship	  with	   the	   local	  media,	   it	  may	   not	   necessarily	   help	  them	   in	   their	   re-­‐election	   attempts.	   It	  may	  not	   necessarily	   be	   a	  wholly	   positive	  influence	  or	  may	  simply	  be	  difficult	  to	  quantify.	  	  
…have	   a	   stronger	   relationship	  
with	  local	  media	   Str.	  Agr	   Agree	   Neutral	   Disagree	   Str.	  Dis	   Total	  n	  
All	   18.3	   46.9	   25.6	   7.4	   1.9	   1,775	  
Incumbent	   10.8	   37.0	   35.1	   13.8	   3.3	   305	  
Freshmen	   20.4	   48.2	   23.3	   6.8	   1.3	   691	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   11.2	   50.7	   27.6	   7.2	   3.3	   152	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   21.2	   49.3	   23.0	   5.1	   1.4	   627	  
[Table	  –	  8.2.2	  (%	  5pt	  Likert	  Scale	  Agr/Dis)	  (n)	  2011-­‐2012]	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elected	  as	  councillor.	  To	  lend	  greater	  support	  to	  the	  results	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  little	   deviation	   in	   the	   proportions	   across	   the	   type	   of	   respondent	   and	   very	   few	  respondents	  leave	  neutral	  responses.	  	  The	  data	  concerning	  incumbent	  candidates’	  relationship	  with	  the	  media	  are	  less	  strong,	   though	   still	   supportive	   of	   the	   overall	   claim.	   Although	   one	   quarter	   of	  respondents	   left	  a	  neutral	  response,	   two	  out	  of	  three	  felt	   that	  a	  position	  on	  the	  council	  would	  better	  a	  candidates’	  relationship	  with	  the	  media	  and	  by	  inference	  their	   electoral	   safety.	   Though	   Incumbents	   do	  not	   disagree,	   their	   responses	   are	  not	   as	   convincing	  as	   those	  of	   less	   experience,	   suggesting	   that	   the	  benefits	  may	  not	   be	   that	   clear	   cut.	   Incumbents	   may	   also	   be	   more	   pessimistic	   about	   the	  benefits	   their	   relationship	   with	   the	   media	   brings.	   Interestingly,	   Experienced	  Freshmen	   are	   much	   more	   likely	   than	   Incumbents	   to	   support	   the	   view	   that	  incumbents	  have	  a	  stronger	  relationship	  with	  the	  media,	  though	  not	  to	  the	  same	  extent	  as	  Freshmen	  and	  Experienced	  Freshmen.	  	  	  Overall,	   the	   data	   presented	   in	   chapter	   8.2	   is	   supportive	   of	   the	   claim	   that	  incumbency	   may	   have	   systemic	   advantages	   for	   candidates.	   As	   an	   elected	  member	   of	   the	   council	   the	   incumbent	   councillor	   is	   a	   ‘legitimate’	   authority	   on	  local	   issues.	  As	  such,	   it	  may	  be	   in	  both	   incumbents’	  and	  the	  media’s	   interest	   to	  have	   a	   ‘cordial’	   working	   relationship	   for	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   term	   in	   order	   to	  maintain	  a	  sufficiently	  high	  profile	  in	  their	  neighbourhood.	  Sub-­‐chapter	  8.3	  will	  look	  at	   the	  more	  practical	  explanations	  of	   incumbency	  advantage,	   investigating	  whether	  respondents	   think	  an	   incumbent’s	  electoral	  strength	  can	  be	  explained,	  to	  some	  degree,	  by	  differences	  in	  their	  behaviour	  during	  the	  campaign.	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  8.3	  –	  The	  Campaign	  Section	   8.2	   presented	   data	   on	   respondents’	   perceptions	   of	   the	   role	   of	  incumbency	   in	   enhancing	   a	   candidate’s	   relative	   ‘profile’,	   as	  well	   as	   councillors’	  relationship	  with	  the	  local	  media.	  Chapter	  8.3	  moves	  on	  from	  this	  discussion,	  to	  consider	   candidates’	  perceptions	  of	   the	   campaign.	   Johnston	  &	  Pattie	   insist	   that	  “local	  activity	  matters”	  (Johnston	  &	  Pattie,	  2003,	  pp.272),	  and	  though	  there	  will	  always	  be	  voters	  whose	  party	  choice	  is	  already	  made,	  there	  are	  a	  large	  number	  of	   ‘floating	  voters’	  who	  want	   to	  be	   convinced	   to	  vote	   for	   a	   candidate	  based	  on	  their	  ideas	  for	  the	  local	  area.	  For	  voters	  to	  make	  these	  decisions,	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  information	  to	  be	  distributed	  to	  them,	  in	  one	  way	  or	  another.	  Some	  may	  seek	  it	   out,	   but	   many	   will	   not	   bother,	   particularly	   in	   local	   elections.	   This	   group	   of	  voters	  rely	  on	  the	  material	  to	  reach	  them	  and	  so	  the	  efficacy	  of	  the	  campaign	  may	  be	   crucial	   in	   order	   to	   engage	   with	   and	   mobilise	   voters.	   As	   Johnston	   &	   Pattie	  reiterate,	  where	  the	  parties	  campaign	  hardest,	  they	  tend	  to	  perform	  best	  and	  at	  the	   individual	   level	  parties	  perform	  best	  with	   those	  voters	  who	  are	  exposed	  to	  campaign	   information	   and	   other	   resources	   (Johnston	   &	   Pattie,	   2003,	   pp.271-­‐272).	   The	   following	  discussion	   is	   based	  on	   results	   from	   two	   statements	  put	   to	  candidates	  on	  the	  local	  campaign.	  	  In	   an	   attempt	   to	   garner	   detail	   on	   any	   difference	   between	   the	   behaviour	   of	  incumbent	  councillors	  and	  their	  challengers,	  table	  8.3.1	  displays	  responses	  to	  the	  statement	   that	   incumbents	   are	   so	   successful	   because	   they	   “put	  more	   personal	  
effort	   into	   their	   re-­‐election	   campaigns”.	   Clearly	   the	   likelihood	   is	   that	   many	  candidates,	   regardless	   of	   their	   electoral	   experience,	   will	   feel	   they	   have	   put	   in	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great	  personal	  effort	   into	  their	  campaigns.	   It	   is	  surprising	  then,	   to	  observe	  that	  the	   largest	  share	  of	  all	   respondents	   (46.7%,	  833)	  agree	  or	  strongly	  agree,	  with	  the	  statement,	   that	   incumbents	  are	  advantaged	  because	  they	  work	  harder	  than	  their	   competitors.	   Unsurprisingly,	   a	   sizeable	   proportion	   of	   respondents	  disagreed,	   some	   24.9%	   (444),	   which	   is	   around	   half	   the	   number	   who	   felt	  otherwise.	   More	   than	   one	   quarter	   of	   respondents	   gave	   a	   neutral	   response	  (28.4%,	   506).	   Figure	   8.3.1	   illustrates	   the	   distribution	   of	   aggregated	   candidate	  responses	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   total	   proportion	   of	   respondents	   who	  agree,	  outweighs	   those	  who	  disagree.	  On	   the	   face	  of	   it,	   the	   results	   suggest	   that	  respondents	  are	  in	  some	  agreement	  that	  councillors	  defending	  their	  seat	  tend	  to	  put	   in	   greater	   personal	   effort	   into	   their	   re-­‐election	   campaigns	   than	   those	  who	  challenge	  them.	  However,	  a	  closer	  inspection	  of	  the	  results	  in	  table	  8.3.1	  shows	  that	   there	   are	   differences	   in	   the	   strength	   of	   these	   assertions	   across	   types	   of	  respondent.	  As	  expected,	  differences	  are	  linked	  to	  the	  experiential	   ‘perspective’	  of	  respondents.	  	  
…put	  more	  personal	   effort	   into	  
their	  re-­‐election	  campaigns	   Str.	  Agr	   Agree	   Neutral	   Disagree	   Str.	  Dis	   Total	  n	  
All	   16.6	   30.1	   28.4	   19.7	   5.2	   1,783	  
Incumbent	   30.0	   35.5	   24.4	   8.1	   2.0	   307	  
Freshmen	   13.2	   26.9	   29.2	   24.2	   6.6	   699	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   18.3	   30.7	   26.8	   19.0	   5.2	   153	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   13.5	   30.9	   29.8	   20.7	   5.1	   624	  









...put	  more	  effort	  into	  their	  re-­‐election	  campaigns	  Strongly	  Agree	   Agree	   Neutral	   Disagree	   Strongly	  Disagree	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For	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  the	  results	  tell	  a	  similar	  story	  to	  Incumbents,	  though	  they	  have	  less	  conviction.	  Half	  of	  respondents	  (49%,	  75)	  agreed,	  to	  some	  degree,	  with	   the	  suggestion	  of	  a	  difference	  between	   the	   level	  of	  effort	   that	   Incumbents	  and	  Freshmen	  put	   into	  their	  respective	  campaigns.	  This	   is	  more	  than	  twice	  the	  number	  who	  disagreed	  with	  this	  proposition	  (24.2%,	  37).	  Just	  over	  one	  quarter	  of	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  gave	  a	  neutral	  response	  (26.8%,	  41).	  Though	  the	  data	  for	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  show	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  feel	  less	  strongly	  in	  support	  of	  the	  issue,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  they	  do	  support	  the	  view	  that	  incumbents	  work	  harder	  for	  the	  win	  than	  Freshmen.	  There	  are	  two	  key	  differences	  between	  responses	  for	  Incumbents	   and	   Experienced	   Freshmen.	   First,	   from	   an	   empirical	   perspective,	  fewer	  respondents	  are	  convinced	  enough	  to	  agree	  strongly	  with	   the	  statement,	  only	  18.3%	  (28)	  compared	  to	  30%	  (92)	  for	  Incumbents	  (see	  table	  8.3.1).	  Second,	  these	   results	   are	   a	   curious	   insight	   because	   of	   the	   ‘privileged’	   position	  Experienced	   Freshmen	   hold.	   Even	   though	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   have	  previously	  sat	  on	  the	  council,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  being	  surveyed	  they	  are	  contesting	  the	  ward	  as	  a	  non-­‐incumbent,	   and	   in	   this	   instance	  what	   could	  be	   considered	  a	  more	   informed	   position	   than	   other	   types	   of	   candidate.	   The	   responses	   from	  Experienced	   Freshmen	   may	   therefore,	   be	   more	   meaningful	   for	   this	   particular	  topic	   than	   other	   types	   of	   respondent,	   given	   their	   unique	   circumstance,	   having	  previous	  experience	  defending	  as	  an	  Incumbent	  and	  before	  that	  challenging	  as	  a	  Freshman.	   Surveying	   this	   group	   certainly	   has	   potential	   for	   further	   research,	  particularly	  as	   this	  group	   is	   the	   smallest	  of	   those	   surveyed,	  with	  a	   total	  of	   just	  153	  respondents,	  making	  up	  only	  8.6%	  of	  the	  total	  sample.	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Both	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	  Freshmen	  types	  of	  respondent	  agree	  that	  Incumbents	  work	  harder.	  For	  Freshmen,	   just	  40.1%	  (280)	  either	  agreed	  or	  strongly	  agreed	  with	  the	  statement,	  which	  is	  higher	  than	  the	  30.8%	  (215)	  who	  either	  disagreed	  or	   strongly	   disagreed.	   Of	   the	   Serial	   Freshmen	   who	   responded,	   44.4%	   (277)	  agreed	  to	  some	  degree,	  compared	  to	  the	  25.8%	  (161)	  who	  reported	  they	  didn’t.	  These	   results	   are	   less	   definite	   than	   for	   other	   candidates.	   As	   for	   all	   types	   of	  respondent,	  both	  these	  groups	  report	  a	  sizeable	  proportion	  of	  neutral	  responses,	  29.2%	  (204)	  and	  29.8%	  (186)	  for	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	  Freshmen	  respectively.	  	  	  Overall	   the	   data	   implies	   that	   respondents	   agree	   with	   the	   suggestion	   that	  Incumbents	  work	  harder	  during	  the	  campaign,	  though	  to	  varying	  degrees	  across	  experience	  groups.	  To	  bolster	  these	  results,	  self-­‐reported	  data	  on	  the	  behaviour	  of	  candidates	  during	  the	  campaign	  can	  be	  used.	  These	  data	  allow	  us	  to	  quantify	  any	   difference	   between	   experience	   groups	   and	   substantiate	   those	   attitudinal	  data	  discussed	  above.	  	  	  Table	   8.3.2	   shows	   replies	   to	   the	   question	   “Did	   you	  have	  a	   campaign	   leaflet	   for	  
distribution?”,	   put	   to	   candidates	   in	   the	   2012	   survey.	   It	   is	   apparent	   from	   the	  results	   that	   Incumbents	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   have	   produced	   a	   leaflet	   for	  distribution	   than	   others.	   More	   than	   nineteen	   out	   of	   every	   twenty	   (95.3%,	  142/149)	   Incumbent	   respondents	   indicated	   that	   they	  did	   so,	   compared	   to	   just	  three	  quarters	  of	  Freshmen	  (74.7%,	  304/407)	  and	   less	   than	  three	  out	  of	  every	  five	   Serial	   Freshmen	   (59.7%,	  216/362).	   Interestingly,	   the	  data	   also	   shows	   that	  Experienced	   Freshmen,	   those	   candidates	   who	   have	   some	   experience	   on	   the	  council,	  are	  more	   likely	   than	  both	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	  Freshmen	  to	  produce	  a	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leaflet	   for	   the	   campaign,	  with	  more	   than	   four	   out	   of	   every	   five	   indicating	   that	  they	   did	   so	   (81.2%,	   69/85).	   These	   data	   show	   that	   there	   are	   substantial	  differences	  in	  the	  behaviour	  of	  different	  types	  of	  candidate,	  even	  with	  something	  as	  basic	  as	  producing	  a	  leaflet	  to	  inform	  voters	  about	  their	  campaign.	  	  
…have	  a	  campaign	  leaflet?	   n	   Yes	  %	  
Incumbent	   149	   95.3	  
Freshmen	   407	   74.7	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   85	   81.2	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   362	   59.7	  
[Table	  –	  8.3.2	  (Did	  you	  have	  a	  campaign	  leaflet	  for	  distribution?)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (%	  Yes)	  2012]	  	  As	  a	  follow	  up	  question,	  those	  respondents	  who	  did	  produce	  a	  leaflet	  were	  also	  asked	   “Did	  you	  deliver	  your	  own	  leaflets	   in	  your	  ward?”	   and	   table	  8.3.3	  displays	  the	  results.	  For	  all	  types	  of	  candidate	  the	  vast	  majority	  delivered	  their	  leaflets	  if	  they	   had	   one.	   Almost	   nineteen	   out	   of	   every	   twenty	   Incumbents	   reported	   that	  they	   did	   deliver	   their	   own	   leaflets	   (94.2%,	   131/139),	   whilst	   slightly	   fewer	  Freshmen	   indicated	   that	   they	   did	   so	   at	   92%	   (276/300).	   As	  many	   Experienced	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	  Freshmen,	  88.1%	  (59/67)	  and	  88.8%	  (190/214),	  indicated	  that	  they	  delivered	  their	  leaflets	  if	  they	  had	  produced	  one.	  	  
…deliver	  your	  own	  leaflets?	   n	   Yes	  %	  
Incumbent	   139	   94.2	  
Freshmen	   300	   92.0	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   67	   88.1	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   214	   88.8	  
[Table	  –	  8.3.3	  (Did	  you	  deliver	  your	  own	  leaflets	  in	  your	  ward?)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (%	  Yes)	  2012]	  	  Results	  in	  table	  8.3.3	  show	  that	  when	  candidates	  display	  intent	  to	  campaign,	  they	  are	   all	   likely	   to	   follow	   this	   through.	   However,	   delving	   deeper	   into	   the	   data	  reveals	   further	  differences	  between	   respondents,	   particularly	   in	   the	   efficacy	   of	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respective	  campaigns.	  Those	  candidates	  who	   indicated	   that	   they	  did	  produce	  a	  leaflet	   for	   the	   campaign	  were	   also	   asked	   “Was	  the	   leaflet	  delivered	   to	  all	  of	   the	  
addresses	  in	  your	  ward?”	  (See	  table	  8.3.4).	  Once	  again	  large	  differences	  between	  the	   responses	  of	  different	   candidates	   re-­‐emerge.	  Around	  nineteen	  out	  of	   every	  twenty	  of	  Incumbent	  respondents	  delivered	  their	  leaflets	  to	  all	  addresses	  in	  the	  (94.2%,	  129/137).	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  are	  the	  next	  most	  likely	  to	  do	  so,	  with	  four	  out	  of	  every	  five	  (80.3%,	  53/66)	  reporting	  that	  they	  reached	  every	  address.	  This	  is	  almost	  14%	  less	  than	  Incumbent	  candidates.	  Fewer	  than	  three	  quarters	  of	  Freshmen	   candidates	   (71.7%,	   213/297)	   stated	   that	   they	   delivered	   their	  campaign	  leaflet	  to	  all	  the	  addresses	  in	  their	  ward,	  which	  is	  more	  than	  20%	  less	  than	  Incumbents.	  Serial	  Freshmen	  were	  the	   least	   likely	  to	  do	  so,	  with	   less	  than	  two	  thirds	  of	  respondents	  (65.6%,	  137/209)	  indicating	  that	  they	  delivered	  their	  campaign	   leaflet	   to	   all	   ward	   addresses,	   which	   is	   almost	   30%	   less	   than	   for	  Incumbent	   candidates.	   These	   data	   support	   the	   narrative	   of	   Incumbents	   being	  more	  likely	  than	  others	  to	  work	  harder	  during	  the	  campaign.	  	  
…delivered	  to	  all	  addresses?	   n	   Yes	  %	  
Incumbent	   137	   94.2	  
Freshmen	   297	   71.7	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   66	   80.3	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   209	   65.6	  
[Table	  –	  8.3.4	  (Was	  the	  leaflet	  delivered	  to	  all	  of	  the	  addresses	  in	  your	  ward?)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (%	  Yes)	  2012]	  	  
…approx.	  %	  of	  ward	  leafleted?	   n	   Ward	  %	   σ	   S.E.	  
Incumbent	   8	   80.9	   18.73	   6.621	  
Freshmen	   79	   56.7	   30.08	   3.385	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   12	   76.6	   15.98	   4.613	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   70	   58.1	   27.17	   3.247	  
[Table	  –	  8.3.5	  (Approximately	  what	  %	  of	  addresses	  was	  leafleted?)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (Mean	  Hours)	  (σ)	  (Error)	  
2012]	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Inc	   Vs.	   Candidate	  
ward	  coverage…	   	  Levene’s	  	   F	   Sig	   t	   df	   Sig	   Ward	  %	   S.E.	  
Freshmen	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	   6.909	   .010	   2.216	   85	   .029	   24.10	   10.876	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   3.241	   11.069	   .008	   24.10	   7.436	  
Serial	  
Freshmen	  
Equal	  Var	  Ass	   4.367	   .040	   2.304	   76	   .024	   22.79	   9.891	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   3.090	   10.709	   .011	   22.79	   7.374	  
Experienced	  
Freshmen	  
Equal	  Var	  Ass	   .036	   .853	   .550	   18	   .589	   4.29	   7.805	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   .532	   13.431	   .604	   4.29	   8.069	  
[Table	  –	  8.3.6	  (Cand.	  Vs.	  Avg.	  Inc.	  Ward	  Coverage	  (%)	  Levene’s	  &	  Indep	  T-­‐Test)	  –	  (F)	  (Sig)	  (t)	  (df)	  
(Sig)	  (ILP)	  (Error)	  2012]	  	  Even	  for	  candidates	  who	  indicated	  that	  they	  didn’t	  manage	  to	  deliver	  their	  leaflet	  to	  all	  ward	  addresses,	   the	  results	  suggest	   that	   Incumbents	   tended	  to	  get	  round	  more	   of	   the	   ward	   than	   others.	   Those	   who	   didn’t	   manage	   to	   deliver	   to	   all	  addresses	  were	  asked	  a	   follow	  up	  question	  “Approximately	  what	  %	  of	  addresses	  
was	  leafleted?”	  Table	  8.3.5	  displays	  the	  responses	  to	  this	  question.	  Examining	  the	  table	   shows	   that	   the	   number	   of	   cases	   observed	   has	   fallen	   substantially,	   this	   is	  because	  the	  question	  was	  only	  asked	  of	  those	  candidates	  who	  indicated	  that	  they	  didn’t	   manage	   to	   get	   their	   leaflet	   to	   all	   ward	   addresses,	   and	   as	   most	   did,	  particularly	  for	  Incumbent	  and	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  candidates,	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  surveyed	  reflect	  this.	  	  Even	  in	  this	  circumstance,	   Incumbents	   leaflet	  a	  greater	  proportion	  of	  the	  ward,	  averaging	  80.9%	  (σ	  =	  18.73)	  ward	  coverage.	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  respondents	  averaged	  slightly	  less,	  just	  over	  three	  quarters	  of	  their	  respective	  wards	  (76.6%,	  σ	   =	   15.98),	   and	   Freshmen	   and	   Serial	   Freshmen	   reported	   the	   lowest	   average	  ward	   coverage	   at	   just	   56.7%	   (σ	   =	   30.08)	   and	   58.1%	   respectively	   (σ	   =	   27.17).	  Table	  8.3.6	  displays	  Levene’s,	  and	  independent	  t-­‐tests,	  comparing	  reported	  ward	  coverage	  between	  Incumbents	  and	  other	  types	  of	  respondent.	  For	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	  Freshmen,	  Levene’s	  tests	  indicate	  that	  equal	  variances	  cannot	  be	  assumed,	  
	  336	  
with	   F-­‐statistics	   of	   6.909	   and	   4.367	   respectively	   and	   corresponding	   p-­‐values	  below	   the	   0.05	   level.	   For	   the	   independent	   t-­‐tests,	   the	   24.1%	   and	   22.8%	  difference	   in	  coverage	  between	  Incumbents	  and	  these	  candidates	  have	  t-­‐values	  of	   3.241	   (df	   =	   85)	   and	   3.090	   (df	   =	   76)	   for	   Freshmen	   and	   Serial	   Freshmen	  respectively.	   Both	   tests	   have	   corresponding	   p-­‐values	   below	   the	   desired	   0.05	  level.	   Results	   for	   the	   4.3%	   difference	   in	   the	   means	   of	   Incumbents	   and	  Experienced	   Freshmen	   shown	   in	   table	   8.3.6	   are	   less	   conclusive	   and	   fail	   to	  confirm	   any	   statistically	   significant	   difference	   between	   the	   two	   groups.	   The	  results	   mean	   that	   we	   can	   be	   confident	   in	   asserting	   the	   difference	   in	   ward	  coverage	   only	   between	   Incumbents	   and	   those	   freshmen	   with	   no	   previous	  experience	  on	  the	  council.	  	  Data	   considered	   for	   the	   production	   of	   candidate	   campaign	   leaflets	   and	   the	  efficacy	  of	  their	  distribution	  show	  that	  more	  experienced	  candidates	  are	  not	  only	  more	   likely	   to	  produce	  a	   leaflet,	  but	  also	   to	  distribute	   it	   and	  distribute	   it	  more	  widely.	  Incumbents	  tend	  to	  be	  the	  most	  active,	  more	  likely	  to	  produce	  a	  leaflet,	  to	  deliver	  it	  themselves	  and	  to	  cover	  most	  if	  not	  all	  of	  their	  ward.	  Interestingly,	  data	  for	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  suggest	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  do	  more	  than	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	   Freshmen	   also,	   perhaps	   an	   indication	   that	   a	   candidate’s	   experience	  may	  alter	  their	  behaviour.	  Whether	  or	  not	  these	  results	  are	  a	  symptom	  of	  experiential	  effects,	  or	  whether	  experience	  is	  a	  product	  of	  their	  behaviour,	  these	  data	  do	  lend	  support	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  Incumbents	  working	  harder	  than	  their	  rivals	  during	  the	  campaign.	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Further	   data	   are	   available	   to	   test	   the	   behavioural	   differences	   between	   the	  different	   candidates.	   Using	   self-­‐reported	   data,	   again	   from	   the	   2012	   Candidate	  Survey,	  table	  8.3.7	  displays	  responses	  to	  the	  question	  “Approximately	  how	  many	  
hours	  a	  week	   in	   total	   did	   you	   spend	   campaigning?”	   This	   question	  was	   asked	   to	  those	   candidates	   that	   produced	   and	   delivered	   a	   campaign	   leaflet	   in	   their	   own	  ward.	   The	   results	   show	   a	   similar	   pattern	   to	   that	   discussed	   above.	   Incumbents	  tend	  put	  in	  the	  most	  hours,	  with	  an	  average	  of	  19.05	  per	  week	  (σ	  =	  9.47).	  They	  are	   followed	   by	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   who	   put	   in	   almost	   18	   hours	   a	   week	  during	  the	  campaign	  (17.95%,	  σ	  =	  10.41),	  an	  average	  of	  an	  hour	  less	  a	  week	  than	  Incumbents.	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	  Freshmen	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  shown	  to	  put	  in	   the	   fewest	   hours.	   The	   figures	   show	   that	   Freshmen	   and	   Serial	   Freshmen	  campaign	   two	   and	   a	   half,	   and	   three	   and	   a	   half	   fewer	   hours	   per	   week	   than	  Incumbent	   candidates	   respectively	   (Freshmen	   =	   16.35,	   σ	   =	   10.26;	   Serial	  Freshmen	  15.42,	  σ	  =	  10.07).	  	  Table	  8.3.8	  displays	  results	  from	  Levene’s,	  and	  independent	  t-­‐tests	  between	  the	  reported	   campaign	   hours	   of	   Incumbent	   respondents	   and	   the	   other	   types	   of	  candidate.	   Results	   suggest	   that	   for	   Freshmen	   and	   Serial	   Freshmen	   we	   can	   be	  confident	   that	   the	   average	   campaign	   hours	   differ	   significantly	   from	   that	   for	  Incumbent	   candidates.	   A	   Levene’s	   test	   for	   the	   2.69	   hours	   difference	   between	  Freshmen	  and	  Incumbent	  candidates	  gives	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  1.878,	  which	  has	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  above	  the	  0.05	  level.	  The	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  2.521	  with	  398	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  has	  a	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  desired	  0.05	  level	  when	  equal	  variances	  are	  assumed.	   Similarly,	   for	   the	   3.63	   hours	   per	  week	   gap	   between	   Incumbents	   and	  Serial	  Freshmen,	  a	  Levene’s	  test	  produces	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  just	  0.925	  and	  thus	  a	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corresponding	   p-­‐value	   above	   the	   0.05	   level.	   So	   when	   equal	   variances	   are	  assumed,	   the	   resulting	   t-­‐value	   of	   3.223	  with	   313	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   has	   a	   p-­‐value	  below	  the	  desired	  0.05	   level.	  As	   for	  ward	  coverage	  data	  (see	  table	  8.3.6),	  results	   for	   the	   1.1	   hours	   per	  week	   difference	   in	   the	  means	   of	   Incumbents	   and	  Experienced	   Freshmen	   fail	   to	   confirm	   any	   statistically	   significant	   difference	   at	  the	  0.05	  confidence	  level	  (see	  table	  8.3.8).	  	  
Cand.	  Campaign	  Hours	  p/week	   n	   Hours	   σ	   S.E.	  
Incumbent	   130	   19.05	   9.47	   0.831	  
Freshmen	   270	   16.35	   10.26	   0.624	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   55	   17.95	   10.41	   1.404	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   185	   15.42	   10.07	   0.740	  
[Table	  –	  8.3.7	  (Approximately	  how	  many	  hours	  a	  week	  in	  total	  did	  you	  spend	  campaigning?	  Hours	  
p/week)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (Mean	  Hours)	  (σ)	  (Error)	  2012]	  	  
Inc	   campaign	  
hours	  p/week	  Vs.	   Levene’s	   F	   Sig	   t	   df	   Sig	   Hours	   S.E.	  
Freshmen	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	   1.878	   .171	   2.521	   398	   .012	   2.69	   1.069	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   2.593	   273.994	   .010	   2.69	   1.039	  
Serial	  
Freshmen	  
Equal	  Var	  Ass	   .925	   .337	   3.223	   313	   .001	   3.63	   1.124	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   3.258	   287.900	   .001	   3.63	   1.113	  
Experienced	  
Freshmen	  
Equal	  Var	  Ass	   .491	   .484	   .701	   183	   .484	   1.10	   1.570	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   .675	   93.605	   .502	   1.10	   1.632	  
[Table	  –	  8.3.8	  (Cand.	  Vs.	  Avg.	   Inc.	  Hours	  p/week	  Levene’s	  &	  Indep	  T-­‐Test)	  –	  (F)	  (Sig)	  (t)	  (df)	  (Sig)	  
(ILP)	  (Error)	  2012]	  	  The	   survey	   results	   regarding	   the	   efforts	   of	   different	   candidates	   during	   the	  campaign	   have	   been	   principally	   in	   support	   of	   the	   hypothesis	   that,	   ‘incumbent	  candidates	  work	  harder	  during	  campaigns’.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  Incumbents	  do	  put	  greater	  effort	  into	  campaigning	  and	  take	  it	  more	  seriously	  than	  other	  types	  of	  candidate.	  On	  average	  Incumbents	  reported	  that	  they	  campaign	  for	  more	  than	  three	  and	  a	  half	  hours	   longer	  a	  week	  than	  Serial	  Freshmen	  and	  more	  than	  two	  and	   a	   half	   hours	   longer	   than	   Freshmen.	   When	   compared	   to	   Experienced	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Freshmen,	   Incumbents	  average	   just	  over	  an	  hour	  a	  week	   longer,	   though	  t-­‐tests	  do	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  be	  confident	  that	  the	  difference	  is	  statistically	  significant.	  	  Overall,	  there	  is	  strong	  evidence	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  suggestion	  that	  Incumbents	  as	  Zaller	  (1998)	  suggests,	  are	  better	  campaigners	  and	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  motivated.	  But	  although	  this	  argument	   is	  compelling,	   there	   is	  another	  sizeable	   facet	  of	   the	  campaign	  that	  is	  yet	  to	  be	  considered,	  which	  again	  addresses	  the	  more	  systemic	  advantages	  of	  incumbency.	  Volunteers	  are	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  the	  local	  campaign	  and	  any	  additional	  help	  can	  be	  a	  great	  contribution	  to	  its	  efficacy.	  This	  is	  not	  just	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  logistics	  in	  ensuring	  the	  delivery	  of	  campaign	  material,	  but	  also,	  with	   regard	   to	   candidate	  morale	   and	   the	   all-­‐important	   telephone	   and	   door-­‐to-­‐door	  canvassing.	  Though	  there	  are	  bound	  to	  be	  variations	  in	  the	  organisational	  strength	   of	   local	   parties,	   the	   ability	   of	   Incumbent	   candidates	   to	   recruit	  volunteers	   to	   their	  campaign	  could	  prove	  vital,	  and	  so	   the	   following	  discussion	  examines	  the	  idea	  that	  Incumbents	  may	  find	  it	  easier	  to	  recruit	  help	  during	  the	  campaign.	  	  Table	  8.3.9	  displays	  responses	   to	   the	  statement	   that	   Incumbents	  are	  successful	  because	   they	   “are	  able	  to	  recruit	  more	  volunteers	  for	  their	  campaigns”.	  The	   top-­‐line	  results	  reveal	  that	  respondents	  are	  inclined	  to	  agree	  that	  Incumbents	  do	  find	  it	  easier	  to	  recruit	  volunteers	  for	  their	  electoral	  defence.	  In	  total	  58.2%	  (1,032)	  of	   respondents	   either	   agreed,	   or	   strongly	   agreed	   that	   councillors	   are	   able	   to	  mobilise	   greater	   support	   for	   their	   campaign	   than	   their	   challengers.	   This	  proportion	  is	  more	  than	  four	  and	  a	  half	  times	  the	  number	  who	  disagreed	  (12.7%,	  226).	  Even	  those	  who	  strongly	  agreed	  with	  the	  statement	  outnumbered	  the	  total	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number	  who	  disagreed	  or	  strongly	  disagreed.	  Some	  31.5%	  of	  respondents	  gave	  a	  neutral	  response	  (555).	  Though	  the	  number	  of	  neutral	  respondents	   is	  high,	  we	  can	   say	   with	   some	   confidence	   that	   the	   results	   are	   indicative	   of	   feelings	   that	  incumbents	   recruit	   more	   volunteers.	   This	   general	   agreement	   is	   illustrated	   by	  figure	  8.3.9.	  	  	  However,	   if	   it	   is	   the	   case	   that	   most	   candidates	   agree	   that	   the	   ‘perks’	   of	  incumbency	  may	  extend	  into	  the	  more	  organisational	  elements	  of	  local	  elections,	  then	   the	   breakdown	   of	   results	   by	   respondents’	   electoral	   experience	  will	   be	   of	  some	   interest.	   For	  Serial	  Freshmen	   the	   results	   are	  manifest.	  Table	  8.3.9	   shows	  that	   of	   the	   626	   responses	   collected,	   almost	   two	   thirds	   (62.8%,	   393)	   agreed	   to	  some	  extent	  with	  the	  premise	  that	  electoral	  defence	  is	  easier	  because	  councillors	  are	  able	  to	  recruit	  more	  volunteers	  to	  the	  campaign	  than	  their	  rivals.	  Those	  who	  agree	  outnumber	  those	  who	  disagree	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  six	  (10.4%,	  65).	  However,	  it	  must	   be	   noted	   that	   a	   good	   number	   of	   those	   Serial	   Freshmen	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  independent	   candidates,	  with	   little	   access	   to	   the	   campaign	   infrastructures	   that	  candidates	  for	  the	  three	  major	  parties	  may	  utilise,	  including	  volunteers	  from	  the	  local	   party.	   With	   this	   in	   mind,	   it	   is	   easier	   to	   understand	   why	   such	   a	   large	  proportion	  of	  Serial	  Freshmen	  tend	  to	  agree	  with	  the	  statement.	  	  	  Also	   evident	   from	   the	   data	   presented	   in	   table	   8.3.9	   is	   the	   difference	   between	  Incumbents	   and	   Experienced	   Freshmen.	   Some	   39.3%	   (120)	   of	   Incumbent	  respondents	   agreed	   or	   agreed	   strongly	   with	   this	   statement,	   almost	   twice	   the	  number	   who	   felt	   otherwise	   (21.2%,	   65).	   However,	   Experienced	   Freshmen	  tended	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  greater	  extent,	  with	  45.6%	  (68)	  either	  agreeing	  or	  agreeing	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strongly.	  This	  is	  more	  than	  three	  times	  the	  number	  who	  disagreed	  or	  disagreed	  strongly	   (14.1%,	   21).	   The	   response	   from	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   perhaps	  qualifies	  that	  revealed	  for	  Incumbents,	  allowing	  for	  their	  previous	  experience	  as	  a	  councillor.	  	  
…are	   able	   to	   recruit	   more	  volunteers	  for	  their	  campaigns	   Str.	  Agr	   Agree	   Neutral	   Disagree	   Str.	  Dis	   Total	  n	  
All	   14.0	   42.2	   31.2	   11.2	   1.5	   1,778	  
Incumbent	   9.2	   30.1	   39.5	   18.3	   2.9	   306	  
Freshmen	   16.1	   43.7	   29.4	   9.5	   1.3	   697	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   6.7	   38.9	   40.3	   12.8	   1.3	   149	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   15.7	   47.1	   26.8	   9.3	   1.1	   626	  
[Table	  –	  8.3.9	  (%	  5pt	  Likert	  Scale	  Agr/Dis)	  (n)	  2011-­‐2012]	  	  
	  
[Figure	  –	  8.3.9	  (%	  5pt	  Likert	  Scale	  Agr/Dis)	  2011-­‐2012	  (n	  =	  1,778)]	  	  As	  for	  the	  data	  on	  the	  efforts	  of	  candidates	  during	  the	  campaign,	  the	  2012	  survey	  allows	  us	   to	  corroborate	   these	  data	  with	  self-­‐reported	   information	  on	   the	  help	  that	   candidates	   received.	   In	   response	   to	   the	   question	   “Did	   you	   have	   any	   help	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few	  cases	  considered	  for	  this	  group.	  93%	  (130/140)	  of	  Incumbents	  reported	  that	  they	  had	  some	  help	  delivering	  their	  leaflets	  during	  the	  campaign.	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	  Freshmen	  have	   the	   lowest	   levels,	  with	   just	  86.9%	  (259/298)	  and	  90.6%	  (192/212)	  respectively	  indicating	  that	  they	  had	  some	  help	  delivering	  leaflets.	  	  To	   help	   signify	   the	   potential	   impact	   of	   volunteered	   assistance	   during	   the	  campaign,	   we	   can	   delve	   a	   little	   deeper	   into	   the	   data,	   to	   identify	   differences	  between	   successful	   and	   unsuccessful	   candidates.	   As	   discussed	   above,	   data	   in	  table	   8.3.10	   show	   that	   Freshmen	   and	   Serial	   Freshmen	   not	   only	   exhibited	   the	  lowest	  level	  of	  support	  during	  the	  campaign,	  but	  these	  groups	  also	  had	  the	  worst	  rate	  of	  election	  of	  the	  four	  candidates	  types	  (see	  table	  8.0.1).	  When	  we	  take	  their	  electoral	   success	   in	   2012	   into	   consideration	  we	   can	  observe	  differences	   in	   the	  likelihood	  of	  help	  within	  these	  groups.	  For	  instance,	  nineteen	  out	  of	  every	  twenty	  Freshmen	  winners	   in	   2012	   (95.5%,	   85/89)	   indicated	   that	   they	   had	   some	   help	  delivering	  their	   leaflets	  during	  the	  campaign,	  whereas	   just	  over	  four	  out	  of	   five	  Freshmen	   losers	   (83.1%,	   172/207)	   indicated	   the	   same.	   The	   associated	   Chi-­‐Square	  value	  is	  8.384,	  and	  with	  1	  degree	  of	  freedom	  the	  p-­‐value	  is	  well	  below	  the	  desired	   0.05	   level.	   For	   Serial	   Freshmen	   there	   is	   a	   similar	   set	   of	   results.	   All	   of	  those	   elected	   (100%,	   40/40)	   reported	   that	   they	   had	   some	   help	   during	   the	  campaign,	   compared	   to	   less	   than	   nine	   out	   of	   ten	   for	   those	   who	   lost	   (88.3%,	  151/171).	  The	  Chi-­‐Squared	  value	   in	   this	   instance	   is	  5.168,	  which	  has	  a	  p-­‐value	  below	   the	   0.05	   level	  with	   1	   degree	   of	   freedom.	   For	   both	   Freshmen	   and	   Serial	  Freshmen	  respondents,	  winners	  were	  around	  12%	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  had	  some	  help	   in	   the	   delivery	   of	   their	   campaign	  material	   and	   Chi-­‐Squared	   tests	   suggest	  that	   we	   can	   be	   reasonably	   confident	   of	   these	   differences.	   However,	   the	   data	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show	  that,	  whether	  they	  win	  or	  lose,	  there	  is	  no	  statistically	  significant	  difference	  in	  the	  chance	  of	  having	  had	  help	  during	  the	  campaign,	  for	  both	  Incumbents	  and	  Experienced	  Freshmen.	  	  …help	   delivering	   these	  leaflets?	   Total	  	  n	   Total	  Yes	  %	   Win	  Yes	  n	   Win	  Yes	  %	   Lose	  Yes	  n	   Lose	  Yes	  %	   Chi-­‐Square	   df	   Sig	  
Incumbent	   140	   92.9	   107	   91.6	   31	   96.8	   0.962	   1	   .327	  
Freshmen	   298	   86.9	   89	   95.5	   207	   83.1	   8.384	   1	   .004	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   67	   97.0	   25	   96.0	   41	   97.6	   0.129	   1	   .720	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   212	   90.6	   40	   100	   171	   88.3	   5.168	   1	   .023	  
[Table	  –	  8.3.10	  (Did	  you	  have	  any	  help	  delivering	  these	  leaflets?)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (%	  Yes)	  (n	  Winners)	  (Winners	  
%	  Yes)	  (Losers	  n)	  (Losers	  %	  Yes)	  (𝑥!)	  (df)	  (Sig)	  2012]	  	  Unfortunately	  no	  data	  were	  collected	  regarding	   the	  number	  of	  volunteers	  each	  candidate	  managed	   to	   recruit	   to	   their	   campaign.	   However,	  we	   can	   utilise	   self-­‐reported	   information	   on	   the	   average	   number	   of	   hours	   of	   assistance	   that	  candidates	  received	  per	  week.	  Table	  8.3.11	  shows	  the	  average	  number	  of	  hours	  that	  volunteers	  delivered	   leaflets	  during	  each	  week	  of	   the	  campaign.	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	  Freshmen	  candidates	  appear	  to	  receive	  the	  least	  help,	  with	  an	  average	  of	   9.15	   hours	   (σ	   =	   8.00)	   and	   9.12	   hours	   (σ	   =	   8.34)	   respectively.	   Experienced	  Freshmen	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  report	  a	  slightly	  higher	  weekly	  time	  from	  helpers,	  at	  9.81	   hours	   (σ	   =	   7.62).	   But	   it	   is	   Incumbent	   candidates	   who	   report	   the	   highest	  level	  of	  support	  from	  helpers,	  with	  an	  average	  contribution	  of	  12.19	  hours	  (σ	  =	  9.92).	   This	   is	   almost	   two	   and	   a	   half	   hours	   a	   week	   more	   than	   Experienced	  Freshmen	   and	   more	   than	   three	   hours	   a	   week	   greater	   than	   reported	   for	  Freshmen	  and	  Serial	  Freshmen.	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Helper	  campaign	  hours	  p/week	   n	   Hours	   σ	   S.E.	  
Incumbent	   129	   12.19	   9.92	   0.873	  
Freshmen	   248	   9.15	   8.00	   0.508	  
Experienced	  Freshmen	   59	   9.81	   7.62	   0.993	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   188	   9.12	   8.34	   0.608	  
[Table	   –	   8.3.11	   (Approximately	   how	   many	   hours	   a	   week	   was	   the	   average	   time	   spent	   by	   others	  
delivering	  your	  campaign	  leaflet?)	  -­‐	  (n)	  (Mean	  Hours)	  (σ)	  (Error)	  2012]	  	  Inc	  helper	   campaign	  hours	  p/week	  Vs.…	   Levene’s	   F	   Sig	   t	   df	   Sig	   Hours	   S.E.	  
Freshmen	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	   8.256	   .004	   3.227	   375	   .001	   3.05	   0.945	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   3.017	   216.431	   .003	   3.05	   1.010	  
Serial	  Freshmen	   Equal	  Var	  Ass	   4.978	   .026	   2.980	   315	   .003	   3.07	   1.031	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   2.886	   243.117	   .004	   3.07	   1.064	  
Experienced	  
Freshmen	  
Equal	  Var	  Ass	   3.101	   .080	   1.635	   186	   .104	   2.38	   1.456	  Equal	  Var	  Not	   	  	   	  	   1.800	   143.593	   .074	   2.38	   1.322	  
[Table	  –	  8.3.12	  (Inc	  Avg.	  Helper	  Hours	  Vs.	  Cand.	  Avg.	  Helper	  Hours	  p/week	  Levene’s	  &	  Indep	  T-­‐Test)	  
–	  (F)	  (Sig)	  (t)	  (df)	  (Sig)	  (ILP)	  (Error)	  2012]	  	  Table	  8.3.12	  displays	  results	  from	  Levene’s	  and	  independent	  t-­‐tests	  between	  the	  average	  weekly	  helper	  hours	  for	  Incumbent	  respondents’	  and	  the	  weekly	  helper	  hours	  of	  other	  candidate	  types.	  The	  results	  suggest	  that	  we	  can	  be	  confident	  that	  Incumbents	   have	  more	   help.	   Average	   campaign	   hours	   that	   helpers	   dedicate	   to	  candidates’	  campaigns	  are	  significantly	  less	  for	  non-­‐incumbents.	  A	  Levene’s	  test	  for	   the	   3.05	   hours	   difference	   between	   Freshmen	   and	   Incumbent	   candidate	  helpers	  has	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  8.256.	  This	  has	  an	  associated	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  0.05	  level.	  The	  t-­‐statistic	  of	  3.017	  with	  216.431	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  has	  a	  p-­‐value	  that	  is	  below	  the	  0.05	  level	  when	  equal	  variances	  are	  not	  assumed.	  Similarly,	  for	  the	  3.07	   hours	   per	   week	   gap	   between	   Incumbent	   helpers	   and	   those	   for	   Serial	  Freshmen,	   a	   Levene’s	   test	   gives	   the	   F-­‐statistic	   of	   just	   4.978	   and	   so	   the	  corresponding	   p-­‐value	   is	   below	   the	   0.05	   level.	   When	   equal	   variances	   are	   not	  assumed,	  the	  resulting	  t-­‐value	  of	  2.886	  with	  243.117	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  has	  a	  p-­‐value	  below	  the	  desired	  0.05	  level.	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Finally,	   Levene’s	   results	   for	   the	   2.38	   hours	   per	   week	   difference	   in	   the	   means	  between	  Incumbent	  helper	  hours	  and	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  helper	  hours	  show	  an	  F-­‐statistic	  of	  3.101,	  with	  a	  p-­‐value	  above	  the	  0.05	  level.	  The	  resulting	  t-­‐value	  of	  1.635	  with	  186	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  means	  that	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  helper	  hours	   fail	   to	   confirm	   any	   statistically	   significant	   difference	   from	   Incumbent	  helper	   hours	   at	   the	   0.05	   level.	   Though	   in	   a	   one-­‐tailed	   test,	   because	   of	   the	  directional	   nature	   of	   the	   hypothesis	   between	   incumbents	   and	   non-­‐incumbent	  helper	   hours,	   the	   p-­‐value	   would	   meet	   the	   required	   0.1	   level	   required	   for	  significance.	  	  	  8.4	  –	  Concluding	  Remarks	  Chapter	  8	  has	  provided	  a	  variety	  of	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  incumbency	  effects	  in	  English	   local	   elections.	   The	   findings	   imply	   that	   incumbent	   councillors	   are	  advantaged,	  with	  respondents	   from	  all	  categories	  of	  experience	  expressing	  this	  view,	   though	   to	   varying	   degrees.	   Using	   data	   from	   local	   elections	   candidates	  surveys,	   provided	  by	  The	  Elections	  Centre	   at	  Plymouth	  University,	   the	   chapter	  detailed	   responses	   to	   seven	  questions	  on	   the	   effects	   of	   incumbency,	   as	  well	   as	  corroborating	   these	   results	   with	   some	   behavioural	   measures	   also	   put	   to	  respondents.	  	  Section	   8.1	   described	   data	   from	   three	   of	   the	   questions	   put	   to	   candidates	  concerning	   the	   effect	   of	   incumbents’	   superior	   experience	   on	   their	   electoral	  fortune.	  Responses	  were	  overwhelmingly	   in	   favour	  of	   experience	  effects.	   Some	  77.6%	  (1,377)	  of	  respondents	  indicated	  that	  they	  supported	  the	  statement.	  That	  incumbents	   are	   more	   successful	   because	   they	   “have	   greater	   experience	   gained	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from	   working	   on	   the	   council”,	   ten	   times	   the	   number	   who	   disagreed	   to	   some	  extent.	   Responses	   were	   broadly	   similar	   in	   magnitude	   for	   the	   statement;	  incumbents	  “no	  longer	  have	  an	  advantage”,	  with	  almost	  two	  thirds	  (64%,	  1,117)	  of	   respondents	   disagreeing	   or	   strongly	   disagreeing.	   Most	   candidates	   felt	   that	  support	   for	   councillors	   was	   consistent	   and	   reliable,	   though	   Experienced	  Freshmen,	  did	   so	   to	  a	   lesser	  extent	   than	   the	  other	  experience	  groups,	  which	   is	  hardly	   surprising	   given	   the	   likelihood	   that	   they	   will	   have	   experienced	   some	  electoral	  failure	  in	  the	  past13.	  Overall	  the	  data	  described	  in	  sub-­‐chapter	  8.1	  lend	  some	   weight	   to	   the	   existing	   literature	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   candidate	   quality.	   As	  detailed	   in	  chapter	  2,	   these	   include	  the	  notion	  that	  candidate	  experience	  might	  be	   a	   desired	   cue	   for	   voters	   and	   second,	   that	   there	   is	   a	   “scare-­‐off”	   effect	   in	   the	  candidate	  selection	  procedure,	   that	  prevents	  strong	  candidates	  competing	  with	  incumbents	   due	   to	   the	   perception	   of	   strong	   and	   reliable	   support	   for	   the	  incumbent.	  For	  instance,	  Carson	  et	  al	  argue	  that	  “modern	  incumbents	  rarely	  find	  themselves	   facing	   strong	   challengers”	   (2007,	   pp.	   300).	   There	   may	   be	   many	  reasons	   for	   this,	   but	   the	   effect	   could	   also	   be	   fuelling	   itself.	   By	   not	   opposing	  incumbent	   candidates	  with	   candidates	   of	   a	   similar	   quality,	   the	   scare-­‐off	   effect	  can	   arise	   based	   on	   nothing	  more	   than	   the	   perception	   of	   incumbents	   as	   strong	  candidates.	   If	   “incumbents	   succeed	   in	  deterring	   strong	  challengers,	   a	   large	  and	  growing	   incumbency	  advantage	  can	  become	  a	  self-­‐fulfilling	  prophecy	  driven	  by	  the	  strategic	  behaviour	  of	  politicians”	  (Levitt	  &	  Wolfram,	  1997,	  pp.57).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  There	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  candidate	  may	  have	  stood	  down/resigned	  in	  the	  past	  rather	  than	  have	  been	  defeated,	  though	  this	  is	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  initiating	  roughly	  52%	  of	  by-­‐elections,	  as	  detailed	  in	  chapter	  3,	  there	  is	  currently	  no	  evidence	  on	  how	  many	  return	  to	  contest	  a	  council	  seat	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Sub-­‐chapter	  8.2	  discussed	  data	  on	  the	  profile	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  and	  their	  relationship	   with	   the	   local	   media.	   Respondents	   felt	   overwhelmingly	   that	  incumbent	   candidates	   were	   advantaged	   because	   they	   enjoyed	   “a	   higher	   local	  
profile	  than	  their	  challengers”.	  More	  than	  90%	  (1,618)	  of	  respondents	  supported	  this	  statement,	  which	  is	  more	  than	  those	  who	  opposed	  it	  by	  a	  factor	  of	  30	  (3.1%,	  55).	  Two	  interesting	  facets	  of	  the	  responses	  to	  this	  question	  were	  the	  conviction	  of	   respondents,	   and	   the	   consensus	   among	   different	   types	   of	   respondent.	   Very	  few	   candidates	   gave	   a	   neutral	   response,	   just	   6.6%	   (118),	   with	   similar	  proportions	   across	   the	   experience	   groups.	   The	   small	   number	   of	   neutral	  responses	  is	  indicative	  of	  a	  stronger	  belief	  amongst	  respondents,	  that	  candidates	  felt	  more	  confident	  in	  their	  assertion	  that	  incumbents	  have	  a	  higher	  profile	  than	  others.	   The	   similarities	   in	   the	   proportion	   of	   responses	   across	   the	   experience	  groups	  suggest	  that	  we	  can	  have	  greater	  confidence	  in	  the	  result.	  Results	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  incumbents	  having	  an	  improved	  relationship	  with	  the	  local	  media	  was	  mixed.	   All	   respondents	   felt	   that	   incumbents	   were	   in	   some	   way	   advantaged	  because	  of	  “a	  stronger	  relationship	  with	  local	  media”,	  but	  this	  varied	  across	  types	  of	   respondent.	   Results	   for	   Freshmen	   showed	   that	   relative	   proximity	   to	  experience	  on	   the	  council	  moderated	  responses,	  with	  Serial	  Freshmen	  strongly	  convinced,	  whilst	   incumbents	   tended	   to	  play	  down	   its	   significance.	  Overall,	   the	  results	   described	   in	   sub-­‐chapter	   8.2	   suggest	   that	   incumbent	   candidates	   do,	   to	  some	  extent,	  benefit	  from	  their	  position	  on	  the	  council.	  	  Finally,	  sub-­‐chapter	  8.3	  was	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  the	  efficacy	  of	  incumbent	  campaigns.	   There	   are	   two	   fundamental	   themes	   that	   can	   be	   derived	   from	   the	  results	   in	   this	   section.	  The	   first	   is	   that	   incumbents	  are	  better	   campaigners	  and	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the	   second	   is	   that	   they	   tend	   to	   have	   more	   help.	   Overall,	   the	   attitudinal	   data	  shows	   that	   incumbents	   put	  more	   effort	   into	   their	   electoral	   campaigns,	   though	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  was	  felt	  varied	  across	  types	  of	  respondent.	  Surprisingly,	  all	  experience	  groups	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  not	  to	  agree,	  and	  thus	  these	  results	  indicate	   something	   of	   an	   admission	   from	   freshmen	   groups	   that	   incumbents	  campaign	   harder.	   There	   is	   evidence	   in	   the	   literature	   to	   support	   the	   notion	   of	  incumbents	   as	   skilled	   campaigners.	   As	   Zaller	   puts	   it,	   “incumbents	   are	   simply	  better	  politicians	  than	  most	  of	  their	  opponents	  and	  are	  therefore	  usually	  able	  to	  best	  them	  in	  electoral	  combat”	  (Zaller,	  1998,	  pp.	  2).	  The	  behavioural	  data	  seem	  also	  to	  support	  this	  claim.	  Data	  discussed	  in	  section	  8.3	  showed	  that	  incumbents	  are	   more	   likely	   than	   others	   to	   produce	   a	   campaign	   leaflet	   for	   distribution	  (95.3%,	  149),	  and	  when	  they	  do,	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  others	  to	  deliver	  it	  to	  all	  addresses	   in	   their	  ward	   (94.2%,	  137).	  But	  perhaps	  most	   telling	  are	   the	   results	  for	   time	  spent	  campaigning.	  These	  showed	  that	   incumbents	  put	   in	  significantly	  more	  hours	  on	  average,	  when	  compared	   to	  others,	  particularly	   those	   freshmen	  with	  no	  previous	  experience	  as	  a	  councillor.	  	  Sub-­‐chapter	   8.3	   also	   provided	   substantial	   evidence	   showing	   that	   incumbents	  have	   considerably	   more	   help	   than	   non-­‐incumbents	   during	   the	   campaign.	   The	  attitudinal	  data	  indicate	  that	  all	  respondent	  groups	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  not	  to	  agree	   that	   incumbents	   “are	  able	  to	  recruit	  more	  volunteers	   for	  their	  campaigns”	  (58.2%,	   1,032).	   Supporting	   this	   finding	   are	   the	   data	   for	   the	   level	   of	   help	  candidates	  had	  delivering	  leaflets.	  Of	  those	  candidates	  that	  did	  have	  some	  help,	  incumbents	  had	  significantly	  more	  weekly	  hours	  of	  help.	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  potential	  explanations	  for	  these	  results.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  volunteer	  hours	  could	  be	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merely	  a	  reflection	  of	  both	  the	  electoral	  and	  organisational	  strength	  of	  the	  local	  party.	   It	   is	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   incumbent	   candidates	   will	   be	   able	   to	  encourage	  volunteers	  to	  help	  campaign	  in	  areas	  where	  the	  party	  has	  already	  had	  electoral	   success.	   Another	   possible	   explanation	   for	   the	   difference	   in	   volunteer	  hours	  is	  that	  respondents	  may	  be	  including	  fellow	  members	  from	  the	  council	  in	  these	   figures.	   This	   would	   mean	   that	   the	   result	   is	   to	   some	   extent	   inevitable,	  because	  they	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  access	  to	  a	  set	  of	  experienced	  campaigners,	  especially	  if	  they	  have	  mid-­‐term	  party	  colleagues	  on	  the	  council.	  	  Finally,	   another	   interesting	   feature	   of	   the	   behavioural	   data	   discussed,	   is	   the	  difference	   between	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   and	   other	   freshmen	   categories.	  Similar	   to	   the	  data	   for	   Incumbent	   respondents,	   results	   throughout	   the	   chapter	  have	  implied	  that	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  tend	  to	  campaign	  harder	  than	  their	  less	  experienced	   counterparts.	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   are	   more	   likely	   to	   deliver	  leaflets,	  to	  deliver	  those	  leaflets	  to	  all	  addresses	  and	  to	  campaign	  for	  more	  hours	  on	  average	  than	  either	  Freshmen	  or	  Serial	  Freshmen.	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Chapter	  9	  –	  Conclusion	  	  	  This	   thesis	   began	  with	   the	   objective	   of	   identifying	   and	  measuring	   the	   value	   of	  electoral	  defence	  in	  English	  local	  elections	  since	  it	  was	  reorganised	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	   Examining	   a	   range	   of	   data	   between	   1974	   and	   2010,	   the	   project	   has	  discussed	   trends	   in	   effects	   on	   an	   assortment	   of	   features	  within	   local	   elections.	  After	   a	   short	   introduction	   to	   the	  key	  developments	   in	   local	   government,	   and	  a	  consideration	   of	   the	   relevant	   literature	   on	   incumbency	   advantage	   theory,	   data	  was	   analysed	   to	   determine	   the	   relative	   electoral	   success	   of	   incumbent	  candidates	  over	  the	  period.	  The	  data	  was	  presented	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  ways	  to	  assess	  the	  size	  of	  any	  effect	  and	  influences	  as	  to	  its	  magnitude.	  The	  thesis	  has	  drawn	  on	  three	   major	   sets	   of	   data	   throughout;	   these	   were	   aggregate	   electoral	   data,	  candidate	  survey	  results	  and	  ONS	  population	  statistics.	  	  Before	  describing	  the	  major	  findings	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  best	  to	  give	  an	  abridged	  discussion	   on	   some	  of	   the	  methodological	  weaknesses	   and	   issues	   encountered	  during	  the	  project.	  	  Chapter	  3	  introduced	  a	  number	  of	  variables	  constructed	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  investigation.	  Two	  of	   these	  were	  derived	   from	   the	   literature	  but	   adapted	   to	   fit	  the	   English	   electoral	   administration	   (SIP	   &	   SRS),	   whilst	   three	   others	   were	  designs	   developed	   specifically	   with	   the	   intention	   of	   measuring	   effects	   (RRILP,	  EPILP,	   STS).	   Both	   the	   Standardised	   Incumbent	   Performance	   (SIP)	   and	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Standardised	   Retirement	   Slump	   (SRS)	   measures	   have	   provided	   invaluable	  evidence	  in	  favour	  of	  incumbency	  effects	  throughout	  this	  project.	  	  	  However,	   it	   must	   be	   noted	   that	   there	  may	   be	   a	   case	   for	   suggesting	   that	   both	  these	   models	   produce	   slight	   underestimations	   of	   incumbency	   advantage	   (IA).	  For	  SIP,	   it	  remains	  unclear	  from	  the	   literature	  as	  to	  whether	  there	   is	  a	  case	  for	  the	  pooling	  of	  support	  among	  candidates	  in	  multimember	  elections.	  Although	  the	  literature	   remains	   silent	   on	   the	   effect	   of	   campaigning	   in	   groups,	   candidates	  standing	  in	  wards	  with	  multiple	  vacancies	  frequently	  do	  campaign	  together	  and	  as	   a	   result	   there	   is	   a	   possibility	   that	   the	   electoral	   fortunes	   of	   junior	   campaign	  partners	  may	  be	  elevated	  simply	  by	  campaigning	  alongside	  a	  more	  experienced	  candidate.	  Considering	  this,	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  behavioural	  patterns	  of	  candidates	  standing	  in	  different	  district	  magnitudes	  may	  be	  required.	  For	  this	  reason	  we	   can	   remain	   slightly	   sceptical	   about	   the	   SIP	  measure	   and	   follow	   up	  these	  results	  with	   further	  research	   into	  the	  effect	  of	  campaigning	   in	  groups.	  As	  there	   are	   few	   examples	   in	   the	   literature	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   campaigning	   in	  multimember	   as	   opposed	   to	   single	   member	   districts,	   one	   could	   turn	   to	   the	  research	  on	  women’s	  electoral	  fortunes	  in	  multimember	  districts	  as	  a	  framework	  for	   further	   investigation.	   Though	   most	   authors	   discount	   any	   notion	   of	  multimember	   campaigns	   improving	   women’s	   chances	   of	   electoral	   success	  (Studlar	   &	   Welch,	   1991),	   these	   studies	   may	   help	   to	   establish	   the	   model’s	  accuracy	   by	   assessing	   if	   there	   are	   any	   ‘coattails’	   effects	   dampening	   the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  SIP	  measure.	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SRS	   has	   also	   been	   an	   important	   indicator	   of	   the	   advantage	   associated	   with	  electoral	   defence,	   particularly	   as	   the	   data	   are	   directly	   comparable	   across	   the	  electoral	  cycle.	  However,	  the	  results	  may	  not	  be	  a	  wholly	  accurate	  estimation	  as	  the	  controlling	  element	  of	  the	  model	  (denominated	  by	  j,	  see	  chapter	  3	  for	  detail)	  is	   composed	  of	   freshman-­‐to-­‐freshman,	   incumbent-­‐to-­‐incumbent	   and	   freshman-­‐to-­‐incumbent	  electoral	  cycles	  for	  comparison.	  As	  has	  already	  been	  demonstrated	  in	   this	   thesis,	   incumbents	   are	   likely	   to	   accrue	   votes	   over	   their	   tenure.	  Considering	   this,	   the	   output	   for	   the	   controlling	   element	   of	   the	   model	   may	  indicate	  a	  higher	  relative	  vote	  share	  if	  there	  is	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  incumbent-­‐to-­‐incumbent	  cycles,	  ultimately	  giving	  an	  inaccurate	  value	  of	  the	  slump.	  	  Regarding	   incumbency	   data;	   as	   noted	   in	   chapter	   4,	   a	   small	   portion	   of	   the	  incumbency	   information	   for	   candidates	   in	   the	   earliest	   years	   of	   the	   period	  was	  missing	  from	  the	  data	  provided.	  As	  such,	  this	  has	  given	  a	  misleading,	  though	  not	  entirely	   false,	   impression	   of	   a	   major	   increase	   in	   the	   number	   of	   incumbent	  candidates	   choosing	   to	   stand	   again.	   Although	   this	   has	   posed	   no	   real	  methodological	  problems	  for	  the	  analysis	  in	  this	  project,	  and	  this	  weakness	  has	  been	   discussed	   in	   the	   main	   body	   of	   text,	   it	   has	   limited	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  comments	   could	  be	  made	  about	   changes	   to	   stand	  again	   rates	   (SARs)	   in	   earlier	  years	  of	  the	  period	  examined.	  	  Finally,	   though	   data	   are	   considered	   throughout	   chapter	   4	   and	   sporadically	  throughout	   the	   thesis	  on	  a	  chronological	  basis,	   little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	   to	  the	  temporal	  variation	  of	  incumbency	  effects	  (i.e.	  most	  analysis	  has	  been	  cross-­‐sectional).	  There	  are	  two	  main	  reasons	  for	  this.	  The	  first	  is	  due	  to	  a	  simple	  lack	  of	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cases.	   Most	   of	   the	   methods	   used	   require	   a	   number	   of	   data	   points	   to	   create	   a	  single	   case	   and	   once	   the	   data	   are	   then	   subdivided	   just	   a	   couple	   of	   times,	   the	  number	   of	   cases	   for	   comparison	   can	   easily	   end	   up	   in	   the	   dozens	   rather	   than	  hundreds	   or	   thousands	   as	   they	   are	   in	   total.	   The	   second	   and	   perhaps	   most	  important	  motive	  is	  that	  examining	  the	  data	  in	  a	  cross-­‐sectional	  manner	  has	  the	  additional	  benefit	  of	  eliminating	  most	  of	   the	  cyclical	  variations	  within	  the	  data.	  Though	   neither	   of	   the	   methodological	   issues	   described	   above	   has	   posed	   any	  serious	  problems	  for	  the	  results	  discussed,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  they	  have	  been	   taken	   into	   consideration	   where	   relevant.	  	  Overall	   the	   findings	   from	   this	   thesis	   are	   clear.	   Incumbent	   candidates	   have	   a	  moderate	  yet	  significant	  advantage	  in	  English	  local	  elections.	  Different	  methods	  used	  have	  reached	  a	  consensus	  in	  their	  results	  and	  were	  supportive	  of	  much	  of	  the	   existing	   literature.	   Sub-­‐chapter	   9.1	   goes	   on	   to	   review	   those	   noteworthy	  findings,	  detailing	   their	   relevance	  and	  offering	  suggestions	   for	   further	  research	  where	  appropriate.	  The	  section	  includes	  not	  only	  figures	  in	  the	  results	  chapters	  of	  this	  thesis,	  but	  also	  their	  broad	  implications	  to	  the	  field.	  	  9.1	  –	  Findings	  &	  Further	  Research	  Section	   9.1	   describes	   some	   of	   the	   major	   findings	   from	   the	   results	   chapters	  (chapters	  4	  –	  8).	  The	  discussions	  are	  divided	  into	  a	  collection	  of	  broad	  themes,	  which	   encompass	   noteworthy	   electoral	   consequences	   and	   detail	   how	   they	   fit	  into	   the	   narrative	   outlined	   by	   pre-­‐existing	   literature.	   Suggestions	   for	   further	  research	  are	  detailed	  where	  appropriate.	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Trends	  -­‐	  Chapter	  4	  has	  outlined	  broad	  trends	  in	  English	  local	  elections	  and	  how	  successful	  incumbent	  candidates	  have	  been	  since	  reorganisation.	  Local	  elections	  have	   become	   increasingly	   competitive	   over	   the	   period.	   Seat	   competition	   has	  been	   on	   the	   rise,	   for	   all	   types	   of	   authority	   and	   this	   has	   altered	   the	   climate	   in	  which	  councillors	  go	  on	  to	  defend	  their	  seats.	  A	  major	  consequence	  has	  been	  a	  reduction	   in	   the	   share	   of	   the	   vote	   required	   to	   win	   a	   seat	   under	   a	   plurality	  electoral	  system.	  The	  emergence	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  has	  undoubtedly	  had	  an	   impact	   on	   English	   local	   elections.	   However,	   the	   rise	   in	   the	   number	   of	  independent	   and	  minor	   party	   candidates	   (classified	   as	   Others	   throughout	   this	  thesis)	  will	  also	  have	  contributed	   to	   the	  reduction	   in	   the	  average	  vote	  share	  of	  winners,	  particularly	  in	  recent	  years.	  	  From	   chapter	   4	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   incumbents	   have	   been	   very	   successful	   in	   their	  attempts	  to	  return	  to	  the	  council,	  and	  this	  level	  of	  success	  has	  been	  maintained	  over	   the	   entire	   period,	   despite	   the	   rise	   in	   competition	   for	   seats.	   The	   data	   in	  chapter	  4	   indicate	   that	   the	  growth	   in	   the	  number	  of	  Other	  candidates	  standing	  has	   had	   little	   effect	   on	   the	   overall	   success	   of	   councillors	   wishing	   to	   return.	   It	  showed	  that	  the	  number	  choosing	  to	  defend	  their	  seat	  on	  the	  council	  (SAR)	  has	  risen.	  When	  we	   couple	   these	   findings	  with	   the	   continued	   success	   of	   returning	  councillors,	  the	  results	  illustrate	  a	  picture	  of	  stagnation	  within	  local	  government.	  Considering	   this,	   it	   is	   hardly	   surprising	   that	   the	   demographic	   of	   councils	   in	  England	  may	   have	   changed	   little	   over	   the	   period	   (Rallings	   &	   Thrasher,	   1997).	  This	  can	  be	  viewed	  in	  either	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  light.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  a	  degree	  of	  continuity	  in	  the	  governance	  of	  local	  communities.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	   is	   little	   opportunity	   to	   alter	   what	   Rallings	   &	   Thrasher	   describe	   as	   the	  
	   355	  
“male,	  pale	  and	  stale”	  composition	  of	  English	  local	  councils	  (Thrasher	  et	  al,	  2013,	  p.	  286).	  	  Overall,	  the	  results	  suggest	  that	  incumbents	  do	  well,	  particularly	  when	  compared	  to	   freshmen,	   but	   there	   are	   issues	  with	   the	   nature	   of	  many	   of	   the	   comparisons	  described	  that	  limit	  the	  scope	  for	  generalisation	  from	  data	  in	  this	  chapter.	  There	  are,	  for	  instance,	  differences	  in	  political	  partisanship	  within	  and	  across	  many	  of	  the	   aggregations	   presented.	   These	   prove	   problematic	   for	   the	   inference	   of	   a	  distinct	   advantage	   for	   incumbents,	   rather	   than	   partisan	   differences.	   There	   are	  dangers	  of	  endogenous	   influences	  on	  the	  performance	  of	   incumbents	   that	   limit	  the	  scope	  for	  speculation.	  For	  instance,	  the	  improved	  performance	  of	  incumbent	  candidates	  may	  be	  due,	   in	  part,	   to	   the	  established	  success	  of	   the	  party	   that	   the	  incumbent	   candidate	  belongs	   to,	   i.e.	   the	   candidate	  has	   already	  demonstrated	   a	  significant	   base	   of	   electoral	   support	   simply	   by	   challenging	   as	   an	   incumbent,	  compared	   to	   the	   many	   other	   candidates	   who	   will	   not	   have	   the	   same	   level	   of	  established	  support.	  However,	  as	  a	  scene-­‐setting	  chapter,	  the	  data	  discussed	  has	  provided	   sufficient	   information	   to	   give	   readers	   a	   comprehensive	   overview	   of	  local	  election	  trends	  in	  England	  since	  its	  reorganisation.	  	  
Measures	  of	  Incumbency	  Advantage	  -­‐	  The	  objective	  of	  chapter	  5	  was	  to	  establish	  the	  presence	  and	  magnitude	  of	  any	  electoral	  advantage	  associated	  with	  standing	  as	   an	   incumbent	   candidate	   in	   England,	   and	   so	   the	   chapter	   presented	   five	  methods	  enabling	  us	  to	  estimate	  any	  effect.	  The	  results	  from	  all	  these	  measures	  provided	  strong	  evidence	  for	  the	  notion	  of	  advantaged	  incumbents.	  The	  chapter	  began	  by	  examining	  simple	  differences	   in	  the	  share	  of	  votes	  for	   incumbent	  and	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freshmen	   winners.	   The	   data	   show	   that	   incumbents	   do	   better	   consistently	  throughout	  the	  period.	  For	  all	  parties,	  incumbent	  candidates	  received	  markedly	  higher	   vote	   shares	   than	   their	   freshmen	   counterparts.	   Noting	   some	   of	   the	  methodological	   issues	   of	   measuring	   incumbency	   advantage	   in	   this	   way,	   the	  chapter	   then	  went	   on	   to	   present	   constructed	  models	   for	   the	   estimation	   of	   the	  effects.	  	  The	   Standardised	   Incumbent	   Performance	   (SIP)	   measure	   showed	   that	  incumbents	   significantly	  outperformed	   their	   freshmen	  colleagues.	  As	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3,	  the	  selection	  criteria	  for	  the	  model	  ensures	  an	  unbiased	  estimation	  of	   incumbency	   effects,	   results	   are	   not	   biased	   by	   partisan	   swing.	   SIP	   for	  incumbent	  winners	  between	  1974	  and	  2010	  was	  estimated	  to	  be	  moderate	  yet	  significant,	   averaging	   2.7%,	   with	   some	   differences	   between	   the	   parties.	   In	   an	  attempt	  to	  implement	  some	  of	  the	  relevant	  theory,	  chapter	  5	  discussed	  estimates	  of	   a	   ‘surge’	   in	   English	   local	   elections.	   The	   results	   support	   the	   existence	   of	   a	  Sophomore	   Surge,	   estimating	   it	   at	   around	   2.2%,	  with	   some	   variation	   between	  the	   parties.	   The	   major	   implication	   from	   these	   findings	   is	   that	   the	   advantage	  associated	  with	  incumbency	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  an	  immediate	  impact	  on	  candidate	  performance.	  In	  addition,	  this	  impact	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  major	  contribution	  to	  the	  overall	  effect	  for	  all	  parties.	  Thus,	  for	  all	  three	  parties	  the	  ‘surge’	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  important	  point	  in	  the	  electoral	  trajectory	  of	  a	  councillors’	  political	  career.	  Data	  analysis	   also	   revealed	   that	   more	   than	   3,400	   councillors	   (for	   the	   three	   major	  parties)	  may	  have	  been	  elected	  due	   to	   the	   electoral	   advantage	   associated	  with	  their	  incumbency	  over	  the	  period	  examined	  (Con	  =	  1,166,	  Lab	  =	  1,271,	  LD=	  986,	  see	  chapter	  5).	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  Another	  model	  presented	  in	  chapter	  5	  was	  the	  Standardised	  Retirement	  Slump	  (SRS)	  estimator,	  which	  focused	  on	  comparing	  retirees	  with	  freshmen	  candidates	  in	  safe	  partisan	  seats.	  Drawing	  on	  and	  adapting	  methods	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  retirement	  slump	  methods	  of	  estimating	  incumbency	  advantage	  (established	  in	  chapter	  2),	  section	  5.3	  presented	  an	  unbiased	  model	  to	  estimate	  the	  advantage	  of	   incumbency	   to	   local	   parties.	   The	   results	   showed	   that	   safe	   seats	   held	   by	   the	  party	  after	  a	  councillor	  decides	  to	  retire,	  experience	  an	  electoral	  ‘slump’.	  Average	  SRS	   was	   2%	   over	   the	   period,	   with	   similar	   variations	   in	   results	   between	   the	  parties.	   As	   for	   SIP	   estimates,	   the	   results	   for	   the	   SRS	   model	   have	   a	   couple	   of	  implications	   for	   notions	   of	   incumbency	   advantage.	   First,	   the	   data	   for	   SRS	  corroborated	   the	   results	   for	   the	   SIP	   model,	   which	   serves	   to	   strengthen	  conclusions	   from	  both.	   Confidence	   should	   come	   from	   the	   knowledge	   that	   data	  inputted	  into	  these	  models	  differ	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  selection	  criteria	  and	  the	  way	  they	  are	  used	  in	  the	  model.	  Second,	  the	  SIP	  measure	  examines	  differences	  in	  the	   share	   of	   votes	   in	  multimember	  districts	   (MMDs),	  whereas	   the	   SRS	  method	  measures	  incumbency	  advantage	  in	  single	  member	  districts	  (SMDs),	  a	  task	  that	  has	  proved	  methodologically	  difficult	  in	  the	  past.	  	  This	   thesis	   presented	   two	   further	  models	   for	   the	  measurement	   of	   incumbency	  effects.	  Sub-­‐chapter	  5.5	  focused	  primarily	  on	  estimating	  the	  effect	  of	  incumbency	  in	  scenarios	  where	  incumbents	  are	  unsuccessful.	  The	  models	  not	  only	  provided	  the	   project	   with	   two	   alternative	   ways	   of	   estimating	   the	   performance	   of	  defending	   councillors,	   but	   also	   an	   opportunity	   to	   utilise	   data	   previously	  discounted.	   The	   two	   different	   methods,	   Role	   Reversal	   Incumbent	   Loser	  
	  358	  
Performance	   (RRILP)	   and	   Experienced	   Partner	   Incumbent	   Loser	   Performance	  (EPILP),	   represent	   two	   slightly	   different	   conditions,	   and	   although	   these	  estimations	  were	   larger	   than	   those	  described	  by	   SIP	   and	   SRS	  methods,	   results	  remain	   broadly	   in	   line.	   Estimations	   of	   incumbency	   advantage	   in	   scenarios	   of	  electoral	  loss	  are	  6.6%	  and	  6.4%	  for	  RRILP	  and	  EPILP	  models	  respectively.	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  SIP	  and	  SRS	  estimations	  and	  these	  models	  may	  also	  tell	  us	   something	   more	   about	   the	   effects	   of	   incumbency,	   namely	   that	   the	   gap	  between	  incumbents	  and	  freshmen	  is	  even	  wider	   in	  scenarios	  of	   loss.	  Again,	  as	  for	  previous	  models	  there	  are	  variations	  in	  average	  RRILP	  and	  EPILP	  estimates	  between	  the	  parties,	  and	  these	  differences	  follow	  previously	  established	  trends	  using	  both	  SIP	  and	  SRS	  estimations.	  	  
Experience	   effects	   -­‐	  Also	   analysed	   in	   chapter	   5,	   was	   the	   effect	   of	   a	   candidate’s	  experience.	   The	   section	   showed	   that	   as	   incumbent	   candidates’	   experience	  increases,	   so	   too	   does	   their	   electoral	   performance.	   After	   describing	   candidate	  career	   trends,	   a	   method	   borrowed	   from	   Stonecash	   (2008),	   sub-­‐chapter	   5.4	  utilised	   the	   SIP	   and	   SRS	   measures	   modelled	   earlier	   in	   the	   chapter.	   For	   both	  measures,	   results	   showed	   a	   gradual	   increase	   in	   the	   average	   advantage	   of	  candidates,	   broadly	   in	   line	   with	   their	   length	   of	   service	   on	   the	   council.	   Longer	  serving	   incumbents	   tended	   do	   better	   than	   shorter	   serving	   ones.	   As	   previously	  established	   in	   the	  chapter,	   there	  were	  notable	  differences	   in	   the	  results	   for	   the	  parties.	  The	   trend	   for	   the	  Conservatives	   showed	   that	   in	   some	   instances	   longer	  serving	  Tories	  performed	  worse	  than	  relatively	  shorter	  serving	  ones.	  For	  Labour	  and	  the	  Lib	  Dems	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  experience	  was	  shown	  to	  have	  a	  significant	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effect	  on	  candidates’	  performance,	  with	   longer	  serving	   incumbents	  averaging	  a	  higher	  advantage	  than	  shorter	  serving	  ones.	  	  Another	  interesting	  facet	  of	  the	  results	  was	  the	  survey	  data	  presented	  in	  chapter	  8,	   which	   supported	   the	   notion	   of	   experience	   effects.	   It	   presented	   data	   from	  candidates	   in	   response	   to	   the	   statement;	   incumbents	   are	   more	   successful	  because	   they	   “have	  greater	  experience	  gained	  from	  working	  on	  the	  council”.	  The	  results	   for	   this	  question	  showed	   that	  all	   types	  of	   respondent	  were	   in	   favour	  of	  the	   notion	   of	   an	   incumbent’s	   experience	   affecting	   their	   chance	   of	   re-­‐election.	  77.6%	  either	  agreed	  or	  strongly	  agreed	  with	  the	  statement,	  roughly	  ten	  times	  the	  number	  who	  disagreed	  or	  strongly	  disagreed.	  In	  addition	  there	  were	  differences	  in	   responses	   between	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   and	   Freshmen/Serial	   Freshmen.	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  showed	  noticeable	  differences	  in	  both	  their	  attitude	  and	  behaviour.	  	  	  Results	   in	   this	   chapter	   also	   showed	   that	   there	  was	   a	   difference	   in	   the	   level	   of	  effort	   that	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   put	   into	   the	   electoral	   campaign	   when	  compared	  with	   to	   the	   other	   non-­‐incumbent	   categories.	   Experienced	   Freshmen	  were	  more	   likely	   to	   produce	   a	   campaign	   leaflet,	  more	   likely	   to	   deliver	   it	   to	   all	  addresses	  in	  the	  ward	  and	  campaigned	  for	  more	  hours	  a	  week	  on	  average	  than	  either	  Freshmen	  or	  Serial	  Freshmen.	   It	   is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	   the	  attitudinal	  results	   from	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   tended	   to	   lean	   towards,	   though	   remain	  distinct	  from,	  Incumbents.	  Responses	  to	  statements	  concerned	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  incumbency	  showed	  that	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  were	  perhaps	  more	  candid	  than	  Incumbents	   about	   any	   advantages	   associated	   with	   electoral	   defence.	   Even	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though	   both	   groups	   will	   have	   had	   some	   previous	   experience	   serving	   as	   a	  councillor,	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  Incumbents	  to	  play	  up	  the	  advantages.	  Consequently,	  their	  views	  may	  offer	  some	  crucial	  insight,	  as	  the	  reality	   is	   that	   in	   another	   electoral	   circumstance,	   Experienced	   Freshmen	   could	  have	  been	  answering	  the	  survey	  as	  an	  Incumbent.	  	  The	   results	   for	   the	   performance	   of	   incumbent	   candidates	   by	   their	   categorised	  experience	  have	  a	  number	  of	  implications	  for	  this	  thesis,	  namely	  that	  the	  effects	  of	   incumbency	  advantage	  may	  be	  cumulative.	  Consequently,	   it	   is	   in	  the	  interest	  of	   local	  parties,	  where	  possible,	   to	   retain	  more	  experienced	  candidates	  as	   they	  offer	  a	  greater	  opportunity	  to	  retain	  seats.	  On	  top	  of	  this	  the	  evidence	  suggests	  that	   in	   situations	  where	   a	   party	   is	   competing	   for	   a	   seat	  without	   an	   incumbent	  candidate,	   fielding	   a	   candidate	   with	   some	   previous	   experience	   as	   a	   councillor	  may	   give	   the	   party	   an	   improved	   chance	   of	   success.	   In	   light	   of	   the	   results	   for	  experience	   effects,	   further	   research	   into	   the	   performance	   of	   candidates	   of	  different	  electoral	  experience	  would	  throw	  light	  on	  the	  findings	  discussed	  in	  this	  thesis.	   Merging	   the	   electoral	   data	   and	   candidate	   survey	   data	   would	   enable	   a	  more	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   effects	   and	   allow	   the	   assessment	   of	   whether	  candidates’	   attitudes	   and	   behaviour	   may	   be	   influenced	   in	   some	   way	   by	   their	  electoral	  environment.	  	  
Administrative	   Effects	   –	   As	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   6,	   the	   differences	   in	   the	  administration	  of	  local	  elections	  (i.e.	  the	  number	  of	  candidates	  standing	  and	  the	  electoral	   cycle),	   provided	   mixed	   results	   for	   their	   influence	   on	   incumbency	  effects.	   Sub-­‐chapter	   6.1	   examined	   the	   effect	   of	   district	   magnitude	   on	   relative	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incumbent	  performance,	  and	  the	  findings	  show	  that	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  the	  level	  of	  advantage	  that	  incumbent	  candidates	  have	  over	  their	  competitors	  across	  the	  district	  magnitudes.	  The	  effect	  is	  measured	  in	  two	  ways;	  incumbent	  finishing	  positions	  and	  change	  in	  SIP.	  	  When	  examining	  districts	  contested	  by	  a	  lone	  incumbent,	  the	  evidence	  suggests	  that	  they	  will	  tend	  to	  finish	  in	  higher	  positions	  as	  district	  magnitude	  decreases.	  The	  chapter	  also	  discussed	  data	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  district	  magnitude	  on	  average	  SIP.	   The	   results	   showed	   that	   SIP	  was	   larger	   in	   2MDs	   than	   3MDs.	   There	  was	   a	  clear	   1.5%	   difference	   in	   SIP	   between	   the	   district	   magnitudes,	   though	   this	  estimate	  varies	  between	  each	  party.	  This	  result	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  scope	  for	  administrative	   aspects	   of	   local	   elections	   influencing	   the	   advantage	   of	  incumbents.	   Incumbents	   may	   find	   it	   easier	   to	   be	   re-­‐elected	   in	   smaller	  magnitudes,	  and	  this	  assertion	  is	  supported	  by	  existing	  literature	  on	  incumbency	  advantage	  (Cox	  &	  Morgenstern,	  1995).	  However,	   this	  may	  be	  worthy	  of	   further	  research.	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  a	  potential	  explanation	  for	  this	  phenomenon	  could	  be	  the	  practicalities	  of	  campaigning	  in	  groups.	  For	  example,	  we	  know	  from	  chapter	  8	  that	  Incumbents	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  help	  than	  freshmen	  and	  when	  they	  do	  have	  help,	   they	  have	  help	  for	   longer.	  Therefore,	  one	  can	  easily	   imagine	  that	   in	   single	   member	   districts,	   challengers	   may	   often	   find	   themselves	  campaigning	   with	   limited	   help,	   if	   not	   alone.	   Also	   the	   familiar	   face	   of	   an	  incumbent	  candidate	  may	  provide	  an	  advantage	  over	  less	  well	  known	  freshmen	  challengers.	   Conversely,	   in	   multimember	   districts,	   campaigning	   in	   groups	  provides	  freshmen	  challengers	  with	  a	  degree	  of	  psychological	  support,	  as	  well	  as	  an	   opportunity	   to	   pool	   their	   resources,	   such	   as	   sharing	   campaign	   leaflets	   and	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posters.	   Campaigning	   in	   groups	   can	   also	   lessen	   the	   burden	   of	   other	   campaign	  activities,	  such	  as	  door	  and	  telephone	  canvassing.	  Also,	  for	  those	  freshmen	  who	  campaign	  alongside	  a	   familiar	  councillor,	   there	  may	  be	   the	  added	  advantage	  of	  an	  accelerated	  rate	  of	  profile	  elevation,	  i.e.	  it	  may	  be	  easier	  to	  get	  to	  know	  voters	  that	  recognise	  your	  colleague,	  rather	  than	  campaigning	  as	  a	  relatively	  unknown	  personality.	  	  Finally,	  sub-­‐chapter	  6.2	  assessed	  the	  impact,	  or	  lack	  of	  impact,	  of	  electoral	  cycles	  on	  incumbent	  performance.	  It	  was	  hypothesised	  that	  the	  electoral	  cycle	  of	  a	  local	  government	   administration	   might	   influence	   the	   magnitude	   of	   an	   incumbent’s	  advantage,	   due	   to	   varying	   degrees	   of	   scrutiny	   of	   candidates	   in	   the	   different	  cycles.	   An	   assumption	  was	  made	   that	   incumbents	  may	   find	   it	   easier	   to	   defend	  their	   seat	   in	   an	   administrative	   cycle	   of	   elections	  by	   thirds,	  where	   according	   to	  Rallings,	   Thrasher	   &	   Borisyuk	   (2003),	   turnout	   is	   known	   to	   be	   lower	   than	   in	  quadrennial	   elections.	   The	   results	   from	   chapter	   6	   failed	   to	   support	   this	  assumption.	   Although	   incumbents	   consistently	   outperformed	   their	   freshmen	  counterparts	   for	   all	   three	   major	   parties,	   the	   evidence	   did	   not	   lend	   itself	   in	  support	  of	  an	  effect	  from	  the	  electoral	  cycle,	  whether	  thirds	  or	  quadrennial.	  	  
Structural	  Effects	  -­‐	  The	  structural	  factors	  affecting	  incumbent	  performance	  were	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  7.	  These	  factors	  included	  turnout,	  ward	  size	  and	  the	  urban	  classification	  of	  wards	  in	  England	  between	  1991	  and	  2010.	  The	  performance	  of	  incumbent	   candidates	   varied	   with	   changes	   in	   the	   structure	   of	   wards	   and	   this	  finding	  is	  critical	  as	   it	   implies	  that	  the	  connection	  incumbents	  have	  with	  voters	  will	   influence	   the	   advantage	   they	   have	   over	   their	   competitors.	   Incumbent	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candidates	  are	  net	   contributors	   to	   turnout,	   and	   small	   rural	   environments	  offer	  improved	  conditions	  for	  councillors	  to	  defend	  their	  seat	  on	  the	  council.	  	  Chapter	   7	   introduced	   another	   model	   for	   estimating	   incumbent	   effects,	   the	  Sophomore	  Turnout	  Surge	  (STS).	  This	  estimator	  is	  designed	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	   incumbency	  on	  ward-­‐level	   turnout.	   STS	  data	   showed	  an	   increase	   in	   turnout	  that	   was	   statistically	   significant	   over	   the	   freshmen-­‐sophomore	   electoral	   cycle.	  Though	  data	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  also	  showed	  growth,	  these	  results	  did	  not	  meet	  the	  required	  level	  of	  significance	  to	  be	  confident	  that	  there	  is	  a	  difference.	  The	   principal	   implication	   of	   these	   data	   is	   concerned	   with	   where	   incumbents	  accrue	  their	   ‘extra	  votes’.	  The	  data	  suggests	   that	   fielding	   incumbent	  candidates	  will	  contribute	  to	  the	  overall	  level	  of	  turnout,	  encouraging	  a	  small,	  yet	  significant	  number	  of	  people	  to	  vote	  who	  wouldn’t	  have	  otherwise.	  The	  STS	  model	  provides	  estimations	  of	  between	  30	  and	  65	  extra	  voters,	  depending	  on	  the	  party	  that	  the	  incumbent	  candidate	  stood	  for.	  	  Ward-­‐size	   effects	   were	   also	   described	   in	   chapter	   7.	   Using	   SIP	   data	   in	  multimember	  wards	  sub-­‐chapter	  7.2	  assesses	  the	  notion	  that	  smaller	  wards	  offer	  more	   favourable	   conditions	   for	   councillors	   to	   maintain	   their	   elected	   position.	  Dividing	   a	   broad	   spectrum	   of	   wards	   into	   groups	   based	   on	   the	   size	   of	   their	  electorate,	   the	   section	   provided	   evidence	   to	   show	   that	   SIP	   varied	   accordingly.	  The	  smaller	   the	  electorate,	   the	  greater	  an	   incumbent’s	  electoral	  advantage.	  For	  all	   three	  parties	   the	  data	  suggested	  that	  smaller	  wards	  averaged	  a	  significantly	  higher	   SIP,	   particularly	   wards	   that	   had	   an	   electorate	   below	   4,500	   voters.	  However,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   electorate	   mattered,	   differed	   between	   the	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parties.	  Tukey	  HSD	  tests	  confirmed	  that	  there	  was	  significant	  variation	  between	  groups	   for	   all	   the	   parties.	   These	   results	   were	   then	   qualified	   by	   assessing	   the	  difference	   in	   advantage	   in	   terms	   of	   votes	   cast	   rather	   than	   vote	   share.	   This	  produced	   a	   curious	   finding.	   For	   Labour	   and	   the	   Conservatives,	   almost	   all	   the	  difference	   across	   the	   electorate	   groups	   was	   eliminated,	   meaning	   that	   the	  advantage	   of	   25	   and	   30	   votes	   respectively,	   was	   more	   or	   less	   consistent	  throughout	  the	  electorate	  groups.	  For	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  the	  effect	  remained,	  but	  was	  dampened.	  The	  implication	  of	  these	  results	  was	  that	  wards	  with	  smaller	  electorates	   offered	  more	   favourable	   conditions.	  Not	   because	   incumbents	   knew	  or	   recruited	   more	   voters,	   but	   because	   the	   voter	   advantage	   they	   retained	   was	  worth	  more	  proportionally	  in	  smaller	  wards.	  	  Finally,	   urban-­‐effects	   were	   also	   detailed	   in	   chapter	   7.	   The	   analysis	   of	   urban-­‐effects	   supported	   previous	   assertions	   that	   rural	   communities	   foster	   better	  conditions	   for	   extended	   careers	   on	   councils.	   The	   data	   showed	   SIP	   to	   vary	  considerably	  over	   the	  ONS	  urban	  classifications.	  Though	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  showed	  the	  greatest	  effect	  from	  incumbency,	  in	  both	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas,	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  difference	  in	  urban	  and	  rural	  SIP,	  between	  2.1%	  and	  3.3%	  depending	  on	   the	   party.	   The	   data	   also	   showed	   that	   Labour	   incumbents	   were	   most	  susceptible	   to	   the	   urban-­‐effect,	   with	   an	   Urban-­‐Effects	   Coefficient	   of	   1.71,	  compared	   to	   just	  1.1	   for	   the	  Conservatives	  and	  1.04	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  These	  results	  not	  only	  suggested	  that	  incumbency	  effects	  were	  stronger	  in	  rural	  areas,	  but	  that	  there	  was	  something	  about	  rural	  elections	  that	  strengthened	  the	  effect	   for	   all	   three	  parties	   examined.	  Rural	   voters	  were	  perhaps	  more	   likely	   to	  know	   the	   incumbent	   candidate,	   or	   there	   may	   have	   been	   something	   different	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about	   the	   way	   rural	   campaigns	   were	   conducted	   that	   inhibited	   any	   ‘coattails’	  effect	  for	  incoming	  freshmen.	  	  
Attitudinal	  &	  Behavioural	  Evidence	  -­‐	  In	  chapter	  8,	  evidence	  was	  used	  to	  illustrate	  the	  attitudes	  of	  candidates	  towards	  a	  set	  of	  statements	  on	  the	  potential	  sources	  of	   incumbency	  advantage.	  The	   chapter	   also	  utilised	   information	  on	   candidate’s	  behaviour	   during	   electoral	   campaigns.	   Results	   from	   both	   these	   sets	   of	   data	  suggested	  that	  all	  candidates,	  including	  councillors	  themselves,	  felt	  not	  only	  that	  incumbents	  were	  advantaged	   for	  a	  variety	  of	   reasons,	  but	  also	   that	   councillors	  were	   better	   campaigners,	   putting	   more	   effort	   into	   the	   campaign	   period	   than	  their	  competitors.	  	  Respondents	   from	   all	   four	   experience	   categories	   (Incumbents,	   Freshmen,	  Experienced	  Freshmen	  &	  Serial	  Freshmen)	  expressed	  agreement	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  an	   incumbency	  effect.	   In	  section	  8.1,	  data	   from	  three	  of	   the	  questions	  put	   to	  candidates	  concerning	  the	  effect	  of	  incumbency	  were	  presented.	  For	  all	  types	  of	  candidate,	  the	  response	  was	  considerably	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  advantaged	  incumbents	  (64%),	  as	  were	  the	  results	  for	  incumbents	  having	  greater	  experience	  (77.6%)	  and	  having	  consistent	  and	  reliable	  support	  from	  residents	  (65.2%).	  The	  data	   in	   sub-­‐chapter	   8.1	   was	   supportive	   of	   existing	   literature	   on	   the	   effects	   of	  candidate	  quality	  in	  elections.	  The	  results	  implied	  that	  a	  candidate’s	  experience	  may	  have	  been	  a	   cue	   for	  voters	  and	  provided	  meagre	  evidence	   in	   support	  of	  a	  ‘scare-­‐off’	  effect	  (Levitt	  &	  Wolfram,	  1997;	  Carson	  et	  al,	  2007).	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Also	   discussed	   in	   chapter	   8,	  were	   data	   on	   the	   profile	   of	   incumbent	   candidates	  and	   their	   relationship	  with	   the	   local	  media.	  Results	   in	   sub-­‐chapter	   8.2	   implied	  that	   respondents	   felt	   incumbent	   candidates	  enjoyed	  “a	  higher	  local	  profile	  than	  
their	   challengers”,	   with	   over	   90%	   of	   respondents	   supporting	   the	   statement	   to	  some	   degree.	   For	   this	   question	   in	   particular	   there	   was	   a	   sense	   of	   conviction	  amongst	  all	  types	  of	  respondent,	  as	  the	  number	  of	  neutral	  responses	  was	  small.	  The	   similarity	   of	   responses	   across	   all	   respondent	   experience	   groups,	   also	  suggested	   that	  we	   could	  be	   confident	   in	   the	   result.	   In	   addition,	   the	  majority	  of	  respondents	   felt	   that	   incumbents	   were	   in	   some	  way	   advantaged	   because	   of	   a	  
“stronger	   relationship	   with	   the	   local	   media”	   (65.2%).	   The	   implication	   of	   these	  findings	  was	   that	   candidates	   felt	   that	   there	  was	   a	   clear	   systemic	   advantage	   to	  incumbency.	   As	   detailed	   in	   chapter	   2	   of	   this	   thesis,	   councillors	   can	   and	   did	  regularly	   feature	   in	   local	   media,	   especially	   those	   with	   special	   responsibilities.	  Councillors	  were	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  had	  greater	  access	  to	  the	  local	  media	  than	  their	  potential	  challengers,	  particularly	  during	  the	  midterm.	  However,	  there	  were	  significant	  methodological	  issues	  to	  consider	  in	  measuring	  such	  an	  effect.	  	  The	   data	   described	   in	   sub-­‐chapter	   8.3	   also	   supported	   incumbency	   effects,	  describing	  results	  on	  the	  efficacy	  of	  incumbent	  electoral	  campaigns.	  Two	  sets	  of	  data	   from	   the	   statements	   put	   to	   survey	   respondents	   were	   discussed	   in	   this	  section,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   variety	   of	   data	   on	   the	   behaviour	   of	   survey	   respondents.	  Results	  from	  all	  experience	  groups	  suggested	  that	  they	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  not	  to	   agree	   that	   incumbents	   “put	   more	   effort	   into	   their	   re-­‐election	   campaigns”	  (46.7%).	   This	   was	   almost	   twice	   the	   number	   who	   disagreed.	   The	   result	   was	  surprising	   as	   it	  was	   in	   effect	   an	   admission	   from	  non-­‐incumbents	   that	   they	  did	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not	  measure	   up	   to	   incumbents	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   campaign	   efforts.	   The	   results	  were	  then	  corroborated	  by	  behavioural	  data	  in	  sub-­‐chapter	  8.3,	  which	  indicated	  that	  incumbents	  were	  indeed	  harder	  workers.	  Incumbents	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  others	   to	   produce	   a	   campaign	   leaflet	   for	   distribution	   (95.3%).	  When	   they	   did	  produce	  a	  campaign	  leaflet	  they	  were	  more	  likely	  than	  other	  groups	  to	  deliver	  it	  to	   all	   addresses	   in	   their	  ward	   (94.2%).	  Results	   in	   section	  8.3	  also	   showed	   that	  incumbents	  put	  in	  significantly	  more	  weekly	  campaign	  hours,	  particularly	  when	  compared	   to	   those	   freshmen	   with	   no	   previous	   experience	   as	   a	   councillor.	  Evidence	   was	   also	   presented	   to	   show	   that	   incumbent	   candidates	   had	  considerably	  more	   help	   than	   non-­‐incumbents	   during	   the	   campaign,	   both	   from	  the	  attitudinal	  and	  the	  behavioural	  data.	  There	  was	  evidence	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  support	  the	  notion	  of	  incumbents	  as	  skilled	  campaigners	  (Zaller,	  1998).	  	  	  This	  is	  another	  potentially	  interesting	  area	  for	  further	  research.	  The	  survey	  data	  obtained	  from	  The	  Elections	  Centre	  contains	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  information	  on	  the	  behaviour	   of	   candidates’	   during	   the	   campaign.	   	   This	   information	  would	   be	   an	  excellent	   resource	   for	   further	   detailed	   investigation	   into	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  electoral	  campaigns.	  	  
The	  Liberal	  Democrats	  –	  The	  reoccurrence	  of	  party	  differences	  was	  a	  consistent	  theme	  throughout	  the	  results	  presented	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  arrival	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	   has	   culminated	   in	   the	   party	   being	   a	   well-­‐established	   force	   in	   local	  government,	  and	  although	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  reached	  their	  peak,	  in	  terms	  of	  local	   authority	   control,	   in	   the	  mid-­‐1990s,	   the	   effect	   of	   their	   advance	   coincided	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  ‘hung	  councils’	  in	  England.	  The	  consequence	  of	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this	   is	   that	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats	   quickly	   found	   themselves	   thrust	   into	   key	  decision-­‐making	  roles	  and	  responsibilities.	  Even	  with	  just	  a	  few	  councillors,	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  have	  had	  plenty	  of	  scope	  to	  establish	  a	  proven	  record	  on	  the	  council	  through	  coalition	  and	  cooperation.	  Thus	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  has	  been	  more	  pervasive	  than	  first	  meets	  the	  eye.	  	  Building	  on	  the	  general	  trends	  established	  for	  the	  party	  in	  chapter	  4,	  estimations	  of	  incumbency	  advantage	  for	  all	  five	  methods	  used	  in	  chapter	  5	  showed	  that	  the	  results	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	   far	  exceeded	   those	   for	   the	  Conservatives	  and	  Labour.	   The	   results	   for	   the	   classified	   experience	   groups	   also	   implied	   that	  incumbency	  was	  of	  greater	  relative	  value	  for	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  The	  data	  in	  chapter	   6	   showed	   that	   district	  magnitude	   reduced	   SIP	   estimations,	   but	   it	   also	  showed	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  continued	  to	  do	  best	  between	  the	  parties,	  despite	  SIP	  results	  in	  both	  the	  2MDS	  and	  3MDs	  being	  in	  decline.	  Chapter	  7	  showed	  that	  Liberal	   Democrat	   incumbents	   tended	   to	   do	   best,	   relatively,	   across	   all	   sizes	   of	  ward,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  vote	  share	  and	  the	  number	  of	  votes	  cast.	  	  There	   is	  an	  abundance	  of	   literature	  on	   the	  success	  of	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	   in	  local	   elections	   helping	   to	   secure	   the	   party’s	   political	   future.	   As	   Russell	   &	  Fieldhouse	  (2005)	  confirm,	  strong	   local	  election	  performances	  during	  the	  early	  1990s	  have	  proved	  a	  crucial	  component	  in	  the	  party’s	  progress	  and	  how	  quickly	  their	   local	   successes	   have	   been	   converted	   into	   national	   gains.	   Rallings	   &	  Thrasher	  also	  note	  that	  the	  party	  has	  employed	  a	  sophisticated	  electoral	  strategy	  since	  their	  emergence.	  	  
	   369	  
“From	   the	   beginning	   the	   party	   became	   more	   selective	   about	   which	   local	   wards	  
were	  contested.	  In	  the	  early	  years	  the	  pattern	  of	  contestation	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  a	  
definable	  electoral	  strategy	  and	  rather	  more	  to	  do	  with	  scarce	  resources	  in	  terms	  
of	   both	   finance	  and	  members.	   In	   recent	   years	   the	   party	   appears	   to	   have	  made	  a	  
conscious	  decision	  to	  focus	  its	  campaigning	  strength	  in	  areas	  where	  other	  parties,	  
chiefly	  but	  not	  exclusively	  the	  Conservatives	  have	  shown	  vulnerability”	  	  (Rallings	  &	  Thrasher	  in	  MacIver,	  1996,	  pp.	  214)	  	  For	   the	   Liberal	   Democrats,	   the	   ambition	   for	   success	   in	   local	   government	  elections	   has	   been	   driven	   in	   part	   by	   the	   party’s	   overall	   electoral	   philosophy,	  what	  David	  Cutts	  defines	  as	  a	  ‘where	  we	  work,	  we	  win’	  strategy.	  When	  the	  party	  wins	   more	   seats	   in	   these	   targeted	   areas	   and	   gains	   control,	   or	   at	   least	   partial	  control	  of	  local	  councils,	  the	  party	  can	  build	  an	  electoral	  credibility	  that	  extends	  both	   the	   political	   future	   of	   the	   party	   and	   its	   reputation	   (Cutts,	   2006,	   pp.221).	  This	  reputation	  has	  been	  critical	  in	  establishing	  their	  national	  presence,	  much	  of	  which	   has	   been	   built	   around	   their	   local	   electoral	   successes.	   The	   results	  presented	   in	  this	  thesis	  are	   in	   line	  with	  the	  established	  research	  on	  the	  Liberal	  Democrats’,	   confirming	  an	  electoral	   strategy	   that	  depends	  on	   the	  success	  of	   its	  councillors	  (Johnston	  &	  Pattie,	  1997;	  Dorling	  et	  al,	  1998;	  McAllister	  et	  al,	  2002	  &	  Cutts,	  2006).	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  localism	  is	  an	  embedded	  part	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Democrat	  campaign	  as	  it	   has	   driven	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   party’s	   success	   and	   popularity	   in	   local	  government	   is	   crucial	   in	  making	  national	  gains.	  Successfully	   identifying	   the	  so-­‐called	   ‘Liberal	   Heartlands’	   (McAllister	   et	   al,	   2002),	   strong	   campaigning	   and	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developing	   a	   positive	   reputation	   for	   successful	   local	   governance	   are	   the	   key	  components	   in	   the	   efficacy	   of	   the	   Liberal	   Democrat	   local	   campaign.	   In	   light	   of	  this,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	  notion	  of	   an	   incumbency	  effect	   is	   central	   to	   the	  party’s	  ability	   to	   grow,	   utilising	   popular	   personalities	   or	   strong	   campaigners	   in	   local	  politics	  to	  retain	  and	  build	  support.	  This	  is	  a	  facet	  of	  the	  data	  that	  will	  certainly	  require	  further	  investigation.	  	  The	  findings	  from	  this	  project	  are	  clear.	  Incumbent	  councillors	  have	  a	  modest	  yet	  significant	   advantage	   in	   local	   elections.	   A	   variety	   of	  methods	   used	   throughout	  this	  thesis	  have	  formed	  a	  consensus	  in	  their	  results	  and	  provides	  the	  project	  with	  convincing	  evidence	   in	   support	  of	  both	  a	  number	  of	   influences	  on	   the	  effect	  of	  incumbency,	  and	  prospective	  explanations	  for	  the	  phenomenon.	  The	  findings	  are	  supportive	   of	  much	   of	   the	   existing	   literature,	   though	   it	  must	   be	   said	   that	   very	  little	  research	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  English	  case,	  particularly	  at	  the	  local	   level.	  For	   all	   parties	   considered,	   the	   data	   show	   that	   electoral	   defence	   is	   a	   relatively	  advantageous	   position,	   particularly	   for	   more	   experienced	   candidates	   and	  especially	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats.	  The	  results	   for	   the	  Liberal	  Democrats	  are	  striking,	  partly	  because	  they	  fit	  well	  with	  established	  research	  on	  the	  campaign	  strategy	  of	  the	  party	  at	  local	  elections,	  but	  also	  because	  they	  imply	  that	  different	  electoral	  strategies	  may	  yield	  different	  results.	   In	   its	  entirety,	   this	   thesis	  serves	  as	  a	  useful	  foundation	  on	  which	  to	  explore	  various	  avenues	  for	  further	  research	  into	  the	  electoral	  connection	  between	  voters	  and	  candidates.	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